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Chemical contamination, whether from deliberate or accidental release of harmful 
chemicals, continues to pose a risk to public health. The 2018 Novichok release in 
Wiltshire, UK highlights the need to protect the UK civilian population from future 
chemical contamination incidents. Casualties of chemical contamination need to be 
decontaminated as soon as possible both to prevent or reduce the extent of adverse 
health outcomes for the casualties themselves and to reduce the risk that other people 
will be exposed to the chemical. 
In the UK, the Initial Operational Response (IOR) protocol was implemented to address 
the need for fast, early decontamination. It is essentially first aid for chemical 
contamination. IOR involves casualties evacuating from the area in which the chemical 
was released, removing contaminated clothing (disrobing), then applying either water 
or dry, absorbent materials, depending on whether the chemical is known to be caustic.  
IOR places a lot of responsibility on casualties. They are required to carry out their own 
decontamination within a short space of time. IOR also places a lot of responsibility on 
first responders who, in addition to all other aspects of the decontamination process, 
need to get casualties to adhere to this protocol. This is challenging for several 
reasons. First, people do not necessarily know that they are contaminated because not 
all hazardous chemicals result in immediate symptoms on contact. Second, even if 
people do know that they are contaminated, findings from this thesis and previous 
studies indicate that not all aspects of IOR are necessarily intuitive to casualties. Third, 
first responders are competing for casualties’ attention with other, potentially more 
intuitive courses of action, such as presenting at a hospital, which may result in 
contamination of hospital staff and patients. 
The aim of this PhD was to determine how first responders should communicate with 
casualties to ensure that casualties adhere to the IOR protocol, particularly when the 
risk of chemical exposure is ambiguous due to a delayed onset of symptoms.  
I based the development of a preliminary communication strategy on: a review of the 
crisis communication literature; a systematic review of the effect of communication on 
casualty behaviour in mass casualty emergencies; a qualitative study on how first 
responders currently communicate with casualties during incidents that require 
decontamination; and an assessment of lay public perspectives on chemical 
contamination and decontamination. Findings from these studies indicated that, at a 
minimum, responders need to provide casualties with: practical instructions for 
undergoing IOR; contextual information about first responders’ expertise in 
decontamination; and updates about actions responders are taking to treat casualties. I 
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drafted messages that contained this information but varied according to how the threat 
of contamination was conveyed and whether the effectiveness of IOR was made clear. 
Messages were tested in an experiment in which participants observed a chemical 
release scenario in the form of an immersive virtual reality video. The final 
communication intervention was based on the outcome of these studies. 
The main academic contribution of this PhD was the finding that explicitly addressing 
the threat facing casualties made study participants more likely to expect themselves to 
remove contaminated clothing in a real incident, whilst explicitly addressing the efficacy 
of dry decontamination made participants more likely to expect themselves to perform 
dry decontamination. This outcome serves as a useful addition to the wider behaviour 
change literature on the processing of fear-arousing information. 
In terms of practical impact, scripts based on the evidence gathered in this thesis will 
be finalised and disseminated to UK frontline responders and control room operators 
by the UK Home Office National Resilience Policy Team. The intention for the script is 
to serve as the basis for evidence-based communication training. 
Based on the studies within this thesis, the key finding to include in this training is that 
people responding to a chemical incident should not shy away from telling the truth. If 
people need to take action, they first need to know that they are in danger and that 
decontamination is the means to resolving that danger. This evidence-based principle 
should support the ongoing cultural shift from control to engagement in the relationship 
between emergency responders and the community in which they work.
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I developed the design for all studies reported in this thesis, with input from my 
supervisors and from members of the following panels attached to the PHOENIX 
project: public advisory panel, end user panel (consisting of emergency response 
practitioners), and technical advisory group (consisting of decontamination experts and 
UK government policy advisors). I wrote and submitted applications for ethical approval 
for all studies and I wrote and submitted the two protocols for the studies in Chapters 3 
and 8, with input from supervisors. I recruited participants for all studies. My co-
supervisor contributed to the identification of sources of recruitment for the interview 
study in Chapter 4. The immersive video used in the study in Chapter 8 was directed 
by Dependable Productions. I managed the logistics of recording, e.g. recruiting the 
cast and securing a filming location, and played an auxiliary role in directing on the day. 
Two of my supervisors and two police officers contributed to production on the day. 
Post-production of the videos was carried out by Dependable Productions with input 
from me. 
I collected data for all studies and devised the randomisation and allocation 
concealment procedures for the study in Chapter 8. For this study, each of my 
supervisors contributed to randomisation and allocation concealment so that I 
remained blind to condition at the point of intervention and analysis. I carried out data 
analysis for all studies. For the quantitative studies (Chapters 7 and 8), I consulted with 
the Biostatistics and Health Informatics Advisory Service and Psychometric and 
Measurement Lab at King’s College London. 
For the systematic review (Chapter 3), I consulted with the Public Health England 
library service at the Porton centre during the development of the search strategy. 
I drafted each of the chapters and, sent them to my supervisors for their comments 
then revised the chapters based on their feedback.
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Chapter 1 Communication during the Initial Operational 
Response (IOR) to mass casualty chemical incidents: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Large-scale Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks are 
identified in the UK’s 2017 National Risk Register as a medium-low probability, but high 
impact risk to the UK civilian population (Cabinet Office, 2017, p. 10). Chemical 
incidents, defined as events involving exposure to chemicals with potentially adverse 
health effects (Clarke et al., 2008), pose a threat to public health that necessitates the 
development of effective countermeasures, in accordance with the Prepare strand of 
the UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy (Home Office, 2011). A critical early 
intervention in the response to chemical incidents is decontamination; the process of 
removing hazardous substances from a contaminated person to reduce or prevent 
adverse health outcomes. The Initial Operational Response (IOR) programme, 
introduced in the UK in 2013, equips non-specialist first responders such as Police, 
Fire and Ambulance Services with protocols for pre-hospital decontamination.  These 
steps are a precursor to specialist decontamination with purpose-built showering 
facilities and consist of ambulant casualties evacuating from the chemical release 
location (or ‘hot zone’), removing outer clothing, and self-decontaminating with either 
absorbent materials such as blue roll or dressings, or with available clean water if the 
chemical is known to be caustic. Communication of instructions and advice from 
emergency responders to casualties is integral to the successful execution of these 
tasks in a mass casualty context.   
Decontamination, particularly IOR, poses a challenge for affected casualties due to the 
active role they must take in these emergency response operations. IOR guidance 
stipulates that preliminary decontamination actions are to be carried out by the 
casualty, away from the source of contamination in an area nearby the hot zone, that is 
referred to as the ‘warm zone’ due to the presence of potentially contaminated 
casualties (National CBRN Centre, 2016). Given the unfamiliar nature of the actions 
required of casualties who do not necessarily know why the prescribed behaviours are 
necessary, an effective communication intervention is required to improve the 
efficiency with which casualties adhere to first responders’ instructions. If casualties are 
unwilling or unable to engage in protective behaviours within a narrow timescale, even 
the most thoroughly researched and optimised decontamination protocol will be 
rendered ineffective from the outset. There is a tendency among authors of 
decontamination guidance documents to conceive of humans in crowds as inherently 
prone to panic by virtue of being in a crowd (Drury, Novelli, & Stott, 2013) or to 
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characterise non-compliance as a baseline position among a proportion of crowd 
members (Carter & Amlôt, 2016) with the implication that responders should “focus 
initial attention on compliant individuals” (Chilcott, Larner, & Matar, 2019, p. 120). Such 
conceptions overlook the effect of incident management on compliance and the 
interplay between the behaviour of authorities at the scene and casualty behaviour. 
Findings from mass decontamination exercises indicate that if communication from first 
responders is perceived as poor, people are likely to be less willing to comply with 
decontamination instructions (Carter, Drury, Rubin, Williams, & Amlôt, 2012b, 2013). 
Communication in this thesis is defined, in accordance with previous 
conceptualisations (Bradley, McFarland, & Clarke, 2014), as the dissemination of 
information from authorities, in this case first responders at the scene of a chemical 
incident, to the affected population, in this case casualties who have been or are 
suspected by authorities to have been contaminated with hazardous chemicals.  
Knowledge gaps pertaining to communication during an emergency and its effect on 
behaviour have been discussed in the literature. For example, previous systematic 
reviews and recent studies have concluded with recommendations for more: high-
quality experimental assessments into what makes communication effective in the 
disaster response and recovery phase (Bradley et al., 2014); research on specific 
message components to improve the persuasiveness of medical countermeasure 
messages (Liu, Quinn, Egnoto, Freimuth, & Boonchaisri, 2017); and empirical studies 
that evaluate the effect of communication on behaviour during CBRN incidents (Rubin, 
Chowdhury, & Amlôt, 2012). Further investigation into the effectiveness of 
communication with casualties at the scene of decontamination has also been 
identified as a priority research need by experts from the Global Health Security 
Initiative’s Chemical and Radiological/Nuclear Working Groups (Cibulsky et al., 2015). 
This investigation has begun. Findings from recent research on decontamination in 
purpose-built showering facilities indicate that trust in first responders can be improved 
through communication consisting of: detailed practical instructions; health-focused 
information as to why decontamination is necessary; and regular updates about actions 
that responders are taking (e.g. Carter, Drury, Amlôt, Rubin, & Williams, 2014; Carter, 
Drury, Amlôt, Rubin, & Williams, 2015; Carter et al., 2013; Carter, Drury, Rubin, 
Williams, & Amlôt, 2015). This is important because trust in communicators is 
associated with message acceptance in the wider literature on risk communication in 
general (Glik, 2007a) and communication about CBRN risks in particular (Rubin et al., 
2012).  Findings also indicated that a lack of detailed instructions increased observed 
confusion and non-compliance with instructions among casualties in a mass 
decontamination field trial (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014).  
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Despite these initial findings, however, other questions remain unanswered. If health-
focused information about why decontamination is necessary needs to be conveyed to 
casualties, then further investigation is required to determine the optimal content and 
presentation of this information. There is a need for research to identify how first 
responders should deliver potentially life-saving information so that it is understood, 
accepted, and acted on. For example, a review of guidance documents on mass 
casualty decontamination revealed variation in the level of detail provided about how to 
communicate with casualties (Carter & Amlôt, 2016). My interactions with members of 
emergency planning and response organisations at stakeholder workshops have 
indicated a need for more detailed guidance on the wording of information. The need 
for further research into the most effective communication channel to disseminate 
information to casualties during a chemical incident has also been identified as a 
priority (Carter & Amlôt, 2016). The aim of this PhD is to determine how first 
responders should deliver information to improve adherence to decontamination 
protocols by casualties in a chemical incident. 
  
1.2 Overview of mass casualty chemical incidents 
Despite international efforts to reduce the availability of Chemical Warfare Agents 
(CWA) (Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993), chemical weapons continue to be used 
in attacks on civilian populations. Recent high-profile cases include the sarin attacks in 
Syria in 2013 and 2017 (Arik Eisenkraft, Kassirer, & Kreiss, 2014; Blake & Mahmud, 
2013; Zarocostas, 2017) and nerve agent releases in Wiltshire in 2018, after which 
official advice to wash clothes and clean personal effects was issued to potentially 
affected members of the public (Public Health England, 2018). Previous high-profile 
cases include: mustard gas attacks on civilians during the Iraq-Iran War (1980-1988) 
(Davis & Aspera, 2001; Ghasemi et al., 2008; Momeni & Aminjavaheri, 1994; Momeni, 
Enshaeih, Meghdadi, & Amindjavaheri, 1992); sarin attacks committed by the religious 
cult Aum Shinrikyo in Matsumoto City in 1994 and the Tokyo subway system in 1995 
(Figure 1-1) that resulted in 12 recorded deaths (Levitin et al., 2003; Miyaki et al., 2005; 
Nakajima, Sato, Morita, & Yanagisawa, 1997; Nishiwaki et al., 2001; Okumura et al., 
2005; Okumura et al., 1996; Yanagisawa, Morita, & Nakajima, 2006; Yanagisawa et al., 
1995) and approximately 6,252 injuries (UPI, 2010); and VX attacks carried out in 
Osaka in 1994 (Tsuchihashi, Katagi, Nishikawa, & Tatsuno, 1998) and North Korea in 
2017 (Hayes, 2017, p. 13). North Korea reportedly has a sizeable arsenal of the nerve 
agent, VX and Daesh reportedly have access to toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and 
mustard gas (Gordon, 2018). Meanwhile it is not only terrorists and state actors who 
have access to chemical weapons. In London, there were 454 recorded grievous bodily 
harm offences involving corrosive substances (so-called “acid attacks”) in 2016 alone 
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(Metropolitan Police, 2017). Corrosive substance attacks involving multiple casualties 
were perpetrated in London In April and July of 2017 (BBC News, 2017a, 2017b).  
In addition to deliberately orchestrated chemical incidents, civilian populations may also 
be exposed to Toxic Industrial Chemicals (TICs), such as chlorine and hydrogen 
sulphide, following accidental releases (Taxell et al., 2013). Such incidents include: the 
release of Methylisocyanate at a plant in Bhopal, India in 1984, which resulted in a 
reported death toll of over 3000 (Broughton, 2005; Chilcott, 2014; Dhara, 1992; 
Tomassoni, French, & Walter, 2015); chlorine gas release following a train derailment 
in South Carolina in 2005 that resulted in nine fatalities, eight of which occurred prior to 
hospitalisation (Gaskin et al., 2017; Van Sickle et al., 2009); and the 1976 Seveso 
chemical plant incident in Italy, which caused the evacuation of over 600 people and 























1.3 Effects of hazardous chemicals 
Hazardous chemical substances include: nerve agents, such as sarin and VX; 
pulmonary agents; cyanide; and blister agents, such as sulphur mustard and lewisite. 
Casualties can be exposed to hazardous chemicals in solid (e.g. powder), liquid, 
vapour and gas form (Geissmann, 2004; Levitin et al., 2003; Maynard, 2007b). Clinical 
effects of chemical incidents vary according to the chemical’s properties and 
environmental factors, such as temperature, wind speed, and precipitation (Garcia, 
Rand, & Rinard, 2011; Gaskin et al., 2017; Vale, Marrs, & Rice, 2016). General 
symptoms of hazardous chemical exposure include: eye, nose and throat irritation; 
vomiting; dizziness; muscle weakness; headache; coughing; and shortness of breath 
(Chilcott, 2014; Kales & Christiani, 2004; Tomassoni et al., 2015). Hazardous chemical 
exposure can also result in long-term detrimental psychological and quality-of-life 
outcomes (Dworkin et al., 2008; E. Jones, Everitt, Ironside, Palmer, & Wessely, 2008; 
Razavi et al., 2014). 
Whilst inhalation of chemical agents in gas or vapour form pose a considerable hazard 
(Gaskin et al., 2017), the majority of chemical agents outlined in Schedule 1 of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention are chemicals that affect casualties via the skin 
(Chilcott, 2007b). Chemical agents have toxic effects if they diffuse through the stratum 
corneum, a membrane at the uppermost layers of the epidermis (Chan, Zhai, Hui, & 
Maibach, 2013; Chilcott, 2007b; Phuong & Maibach, 2016; S. C. Wilkinson, 2008). 
Chemicals that affect casualties via penetration through the skin include nerve agents, 
which are particularly toxic to humans when absorbed via the skin (Vale et al., 2016) 
and blister agents, such as sulphur mustard. Sulphur mustard is one of the chemical 
agents of greatest concern due to the high number of casualties resulting from 
exposure to it throughout its use over the last century (Kales & Christiani, 2004; 
Wattana & Bey, 2009). Sulphur mustard (often referred to as “mustard gas”) can affect 
the skin when it is in liquid or vapour form (Maynard, 2007a) and can result in death, 
conjunctivitis, pneumonia, bone marrow effects, gastrointestinal effects and renal 
effects, and painful skin burns that are susceptible to infection (Borak & Sidell, 1992; 
Davis & Aspera, 2001; Ghabili, Agutter, Ghanei, Ansarin, & Shoja, 2010; Wattana & 
Bey, 2009). 
Casualties do not necessarily display symptoms at the scene of the incident. Latency, 
the interval between exposure to the agent and the onset of symptoms, is dependent 
on properties of the chemical agent, environmental variables, and route of exposure 
(Chilcott, 2014). Some chemical substances, such as nerve agents in vapour form and 
the blister agent phosgene oxime can cause immediate, painful and debilitating 
symptoms on exposure (Garcia et al., 2011; Tomassoni et al., 2015). However, other 
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chemical substances have a latency period that stretches over hours and days 
(Geissmann, 2004). For example, onset of symptoms following exposure to the nerve 
agent VX may occur up to 18 hours from exposure to the agent in liquid form (Clarke et 
al., 2008). Following exposure to sulphur mustard in liquid form, the latency period 
ranges from 30 minutes to 12 hours (Borak & Sidell, 1992; Clarke et al., 2008; Kales & 
Christiani, 2004; Spiandore et al., 2017; Wattana & Bey, 2009), the most frequently 
cited range being 4 to 12 hours (Borak & Sidell, 1992; Clarke et al., 2008; Kales & 
Christiani, 2004). During this latency period, casualties may be unaware that they are 
contaminated (Clarke et al., 2008; Kales & Christiani, 2004; Wattana & Bey, 2009) but 
if the chemical is not removed quickly, penetration of sulphur mustard through the skin 
can lead to irreversible cell and tissue damage within minutes of exposure (Borak & 
Sidell, 1992; Davis & Aspera, 2001; Garcia et al., 2011; Kales & Christiani, 2004). Lack 
of awareness of hazardous chemical exposure due to a long latency period could 
potentially prevent a casualty from immediately recognising the need to undergo 
decontamination even though unmitigated penetration of the agent may have 
detrimental health effects within minutes. 
In addition to the effects on the casualty, chemical agents may result in clinical effects 
in people who come into contact with vapours released from contaminant remaining in 
the clothing, skin and hair of casualties who have not been decontaminated; a process 
termed, “secondary contamination” (Chilcott, 2007a; Clarke et al., 2008; Eckstein, 
1999; Gaskin et al., 2017; Horton, Berkowitz, & Kaye, 2003; Nakajima et al., 1997; 
Nishiwaki et al., 2001; Okumura et al., 2005; Spiandore et al., 2017; Vale et al., 2016). 
In a chemical incident, the majority of contaminated casualties are likely to be able to 
walk and therefore self-present at a hospital (Kales & Christiani, 2004), which can lead 
to secondary contamination of other people, including healthcare staff. Chemicals in 
liquid form are more conducive than gaseous chemicals to secondary contamination 
because they are more likely to remain on the casualty (Clarke et al., 2008). The extent 
of vapour release from clothing is also dependent on the type of clothing worn by the 
casualty, with down outerwear leading to a longer duration of vapour release than 
jeans, as indicated by a study using the simulant chemical warfare agent, methyl 
salicylate (Feldman, 2010).  
Medical staff have succumbed to secondary contamination following chemical 
poisoning and chemical suicides with hydrogen sulphide and phosphine (Gaskin et al., 
2017). Between 1995 and 2001, there were six events in which United States 
Emergency Department staff experienced secondary exposure (Horton et al., 2003). 
Secondary contamination of rescue workers and staff at hospital facilities occurred 
following the Matsumoto and Tokyo sarin attacks (Clarke et al., 2008; Eckstein, 1999; 
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Nakajima et al., 1997; Nishiwaki et al., 2001; Okumura et al., 2005). In the absence of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) to provide protection from vapours released from 
casualties, rescue workers who responded within 270 minutes of the 1994 Matsumoto 
sarin attack experienced similar symptoms to the casualties (Nakajima et al., 1997). 
Following the 1995 Tokyo sarin attack, 23% of hospital staff at one of the receiving 
hospitals were subjected to secondary contamination due to a lack of PPE and on-site 
decontamination facilities (Okumura et al., 2005). Rescue workers who responded to 
the sarin attack were found to have chronic memory function impairment three years 
and nine months following secondary exposure to the contaminant (Nishiwaki et al., 
2001). Such cases highlight the importance of containment of casualties prior to the 
arrival of decontamination facilities to protect emergency response staff, hospital staff, 
and other members of the public who lack the necessary PPE to mitigate against the 
risk of secondary contamination. 
 
1.4 Decontamination 
Decontamination is the process of removing or neutralising hazardous materials on 
external surfaces in order to reduce the risk of inhalation, reduce or limit skin 
absorption, and to protect others from secondary contamination (Chilcott, 2014; 
Cibulsky et al., 2015; Clarke et al., 2008; Levitin et al., 2003; Spiandore et al., 2017; US 
Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). Guidance documents on 
decontamination, published by Government departments and emergency response 
agencies in the UK and US, converge on the principle that following evacuation from 
the source of chemical release, the optimum method of decontamination is the removal 
of contaminated clothing (disrobing) and showering in a high volume of water 
(Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, 2015; Home Office, 
2013; Lake, Schulze, & Gougelet, 2013; National Ambulance Resilience Unit, 2014; US 
Army Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear School, 2011). Secondary 
contamination of healthcare staff can be reduced by deploying showering facilities to 
the scene of the incident (Kenar & Karayilanoglu, 2004), in an area referred to as the 
“warm zone”.  A shower can be conducted in the warm zone in purpose-built mobile 
decontamination structures (Figure 1-2) and/or via the arrangement of fire appliances 
to produce a corridor with fire hoses positioned either side (the “ladder pipe” system). 
The latter is regarded as an interim step in the decontamination process, whereas the 
former is considered to be a more thorough form of decontamination (Biomedical 
Advanced Research and Development Authority, 2015). 
Whilst the effectiveness of specialist decontamination showering facilities has been 
subjected to extensive testing in controlled studies (Amlôt et al., 2010; Hood, 
Fernandes-Flack, & Larrañaga, 2011; Leary et al., 2014), there may be a long delay to 
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the arrival of such resources (Amlôt, Carter, Riddle, Larner, & Chilcott, 2017; Chilcott, 
2014; Gaskin et al., 2017; Leary et al., 2014; Monteith & Pearce, 2015). For example, 
in a survey of European Union emergency response organisation staff, 20-30% of 
respondents indicated an estimated deployment  time in excess of 10 hours (Chilcott, 
2014; Gaskin et al., 2017). There may even be a delay in the arrival of resources for 
interim decontamination. In a recent survey of US Fire Department staff, the mean 
estimated dispatch time of a ladder pipe system was approximately 8 minutes during 
peak traffic with an additional mean time of approximately 5 minutes between arrival of 
fire tenders and establishment of a decontamination corridor (Power et al., 2016), 
notwithstanding time between detection of the hazardous chemical release and 
notification of emergency services. Any delay to the arrival of decontamination facilities 
is problematic given that time is critical to the effectiveness of decontamination 
showering (Borak & Sidell, 1992; Chan et al., 2013; Chilcott, 2014; Hewitt, Hotchkiss, & 
Caldwell, 1995; Hui, Domoradzki, & Maibach, 2012; Kales & Christiani, 2004; Leary et 
al., 2014; Levitin et al., 2003; Wester, Hui, Landry, & Maibach, 1999). The ideal 
decontamination protocol is one which can be implemented immediately following 
detection of hazardous chemical contamination. 
 
Figure 1-2 Casualty actors (wearing orange capes) disrobing out of ‘contaminated’ 
clothing in a simulated chemical incident exercise; Fire Service Responders (wearing 
green protective suits) guide casualty actors through a structured mass 
decontamination shower in the tent structure (MD 1-3 structure) pictured in yellow 




1.5 Initial Operational Response 
In the UK, the need for efficient decontamination that can be achieved prior to the 
arrival of specialist decontamination resources and personnel has been addressed with 
the implementation of the Initial Operational Response (IOR) programme by Police, 
Ambulance, and Fire & Rescue Services. The IOR programme has been developed for 
use by first responders who do not necessarily have specialist training in CBRN or 
hazardous materials (HazMat) incident response (Home Office, 2015).  IOR can be 
thought of as ‘first aid for chemical incidents’. Its first steps consist of evacuation and 
disrobing. Following this, if the chemical is non-caustic, absorbent materials, such as 
paper towels, should be applied to skin (improvised dry decontamination). If the 
chemical is caustic, water from any available clean water source should be applied to 
skin (improvised wet decontamination). The process used to decide the choice of 
improvised decontamination method is illustrated in the flow chart in Figure 1-3. 
The efficacy of evacuation as a preliminary form of decontamination is clear. Removing 
the casualty from the source of contamination lessens the contact between person and 
contaminant. Casualties should ideally evacuate upwind from the source of 
contamination (Kales & Christiani, 2004). Disrobing then removes a substantial 
proportion of the amount of contaminant remaining on the casualty following 
evacuation from the hot zone, and is an integral part of the decontamination process 
(Butler, 2014; Chilcott, 2014; Clarke et al., 2008; Kales & Christiani, 2004; Lake et al., 
2013; Levitin et al., 2003; US Army Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear 
School, 2011; US Department of Health and Human Services, 2014). The effectiveness 
of removing contaminated clothing on reducing skin absorption of chemical agents 
decreases over time (Matar, Price, & Chilcott, 2010b), so disrobing should be carried 
out as soon as possible following evacuation. The optimum timescale for completion of 
evacuation and disrobing is within 15 minutes of exposure (Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority, 2015; Home Office, 2013, 2015; National 
Ambulance Resilience Unit, 2014; National CBRN Centre, 2016). The safest procedure 
for removing clothing is to cut the clothing off rather than lift clothing over the head. 
However, if cutting the clothing is not possible and the clothing can only be lifted over 
the head, casualties should be instructed to keep their mouth closed whilst lifting the 
clothing in such a way that it is kept away from their face in order to protect their 
mucous membranes (Figure 1-4)  (Biomedical Advanced Research and Development 
Authority, 2015; Lake et al., 2013). For exposure to chemical agents in gas or vapour 
form, evacuation and disrobing are regarded as sufficient self-decontamination 
measures (Cibulsky et al., 2015; Levitin et al., 2003; US Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2014). When the agent is in liquid form, dry decontamination (Figure 
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1-5) is the default option for removing non-caustic agents from the skin once 
contaminated clothing has been removed. Studies have indicated that exposure to 
simulants of liquid chemical agents is reduced following the application of incontinence 
pads or blue roll, particularly when a blotting-followed-by-rubbing application method is 
used (Amlôt et al., 2017; Kassouf, Syed, Larner, Amlôt, & Chilcott, 2017).  
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the success of IOR decontamination as a 
countermeasure is contingent on casualties knowing, accepting, and engaging in the 
required behaviours. IOR decontamination can be conceptualised as a series of 
adaptive behaviours performed by the casualty, with communication from first 
responders serving as the external stimulus for action. Adaptive behaviours include: 
evacuation from the hot zone; disrobing in a safe manner as quickly as possible; 
application of absorbent materials to unprotected skin and hair; and remaining in the 
warm zone until specialist decontamination resources arrive (self-containment). These 
behaviours are adaptive in that they reduce the threat posed to the casualty by 
hazardous chemical materials and the wider threat of secondary contamination. In 
contrast, maladaptive actions may include: ignoring or resisting responders’ 
instructions; self-evacuating from the treatment area without undergoing any form of 
decontamination; or presenting at a hospital and risking secondary contamination of 
hospital staff. The risk that maladaptive behaviours may occur is not merely 
hypothetical. For example, during a ‘false positive’ CBRN incident at the B'nai B'rith 
Headquarters, Washington D.C., casualties refused to disrobe when instructed (Vogt & 
Sorensen, 2002). Casualties self-presented at hospitals without undergoing pre-
hospital decontamination during the Tokyo subway sarin attack of 1995, resulting in 
contamination of hospital staff (Okumura et al., 2005). Even if casualties are willing to 
engage in adaptive behaviours, the processes required to complete IOR actions are 
not necessarily intuitive to all casualties. The instruction, “remove your outer clothing”, 
would not automatically prompt the casualty to adopt the safe disrobing procedure 
outlined in the decontamination section in this chapter. First responders therefore need 
to encourage casualties to undertake specific rather than general adaptive behaviours 






Figure 1-3 Flow chart to guide decision as to whether to implement dry or wet 
















Figure 1-5 Dry decontamination procedure as illustrated in draft improvised dry 




1.6 Aims and objectives  
The aim of this PhD is to develop a communication strategy as an instrument to 
facilitate adaptive behaviour change within a narrow timescale to reduce skin 
absorption of hazardous substances in the acute phase of a chemical incident. The 
type of chemical incident for which the communication intervention developed during 
this PhD is primarily tailored towards is one in which the risk of contamination is 
ambiguous, with minimal signs and symptoms, but contamination is suspected to be 
likely by responding authorities. Such a scenario could occur, for example, following 
contamination by a chemical agent with a long latency, such as sulphur mustard in 
liquid form, as explained earlier. 
Although there is a need to address the communication needs of a heterogeneous 
population that includes at-risk or vulnerable groups, such as children, older adults, 
people with physical or cognitive impairments and people who do not understand the 
language of the communicator (Edkins, Carter, Riddle, Harrison, & Amlôt, 2010), the 
initial development of a communication intervention may be easier with a relatively 
homogenous group. To test the initial principles developed over the course of this PhD, 
the target population for this investigation will be ambulant adults with no medical 
conditions that would render them unable to comprehend a communication intervention 
and who speak fluently the language of the communicator.  
The primary end user group for the recommendations arising from the outcomes of this 
PhD is first responders tasked with carrying out decontamination during incidents 
involving potentially hazardous contamination of large numbers of casualties. 
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Chapter 2 Principles of effective communication in the acute 
response phase of an emergency: A literature review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I explained why casualty behaviour is integral to the successful 
outcome of IOR decontamination and why an effective behaviour change intervention 
is required to promote IOR adherence. The development and testing of this intervention 
is the overall aim of my PhD. The UK Medical Research Council recommends basing 
the development of a behaviour change intervention on a theoretical framework prior to 
testing and implementing (Craig et al., 2008; Michie, West, Campbell, Brown, & 
Gainforth, 2014).  In this chapter, I will synthesise relevant theories, models and 
findings from research in the ergonomics, health, social and cognitive psychology 
literatures to identify communication parameters that should be theoretically effective at 
promoting IOR adherence during a chemical incident.  
The intervention of interest in this review is communication during the response phase 
of an emergency or crisis and the outcome of interest is observed or self-reported 
behaviour, particularly adherence to emergency directives. Using Grant and Booth’s 
typology of reviews (2009), this chapter would be classified as a literature review rather 
than systematic review. Systematic reviews on the effect of crisis communication are 
already available (Bradley et al., 2014; Brandeau, Zaric, Freiesleben, Edwards, & 
Bravata, 2008; Glik, 2007a; World Health Organization, 2017). In terms of the 
methodology employed in this review, many of the studies on which it was based were 
obtained during the full text screening process for the systematic review reported in the 
following chapter (Appendix B), following the electronic database search reported in the 
systematic review (Chapter 3) and additional forwards and backwards citations 
searches that were carried out but not recorded in a systematic, comprehensive 
manner. My narrative synthesis approach was guided by an a priori framework based 
on the key components of crisis communication outlined below, rather than a 
systematic approach based on findings of included studies. This review also 
encompasses previous reviews in addition to original studies.  
Crisis communication is the reactive process of transmitting information from 
authorities to the public during a situation in which public health and/or safety is 
threatened in order to motivate the uptake of protective actions to prevent or reduce the 
extent of adverse events (Barry, Sixsmith, & Infanti, 2013; Bradley et al., 2014; Glik, 
2007a; Lindell & Perry, 2012; M. B. Rogers & Pearce, 2016). Whereas risk 
communication concerns the exchange of information about health risks over longer 
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timeframes, crisis communication occurs in a time-critical context when knowledge 
about the risks may be incomplete, when public outrage and/or anxiety are likely to be 
high, and when communicators need to motivate the public to take specific actions to 
prevent the situation from worsening (T. W. Cole & Fellows, 2008; Liu et al., 2017; 
Sandman, 2003; T. L. Sellnow & Sellnow, 2010).  
Insufficient or ineffective crisis communication can have adverse consequences. 
Surveys and interview studies indicate that delayed evacuation during Hurricane 
Katrina was partially associated with inadequate communication, characterised as 
information sources not being deemed credible by the message audience; lack of 
information; lack of clarity regarding how to evacuate; and ambiguity regarding the 
necessity of taking action (Brodie, Weltzien, Altman, Blendon, & Benson, 2006; T. W. 
Cole & Fellows, 2008; Eisenman, Cordasco, Asch, Golden, & Glik, 2007; Glik, 2007b). 
In decontamination exercises, communication perceived as poor, for example due to 
lack of information, was perceived by role-playing “casualties” to be conducive to non-
compliance and self-evacuation from the treatment area in a real incident (Carter, 
Drury, Rubin, Williams, & Amlôt, 2012a; Currie & Heslop, 2018). The large number of 
injuries resulting from the 2002 anhydrous ammonia release in Minot, North Dakota 
was partially attributed to the lack of information provided (Veil, 2007). If insufficient 
crisis communication is associated with adverse behavioural outcomes, further 
investigation is required into what features within crisis communication are required to 
elicit target, adaptive behaviour. 
The utility of openly and honestly engaging with affected populations as a means of 
promoting mass uptake of adaptive behaviours during an emergency, crisis or disaster 
(terms used interchangeably henceforth) is predicted by the Social Identity Model of 
Collective Resilience (SIMCR) (Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel, 1979; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) and Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) 
(Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000). SIMCR suggests that people have both personal and 
social identities, and that social identities are based on group memberships. When 
people share a social identity, this affects the way they interact with members of their 
own social group (ingroup members) and members of other social groups (outgroup 
members). Ingroup members share norms and values based on their group identity 
and these norms determine the perceived acceptability of behaviours. In the ESIM, 
identification with other ingroup members, adherence to ingroup norms and the 
resulting adoption of behaviours is itself a product of the behaviour of a perceived 
“outgroup”, for example emergency responders. When the actions of the outgroup 
members are perceived by the ingroup members to be illegitimate, opposition and 
resistance to the outgroup, characterised as crowd conflict, is deemed normative and 
32 
 
acceptable by members of this psychological crowd (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; 
Stott et al., 2018; Zeitz, Tan, Grief, Couns, & Zeitz, 2009). Conversely, when outgroup 
members are perceived to be behaving legitimately, for example when authorities are 
perceived to be transparent and honest, co-operative behaviour is deemed normative 
and acceptable by members of the psychological crowd. Open and honest engagement 
with affected populations is likely to be associated with the adaptive behavioural 
outcome of mass compliance with emergency services, based on the predictions of 
these social psychology theories and models of crowd behaviour. In this chapter, I will 
discuss the relevant research, from a range of psychology domains, that informs the 
most effective components of open, honest communication at promoting adherence. 
The crisis communication literature broadly indicates that the effect of communication 
on compliance with directives is based on an interaction of: information source, e.g. 
government spokesperson or news broadcaster; information channel, e.g. television; 
message content, e.g. types of message; and audience factors, e.g. sociodemographic 
characteristics and risk perceptions among message recipients (Glik, 2007a; McGuire, 
1981; McGuire, Rice, & Atkin, 2001). In the sections that follow, I will draw on theories 
and research that address the optimum source, channel, and content of communication 
and which audience factors moderate the effect of crisis communication on behaviour. 
These questions need to be addressed when developing a research agenda and 
communication intervention for use by first responders at the scene of a chemical 
incident in which casualties need to undergo IOR. 
  
2.2 Message content 
2.2.1. Types of information  
The recommendation to provide specific guidance on actions message recipients 
should take to protect their health and/or safety is well supported by studies on 
communication in several types of emergency (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, 
et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; Glik, 2007a; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; D. 
D. Sellnow, Lane, Sellnow, & Littlefield, 2017; Sutton, Vos, Wood, & Turner, 2018; 
World Health Organization, 2017), including hypothetical or simulated chemical 
incidents (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et 
al., 2015). Studies on behaviour of role-playing bystanders during simulated vehicle 
accidents in virtual environments indicated that providing message recipients with a 
specific course of action reduced the likelihood of them moving the body of a virtual 
casualty – an action that would have adversely affected the casualty’s health in a real 
incident (Bakker, Kerstholt, & Giebels, 2018; Stubbe, van Emmerik, & Kerstholt, 2017). 
But people do not automatically follow instructions in a warning message unless there 
is a justification for following instructions and the justification is understood (Sorensen, 
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2000). There are two recommended types of information pertaining to justification for 
action, predicted by well-supported theories and models of behaviour that are outlined 
below. These information categories are, broadly speaking, Threat and Efficacy. The 
rationale for this assertion is outlined in the remainder of this subsection. 
In the context of non-emergency hygiene behaviour, which is separate from emergency 
behaviour but proximal to the subject area of decontamination, behaviour change 
interventions that consist of simply providing health education about handwashing had 
limited impact on handwashing behaviour (Biran et al., 2014; Biran et al., 2009; Curtis 
et al., 2011; Naikoba & Hayward, 2001). There is greater empirical support, based on a 
cluster RCT (Biran et al., 2014) and a review of studies from 11 countries (Curtis, 
Danquah, & Aunger, 2009), for the use of emotional drivers, such as appeals to 
disgust, in promoting handwashing with soap than there is for the use of knowledge 
promotion. In the context of an emergency, fear is likely to be a more accessible 
emotion than disgust. Stress and anxiety are frequently cited emotional responses to 
crisis situations (Covello, Peters, Wojtecki, & Hyde, 2001; Firestone & Everly, 2013; 
Glik, 2007a). In controlled intervention trials, physiological stress measured with 
salivary cortisol was elevated both immediately and 20 minutes after a simulated fire 
emergency (Robinson, Leach, Owen-Lynch, & Sünram-Lea, 2013) and 25 minutes 
after evacuation from a helicopter submerged underwater (Robinson, Sünram-Lea, 
Leach, & Owen-Lynch, 2008). Chemical incidents in particular are likely to provoke 
anxiety and stress, for example because of the direct effect that chemical agents can 
have on behaviour and cognition; participants exposed to nerve agents in human 
volunteer trials displayed increased anxiety, depressed mood and diminished 
performance in cognitive and psychomotor tasks (DiGiovanni, 2003; DiGiovanni Jr, 
1999). Anxiety, stress, fear and confusion may also result from the psychological threat 
attributed to the rarity and unfamiliarity of CBRN materials (Krieger, Amlôt, & Rogers, 
2014; Sheppard, Rubin, Wardman, & Wessely, 2006; Sullivan & Bongar, 2007).  
Laboratory induced acute stress has been shown to have a detrimental effect on 
performance in working memory tasks (Jiang & Rau, 2017; Olver, Pinney, Maruff, & 
Norman, 2015) and in working memory related activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Qin, Hermans, van Marle, Luo, & Fernández, 2009). Controlled intervention 
studies on cognitive performance indicated impairment in measures of executive 
function (Porter & Leach, 2010) and visual declarative and working memory (Robinson 
et al., 2013) in simulated emergencies. But there is also empirical support for the 
enhancing effect of acute physiological stress on working memory (Duncko, Johnson, 
Merikangas, & Grillon, 2009; Yuen et al., 2009; Yuen et al., 2011). A degree of stress 
can be adaptive but excessive stress can be maladaptive, a concept made explicit in 
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the Yerkes–Dodson law, whereby task performance improves with a certain level of 
arousal then decreases past this point in an inverted U-shape (Cohen, 2011). 
Restriction of information about the emergency is an approach that has been used by 
emergency response agencies to reduce or prevent expected public panic, as cited in a 
proportion of UK emergency planning guidance documents published between 1999 
and 2011 (Drury et al., 2013). This approach is misguided for three reasons. Firstly, 
information deficiency itself can provoke anxiety in an emergency (Carter et al., 2012b; 
Sheppard et al., 2006). Secondly, reassuring information perceived as false or 
unsubstantiated can have a negative impact on trust in message sources (Maxwell, 
2003; Rubin et al., 2012; Wiedemann & Schütz, 2005). Thirdly and most importantly, 
fear is not necessarily an impediment to adaptive behaviour in an emergency, in fact, 
fear is widely recognised in the literature as a key determinant of engagement in 
information about health threats (Peters, Ruiter, & Kok, 2013; Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018; 
Witte, 1992, 1994).  
Behaviour change theories centred on the processing of fear appeals (messages 
designed to induce fear in the message recipient to elicit targeted behaviour change) 
have been subjected to empirical assessment for over 50 years (Maloney, Lapinski, & 
Witte, 2011; Ruiter, Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 2014; Witte & Allen, 2000). Several 
theories and models have developed to explain the effectiveness of fear appeals at 
eliciting target behaviour change, including Protection Motivation Theory (PMT; Figure 
2-1) (R. W. Rogers, 1975, 1983), which is the most frequently used approach for 
assessing fear appeal effectiveness (Ruiter et al., 2014), and the Extended Parallel 
Process Model (EPPM; Figure 2-2) (Witte, 1992, 1994). I will first outline these theories 
and then the empirical support for including threat and efficacy information in crisis 
communication messages based on these theoretical approaches. 
In PMT, motivation to adopt behaviours that are adaptive to health protection or to 
cease behaviours that are maladaptive is determined by the cognitive processes of 
threat and coping appraisal. During threat appraisal, maladaptive response probability 
is mediated by the perceived benefits associated with the maladaptive behaviour. 
Adaptive response is mediated by perceptions of the severity of the threat and the 
susceptibility of the message recipient to the threat or likelihood of being affected by 
the threat. During coping appraisal, maladaptive response is mediated by perceptions 
of the cost to the message recipient of engaging in the recommended behaviour 
(response costs) whilst adaptive response is increased by perceptions of response 
efficacy and self-efficacy. Response efficacy denotes the perception that the 
recommended action would be effective in negating the health threat whilst self-efficacy 
refers to the message recipient’s perceived ability to adopt the prescribed action. Crisis 
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efficacy, a concept developed by Avery and Park (Avery & Park, 2016), specifically 
refers to perceived capability to adopt prescribed actions during a time-critical crisis. 
The researchers found that crisis efficacy predicted intended willingness to comply with 
official actions following hypothetical tornado, whooping cough and food-borne illness 
scenarios. 
The EPPM, which is one of the prevailing theories of the effectiveness of threatening 
communication on health behaviour change (Peters et al., 2013) and has also informed 
successful interventions in previous studies on crisis communication (Sutton, Vos, et 
al., 2018; Verroen, Gutteling, & de Vries, 2013), expands on PMT by specifying how 
cognitive processes lead to either message rejection or acceptance on exposure to a 
fear appeal message (Witte, 1996). If the message recipient does not engage in threat 
appraisal then no response is elicited, irrespective of the salience of efficacy in the 
message. If the message recipient engages in threat appraisal but perceived threat is 
higher than perceived efficacy, or there is no perceived efficacy, then the recipient 
engages in the process of “fear control” to reduce their own perception of the threat. 
Fear control can consist of denial of the threat, unwillingness to think about the threat, 
or reactance: “threat to or loss of a freedom [which] motivates the individual to restore 
that freedom” (Brehm & Brehm, 2013, p. 4). When the message recipient’s perceptions 
of response efficacy and self-efficacy are high following threat appraisal, then a 
“danger control” process is initiated and the message recipient engages in the process 
of reducing the threat. In other words, the message is only accepted when both threat 
appraisal and efficacy appraisal are high. 
The inclusion of information about threat and efficacy is also supported by the 
Protective Action Decision Model (PADM; Figure 2-3) (Lindell & Perry, 2012), a model 
for predicting behavioural responses to environmental hazards, which has been 
supported by findings from studies on behaviour and intentions in response to real or 
hypothetical cyclones (Ahsan, Takeuchi, Vink, & Warner, 2016), air pollution crises (P. 
Cheng, Wei, Marinova, & Guo, 2017), floods (Terpstra & Lindell, 2013), earthquakes 
(Lindell et al., 2015), wildfires (Strahan & Watson, 2018) and hurricanes (Huang, 
Lindell, & Prater, 2016). Similar to PMT and EPPM, the PADM accounts for the 
moderating role of perceptions about the threat, specifically the imminence of the threat 
and the susceptibility of the message recipient to the threat, and beliefs about 
protective actions in behavioural responses, such as searching for further information 
or taking protective action.  
The converging prediction of PMT, the EPPM and the PADM is that adherence to 
official directives can be facilitated by making salient: the severity of the threat facing 
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message recipients; their susceptibility to the threat; the efficacy of adhering to 
recommended actions; and recipients’ self-efficacy at adopting said actions. For the 




Figure 2-1 Diagram depicting components of Threat and Coping Appraisal in Protection Motivation Theory (R. W. Rogers, 1975, 1983), image 





Figure 2-2 Diagram depicting the Extended Parallel Process Model (reproduced with permission from Kim Witte); in the fear control process, perceived 
threat leads to message rejection via fear and defensive motivation whereas in the danger control process, perceived threat results in message 





Figure 2-3 Sequences in the Protective Action Decision Model, Figure 1 from Lindell and Perry (2012); the left section depicts external components, 




Meta-analyses have indicated that the most effective interventions at promoting 
behaviour change, based on measures of attitudes, intentions or real behaviour are 
high in both threat and efficacy information (Peters et al., 2013; Sheeran, Harris, & 
Epton, 2014; Witte & Allen, 2000). Whilst only six studies met the inclusion criteria in 
the meta-analysis carried out by Peters et al. (2013), in all included studies, both threat 
(severity and/or susceptibility) and efficacy (response efficacy and/or self-efficacy) 
information was manipulated in a minimum 2x2 factorial design. Further, only studies 
with measures of observed behaviour, as opposed to proximal measures such as 
intention, were included. The meta-analysis indicated that threat information only 
affected behaviour when efficacy information was high whilst efficacy information only 
affected behaviour when threat information was high (Peters et al., 2013). Fear appeals 
that promote one-time behaviours, such as getting vaccinated, were found to be more 
effective than fear appeals that promote repeated behaviours, such as exercising 
regularly, in a meta-analysis of 248 independent samples (Tannenbaum et al., 2015). 
These meta-analyses are all based on studies of behaviour change in response to 
long-term health risks, such as smoking and alcohol-related risks, rather than 
behaviours in response to acute, emerging health risks.  
During this review, I was unable to locate any meta-analyses, systematic reviews, or 
intervention studies on the effects of and/or interaction between manipulated threat and 
efficacy constructs in crisis communication messages on behaviour. Qualitative 
findings from a systematic review of studies on communication with the public about 
hypothetical or real CBRN emergencies (Rubin et al., 2012) revealed that people would 
want to receive information about incident severity, likelihood of being affected, the 
efficacy of recommended protective actions, and potential risks associated with taking 
recommended actions. Low self-efficacy was a reported barrier to seeking further 
information. Threat and efficacy message constructs have been assessed in terms of 
their effect on information circulation among social media users in the response phase 
of actual disasters but the number of studies is low. Analysis of Tweets transmitted 
during the Waldo Canyon wildfire (Sutton et al., 2014) and 2013 Boston Marathon 
Bombing (Sutton et al., 2015) indicated that messages with information that described 
the hazard and its impact, for example information about damaged areas, were 
associated with higher message re-transmission among Twitter users. Analysis of 
Tweets published in the United States during the 2016 Zika outbreak (Vos et al., 2018) 
showed that inclusion of severity (e.g. “Zika can cause birth defects”) or response 
efficacy (e.g. “To prevent the spread of Zika is to prevent mosquito bites”), but not 
susceptibility information, was associated with message retransmission. Interestingly, 
the inclusion of both severity and response efficacy information in the same message 
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was associated with reduced retransmission, relative to messages that incorporated 
one of these components.   
Previous studies on behavioural intention in response to crisis communication have 
tested the effectiveness of either threat or efficacy message constructs at improving 
self-reported adherence likelihood. For example, Pearce, Rubin, Amlôt, Wessely, and 
Rogers (2013) found no difference in intended compliance with official 
recommendations during a hypothetical chemical release incident between a message 
in which severity was made salient or a message in which the threat was understated 
to reassure recipients. But intended compliance was associated with higher 
perceptions of response efficacy and self-efficacy whilst non-compliance was 
associated with higher threat perceptions. Based on the findings pertaining to 
perception variables and the predictions of PMT and the EPPM, the inclusion of 
information about the efficacy of following official recommendations would have most 
likely increased the effectiveness of the “worst case scenario” message relative to the 
reassuring message. Verroen et al. (2013) tested the combined effect of efficacy 
information (“…The following self-protective actions have proven to be very effective”) 
and peer feedback on intended compliance with official recommendations following a 
hypothetical hazardous chemical release. Peer feedback was conveyed through mock 
social media messages that either supported or opposed the advice recommended in 
the message intervention. All participants were primed with the same threat-based 
information pertaining to the hazardous substance risks associated with the area 
surrounding their postal code. Whilst there was no effect of efficacy on intended 
compliance, there was a significant interaction between efficacy and peer feedback 
whereby peer feedback had no effect on intended compliance when efficacy 
information was provided, but did affect intended compliance when no efficacy 
information was provided.  
The implication of theories and studies outlined above is that in addition to providing 
recipients with information on protective actions that they should take and information 
pertaining to the source of the message, communicators should address rather than 
negate fear by explicitly acknowledging the severity of the hazard and the likelihood 
that recipients will be affected. This information should also be accompanied by 
information about the efficacy of protective actions to promote adherence. 
2.2.2. Communicating uncertainty 
Communicators may not have access to all the information outlined above at the time 
when information would need to be disseminated. But based on the importance of 
timely communication, as outlined in Section 2.4.1, communication cannot be delayed 
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until all specific details are known. Scholars of risk communication advise that 
uncertainty is addressed early on in a crisis (Liu et al., 2017; Sandman, 1993) and 
systematic review findings pertaining to a range of crises, predominantly infectious 
disease outbreaks, indicate that communicators should state when information is 
currently unknown in order to facilitate trust (World Health Organization, 2017). There 
is a low number of studies on crisis-specific uncertainty communication (Liu et al., 
2017) and a systematic review (Sopory et al., 2019)  on how to communicate 
uncertainty in public health emergencies found only one study in which a comparison 
group was used in the assessment of uncertainty communication. The review covered 
a range of methodological approaches, sample nationalities, and types of public health 
emergency, such as infectious disease and flooding. The key finding from the review in 
terms of message content guidance was to include information about uncertainties as 
this was associated with positive outcomes, such as a reduction in the influence of 
misinformation from other sources, although acknowledgement of uncertainty was 
associated with reduced trust in authorities and decision-making inertia among 
message recipients from vulnerable groups (Sopory et al., 2019).  
Given the potential for low threat perception or “wishful thinking” in response to stated 
uncertainties, as observed in climate change risk communication (Markowitz & Shariff, 
2012), communicators should balance acknowledgement of uncertainty with  the need 
for people to take action. When the extent or impact of a hazard is ambiguous to the 
communicator but recipients still need to be motivated to take action, possible 
approaches include stressing that taking action is more important than clarifying the 
risk (Sandman, 1993) or using a combination of verbal (e.g. “very likely”) and numerical 
(e.g. “90%”) indicators to frame the probability of impact (Bostrom, Böhm, & O’Connor, 
2018). 
2.2.3. Ordering of message content 
There is limited evidence to inform the order in which information should be presented. 
One study on communication of smoking risks indicated no difference in effect on 
intended smoking cessation between an intervention in which threat was presented 
before efficacy information and an intervention in which efficacy was presented before 
threat information (Hall, Bishop, & Marteau, 2006). However, the EPPM would suggest 
that information about the threat should precede information about efficacy because 
threat appraisal is a necessary precursor to efficacy appraisal. Based on a review of 
studies on response to emergencies to inform the design of emergency warning 
systems in buildings (Omori, Kuligowski, Gwynne, & Butler, 2017), the recommended 
order of content for long messages is as follows: statement about message source, 
statement about hazard, location, guidance on action to take, and when people need to 
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act (Omori et al., 2017, p. 1656) though this recommendation was based on only one 
study that could not be retrieved. Based on the available evidence, the order in which 
information to inform and justify action is presented is not important so long as threat 
information precedes efficacy information and the source of the message is stated at or 
near the beginning of the message. 
2.2.4. Wording of message content 
As stated earlier, cognitive function may be impaired under stressful conditions based 
on findings from laboratory studies (Jiang & Rau, 2017; Olver et al., 2015; Qin et al., 
2009) and studies in which stressors were applied in naturalistic settings (Porter & 
Leach, 2010; Robinson et al., 2013). The Mental Noise Model predicts that information 
processing is impaired in situations involving high stress and arousal, as would be 
expected in an emergency (Covello et al., 2001; Firestone & Everly, 2013; Glik, 2007a). 
One of the recommendations emanating from the Mental Noise Model is that no more 
than three messages are presented at one time (Firestone & Everly, 2013). I was 
unable to find a study from the crisis and emergency response domain in which 
comprehension under stress was tested as a function of the number of messages 
presented. One tangentially pertinent experiment from the marketing domain showed 
that appraisal of a cereal product was higher when four rather than three positive 
statements were presented to participants experiencing higher cognitive load whereas 
three messages were more effective than four in the lower cognitive load condition 
(Shu & Carlson, 2014) but this finding pertains to message persuasiveness rather than 
comprehension. Previous studies on intended behavioural responses to nuclear device 
explosion (Wood et al., 2017) and tsunami (Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018) warnings have 
indicated that condensed warning messages may result in increased intended milling 
(Wood et al., 2017), reduced ratings of fear (Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018), and reduced 
perceived ability to decide what to do in response to the warning message (Sutton, 
Vos, et al., 2018; Wood et al., 2017), relative to more comprehensive messages, which 
indicates the need to provide sufficient information.  
A better approach than message reduction for reducing cognitive demand in an 
emergency is to tailor language to be easily understandable by most lay audiences. 
Words frequently used by risk managers, such as “non-significant” may not necessarily 
be readily understood by all audiences (McComas, 2006). A review of studies on the 
effectiveness of public health messaging during hazardous smoke events indicated that 
messages constructed in non-technical language, such as  ‘stay indoors’ and ‘reduce 
outdoor physical activity’ were more likely than scientifically-worded messages to be 
recalled, understood, and acted on by the message audience (Fish et al., 2017). It is 
recommended that information be tailored to the US 6th-grade reading level or lower (R. 
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C. Chandler, 2010; Omori et al., 2017), which corresponds to the Year 7 or Key Stage 
3 reading level in the UK. Given the potential for casualties’ working memory to be 
compromised, it is also recommended that all messages are repeated throughout the 
process so that casualties are not required to recall all information. Repetition of 
messages is also an effective means of conveying urgency, which is in turn a 
determinant of message compliance (Bean et al., 2015). 
 
2.3 Source 
One of the key determinants of whether official advice in an emergency is accepted 
and acted on is the message recipient’s trust in the information source (Bass et al., 
2015; Glik, 2007a; Liu et al., 2017; Maxwell, 2003; McComas, 2006; Pearce et al., 
2013; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Rubin, Amlôt, Page, & Wessely, 2009; Sherman-
Morris & Lea, 2016). This has been specifically observed in emergencies involving 
CBRN material (Rubin et al., 2012), including hazardous chemicals (Pearce et al., 
2013). Trust in the context of crisis communication is defined as the “‘impersonal’ trust 
the public attributes to persons working in (public) institutions” (Chryssochoidis, Strada, 
& Krystallis, 2009, p. 137). There is evidence to support the likelihood that certain 
baseline communicator characteristics would be more likely to promote trust. For 
example, local sources and emergency responders are more likely to be trusted than 
communicators at a more abstract level, such as national government (Aldoory & Van 
Dyke, 2006; Wray, Rivers, Jupka, & Clements, 2006). I was unable to locate any study 
in which variability in public trust between the emergency services was assessed.  
Sources perceived as competent (Cordasco, Eisenman, Glik, Golden, & Asch, 2007; 
Latré, Perko, & Thijssen, 2017) and caring or benevolent (Latré et al., 2017; 
McCroskey & Teven, 1999) are likely to be trusted. In one study on expected 
adherence to preparatory actions for a hypothetical nuclear incident, perceived 
trustworthiness and credibility varied according to the type of communicator, but 
expected adherence did not (Latré et al., 2017).  
The specific effect of message source has been assessed in the field of social media 
crisis communication. The Social-Mediated Crisis Communication Model (SMCC; 
Figure 2-4) is used to explain the transmission of information from “influential social 
media creators” either directly to “followers” of influential creators or indirectly to “social 
media inactives” who receive information from personal acquaintances or traditional 
media organisations who follow influential social media creators (Austin, Liu, & Jin, 
2012). Early research on the SMCC and crisis communication in social media has 
highlighted the impact of the source of the social media message on the message 
audience’s intended information seeking (Austin et al., 2012), information 
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retransmission (Rasmussen & Ihlen, 2017; Snoeijers, Poels, & Nicolay, 2014), and 
compliance with recommendations or instructions within the message (Freberg, 2012; 
Liu, Fraustino, & Jin, 2016). Austin et al. (2012) found that when the initial information 
was presented to participants as having originated from a university, further information 
seeking was reportedly less likely to occur than when the source of the message was a 
third party, such as a journalist or friend. Freberg (2012) found that a social media 
message generated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was more likely 
to affect intended compliance with a food recall message than a message generated by 
a non-expert social media user. A social media message originating from a government 
official was associated with high perceived evacuation likelihood in response to crisis 
information (Liu et al., 2016). In an experimental study on social media crisis message 
retransmission among university students, a message presented as having originated 
from the dean of a university resulted in greater intended message retransmission 
compared to a message originating from the university (Snoeijers et al., 2014). The 
number of followers of a Twitter account is a peripheral factor associated with the 
source of a Tweet. During the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, the number of 
followers was strongly associated with retransmission of Twitter messages (retweeting) 
(Sutton et al., 2015). The implication from these findings is that indicators of expertise 
and authority are associated with increased adaptive crisis behaviours, including 




Figure 2-4 Social-Mediated Crisis Communication Model (SMCC), Figure 1 from Austin et al. (2012); the diagram depicts how information is 
disseminated via social media during a crisis.
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Although it is important for adherence outcomes that information is delivered by 
communicators who are trusted, perceptions of trust can themselves be improved by 
the content of communication. Message content characteristics that have been 
observed as being conducive to trust were discussed in Section 2.2. An additional type 
of information that promotes trust is information about actions taken by the 
communicating authorities to protect message recipients. For example, in studies on 
observed crowd behaviour during decontamination or expected behaviour in a 
hypothetical decontamination scenario, updating casualties on actions being taken by 
first responders at the scene improved ratings of perceived legitimacy of, and 
identification with, responders and these perceptions were associated with ratings of 
intended compliance with decontamination instructions (Carter, Drury, & Amlôt, 2018; 
Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015). But information 
about why decontamination is beneficial was provided concurrently in the same 
messaging framework, so it is unclear what effect information about actions responders 
are taking would have in isolation. The Internalization, Distribution, Explanation, Action 
(IDEA) model (D. D. Sellnow et al., 2017) of instructional risk and crisis communication 
predicts that effective compliance-promoting messages include information about what 
actions are being taken by authorities. But the model also includes information about 
the degree to which the message recipient and their loved ones would be affected by 
the crisis and what actions the message recipient should take within the same 
messaging framework. Further, at the time of writing there is little empirical support for 
the model beyond one study in which a messaging intervention based on the model 
improved adaptive behavioural intentions in a hypothetical E. coli outbreak, relative to 
an intervention modelled on traditional news coverage (D. D. Sellnow et al., 2017).  
There is tentative support in the literature (Mallett, Vaught, & Brnich, 1999; Omori et al., 
2017) for beginning a message with a statement pertaining to the source of the 
message, although one publication (Mallett et al., 1999) cited no empirical support for 
the recommendation and the other publication (Omori et al., 2017) cited only one 
source which was not retrievable during the course of the present review. But based on 
the previously discussed effect of source characteristics, specifically ones that denote 
expertise and authority, on behavioural outcomes including message compliance, it is a 
reasonable assumption that message recipients would need to know who the 
messenger is so that the potential moderating effect of baseline trust in the source is 
activated. Information about who the communicator is (or which organisation they 
represent) and what actions they are taking in support of message recipients are 
theoretically effective source-based message components to augment the message 




Communication channels, modalities or media fall into three broad categories: “push 
technologies”, such as public address systems, that do not necessitate information 
recipients actively searching for information; “pull technologies”, such as websites, that 
rely on active information searching on the part of the audience; and combination push-
pull technologies, such as social media notifications or mobile text alerts, that require 
pre-incident registration and peri-incident access to technologies by the message 
audience (Omori et al., 2017). There is limited empirical support for the relative 
effectiveness of different communication channels, e.g. audio announcements via 
public address versus written instructions via signage, at promoting target behaviour 
change during a crisis. In laboratory studies, written instructions were less conducive to 
compliance with safety instructions (Wogalter & Young, 1991) or compliance with a 
novel task under time pressure (Pacilio Jr, 1977) than audio instructions or a 
combination of audio and written instructions. The only available study in which 
communication channels were compared in the recovery phase of a real emergency 
was a survey of survivors of the 2010 Haiti earthquake (Contzen & Mosler, 2013). 
Change in reported handwashing frequency was associated with the type of channel 
used to promote hygiene, with channels such as radio associated with increased food-
related handwashing. Other channels had no effect or, in some cases, were even 
associated with decreased food-related handwashing, as was the case with home visits 
and community workshops. These findings pertain to sustained, long-term behaviour 
rather than acute, responsive behaviour however. One study (Edworthy, Hellier, 
Newbold, & Titchener, 2015), consisting of three experiments, was found that directly 
compared different communication channels in terms of their effect on warning 
message retention following retransmission of messages from person to person during 
a simulated crisis. Whilst written communication resulted in more accurate message 
recall than verbal information, the difference between communication channels became 
less pronounced as information was disseminated further down the “grapevine”.  
2.4.1. Multiple channels 
Whilst there is no strong evidence for using one particular source or channel to 
disseminate information, the use of multiple sources disseminating one consistent 
message has been suggested to be an effective approach to promoting trust and 
adherence to recommended protective actions (Glik, 2007a, 2007b; Mileti & Sorensen, 
1990; Omori et al., 2017; Rubin et al., 2012; Sorensen, 2000; World Health 
Organization, 2017). Inconsistency between information disseminated by the media 
and official information provided by authorities was found to be associated with 
reduced intention to adhere to protective behaviours in a systematic review of 
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uncertainty communication in public health emergencies (Sopory et al., 2019). 
Pragmatically, the most effective communication channel is one that guarantees that 
information reaches the target audience. A combination of push and pull technologies 
increases the likelihood that initial information reaches the target audience and that the 
audience is able to retrieve further information (R. C. Chandler, 2010; Omori et al., 
2017). For example, official leaflets containing protective measures for safe water 
consumption that were distributed to Gloucestershire residents affected by the 2007 
flood were not used by the majority of residents in one survey, particularly older adults 
in the sample, with local media and family and friends necessary as additional 
communication channels to extend the reach of the information to the intended 
audience (Rundblad, Knapton, & Hunter, 2010). Compliance with emergency directives 
was positively associated with receiving directives via multiple channels during the 
2007 San Diego wildfire (Strawderman, Salehi, Babski-Reeves, Thornton-Neaves, & 
Cosby, 2012) and an acute haemorrhagic conjunctivitis outbreak in Taipei City (Yen et 
al., 2009).  
Findings from previous crisis and emergency communication reviews indicate that 
communication should be implemented as soon as possible in order to promote trust in 
the communicator and compliance with official advice during a hazardous event (Carter 
& Amlôt, 2016; Omori et al., 2017; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; World Health 
Organization, 2017). In a survey of cyclone evacuation in Bangladesh, a greater 
proportion of households that evacuated received early warnings, compared to 
households that did not evacuate (Ahsan et al., 2016). Residents of an area in which 
drinking water was contaminated were more likely to adhere to official recommended 
behaviours, such as drinking bottled water or flushing taps prior to ingesting water, if 
they received information on the day of the emergency rather than subsequently 
(Galarce & Viswanath, 2012; Savoia, Stoto, Gupta, Wright, & Viswanath, 2015). 
Delayed provision of information was associated with anxiety and rumour circulation in 
an open-ended questionnaire study of attitudes of Year 12 students during a 
meningococcal disease outbreak (Taylor-Robinson, Elders, Milton, & Thurston, 2009). 
In the absence of accurate and sufficient information, members of the target audience 
are likely to seek out further information (a process referred to as “milling”) and thereby 
delay taking protective action (Omori et al., 2017; Sutton et al., 2014; Wood et al., 
2017). Swift communication from authorities can itself be a facilitator of trust during an 
emergency (Sharp, Thwaites, Curtis, & Millar, 2013). The effectiveness of a 
communication channel at promoting adherence to emergency directives is inversely 
proportional to the speed at which it can be employed.  
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In previous disasters, communication infrastructure itself has been disrupted as a result 
of the hazard. This occurred in the wake of Hurricane Katrina when communication 
systems reliant on electricity ceased to be operational and health communicators relied 
on face-to-face means of message dissemination (Vanderford, Nastoff, Telfer, & 
Bonzo, 2007). The implication is that the most reliable intervention would be a 
combination of channels both reliant and non-reliant on functioning infrastructure, such 
as face-to-face communication or vocal communication via battery-operated public 
address systems.  
2.4.2. Communication via mobile phone 
Social media have been used increasingly by emergency response authorities as part 
of disaster information dissemination campaigns (Leykin, Aharonson-Daniel, & Lahad, 
2016; Ma & Yates, 2014) due in part to the speed at which information can be 
transmitted (Finch et al., 2016) and also because information can be transmitted more 
widely. Social media, particularly Facebook and Twitter, have received increased 
attention in the literature on crisis communication and there is recognition of the need 
to combine social and traditional media when disseminating information to affected 
populations (Y. Cheng, 2018; Rasmussen & Ihlen, 2017; World Health Organization, 
2017). In a large-scale pan-European public perceptions survey, the peri-emergency 
phase, as opposed to pre- or post-emergency phase, was the phase at which social 
media was found to be least impactful on behaviour and information exchange (Knuth, 
Szymczak, Kuectiekbalaban, & Schmidt, 2016). During Hurricane Sandy and the 2013 
Boston Marathon Bombings, the majority of Twitter users who had been misinformed 
on Twitter proceeded to circulate the misinformation (Wang & Zhuang, 2018), 
indicating that extensive, rapid information retransmission would not necessarily entail 
the adoption of target, adaptive behaviours. In terms of message format, the use of 
capital letters to precede a declarative statement about evacuation was not associated 
with retransmission during the Waldo Canyon wildfire (Sutton et al., 2014) but was a 
strong predictor of retransmission during the Boston Marathon Bombing (Sutton et al., 
2015). 
Location-based mobile alerting systems enable emergency response organisations to 
transmit text messages, via short messaging service (SMS) or cell broadcast, to all 
mobile phones within a defined geographic area (Bean et al., 2015; Cabinet Office, 
2014; Wong, Jones, & Rubin, 2018). Consultation with UK emergency response 
organisations suggests that messages can be delivered within a maximum timeframe 
of 15 minutes (Cabinet Office, 2014). The majority of respondents in a UK survey 
indicated high intended compliance with messages received via mobile alerting 
(Cabinet Office, 2014). Survey respondents who received a warning via Reverse 911, 
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an automated landline telephone call issued by emergency services, reported 
significantly higher evacuation rates during the 2007 San Diego wildfire than 
respondents who received alerts via other channels (Strawderman et al., 2012). 
Participants in a qualitative study on public perceptions of text message alerts about a 
hypothetical nuclear detonation expected that they would experience fear and 
confusion due to limited information about the emergency and vague information as to 
what the recipient can do to alleviate the threat (Bean et al., 2016). Trust in, and 
compliance with, messages received via this channel is affected by factors such as: 
pre-existing awareness of the mobile alerting system among message recipients, which 
can be achieved via a public information campaign about the system or by recipients 
opting in to the system (Bean et al., 2016; Cabinet Office, 2014; Wong et al., 2018); 
perceived social pressure to comply (Gutteling, Terpstra, & Kerstholt, 2017; Han, Ada, 
Sharman, & Rao, 2015); perceived information quality (Gutteling et al., 2017; Han et 
al., 2015); affective response to message (Gutteling et al., 2017); perceived safety 
threat; perceived finance threat; and past experience with emergencies (Han et al., 
2015). Previous studies have indicated that additional information would be sought by 
message recipients via other channels, such as the internet, prior to following directives 
in location-based text messages (Bean et al., 2016; Cabinet Office, 2014; Wong et al., 
2018), which indicates that the use of location-based text messaging does not 
necessarily prevent milling (information-seeking). 
There are two theoretically effective approaches to overcoming limitations regarding 
the amount of text that can be included in one message delivered via location-based 
text or social media message: inclusion of a hyperlink to a webpage with further 
information or staggering information across a sequence of messages. Whilst the 
perceived need for information in an emergency situation may motivate recipients to 
click on the hyperlink (Sutton, Woods, & Vos, 2018), the inclusion of a hyperlink had no 
effect on message retransmission of evacuation-related Tweets during the Waldo 
Canyon fire (Sutton et al., 2014) and was a barrier to message retransmission among 
social media users during the Boston Marathon Bombing (Sutton et al., 2015). In a 
study on responses to a hypothetical impending tsunami message, condensing all 
information so that it can be transmitted in one message resulted in reduced ratings of 
fear and reduced perceived decision-making ability, whereas staggering the 
information over a sequence of messages did not (Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018). The 
implication is that a sequence of messages containing all necessary information would 
be more conducive to message compliance than one condensed message but the 




Emergency communication can also be factored into the architecture of public spaces. 
When a crisis or emergency requires evacuation from a location, evacuation speed can 
be increased by updating emergency exit signage in preparation for the emergency. 
Manipulation of visual parameters of signage affects wayfinding during simulated 
emergency evacuations (Andrée, Nilsson, & Eriksson, 2016; Galea, Xie, Cooney, & 
Filippidis, 2015; Galea, Xie, Deere, Cooney, & Filippidis, 2017a, 2017b; Galea, Xie, & 
Lawrence, 2014; Glover & Wogalter, 1997; Künzer, Hofinger, & Zinke, 2016; Kwee-
Meier, Mertens, & Schlick, 2017; Nilsson, Frantzich, & Saunders, 2005, 2008; Vilar, 
Rebelo, Noriega, Duarte, & Mayhorn, 2014). The use of an Active Dynamic Signage 
System (ADSS), which consists of flashing lights to highlight the existence of the 
escape route sign or a red cross to indicate that the exit route is no longer viable, 
improves on static signage in terms of noticeability (Galea et al., 2014) and guiding 
evacuees towards a particular exit (Galea et al., 2015; Galea et al., 2017b). When a 
red cross was used to indicate that an exit route is not viable and adjacent signs were 
positioned to indicate an available route more participants evacuated via appropriate 
exits (Galea et al., 2017a). Findings from this programme of research support previous 
studies in which green flashing lights influenced route choices during simulated fire 
evacuations (Andrée et al., 2016; Nilsson et al., 2005, 2008) most likely due to the 
salience of flashing lights and the cognitive affordance of the colour green; green being 
commonly associated with the concept of “safe to proceed” (Künzer et al., 2016). 
During tunnel evacuation experiments in which smoke was present (Fridolf, Ronchi, 
Nilsson, & Frantzich, 2013; Ronchi et al., 2017), the addition of a loudspeaker with a 
voice message that informed participants to use a particular exit improved participants’ 
motivation to select the exit route.  
2.4.4. Acoustic factors 
The use of the voice to transmit information from authorities to casualties is a 
potentially useful modality given that it does not require access to pre-developed 
materials. More importantly, live, as opposed to pre-recorded vocal communication 
allows for updated information (Omori et al., 2017) which is useful in a crisis situation 
as available information is subject to change during an incident. Voice amplification 
technology, such as vehicle-mounted or handheld public address systems, would 
increase the volume and hence the reach of communication. Acoustic factors of vocal 
communication can affect response time (Arrabito, 2009; Simpson & Williams, 1980) 
and self-reported attitudinal responses (Barzegar & Wogalter, 1998; Hollander & 
Wogalter, 2000; Taylor, 2014) to warning information. For example, enunciation by a 
recorded female, rather than male speaker has been associated with reduced accuracy 
and slower response times among listeners in a word identification task (Arrabito, 
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2009) and lower ratings of perceived acceptability of voiced fire evacuation warnings 
(Taylor, 2014) but has also been associated with improved ratings of intended 
carefulness (Barzegar & Wogalter, 1998; Hollander & Wogalter, 2000). Words recorded 
with a “whisper voice” style resulted in reduced response time in a word identification 
task, relative to urgent or monotone voice styles (Arrabito, 2009), whilst words recorded 
with an urgent or “emotional” vocal tone (characterised as a voice style that would be 
used by the speaker when alerting a loved one to an imminent threat (Barzegar & 
Wogalter, 1998)) resulted in higher ratings of intended carefulness (Barzegar & 
Wogalter, 1998), faster response times (Ljungberg & Parmentier, 2012), and increased 
distraction from engagement in a cognitive task (Ljungberg, Parmentier, Hughes, 
Macken, & Jones, 2012) in laboratory studies. Warning words presented quickly (50% 
faster than recorded speed of word) improved ratings of intended carefulness 
compared to warning words presented at 50% slower than recorded speed (Hollander 
& Wogalter, 2000).  
 
2.5 Moderating effect of audience characteristics 
The ability to access, process and act on warning messages is influenced by 
sociodemographic factors relating to the recipients of crisis communication, such as 
age, gender and socioeconomic position (Galarce & Viswanath, 2012; Glik, 2007a; 
Saha & James, 2017; Taylor-Clark, Viswanath, & Blendon, 2010). For example, 
whether people heard, understood or acted on Hurricane Katrina evacuation orders 
was associated with employment status, having family or friends, home ownership, 
gender, and age (Taylor-Clark et al., 2010). Participants from ethnic minority groups in 
England, Scotland and Wales were more likely than white participants to have engaged 
in recommended health behaviours during a swine flu outbreak (Rubin et al., 2009). 
During a contaminated drinking water incident, compliance with official 
recommendations varied among different demographic groups within a surveyed 
sample (Galarce & Viswanath, 2012). For example, self-reported compliance with 
official advice to flush warm water taps for at least 15 minutes was higher for women 
than men and higher for Black respondents than for Hispanic or White respondents.  
Female participants reported higher ratings than male participants of risk perceptions 
and intention to change their behaviour in response to information about hypothetical 
terrorism, food safety and bed bug infestation events (Spence et al., 2017). Full 
compliance with recommended protective behaviours following a hypothetical chemical 
spill was higher among women than among men and higher among UK than among 
Polish participants (Pearce et al., 2013). Frisby, Sellnow, Lane, Veil, and Sellnow 
(2013) found that there was a significant interaction between participants’ stated 
learning preferences and the type of information they received on their perceived 
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efficacy to take protective action during a crisis. Younger participants indicated greater 
intended compliance than older participants with a food recall message disseminated in 
a social media message generated by a non-expert social media user (Freberg, 2012).  
Behavioural response to signage can also differ depending on audience 
characteristics. In a laboratory study of simulated wayfinding in a tilted passenger ship, 
evacuation decision-making of younger participants was influenced more by signage 
containing a green flashing frame on the perimeter of the sign, whereas decision-
making of older adult participants was influenced more by signage containing 
information on when the sign was last updated (Kwee-Meier et al., 2017). 
A range of factors affect perceptions of trust in the communicator, including 
sociodemographic characteristics of the audience (Chryssochoidis et al., 2009) and the 
communicator’s pre-existing reputation for trustworthiness among the audience 
(Cairns, de Andrade, & MacDonald, 2013). Historical and contemporary unjust 
treatment of the message audience by authorities due to sociodemographic factors 
such as ethnic and socio-economic group was a reported factor in non-adherence to 
evacuation warnings during Hurricane Katrina (Cordasco et al., 2007).  
In the field of non-emergency hygiene which is proximal to decontamination though 
unrelated to emergency behaviour, a covert observational study of soap use in a 
natural setting revealed gender differences, with women responding more than men to 
the promotion of hand hygiene education and men responding more than women to an 
appeal to the emotion of disgust (Judah et al., 2009). In a meta-analysis of the effect of 
fear appeals on attitudes, intentions, and behaviour in a wide range of behavioural 
contexts such as dental hygiene, fear appeals were found to be more effective when 
the percentage of female participants exceeded the percentage of male participants in 
the sample (Tannenbaum et al., 2015).  
 
2.6 Discussion 
The aim of this review was to draw from the literature and from health and social 
psychology theories more broadly, to identify guidelines for communication from 
authorities to improve casualty adherence to IOR protocols during the initial stage of 
the response to a chemical incident. Outcomes from this review include initial 
guidelines on communication during IOR and an agenda for future research. It may not 
be feasible to translate all review outcomes to IOR practice. I will now outline each 
recommendation, based on the findings of the present review reported in earlier 
sections, and explain both the feasibility of applying the recommendation to practice 
and the need to conduct further empirical assessment prior to practical application. The 
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communication principles derived from this review are based on unidirectional 
communication from authorities to recipients. It is anticipated that when casualties 
contact communicators, e.g. by dialling 999, it is not necessary, for example, to 
explicitly address competence and expertise of the communicator because this would 
already be acknowledged by message recipients in advance of the interaction. As 
stated in Chapter 1, the primary scenario of interest is one in which the threat of 
contamination is ambiguous to casualties but deemed highly likely by responders. 
 
Recommendation 1. Information should be disseminated to affected casualties 
as soon as responders know that IOR needs to be 
implemented 
 
Previous research indicates that faster communication is effective in promoting 
behaviour change. With IOR there is no real choice but to communicate quickly, 
rendering further empirical assessment of this recommendation redundant. Actions 
need to be taken as soon as possible therefore actions need to be communicated as 
soon as possible. As stated in Chapter 1, the optimum timescale for completion of 
evacuation and disrobing is within 15 minutes of exposure (Biomedical Advanced 
Research and Development Authority, 2015; Home Office, 2013, 2015; Joint 
Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, 2013; National Ambulance 
Resilience Unit, 2014; National CBRN Centre, 2016) therefore casualties need to be 
informed about the actions required of them as soon as possible. The most important 
consideration regarding communication channels in a chemical incident is that 
information is received by casualties quickly and that information is received by as 
many casualties as possible. Fast communication from responders to casualties serves 
not just the practical requirement of ensuring that evacuation and disrobing occur within 
the optimum 5-minute timeframe; it is also likely to improve perceptions of trust in the 
source of the message. It is anticipated that the channel most conducive to swift 
information dissemination to affected casualties would be the use of amplified vocal 
communication by responders at the scene, for example via a handheld or vehicle-
mounted loudhailer. Whilst acoustic factors of vocal communication have been shown 
to affect outcomes in laboratory studies, responders would have to use the voice that 
they have. The fundamental recommendation regarding the acoustic parameters of 
vocal communication in the IOR context is to eliminate background noise if possible 
and practical and to ensure that the voice of the responder is of sufficient volume to be 




Recommendation 2. Multiple sources and channels should be used to 
disseminate one consistent message to casualties 
 
The source of communication during IOR is likely to be determined either by current 
IOR guidelines which specify that the first responders on scene would be the first 
communicators (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, 2013; National 
CBRN Centre, 2016) or by the need to communicate rapidly to ensure rapid 
decontamination, in which case the first communicator may be a civilian at the scene 
with training in decontamination, for example attendance at the first aid course. The 
choice of platforms, channels or media used to disseminate information to casualties is 
likely to be constrained by what is available to the first responder at the point when they 
arrive on the scene. Therefore, there is little practical utility to testing the effectiveness 
of different communicators. 
Whilst it would be useful to run a study to test whether the use of multiple sources and 
channels is more effective at promoting IOR adherence, the more pragmatic approach 
is to determine which communication channels are likely to be available to responders 
then focus on finetuning message content that can be applied to available channels. 
Findings from this review indicate that location-based text messaging and carefully 
managed social media communication could be used to augment messages delivered 
by responders at the scene. But further investigation is required to test whether terse 
messaging would be effective at promoting adherence when applied to recipients at the 
treatment area of a mass casualty emergency. 
 
Recommendation 3. Casualties need to be provided with the following 
information: who the responder(s) is/are (including 
information to denote their competence and actions they are 
taking); information about the likelihood and severity of 
contamination; practical instructions on actions casualties 
should take to protect one another; the efficacy of these 
actions at reducing the threat of contamination; and 
casualties’ self-efficacy  
 
During certain types of emergency, justification to take action may be apparent in the 
absence of communication from authorities, for example due to the presence of fire. 
However, as explained in Chapter 1, skin exposure to hazardous chemicals does not 
necessarily result in immediate symptoms (Borak & Sidell, 1992; Chilcott, 2014; Clarke 
et al., 2008; Davis & Aspera, 2001; Garcia et al., 2011; Geissmann, 2004; Kales & 
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Christiani, 2004; Spiandore et al., 2017; Vale et al., 2016; Wattana & Bey, 2009) and 
casualties may not know that they are contaminated and that decontamination is 
required. The threat posed to casualties would therefore need to be explained to them. 
Based on the outcomes of this review and relevant theories, the application of 
information about the severity of and casualties’ susceptibility to chemical 
contamination; the efficacy of IOR decontamination; specific instructions about actions 
casualties should take; and a statement as to the expertise/competence of and actions 
taken by the communicator would constitute a theoretically effective approach to 
promoting the uptake of protective behaviours in the initial minutes of a chemical 
incident. It is anticipated that information about the efficacy of decontamination and 
casualties’ self-efficacy as agents of their own protection would serve to alleviate 
excessive fear by orienting attention to the fact that whilst the situation is threatening, 
the casualty has the means to resolve the threat. This theoretically allows first 
responders to maintain trust by avoiding unsubstantiated reassurance about the threat 
whilst also preventing threat appraisal from exceeding efficacy appraisal. If the source 
or cause of the chemical release is unknown to authorities, the uncertainty could be 
acknowledged by stating that responders are investigating the cause of the chemical 
release, but the chemical is known to be harmful so action needs to be taken 
immediately. 
In the context of communication during the initial phase of decontamination, it is 
anticipated that threat framing would consist of highlighting the fact that the message 
recipient has been contaminated with a hazardous chemical and that failure to respond 
to the threat will result in adverse health consequences for themselves and people with 
whom they come into contact. In a chemical incident, susceptibility would be conveyed 
by highlighting the location of the source of exposure. Efficacy framing would consist of 
explaining the benefit of recommended actions (removal of outer clothing and 
application of absorbent materials to skin) and by explaining the ease with which the 
message recipient can engage in these actions. At present, these are assumptions but 
further qualitative investigation into how lay people conceptualise chemical skin 
contamination would allow for more rigorous guidance on how to convey threat and 
efficacy constructs (see Chapter 5). It is anticipated that self-efficacy is a harder 
construct to address via communication as only the message recipient can be truly 
aware of their own self-efficacy. 
Studies included in previous reviews and meta-analyses on the effect of threat and 
efficacy information on behavioural outcomes have only assessed behaviour change 
pertaining to long-term risks, for example smoking cessation, vaccination, diet, 
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exercise, sun protection, disease prevention, safe driving, and earthquake preparation 
(Peters et al., 2013; Sheeran et al., 2014; Tannenbaum et al., 2015), as opposed to 
behaviour in the acute response phase of an emergency. Whilst previous studies have 
supported PMT in the context of emergency preparedness behaviour (Mulilis & Lippa, 
1990; Poussin, Botzen, & Aerts, 2014), no empirical support was found in the present 
review for the effect of threat and efficacy information on behaviour change within a 
narrow timeframe, such as would be available in an incident that necessitates IOR. 
It is expected that, pending further empirical assessment outlined above, this 
recommendation would be easy to apply in practice. In subsequent chapters, I will 
explore potential impediments to the practical application of theoretically effective 
guidelines pertaining to message content. 
 
Recommendation 4. Information should be staggered rather than condensed and 
repeated throughout the IOR process 
 
Based on the anticipated stress and anxiety that would occur during a mass chemical 
incident and the predictions of the Mental Noise Model, processing of all the 
information outlined in the previous recommendation is likely to be impaired. The most 
effective approach to addressing this processing impairment is to stagger and repeat 
information, rather than condense and hence provide insufficient information. There is 
evidence to support this recommendation from one study on decision-making 
responses to a hypothetical impending tsunami social media message (Sutton, Vos, et 
al., 2018). It would be useful to repeat this experiment in the IOR context using 
channels that would be available to first responders.  
 
Recommendation 5. Language used to construct messages should be simple 
and nontechnical 
 
Messages cannot be accepted and acted on if they are not understood. The tailoring of 
crisis and risk communication to audiences with different information processing 
abilities is receiving attention, for example through a programme of research (Bass, 
Gordon, Gordon, & Parvanta, 2016; Bass, Gordon, Maurer, et al., 2016) on improving 
communication with low-literacy adults about radiological terror events. The most 
pragmatic approach to take in a chemical incident, based on findings from this review, 
is to frame information in simple, non-technical language, using the US 6th-grade 
reading proficiency level (R. C. Chandler, 2010; Omori et al., 2017) as a guide for pre-





This review was carried out whilst the response to the 2018 Wiltshire Novichok incident 
was still unfolding. While lessons from the incident are likely to be relevant to this work, 
at the time of writing no assessment of public responses to communication issued by 
authorities during this incident was available. 
As explained in the introduction, this review included a proportion of studies found 
following a systematic search, the method for which is reported in the following chapter. 
Due to the breadth of theories and studies, I did not use a systematic, replicable 
method to identify and synthesis findings from the entirety of literature relating to crisis 
communication, but I included findings from previous systematic reviews. 
To further develop guiding principles for communication during IOR that can be 
empirically tested, I carried out a systematic review with more stringent inclusion 
criteria, limited to studies of behaviour in response to communication with casualties at 
the scene of a mass casualty emergency. This review is reported in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3 The impact of communication on casualty behaviour 
during mass casualty emergencies: A systematic review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the event of a mass casualty emergency involving the release of a hazardous 
chemical, UK first responders are trained to implement Initial Operational Response 
(IOR) as a preliminary countermeasure, prior to the arrival of specialist 
decontamination facilities. During IOR, casualties are required to adopt a series of 
behaviours, including evacuation; improvised dry decontamination (removal of a 
contaminant from the skin using any available absorbent materials) or improvised wet 
decontamination (removal of a contaminant from the skin using any available water 
source). The success of these steps as a countermeasure against exposure to a 
harmful chemical will be determined by casualties’ willingness to carry out 
recommended behaviours. If casualties are unwilling to engage in the required 
behaviours, then the countermeasure will be ineffective.  
In the previous chapter, I outlined recommendations for communication techniques that 
are likely to be conducive to public adherence to protective actions during an 
emergency. These are based on well supported theories of behaviour change, previous 
reviews and studies on research areas tangential to IOR decontamination, including 
crisis and emergency risk communication, wayfinding signage, and non-emergency 
hygiene behaviours. Based on the outcomes of the review, it is expected that 
adherence to IOR can be improved via: swift communication (Carter & Amlôt, 2016; 
Omori et al., 2017; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; World Health Organization, 2017); 
multiple sources disseminating one consistent message (Glik, 2007a, 2007b; Mileti & 
Sorensen, 1990; Omori et al., 2017; Rubin et al., 2012; Sorensen, 2000; World Health 
Organization, 2017); simple, non-technical language (Fish et al., 2017); and the 
provision of information about who the first responders are (Mallett et al., 1999; Omori 
et al., 2017) and what actions they are taking to protect casualties (Carter, Drury, 
Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015), what protective actions 
casualties need to take (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, 
Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; Glik, 2007a; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; D. D. Sellnow et al., 
2017; Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018; World Health Organization, 2017), and information 
about the emergency itself, such as cause and impact (Firestone & Everly, 2013; 
Omori et al., 2017; Sorensen, 2000; Sutton et al., 2015; Sutton et al., 2014; Sutton, 
Vos, et al., 2018). Based on converging predictions of Protection Motivation Theory 
(PMT) (R. W. Rogers, 1975, 1983), the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) 
(Witte, 1992, 1994), the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) (Lindell & Perry, 
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2012), and the IDEA Model of instructional risk and crisis communication (D. D. 
Sellnow et al., 2017), information about the severity of the threat, casualties’ 
susceptibility to hazardous chemical exposure, the efficacy of IOR at reducing the 
threat of contamination; and casualties’ self-efficacy at performing IOR, should improve 
the effectiveness of messages designed to promote adherence.  
Whilst previous literature reviews have assessed communication-related factors that 
may affect emergency preparedness (Savoia, Lin, & Viswanath, 2013) or public 
behaviour in the response phase of disasters (Bean et al., 2015; Bradley et al., 2014; 
Glik, 2007a), including CBRN disasters (Rubin et al., 2012), there has yet to be a 
systematic review directly relevant to mass casualty IOR decontamination, a 
communication context with a particular set of constraints. Firstly, the audience 
consists of people confined to the particular location of the emergency, such as a car 
park or train station, and who are, or are strongly suspected to be, casualties of the 
incident. Secondly, the timeframe of interest is the acute phase of the incident when 
behaviour change is required immediately to protect life or prevent serious negative 
health effects. This contrasts with communicating preparedness messages before an 
incident or risk communication in the medium to long-term following an emergency. 
Third, the communicators would be responders present at the scene, such as police, 
ambulance staff or firefighters, who are engaging directly with casualties, rather than 
government or media spokespersons disseminating information via social or traditional 
media. 
In this review, I explored the existing literature on communication with casualties at the 
scene or treatment area of a mass casualty emergency, defined as an event where the 
number of patients poses a substantial demand on first responders and first receiving 
hospital staff and resources (Floyd, 2017; Glarum, Birou, & Cetaruk, 2009), reducing 
the capacity to concurrently treat all patients (Lynn, 2016). Mass casualty emergencies 
differ from disasters in that patients, “can be managed within the resources of the 
affected organisation or health facility” (Aitken & Leggat, 2012, p. 144). The category, 
“mass casualty emergency” (MCE) encompasses chemical incidents in addition to 
other types of emergency, such as a fire. The terms “mass casualty incident” or “mass 
casualty event” describe a similar set of parameters and in this chapter the terms are 
used interchangeably.  
The aim of the review was to identify communication interventions that have been 
assessed in terms of their effect on: a) the observed or self-reported behaviour of 
casualties at the treatment area of an emergency (including incidents that later 
transpire to have been false alarms); b) the observed or self-reported behaviour or self-
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reported behavioural intentions of participants during a simulated emergency; or c) the 
behavioural intentions and expectations of participants in a hypothetical emergency 
situation or vignette. The purpose of this review is to identify communication factors 
that are likely to be directly relevant to communication during IOR and to identify 
unanswered research questions that need to be addressed when developing a 
communication intervention for this type of emergency. 
 
3.2 Method 
3.2.1. Electronic database searches 
I used search terms (Appendix A) pertaining to the population/context, intervention and 
outcome of the research question to search the following electronic databases: 
• Ovid®SP MEDLINE® In-Process & Other Non-Indexed Citations;  
• Ovid®SP MEDLINE® 1946 to Present;  
• OvidSP PsycINFO® 1806 to March Week 1 2018;  
• Web of Science™ v5.27.2 (Thomson Reuters, New York, New York, USA). 
  
Searches were first conducted on 12th August 2016, with preliminary results used to 
inform the scope of investigation in the PhD, then replicated in March 2018. In this 
chapter, I describe the method and results of searches carried out on 14th March 2018. 
Database-specific controlled vocabulary was used where available (MEDLINE® and 
PsycINFO® searches). Free text terms were consistent, save for database-specific 
truncation and wildcard options, across all three databases. Free text terms were 
searched within titles and abstracts on MEDLINE® and PsycINFO® and within title, 
abstract, author keywords, and Keywords Plus® in all Web of Science™ v5.22.1 
databases, excluding MEDLINE® (Web of Science™ Core Collection, BIOSIS Citation 
IndexSM, BIOSIS Citation IndexSM,KCI-Korean Journal Database, Russian Science 
Citation Index, and SciELO Citation Index). MEDLINE® results were excluded from the 
Web of Science database results because MEDLINE® had already been searched via 
Ovid®SP. 
A proportion of the population/context free text search terms were derived from 
previous reviews on the subject of disasters (Brooks et al., 2015) and communication 
regarding CBRN incidents (Rubin et al., 2012). In line with recommendations by Egan, 
MacLean, Sweeting, and Hunt (2012), both generic (e.g. disaster) and specific (e.g. 
chemical spill, hurricane, landslide) search terms were used. 
Search terms pertaining to each concept of the research question were combined via 
the Boolean operator “OR.” The combined searches for each concept were 
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subsequently combined using the Boolean operator, “AND.” Resulting citations were 
exported to EndNote© X8.0.1(Thomson Reuters, New York, USA) and duplicates were 
removed.  
3.2.2. Grey literature searches 
I searched the following grey literature sources on 20th March 2018: British Library 
directory of online doctoral theses (EThOS); International Standard Randomised 
Controlled Trials Number (ISRCTN) registry; the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies 
Secretariat Emergency Planning College Document Hub; Fire Brigades Union (FBU) 
Publications; Fire Safety Engineering Group publications; Defense Technical 
Information Center (DTIC); and The National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH-2) bibliographic database. Exercise reports written by Public Health 
England (formerly Health Protection Agency staff) were not included in the greay 
literature search as these had already been subjected to secondary analysis by Carter 
et al. (2012b, 2013). Based on the outcomes of the secondary analysis and 
consultation with the lead author, there was no information in these materials on the 
relationship between decontamination compliance and specific characteristics of 
communication. These reports would therefore not have met the intervention criteria for 
this review. The main finding of this literature was that information perceived by 
roleplaying exercise casualties as poor was associated with expectations of non-
compliance in a real incident. Whilst this finding contributed to the rationale for the 
project, the reports themselves did not meet my inclusion criteria. 
The terms “communication,” “emergency” and “behaviour” were entered into the 
abstract, title, and subject keyword search fields in EThOS, combined with the Boolean 
operator, “AND”. The terms “communication” and “emergency” were entered, with the 
Boolean combination operator “AND,” into the text search field of the ISRCTN registry 
and ‘All Fields’ search field of the NIOSH-2 database. The term “Communication” was 
entered as a keyword search in the FBU publications database. All Fire Safety 
Engineering Group and Cabinet Office Civil Contingency Secretariat Emergency 
Planning College publications were screened for relevance. The following search terms 
for were used to search for DTIC technical reports: 
("mass casualty emergency" OR "mass casualty incident") AND (communicat* OR 
instruct* OR messag* OR signage) 
 
3.2.3. Citation checking 
Following the screening of full texts found in electronic database and grey literature 
searches, I reviewed the citations of included papers, relevant review papers found in 
electronic database searches, and references of potentially relevant abstracts for which 
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full texts could not be accessed. I also used Google Scholar to screen papers which 
had cited included papers. 
3.2.4. Study selection, quality appraisal, data extraction and data synthesis 
I conducted an initial screening of all the titles and abstracts of electronic database 
search results against the inclusion and exclusion criteria outlined in Table 3-1 to 
identify potentially relevant papers. Electronic database searches were not restricted by 
language so I was able to identify potentially relevant non-English language papers by 
screening abstracts that had been translated into English. The full texts of potentially 
relevant papers were examined further to ensure that all criteria were met. Full texts for 
which the applicability of inclusion criteria was uncertain were reviewed by the 
supervisory team and discussions were held until consensus was reached.  
I used the 2011 version of the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT) (Pluye et al., 
2011) to appraise the quality of included studies based on information provided in the 
publications and, where available, supplementary information. The tool was developed 
specifically for appraising the quality of studies in systematic reviews in which there are 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods studies (Pluye, 2013; Pluye & Hong, 2014). 
Whilst the tool’s content validity and reliability have been assessed, work is ongoing to 
further develop the tool (Hong, Gonzalez‐Reyes, & Pluye, 2018; Pluye et al., 2011; 
Souto et al., 2015).  
I extracted and tabulated the following data from included studies. First author, year of 
publication, study type (e.g. randomised trial, cross-sectional survey, focus group); 
setting (country in which study took place); sample size; sampling method and study 
population (e.g. students); type of emergency (e.g. hurricane); and nature of 
emergency (e.g. real, simulated or hypothetical) were collated for display in one table 
(Table 3-2). Communication intervention(s) or predictor(s) assessed; behavioural 
measure(s); key findings (effect or lack of effect of communication 
interventions/predictors on behavioural outcomes); and quality appraisal score were 
collated and displayed in another table (Table 3-3). 
Data extracted from each study were submitted to each corresponding author, when 
correspondence was possible, to check for accuracy of data extraction.  
Narrative synthesis is an established method of using text to collate study findings in 
mixed systematic reviews for which meta-analysis is not appropriate due to 
methodological and statistical variability (Campbell, Katikireddi, Sowden, McKenzie, & 
Thomson, 2018). Following the method of narrative analysis established by Popay et 
al. (2006) and cited as an available narrative synthesis method in PRISMA-P 
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guidelines (Shamseer et al., 2015), I grouped communication interventions and 
predictors across studies into categories and reported whether and how each 
communication category affected behaviour during an incident. Preliminary synthesis 
was developed by tabulating effects and direction of effects of each study (Table 3-3). 
Qualitative case descriptions about interventions and/or predictors that had similar 
directions of effect across studies were used to identify factors that explain the effect 
that communication can have on casualty behaviour in an MCE, based on the available 
literature.  
3.2.5. Protocol registration 
The protocol for this review was published on PROSPERO (2016:CRD42016047719) 
on 19th September 2016. The protocol was amended on 11th January 2017 to include 
“written in English” as a criterion for type of study to be included in the review.  
I stated in the protocol that I anticipated using the Cochrane Collaboration’s tool for 
assessing risk of bias but given that the tool was developed for the appraisal of 
randomised trials and that studies found in this review covered a wider range of study 
types, including qualitative studies, in practice I used the Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool 
(Pluye et al., 2011) because it is tailored to mixed systematic reviews (Pluye, 2013; 
Pluye & Hong, 2014). 
Rather than separate qualitative from quantitative studies and randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs) from other quantitative studies and carry out separate narrative syntheses 
(as stated in the protocol), I applied narrative synthesis to all included studies. This was 
due to the low number of included studies. In the protocol, I specified that I would 
synthesise the relative impact of “behaviour change predictors” in observational studies 
but because the research question centred on the impact of communication on 




Table 3-1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria for study selection. 
Category Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria 
Type of study • Contains original data;  
• Human participants; 
• Written in English. 




• Casualties in a mass casualty 
emergency (hypothetical, 
simulated or real-life); 
• Civilians who have not 
completed training in 
response to emergency 
situations as part of their 
profession.  
 
• Participants and populations 
drawn from military 
organisations;  
• Participants and populations 
drawn from emergency 
response organisations; 
such as paramedics and 
firefighters, who are trained 
to adopt target behaviours 
in response to emergency 
situations; 
• Studies on communication 
with the wider public (i.e. 
people who are not directly 




• Studies where there is an 
explicit qualitative or 
quantitative evaluation of the 
effect of emergency 
responders’ communication 
on casualty behaviour; 
• Studies of mass casualty 
emergencies in which 
responders are deployed to 
the scene of the emergency 
and are required to 
communicate with casualties; 
• Communication interventions 
include, but are not limited to, 
one-to-one interaction 
between responders and 
casualties without the aid of 
technology; interaction 
between responders and 
casualties involving 
technology (e.g. public 
address systems); pre-
recorded audio, visual, and 
audio-visual message(s); 
information sheets; siren 
systems; provision of 
equipment, such as first aid 
kits, with instructions to 
casualties. 
• Studies on long-term 
communication campaigns; 
• Studies on communication 
between responders or 
communication between 





• Objective measures, 
observations or self-reports 
of behaviour or behavioural 






Figure 3-1 Preferred Reporting Items of Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) (Mother, Liberati, & Tetzlaff, 2009) flow diagram of the 




3.3.1. Study selection and summary 
5179 search results, excluding duplicates, were extracted from electronic databases. 
The abstracts of two theses (Abdelhamid, 2018; Fraustino, 2017) were deemed 
potentially relevant but after exhausting all means of accessing full texts (including 
contacting corresponding authors), I had no option but to exclude studies contained in 
these theses. References were available –and searched -for one of the abstracts 
(Fraustino, 2017). One paper (Baek, Baek, Shin, Song, & Kook, 2011) with an abstract 
that indicated potential relevance was excluded because the full text was not available 
in English. Following title and abstract screening, 113 full texts were screened and four 
studies met all inclusion criteria. The list of papers excluded on full text screening and 
the justifications for exclusion are outlined in Appendix B. One study found in grey 
literature searches was included and two studies were included following citation 
searches. The total number of included studies was seven (flow diagram displayed in 
Figure 3-1). 
Six studies (Duarte, Rebelo, Teles, & Wogalter, 2014; Fridolf et al., 2013; Galea et al., 
2017a, 2017b; Kwee-Meier et al., 2017; Vilar et al., 2014) for which full texts were 
screened were excluded from the review because the tested interventions were 
emergency exit designs inherent in the structural design of the environment in which 
participants underwent emergency wayfinding, rather than interventions administered in 
response to an MCE. Although not meeting the inclusion criteria for this review, the 
outcomes of these studies and related studies found via backwards and forwards 
citation searching (Andrée et al., 2016; Bode, Wagoum, & Codling, 2014; Galea et al., 
2014; Glover & Wogalter, 1997; Nilsson et al., 2005, 2008) are outlined in the previous 
chapter. 
Data extracted from the included studies (Amlôt et al., 2017; Boyce, McConnell, & 
Shields, 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; 
Mallett, Vaught, & Brnich Jr, 1993; Proulx & Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010) are displayed in 
Tables 3-2 and 3-3. The types of emergency in included studies were: mass casualty 
exposure to an unknown substance (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 
2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015), emergency fire evacuation (Boyce et al., 
2017; Mallett et al., 1993; Proulx & Sime, 1991), and evacuation for unknown reason 
(Purser, 2010).  Behavioural measures concerned either evacuation (Boyce et al., 
2017; Mallett et al., 1993; Proulx & Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010) or compliance with 
decontamination instructions (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; 
Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015). Aside from one hypothetical scenario presented to 
participants via vignette (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015), one real incident recounted 
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by participants in a qualitative case study (Mallett et al., 1993) and one observational 
study without comparison group (Boyce et al., 2017), the remaining studies were 
emergency simulations conducted as randomised (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, 
Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; Purser, 2010) or non-randomised 
(Proulx & Sime, 1991) controlled trials in a natural (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; 
Proulx & Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010) or laboratory (Amlôt et al., 2017) setting for which 
participants were briefed (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014) or not 
briefed (Proulx & Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010) in advance. The studies in which 
participants were not briefed in advance about the emergency simulation differed from 
the studies in which participants knowingly took part in emergency simulations, in terms 
of the type of emergency studied. These ’covert’ emergency simulations were all 
studies of mass evacuation behaviour, whereas overt studies centred on behaviour 
during mass casualty decontamination.  
In studies on evacuation, target behaviour change consisted of exiting the emergency 
location within the shortest possible time (Boyce et al., 2017; Mallett et al., 1993; Proulx 
& Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010) whilst using the safest exit routes (Mallett et al., 1993; 
Proulx & Sime, 1991). In studies on mass casualty decontamination, target behaviour 
was characterised as adherence to emergency responders’ instructions (Amlôt et al., 
2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015) with 
maximum efficiency (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014).  
3.3.2. Quality Appraisal 
The one included qualitative study met all criteria in the MMAT aside from 
demonstration of appropriate consideration for how the influence of researchers may 
have affected findings. Overall quality of included quantitative studies was low with 
most studies meeting one MMAT criterion at most. Limitations applicable to all included 
RCTs were lack of clear description of the randomisation, with authors frequently 
stating that participants were randomised rather than describing the randomisation 
procedure in sufficient detail, and lack of information about the size of the withdrawal or 
drop-out rate. Only one RCT provided a description of allocation concealment by 
stating that participants were assigned to an intervention condition via a computer 
programme when they clicked on the link to the online experiment (Carter, Drury, 
Amlôt, et al., 2015), thus ensuring that researchers would be blind to condition at 
allocation stage. However, authors either reported that researchers were not blind or 








Study type Setting 
Sample 
size 






UK 21 Not stated  
Mass casualty exposure 










UK 239 Occupants present at the study location Fire alarm 
Covert simulation 
(participants unaware 







Self-selected convenience sample of university 
students 
Mass casualty exposure 
to unknown substance 







Self-selected convenience sample of university 
psychology students 
Mass casualty exposure 










UK Not stated Occupants present at the study location Fire alarm 
Covert simulation 
(participants unaware 









Self-selected convenience sample of university 
students and staff 
Ambiguous incident 












Communication intervention(s) or 
predictor(s) assessed 





Two messaging interventions administered 
in a between-subjects design with one trial 
per condition:  
Condition 1. Control intervention (no 
instructions or explanation); 
Condition 2. Provision of instructions on 
how to undergo dry 
decontamination and an 
explanation as to the purpose 
of dry decontamination.   
• Observation of participants 
undergoing dry decontamination;  
• 7-point Likert scale item pertaining 
to self-reported intention to 
undergo dry decontamination and 
intention to seek further treatment 
in a real incident. 
• Significantly more participants in the intervention group 
applied absorbent materials to all parts of their body and 
adopted the correct procedure and used sufficient absorbent 
material to avoid cross-contamination; 
• No statistically significant effect of intervention on self-
reported behavioural intentions.   
0% 
Boyce (2017) All occupants received: alarm siren (fire 
alarm); live voice announcements 
administered via public address system 
after alarm sounding; and cases of staff 
requesting that patrons evacuate after 
alarm sounding. Two separate rooms within 
the same building were analysed 
separately.  In Room 1, the alarm was 
followed by one main announcement from 
the bar manager. In Room 2, the alarm was 
followed by repeated announcements from 
the DJ. 
Observation of recognition time (time 
taken for occupants to realise that an 
emergency is occurring) and 
response time (time taken for 
occupants to make first move 
indicative of evacuation from building 
after realising that emergency is 
occurring).  
No inferential statistical analysis was carried out on difference 
between communication conditions but there were descriptive 
observations in both rooms of increase in evacuation activity 








Communication intervention(s) or 
predictor(s) assessed 
Behavioural measure(s) Key findings Quality 
appraisal 
score 
Carter (2014) Three messaging interventions 
administered in a between-subjects design 
with one trial per condition:  
Condition 1. Sufficient practical information 
about steps casualties should 
take; health-focused 
explanations about why 
actions are necessary; and 
updates about actions that 
responders are taking;  
Condition 2. Sufficient practical information 
about actions casualties 
should take;  
Condition 3. Insufficient practical 
information about actions 
casualties should take. 
• Observation of time taken for total 
number of participants per 
condition to proceed through 
decontamination shower 
(descriptive statistics); 
• Observation of frequency of non-
compliance, confusion, and helping 
behaviours;  
• Ordinal questionnaire items 
pertaining to self-reported 
willingness to help others during a 
real incident (1 item) and 
expectations of compliance during 
a real incident (3 items); 
• Open-ended questionnaire items 
pertaining to participants' self-
reported experiences of field 
experiment. 
• No inferential statistical analysis was carried out on time 
taken to proceed through decontamination shower. 
Descriptive statistics indicated that participants in Condition 
1 took the least amount of time and participants in Condition 
2 took the most amount of time to complete the shower.  
• There was no significant effect of messaging intervention on 
observed helping behaviour. 
• Observational analysis indicated significantly more instances 
of behaviour coded as non-compliance and confusion when 
practical information was insufficient (Condition 3) than when 
practical information was sufficient (Conditions 1 and 2). 
Significantly less confusion was observed when health-
focused information about why actions are necessary and 
updates about actions that responders are taking were 
provided (Condition1). 
• There was no significant effect of messaging intervention on 
self-report ordinal measures of expectations of compliance 
or willingness to help others during a real incident.  
• Path analysis indicated no indirect effect of communication 
on expected compliance in a real incident but, following 
removal of non-significant paths, path analysis did indicate 
that being in Condition 1, rather than Conditions 2 and 3, 
was a significant predictor of responder legitimacy, which in 
turn was a significant predictor of collective agency, which in 
turn was a significant predictor of willingness to help others 
during a real incident. 
• Content analysis of open-ended questionnaire items resulted 
in no themes pertaining to self-reported behaviour or 







Communication intervention(s) or 
predictor(s) assessed 
Behavioural measure(s) Key findings Quality 
appraisal 
score 
Carter (2015) Three messaging interventions 
administered in a between-subjects design:  
Condition 1. Sufficient practical information 
about steps casualties should 
take; health-focused 
explanations about why 
actions are necessary; and 
updates about actions that 
responders are taking;  
Condition 1. Sufficient practical information 
about actions casualties 
should take; 
Condition 2. Insufficient practical 
information about actions 
casualties should take. 
Ordinal questionnaire items 
pertaining to self-reported 
expectations of compliance with the 
decontamination process (3 items) 
and helping and orderly behaviour (3 
items) were the scenario to occur in 
real life. 
• There were no statistically significant differences between 
messaging intervention on expectations of compliance or 
helping and orderly behaviour in a real incident. 
• Following removal of non-significant paths, path analysis 
indicated that being in Condition 1, rather than Conditions 2 
and 3, was a significant predictor of perceptions of 
responder legitimacy. Perceived responder legitimacy was a 
significant predictor of perceived identification with 
responders, which in turn was a significant predictor of 
expected compliance.  Perceived responder legitimacy was 
also a significant predictor of perceived collective agency, 
which in turn was a significant predictor of expected helping 




Mallett (1993) All respondents potentially received face-to-
face communication between mine staff; 
page phone system; dial phone system; 
and wayfinding signage. 
Self-reported retrospective accounts 
of behaviour. 
• Evacuation was reportedly delayed by lack of detailed 
information (e.g. size and location) about the fire; insufficient 
instructions as to how to evacuate; obscured wayfinding 
signage; lack of trust due to previous difficulties with 
following wayfinding signage; the malfunctioning of the page 
phone system; and inability to hear the dial phone ringing.  
• Participants reported following other mine staff who were 
perceived as experienced in wayfinding, for example miners 







Communication intervention(s) or 
predictor(s) assessed 
Behavioural measure(s) Key findings Quality 
appraisal 
score 
Proulx (1991) Five communication interventions 
administered in a between-subjects design:  
Condition 1. Alarm siren;  
Condition 2. Instruction to evacuate 
administered by station staff;  
Condition 3. Repeated instruction to 
evacuate administered via 
public address system;  
Condition 4. Instructions on which 
evacuation routes to take and 
directive instructions aimed at 
specific occupants, 
administered by public address 
system and train station staff;  
Condition 5. Instructions on which 
evacuation routes to take, 
directive instructions aimed at 
specific occupants, and 
information about the reason 
for evacuation (fire) and the 
location of the fire, 
administered via public 
address system. 
Observation of time taken for 
occupants to start to move, time 
taken for occupants to evacuate from 
the station, and whether occupants 
took safest evacuation route from 
their starting location. 
No inferential statistical analysis was applied to test the 
difference between conditions on behavioural measures. 
Descriptive statistics indicated that the alarm siren (condition 
1) resulted in the greatest delay to time taken to start to 
evacuate and time taken to evacuate from the station. The 
intervention administered in condition 5 resulted in the most 







Communication intervention(s) or 
predictor(s) assessed 






Three communication interventions 
administered in a between-subjects design 
with two trials per condition:  
Condition 1. Alarm siren;  
Condition 2. 9-second recorded female 
voice message: "Attention 
please! Attention please! This 
is an emergency. Please leave 
the building by your nearest 
exit"; 
Condition 3. 4-second recorded female 
message: "This is an 
emergency! Please leave the 
building". 
• Observation of recognition time 
(time taken for each participant to 
stop engaging in pre-intervention 
activity and respond to 
intervention), response time 
(interval between first response to 
alarm and first movement to 
evacuate);  
• Additional observations of 
behaviour (no coding scheme);  
• Ordinal questionnaire items 
pertaining to the extent to which 
participants were motivated to 
leave the room, were motivated by 
the alarm, and attempted to finish 
their activity before evacuating. 
• Participants in the voice message conditions displayed 
shorter recognition times than participants in the alarm 
condition. 
• Participants in the 4-second message condition displayed 
shorter recognition times than participants in the 9-second 
message condition.  
• There was no effect of intervention on response time.  
• Data from one 4-second message trial were excluded (and a 
replacement trial carried out) because occupants did not 
evacuate at any point during the trial.  
• There were observed evacuation delays in the voice 
message conditions due to participants staying to listen to 
the full message and its first repeat but no descriptive or 
inferential statistics of this observation were reported.  
• Group interactions were observed as having an effect on 
time taken to evacuate.  
• Questionnaire items indicated that participants were 
significantly more motivated to the leave the room in the 9-
second than in the 4-second message condition and that the 
intervention reportedly had a significant effect on whether 
participants attempted to finish pre-intervention activity 
before evacuating but there was no explicit statement as to 






3.3.3.1 Provision of instructions improved uptake of target behaviours 
For both categories of target behaviour, the provision of instructional information, 
delivered either in person or via a speaker system, as to what actions were required of 
the audience was found to be more conducive to changing the target behaviour when 
compared to minimal or no information about required actions. Live or pre-recorded 
voice message instructions to evacuate resulted in reduced time taken by casualties to 
respond to an unanticipated evacuation (Proulx & Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010) and 
greater disengagement from pre-alarm activities (Boyce et al., 2017), relative to the 
sounding of an alarm, though inferential statistical tests were only carried out in one 
(Purser, 2010) of these three studies.  
Greater detail in instructional information improved outcomes relative to instructions 
that lacked detail. In one study (Proulx & Sime, 1991), more specific instructions on 
how to evacuate, “Passengers on all platforms should board the first available train. 
Passengers at Concourse level should leave by the nearest exit. Do not use the lift.” 
appeared to reduce time taken for the message audience to clear the area when 
compared to the less detailed instruction to “evacuate the station immediately”. 
Instructions on how to evacuate that were perceived by participants to be insufficient 
were associated with delayed evacuation in an underground fire (Mallett et al., 1993). 
Similarly, participants subjected to a communication intervention in which they were 
guided through the entire process of dry decontamination with instructions such as, 
“use some of the blue roll to blot and rub hands until they are clean” were significantly 
more likely to apply absorbent materials to all parts of their body and to apply 
absorbent materials in a manner that would not incur cross-contamination (Amlôt et al., 
2017). Participants in a mass decontamination field experiment (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, 
et al., 2014) displayed behaviours coded as confusion, such as asking other 
participants or emergency responders to explain what actions should be taken, or non-
compliance, such as leaving the trial area, significantly more frequently when practical 
information about what actions they should take were limited to, “We would like you to 
undergo a decontamination shower. Please take off your outer layers of clothes, down 
to your swimwear. Please then change into the orange ponchos provided” and when 
first responders at the scene were briefed in advance not to help participants undergo 
actions.  
3.3.3.2 Provision of justification for instructions improved uptake of target 
behaviours 
When provided with either specific information about the emergency or information as 
to why it was necessary to take protective action, participants were observed or self-
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reported to be more likely to engage in target behaviours. Respondents who had 
evacuated from a real-life underground fire reported that their decision to evacuate was 
delayed by lack of detailed information about the fire, for example the size of the fire 
and where the fire was located (Mallett et al., 1993). When informed in an 
unannounced train station evacuation that there was a suspected fire and when 
informed of the specific location of the fire, passengers evacuated from a train station 
more quickly than when they were not informed of the type and location of the 
emergency (Proulx & Sime, 1991). Participants in a decontamination laboratory trial 
(Amlôt et al., 2017) adopted the correct, safe dry decontamination procedure more 
frequently when informed that, “using the blue roll to remove the contaminant is an 
effective way to make sure that as much of the contaminant as possible is removed 
from your skin…to reduce any adverse health effects from the contaminant…[and] 
prevent spread of the contaminant to other people and places”. It is not possible to 
determine whether it was justification in the form of information about the threat or 
information about the efficacy of protective action that resulted in improved behavioural 
outcomes or whether it was provision of direct instructions on how to engage in 
protective actions that improved outcomes as both types of information were provided 
concomitantly in both studies. 
There were significantly fewer instances of confusion, and descriptive data indicated 
that passage through a decontamination shower was more efficient, when responders 
were briefed to be as helpful as possible and when health-focused information as to 
why decontamination is necessary was provided in the form of the following message 
delivered via public address system: “Undergoing a decontamination shower will then 
remove any remaining contaminant from your skin. This will help to prevent you 
suffering any adverse effects from the contaminant” (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014). 
There was also an indirect effect on expected helping behaviour in a real incident, that 
was mediated by increased perceptions of responder legitimacy and collective agency 
(the perception that participants would be able to work together to resolve the 
situation). It is not possible to determine whether these outcomes can be attributed to: 
the health-based justification message that participants heard; the unrecorded 
information they will have received from responders; or the information about actions 
responders were taking that was also present in this communication condition. In an 
online RCT, the provision of a similar justification for following instructions (“it is 
important that you undergo decontamination, as this will protect you, and others around 
you who may become contaminated”) had an indirectly positive association with 
expected compliance in a real incident, after taking into account perceptions of 
responder legitimacy and perceived identification with responders. However, it is not 
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possible to separate the effect of this justification from the effect of stating actions that 
responders are taking (“you are informed that responders are setting up the 
decontamination tent, and as soon as this has been completed, the decontamination 
process will begin”) as this information was also present exclusively in the same 
condition. 
3.3.3.3 Provision of regular updates about actions responders are taking improved 
uptake of target behaviours 
In an online RCT to test messaging interventions in a mass decontamination scenario 
(Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015), regular updates from responders about actions they 
are taking, such as “responders are setting up the decontamination tent, and as soon 
as this has been completed, the decontamination process will begin” (p. 188) had an 
indirectly positive association with expected compliance in a real incident. Inclusion of 
similar information in a messaging intervention administered in a field experiment in 
another included study (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014), e.g. “We are now finishing 
the set up of the decontamination tent, and the decontamination process will begin in 
about 5 minutes time”: increased the efficiency with which participants proceeded 
through the decontamination shower, though inferential statistical analysis of this 
difference was not possible; resulted in fewer observed instances of confusion; and 
indirectly increased self-reported ratings of likelihood of helping other casualties in a 
real incident. But it is not possible to separate the effect of this type of message from 
the effect of providing health-based justification for undergoing decontamination as 
neither type of message was tested in isolation in either study. 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The aim of this systematic review was to assess the effect of communication on the 
behaviour of casualties at the scene or treatment area of an MCE as an initial step in 
developing a communication intervention for use by first responders tasked with 
promoting casualty engagement in IOR at the scene of a chemical incident. My 
synthesis of included studies indicated that uptake of target behaviours among 
casualties in an MCE can be improved by providing: information about actions 
casualties should take; justification for taking such actions in the form of information 
about the emergency, specifically the type of emergency and the location or source of 
the incident, and information about the efficacy of taking protective action; and regular 
updates from responders about actions they are taking. 
Findings from this review are supported by findings from other reviews and studies on 
crisis communication with the wider public during a hazardous event, which indicate 
that specifying the type of hazard that is facing message recipients as well as its 
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source and impact (Firestone & Everly, 2013; Omori et al., 2017; Sorensen, 2000; 
Sutton et al., 2015; Sutton et al., 2014; Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018) and providing 
information on specific actions that message recipients should take to protect 
themselves (Glik, 2007a; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; D. D. Sellnow et al., 2017; Sutton, 
Vos, et al., 2018; World Health Organization, 2017) would improve public adherence to 
adaptive behaviours during a hazardous event. Threat perceptions are predicted to 
influence likelihood of taking protective action in Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) 
(R. W. Rogers, 1975, 1983), the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte, 
1992, 1994), and the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) (Lindell & Perry, 2012), 
while the IDEA Model of instructional risk and crisis communication (D. D. Sellnow et 
al., 2017) predicts that increased specificity of recommended actions promotes greater 
likelihood of adherence to target behaviours. The present review provides evidence, 
albeit limited, that provision of both types of information promote adaptive behaviour at 
the scene or treatment area of an MCE. 
The present review also provides tentative evidence that information about the 
response efficacy of protective action improves adherence to recommended response 
protocols. However, studies in which response efficacy was tested also included other 
types of messaging within the same intervention. In other words, it was unclear 
whether it was response efficacy information or more specific practical instructions 
(Amlôt et al., 2017) or updates about actions responders are taking (Carter, Drury, 
Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015) that had the observed impact on 
behavioural outcomes. But there is evidence in the wider literature that explaining the 
benefit of taking protective action improves adherence to adaptive, target behaviours 
during a chemical incident (Rubin et al., 2012; Verroen et al., 2013) and the 
effectiveness of appeals to response efficacy at promoting target behaviour change is 
supported by theories of fear appeal effectiveness, such as PMT (R. W. Rogers, 1975, 
1983) and the EPPM (Witte, 1992, 1994). 
There is also theoretical support for the finding from this review that updating casualties 
on actions responders are taking would have an impact on casualty behaviour. In the 
previous chapter, I reported that trust is a potential determinant of compliance (Bass et 
al., 2015; Glik, 2007a; Liu et al., 2017; Maxwell, 2003; McComas, 2006; Pearce et al., 
2013; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Rubin et al., 2009; Sherman-Morris & Lea, 2016). 
Further, the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000) 
predicts that co-operation with the out-group (in this case, emergency responders) is 
likely to occur when the behaviour of out-group members is perceived as legitimate by 
members of the in-group (in this case, casualties). Making salient that responders are 
working to protect casualties is a theoretically effective approach to demonstrating 
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legitimacy and projecting goodwill, which is associated with trust (Latré et al., 2017; 
McCroskey & Teven, 1999). In the two included studies that included such statements 
in the messaging intervention, perceived legitimacy of responders and identification 
with responders was increased (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, 
et al., 2015). As far as I am aware, there is no empirical test to confirm whether 
information about actions authorities and responders are taking would have a positive 
effect on perceived trust, legitimacy, or outcomes relating to compliance in the absence 
of any other information. But there is sufficient evidence from included studies in this 
review to predict that inclusion of information about actions responders are taking 
would improve the likelihood of casualty adherence. 
This review has highlighted the limited number of studies on communication with 
people at the scene of an MCE. This reflects the finding by Rubin et al. (2012) about 
the absence of studies on the information needs in the immediate hours or days 
following a real-life Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) incident, 
“during the chaos of the early stages of a real incident” (p. 11). The few studies that 
have been done in this area are largely poor quality. The evidence from included 
studies indicates that communication affects behaviour at the treatment area of a mass 
casualty emergency, but further research is warranted to provide more detailed 
guidance on how responders should communicate with casualties. Some findings from 
this review may be interpreted as axiomatic and leave many unanswered questions. 
For example, included studies provide no evidence to support recommendations on 
which channel to use to disseminate information to casualties. 
Based on the common components in PMT, EPPM and PADM and the support for 
these theories in the disaster communication literature, the combination of information 
about the severity and susceptibility of the threat with information about the efficacy of 
protective action and message recipients’ self-efficacy is likely to improve adherence to 
target behaviours. Previous meta-analyses have supported this assertion when it 
comes to health and safety behaviours in other, non-emergency response contexts 
(Peters et al., 2013; Sheeran et al., 2014; Witte & Allen, 2000), even when outcomes of 
studies were limited to real behaviour (Peters et al., 2013). But this combination of 
message components has yet to be tested in a messaging framework tested in the 
MCE context. 
3.4.1. Limitations of included studies 
By far the biggest limitation within this review was the small number of studies that I 
identified. It appears that very little research has considered the impact of different 
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communication styles on behaviour during an MCE. All conclusions drawn from this 
body of work must therefore be treated with caution.  
“Immersion” in emergency exercises refers to “the subjective experience of being in 
one place or environment when one is physically situated in another,” with high 
immersion improving the external validity and generalisability of findings from 
emergency simulation studies (Alison et al., 2013, p. 4). A common limitation of studies 
included in the present review was the lack of realism in overt emergency simulations 
or visualisations of hypothetical emergency scenarios. The stress inherent in an 
emergency (Leach, 2004, 2005; Porter & Leach, 2010; Robinson et al., 2013; Robinson 
et al., 2008), particularly when CBRN materials are involved (Krieger et al., 2014; 
Sheppard et al., 2006; Sullivan & Bongar, 2007), has the potential to cause diminished 
cognitive functioning (Jiang & Rau, 2017; Olver et al., 2015) and impaired information 
processing (Covello et al., 2001; Firestone & Everly, 2013; Glik, 2007a).  
The apex of immersion in a decontamination study would be to convince participants 
that real contamination has occurred. The subject of making study participants or 
exercise casualty role-players truly believe that they have been contaminated has been 
raised during discussions with stakeholders but disregarded for two important ethical 
reasons. First, to successfully convince someone that their health is in real danger 
constitutes a form of psychological harm, a tactic used by those who would post 
innocuous white powder to provoke distress in the recipient. Second, there is the 
concern that the act of undertaking a scientific study in which participants are deceived 
into thinking they have been exposed to a noxious substance would likely undermine 
public trust in a subsequent official, genuine message that a hazardous chemical has 
been released. 
In future studies on the effectiveness of communication on behaviour in simulated 
emergencies, an acute laboratory stressor, such as CO2-enriched air inhalation (Ehlers, 
Margraf, & Roth, 1986; Ree, French, MacLeod, & Locke, 2008; Van Den Bergh, 
Kempynck, Van De Woestijne, Baeyens, & Eelen, 1995), could be applied to induce 
physiological stress prior to the communication intervention to more realistically assess 
the impact of communication on behaviour in an emergency. The limitation inherent in 
this approach is that, in the absence of method development work, it is unclear whether 
laboratory stressors would be a valid proxy for the stress experienced at the scene of 
an emergency. Observational analysis of real emergencies, for example via footage 
extracted from body cameras worn by first responders, would be a useful approach to 




Another limitation that applied to all quantitative studies in this review was the use of 
group participation (Amlôt et al., 2017; Boyce et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 
2014; Proulx & Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010), whereby participants were allocated to or 
observed in groups rather than in single study sessions. Whilst observing participants 
in groups improves the generalisability of findings to the mass casualty context, it 
means that only one (Amlôt et al., 2017; Boyce et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 
2014; Proulx & Sime, 1991) or two (Purser, 2010) trials were carried out to test each 
communication intervention, raising the risk of bias due to baseline characteristics, for 
example number of participants, and any pre-existing social relationships within each 
group.  
There are three viable approaches to resolving this issue whilst ensuring that 
participant behaviour is assessed in a crowd context to achieve ecological validity. The 
first is to use multiple trials per condition. The second is to allocate participants to 
communication conditions in single study sessions using confederates to play the role 
of the other casualties to ensure consistency between conditions. Both approaches are 
costly in terms of time and money. The third approach is to use an immersive virtual 
environment to simulate being in an MCE. A proportion of the excluded studies on 
wayfinding behaviour in response to different emergency exit signage (Duarte et al., 
2014; Vilar et al., 2014) or pre-incident instructions (Carattin, Meneghetti, Tatano, & 
Pazzaglia, 2016) and an excluded study on peri-emergency bystander behaviour were 
carried out in an immersive virtual environment (IVE) where participants operated 
virtual bodies from a first-person perspective to simulate being in an emergency. The 
use of an IVE in an RCT on communication during IOR decontamination would allow 
for accurate simulation of a large-scale chemical incident (complete with multiple other 
casualties) whilst ensuring that participants can complete the study in a single session 
to avoid the confounds associated with group participation. 
All quantitative studies were carried out in the UK and only one included study was 
carried out outside of the UK. Caution should be taken when extrapolating findings 
from this review to non-UK populations.  
Studies were predominantly low quality, particularly in the case of RCTs. It is possible 
that some aspects of these studies that would meet the quality appraisal criteria were 
present but not reported. The need for more high-quality randomised controlled trials in 
the field of crisis communication has been raised in a previous systematic review 
(Bradley et al., 2014). The quality of future MCE communication RCTs can be 
improved by: explicitly stating the percentage of participants who completed all 
outcome measures and the percentage of participants who withdrew or were withdrawn 
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from the study; reporting in detail the approach to randomisation; and where possible, 
developing a procedure for blinding researchers to study condition at both the 
allocation and analysis stages of the research process.  
3.4.2. Limitations of review 
Grey literature searches were carried out to circumvent the risk of publication bias but 
there is no guarantee that every study that meets the inclusion criteria was found 
during the search process. Studies which found no effect of communication 
interventions on casualty behaviour in an MCE may have been harder to locate, 
resulting in a bias in the review’s findings. 
Only one potentially relevant non-English language paper (Baek et al., 2011) was 
excluded from the review due to the English language exclusion criterion. Based on the 
abstract, it is highly unlikely that review outcomes would have changed had this study 
been included so the English language restriction was not a limiting factor. 
Whilst the MMAT is an appropriate tool for a mixed systematic review, the MMAT has 
been criticised on the basis that some criteria, such as <20% withdrawal rate, may 
have been met but not reported and so study quality may be assessed as low purely on 
the strength of reporting rather than methodology (Hong et al., 2018). In the present 
review I cannot rule out the possibility that studies were appraised inaccurately as low 
quality due to reporting rather than methodology. 
Whilst I consulted with my supervisors when unsure about the applicability of studies to 
this review, screening of both titles/abstract and full texts was carried out by me only. It 
is possible that the use of single-screening increased the risk of missing studies that 
would have met the inclusion criteria at each step of the search process but the 
recommendation to use double-screening to improve accuracy of study identification is 











Chapter 4 Qualitative investigation into the standard practices of 
first responder communication in a hazardous chemical release 
incident: A guidance document review and interview study 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Findings from the literature reviews reported in Chapters 2 and 3 provide initial 
guidelines for developing a communication intervention for use by first responders to 
improve the likelihood of casualty adherence to IOR in a chemical incident, particularly 
when signs and symptoms of exposure are not salient. Swift communication, using 
simple, non-technical language, and having multiple sources and channels 
disseminating one consistent message to affected casualties are likely to be effective 
approaches to promote adherence. In terms of message content, it is likely that an 
effective communication intervention would need to include information about: the 
severity of the contamination threat posed to casualties; the likelihood of exposure; 
practical information about actions casualties should take to protect themselves; the 
efficacy of these actions in reducing the threat; information about casualties’ self-
efficacy in performing these actions; and information about who the communicators are 
and what actions they are currently taking. In this chapter, I will investigate whether 
these theoretically effective approaches are used in current standard practice.  
Official guidance documents on the management of casualties during mass casualty 
decontamination have been published by many government departments, particularly 
in the UK (HM Government, 2008; NHS, 2010; NHS Scotland, 2012) and USA 
(Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, 2006; Lake et al., 2013; US Army Chemical 
Biological Radiological and Nuclear School, 2011; US Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2014). The target audiences of these documents include incident 
commanders, trainers for emergency response organisations (US Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2014) and first responder agencies, such as the Fire and 
Rescue, Police and Ambulance services. In a previous review in this area, 15 of the 19 
guidance documents published before 2016 that were identified were found to provide 
information about communication during an incident, but the level of detail varied 
between documents (Carter & Amlôt, 2016). It is also unknown whether the guidance 
on communication in these documents is reflected in the training and conduct of first 
responders who communicate with casualties when responding to an incident involving 
a hazardous chemical release. 
The aim of the present study was to ascertain current first responder communication 
practices during mass casualty decontamination, particularly at the initial stage, via a 
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review of guidance documents and interviews with first responders. My objective was 
to assess whether current practice corresponds to the theoretically effective guidelines 




The investigation consisted of a) a review of decontamination guidance documents to 
collate specific examples of communication approaches recommended for use by 
responders and b) semi-structured open-ended one-on-one interviews with responders 
in UK Police, Ambulance, and Fire & Rescue Services in order to gather information on 
strategies used by responders when communicating with casualties during 
decontamination procedures.  
4.2.2. Review of guidance documents 
4.2.2.1 Search strategy and screening 
Guidance documents (n = 19) containing information about the management of 
casualties during mass casualty decontamination were identified as part of a review 
carried out by Carter and Amlôt (2016), who searched for reports published up to 2014. 
I repeated the search strategy reported in their review in October 2016 with the date 
refined to only include documents published since the previous review was conducted. 
The search strategy consisted of screening the first 200 results of advanced Google 
searches with the search terms: “mass decontamination” AND “guidance”; “mass 
decontamination” AND “procedure”; “mass casualty decontamination”; and 
“decontamination public emergency” (Carter & Amlôt, 2016). 
I identified additional guidance documents following consultation with subject matter 
experts at Public Health England. I screened guidance documents found via all 
searches against the following inclusion criteria. Documents had to contain references 
to channels or modalities that could be used to communicate information to casualties 
and/or refer to examples of specific messages that could be communicated to 
casualties by responders during mass casualty decontamination operations. Where I 
identified two or more versions of a document, only the latest version was included.  
4.2.2.2 Data extraction and analysis 
I extracted data from guidance documents that related to communication 
recommendations. I carried out thematic analysis on recommended messages (specific 
statements for responders to communicate with casualties that were extracted from 
guidance documents) using NVIVO 11.2.1.616 (QSR International). Recommended 
messages were allocated to semantic categories using the data-derived approach to 
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thematic analysis outlined by Braun and Clarke (2013) to “reflect the semantic content 
of the data” (p. 207). Types of messages and communication channels were not 
reported if they were only included in one guidance document in order to avoid basing 
a theme on the position of one particular set of document authors. Theme titles were 
italicised in the results section. 
4.2.3. Interviews with first responders 
4.2.3.1 Participants 
I used purposive sampling, identifying participants by consulting with members of an 
end user panel for the wider programme of research in which this study was conducted 
and by colleagues of panel members. The panel consisted of emergency response 
professionals. I recruited additional participants from my research team’s database of 
contacts who had consented to be contacted about participation in studies. I recruited 
interview participants from Police (n=2), Ambulance (n=4), and Fire & Rescue (n=6) 
organisations to cover the range of first responder organisations that are likely to be 
communicating at the scene during IOR. The letter used to recruit participants is 
displayed in Appendix C. 
4.2.3.2 Materials 
I used an interview schedule (Appendix D) to ensure consistency in the data collection 
method. I pilot tested the schedule via a practice interview with a subject matter expert 
(Fire & Rescue Service Capability Advisor). In brief, the interview schedule contained 
questions on the following main topics:  
• The interviewee’s experience and training in communication with casualties 
during incidents where decontamination is required; 
• Available channels (equipment or technology) for communicating with 
casualties; 
• What the interviewee would say to casualties when they arrive on the scene; 
• Examples of what the interviewee has said (in training or in practice) or would 
say in order to get casualties to: 
• Disrobe; 
• Implement improvised dry and wet decontamination; 
• Remain in place; 
• Summary and clarification on how the interviewee approaches communication 
with casualties in incidents where decontamination is required; 






I carried out semi-structured open-ended one-on-one interviews via telephone or Skype 
in March and April 2017. Ethical approval for this study was granted by the King’s 
College London Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Panel (reference: 
LRS-15/16-3406; Appendix E). Prior to the interview, interviewees read an information 
sheet (Appendix F) and submitted a completed consent form (Appendix G). All 
interviews were audio recorded and transcribed either by me or by an external 
transcription agency (with a non-disclosure agreement in place to ensure data 
confidentiality).  
4.2.3.4 Analysis 
I analysed anonymized interview transcripts in NVIVO 11.2.1.616 (QSR International), 
using the same approach to thematic analysis that I used to code recommended 
messages from guidance documents to message content themes. The minimum 
number of sources required to constitute a theme was two to avoid basing a theme on 
one participant’s particular attitudes and experiences. Theme titles were italicised in the 
results report. 
4.2.3.5 Participant feedback 
Following completion of the study, I sent a summary of results of the interview study to 
everyone who had participated. Participants were asked whether the findings reflected 
their experience of communication in chemical incidents. Where participants elaborated 
on their communication technique or suggested changes to the results, consideration 
was then given to adjusting the results summary to take these points into account. 
   
4.3 Results 
4.3.1. Review of guidance documents 
4.3.1.1 Document selection 
Of the 19 decontamination guidance documents included in the previous review on 
psychosocial aspects of mass casualty decontamination (Carter & Amlôt, 2016), 12 
were included in the present review (Department for Communities and Local 
Government [DCLG], 2012; Fire and Rescue Service [FRS], 2003; Governor’s Office of 
Emergency Services [GOES], 2006; Harvard School of Public Health [HSPH], 2013; 
Home Office, 2004, 2013; Lake et al., 2013; Metropolitan Medical Response System 
[MMRS], 2003; National Ambulance Resilience Unit [NARU], 2014; State Government 
of Victoria [SGV], 2007; US Army Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear School 
[USACBRNS], 2011; US Department of Health and Human Services [HHS], 2014). Six 
documents were excluded because they did not contain recommendations about 
communication channels or communication messages (Health Protection Agency, 
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2008; HM Government, 2008; International Atomic Energy Agency, 2013; NHS, 2010; 
NHS Scotland, 2012; U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command, 2003) and 
one (Lake, Schulze, & Gougelet, 2009) was excluded because a more recent version 
of the same document was already included in the review. No additional guidance 
documents were found by updating the search, although five additional documents 
were identified by subject matter experts at Public Health England (Biomedical 
Advanced Research and Development Authority [BARDA], 2015; Home Office, 2015; 
Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme [JESIP], 2013; National 
Ambulance Resilience Unit [NARU], 2016; National CBRN Centre [NCC], 2016).  
In total 17 guidance documents were included in the review. One source was a training 
video on IOR (NCC, 2016) which contained scenes of responders communicating to 
actors who were role-playing casualties. This was included as a guidance “document” 
because whilst the format differed from a text document, the information contained in 
the video served the same function as a text document. Nine documents were 
published in the UK (DCLG, 2012; FRS, 2003; Home Office, 2004, 2013, 2015; JESIP, 
2013; NARU, 2014; NARU, 2016; NCC, 2016), seven in the US (BARDA, 2015; 
GOES2006; HSPH, 2013; Lake et al., 2013; MMRS, 2003; USACBRNS, 2011; HHS, 
2014), and one in Australia (SGV, 2007). Documents were published between 2003 
and 2016. 
4.3.1.2 Communication channel 
Fourteen of the 17 included documents contained one or more recommendations about 
channels, media, or modalities that could be used to communicate information to 
casualties during mass casualty decontamination. One recommended communication 
channel was voice amplification equipment, such as loudhailers and public address 
(PA) systems on emergency vehicles, to facilitate verbal communication with multiple 
casualties. It was recommended that a PA system should be “on one of the first arriving 
emergency vehicles” (USACBRNS, 2011) and that responders should use a “calm but 
authoritative voice” when broadcasting via a PA system (HHS, 2014). Another 
recommended channel was pictorial instructions (e.g. Figure 4-1), such as those 
included in the instructions in ‘disrobe packs’ (Figure 4-2), which are supply kits 
containing provisions for decontamination. It was recommended that pictograms should 
be large and brightly coloured (HSPH, 2013). Other recommended communication 
channels were: posters or signage; pre-recorded, looped audio and/or video messages 
to provide instructions to casualties; flyers or instruction sheets (e.g. Figures 4-3 and 4-
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Figure 4-1 Decontamination instructional images developed by Cambridge Public 






























































































4.3.1.3 Message content 
Eight of the 17 included documents (BARDA, 2015; GOES, 2006; JESIP, 2013; 
MMRS, 2003; NARU, 2014; NARU, 2016; NCC, 2016; USACBRNS, 2011) contained 
recommendations for specific messages that responders could provide to casualties. 
Four main themes were identified in these recommendations.   
Instructional messages featured in all documents in which specific messages were 
recommended. Recommended instructional messages addressed: general adherence 
to instructions; evacuation; remaining in place following evacuation; disrobing; dry 
decontamination; wet decontamination; and helping other casualties.  
You must be thoroughly cleaned before you can be treated (MMRS, 2003). 
If you can hear me, follow me (BARDA, 2015). 
Wait for the emergency services to arrive and act upon their instruction (NARU, 
2014). 
Remove outer clothing – do not pull clothing over head unless absolutely 
necessary (JESIP, 2013). 
Please use this material…to remove the substance from your skin (NARU, 
2016). 
We are going to wash you off. Walk towards the water spray (USACBRNS, 
2011). 
Assist others who are less able or injured to carry out tasks - if you can (NARU, 
2014). 
Response efficacy messages included statements that alluded to the effectiveness of 
adherence to instructions as well as statements that provided more elaborate 
explanation as to the health protective benefits of adherence to specific forms of 
decontamination, such as disrobing and dry decontamination. 
In order to help you and to protect your health and safety, and the safety of 
others, please follow our directions (MMRS, 2003). 
Removing the outer layer of clothing is sufficient response to removing the 
hazard from you, and no further on-scene cleansing or decontamination is 
necessary (GOES, 2006). 
Using this absorbent material to remove the substance from your skin will 
ensure that as much as possible is removed. Which will help to prevent you 
suffering any adverse effects, and will also prevent the spread of the substance 
to other people and places (NARU, 2016).  
Messages coded to the theme of informing casualties that they may have been 
contaminated all contained qualifying words and phrases such as “may”, “might” or “we 
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do suspect”. And, in some cases, messages explicitly understated the threat of 
contamination.  
You may have been exposed to a hazardous substance (MMRS, 2003). 
We have a reasonably strong belief that a substance, no matter how slight, has 
come into contact with you (GOES, 2006). 
It is highly unlikely that any harm has come to you (GOES, 2006). 
4.3.2. Interviews with first responders 
4.3.2.1 Sample characteristics 
All participants had experience in responding to real chemical incidents and/or in 
participating as responders in decontamination exercises with role-playing casualty 
actors. Sample characteristics are displayed in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1 Sample characteristics of interview study participants. 
Emergency Service 
Experience in responding 
to real chemical incidents 
(including false positive 
incidents) 
Experience in live 
decontamination exercises 
Ambulance Yes Yes 
Ambulance Yes Yes 
Ambulance Yes Yes 
Ambulance No Yes 
Fire & Rescue Yes Yes 
Fire & Rescue Yes Yes 
Fire & Rescue No Yes 
Fire & Rescue No Yes 
Fire & Rescue  No Yes 
Fire & Rescue No Yes 
Police Yes No 
Police No Yes 
 
4.3.2.2 Communication channel 
First responders discussed the range of communication channels available to them 
when responding to a chemical incident. Reported communication channels included 
the use of voice amplification equipment to facilitate the verbal delivery of messages to 
casualties. Discussion around voice amplification technology was primarily focused on 
handheld loudhailers and vehicle-mounted PA systems. The use of PA systems 
already installed in buildings or venues, for example in a football stadium, and the use 
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of helicopter PA systems were discussed but the participants had not themselves used 
these particular forms of voice amplification. When discussing voice amplification, 
participants described how they would provide casualties with a two-way radio and 
thereby communicate from a distance.  
It'll be a case of somebody, whether they've got to stand on the fire engine or 
whether they've got a loud speaker or whatever (P3). 
you might be in an area that has actually got some sort of security, or enclosed 
like a football ground where you can control the public and you can 
communicate with the PA systems … we rely a lot on loudhailers (P5). 
within our service the things that we teach them to do is the PA system on your 
fire engines, I don't know if you're aware of that, so basically the button that 
controls the sirens you flick it over and it turns into a PA system. And all our fire 
engines carry that. (P6). 
we've also developed a method within the service where we teach them to 
throw a hand-held radio forward into the risk area (P6). 
The ambulance vehicles rather than our rapid response vehicles, have loud 
hailers as part of the setup. So, what they can do is have someone sat in the 
cab actually then communicating over a loud hailer to everyone. (P7). 
We have started carrying a loud hailer on one of our vehicles just to try and 
assist with the volume over a distance, just to try and keep that barrier (P10). 
I have observed the operational crew are using loud hailers on front line 
appliances (P11). 
Participants pointed out that voice amplification was not available in all response 
vehicles and, in one case, the participant reflected on the utility and cost-effectiveness 
of making voice amplification equipment more widely available to first responders. 
Certainly megaphones, I think is just generally, if we’re expected to go to any 
sort of large-scale public incident, being able to gain attention and communicate 
across a large group, which is gonna be noisy because people are gonna be 
talking and all the other stuff that goes with that would be hugely useful for this, 
to the point where I think it’s very unlikely being able to do it without it. And 
they’re not expensive or large. I just Googled one, I said to my boss can we 
have some, I Googled it and it was like, you know, a tenner for one, they fold 
down and it’s quite a small thing. (P1). 
We have got loud hailers and they do… there are some police vehicles that 
carry the loud hailers, but not all of them. And if it was really… if you're really, 
kind of, faced with… And if we've got time yes, we can call upon a loud hailer, 
or a police vehicle with a loud hailer on it (P12). 
Pictorial instructions, such as pictograms in disrobe packs, were discussed when 
participants described the ways in which they would guide casualties through the 
decontamination process. Participants also discussed the use of physical 
demonstration (e.g. miming disrobing and dry decontamination) as a means of 
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conveying required actions to casualties. One participant reported that they used 
physical demonstration to convey instructions when casualties were non-anglophone. 
The use of gestures or cues, for example placing blue roll in front of casualties, was 
cited as an approach used to encourage self-decontamination. 
We have done this with, potentially, non-English speakers so what we've had to 
do then is we have had to basically do the best we can, even to the point of 
we've… so the emergency services themselves, we've actually tried to show 
them, so we've basically mimicked, we've done something and tried to do a bit 
of hand signal … so they've followed what we actually did. (P3). 
We're sort of, miming, we're sort of gesturing with our hands what they need to 
do … we sort of, would get a handful of blue roll and sort of, try and show them 
what we're expecting. Brushing it off of them, brushing it downwards, brushing it 
away from them. … And sort of, imitating what we want them to do so they can 
try and copy us. (P4). 
If a casualty is basically right, you don't know whether you've got contaminant 
on you or not, we'll then issue a disrobe pack and let them read it and then 
actually get them to go through the pictographs themselves, we won't touch 
them, nothing. Make no touching nor movement towards them. … Our only 
method at the minute is to hold up a pictogram and say, this is what you've got 
to do. (P5). 
You need to keep it short and you need to keep it direct because people can 
tend to work things out, you start pointing at buckets and pretending to wash 
your face. People pick up on that quite quickly, as opposed to trying to explain it 
saying: well, you're going to do this first, you're going to rinse this and then 
you're going to wipe this or you're going to take this blue roll. You know, quite 
often it's easier just to grab a piece of the blue roll and physically rub it across 
your arms or your face, as opposed to trying to explain it. And it tends to get a 
lot more direct results quicker. (P6). 
Depending on whether it's going to be a wet decon or a dry decon, by putting 
something in front of them quite quickly, whether it's blue roll or buckets 
depending on which direction we're going in, again, focusses their mind and 
they all tend to huddle around that equipment (P6). 
They're told to have a look at the cover that shows the pictorial diagram, open 
them up, and if they can follow the guidance (P11). 
Participants discussed the use of lights and sirens on emergency response vehicles as 
a means to capturing casualties’ attention in the first instance.  
Put the blue lights on give a blast of the sirens just so it focuses everybody. … 
We will blast the horns on the appliances, put the blue lights on just so 
everybody looks at us (P3). 
Communication in the absence of equipment or technology was discussed when 




We don’t have anything really, we don’t have any megaphones or anything like 
that, it’s simply about shouting (P1). 
So I sort of parked it [the car] up with the passenger side toward where the 
group was assembled and shouted out from sort of only 20-25 metres away 
(P10). 
Casualties themselves were discussed as a potential channel of communication from 
responder to casualties. Participants discussed how, in exercises, they would nominate 
a casualty as a spokesperson to relay instructions from responders to other casualties. 
The stated advantage of the approach was that it reduces the size of the audience to 
whom the responder would need to disseminate information. Spokespeople would be 
selected from the crowd of casualties based on whether they were known to having a 
military, medical, or emergency response background or based on whether they 
demonstrated signs of being an “obvious” or “natural” leader. One participant stressed 
that they had only used the approach under exercise conditions and were unsure as to 
whether the nominating of a casualty spokesperson would be an effective and practical 
means of communication in a real incident. 
One of the things that I did find quite useful from a mass decon point of view 
during exercises was using a stooge. … If you’re communicating with one 
person, rather than communicating with dozens of people, you can get one 
person to shout out, you know, “I want you to follow what I’m doing”. So we 
found that to be quite useful but that’s very much in a staged environment, I 
don’t know how it would work in the general population. From a mass casualty 
point of view, certainly in the staged environment, that seemed to work 
reasonably well. It was something we didn’t start using until the latter exercises. 
And it was because I witnessed it somewhere else, to be honest, that I actually 
started using it, where you’ve got a natural leader, who’s like, “Right guys, listen 
in, do this”. It was like, I actioned that. It’s much easier communicating with one 
person rather than trying to communicate with dozens of people at one people. 
… there’s always one obvious leader amongst them –the noisy one in there. 
And if you can get them on your side, I found that was quite useful. (P2). 
I think you would look for the most coherent and engaged person, and try and 
develop an initial rapport, and then ask them if they are willing to be your 
spokesperson. … If I put fire gear on and a face mask, that's a big barrier to 
good communications. So if there's someone who is already, or who is possibly, 
affected; then they could be good. And obviously, you could ask people if 
they're military, emergency service, doctors, nurses; someone who has a 
degree of responsibility or seems willing to do so. So if you found out if there 
are people within that group who are from an emergency sort of responsible 
background, then maybe they can be used as an asset to pass the message 
around. (P11). 
4.3.2.3  Message content 
All participants reported that they did not have access to a script for communication 
during mass casualty decontamination and arguments were made about the 
impracticality of standardising or scripting communication due to the need to be able to 
97 
 
adapt communication to different situations and different casualty populations. When 
prompted for specific examples of things said by responders, responses tended to 
focus on the approach to communication that they would take. 
Training was very much focused on the fact that you have to adapt how you 
communicate with people depending on the circumstances (P2). 
You see it, you can't have a specific set way of talking to somebody. … You 
can't have almost like [have] a script because you don't know what it is you 
could be doing (P3). 
We don't have a script as such, and I think that would be hard to do purely from 
the dynamics and the demographics of where we're based. Obviously, being 
the brigade that I'm in we can go into quite large Asian communities, we could 
be going to quite a large Somali community and we've got quite a large Eastern 
European community as well, so it's quite difficult to have a scripted approach, 
it's got to be more dynamic than that. (P6).  
You take every incident as you see it, so you... I think you are allowed to 
assume some things and you have to pre-script and pre-load as you respond to 
any incident, really. But when you get there, things certainly change and you 
have to adapt what your initial thoughts were before you arrived. (P11). 
There's nothing scripted because that, again, under pressure it would be difficult 
for officers to remember (P12). 
Participants reflected on specific, discrete statements that they had made when 
speaking to casualties either in real incidents or in exercises. All participants recalled 
the use of instructions. Actions for which instructions were targeted included general 
adherence to instructions; evacuation; remaining in place following evacuation; 
disrobing; dry decontamination; wet decontamination; helping other casualties; and 
refraining from eating, drinking or smoking.  
“This is what I want you to do. I want you to move away from the hazard” (P1). 
“Right, there’s the shower, it’s in the front garden. Go and get washed off” (P2). 
“What I want you to do now is to put your arms into that water there” (P3). 
“Come towards the sound of my voice” (P4).  
“I am telling you, you will remove the clothing and you will go into the shower” 
(P6). 
“Okay, everybody, you all need to take your outer clothes off” (P8). 
“Please come towards me, walk towards me now, and as you're doing so take 
off your top layer of clothing” (P12).  
Messages coded to the theme of threat severity included statements about the 
personal adverse health consequences for the casualty if they do not adhere to 
responders’ instructions as well as statements about the consequences for other 
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people, including loved ones, who may be contaminated by coming into contact with 
the casualty if they self-evacuate without undergoing decontamination. References 
were also made to stating the likelihood that casualties are contaminated. 
“As far as we’re concerned you’re all contaminated” (P3). 
“If you leave here and you go home there's a chance that you can put your 
loved ones at risk” (P3).  
“Look, you know, the belief is you have been contaminated in something” (P6). 
“What you're wearing at the moment is covered in a chemical, it will slowly but 
surely soak through your clothing and it will start to, potentially, damage your 
skin and cause you problems” (P7). 
“If you go home without any level of assessment carried out on you, and 
possible decontamination, would you want to go home and spread something 
that we don't know that's on you on to your loved ones” (P11). 
When recalling severity-based messages that they had used, participants discussed 
the rationale for this type of messaging and reflected on how describing the risks to 
casualties and their loved ones would motivate casualties to adhere to instructions. 
So we kind of… it's almost like giving them a bit of a guilt complex (P3). 
Fear might be the most effective way of containment (P10). 
Whilst severity-based statements had reportedly been used in communication by half 
of the sample, all participants recalled using messages that were coded to the theme of 
reassurance, for example to reduce anxiety or distress. Reassurance comprised a 
range of message types. In most cases, reassurance consisted of highlighting that 
medical assistance will be provided or highlighting the response efficacy of adhering to 
responders’ instructions. Messages coded to the theme of response efficacy were 
specifically discussed by participants with reference to motivating casualties to adhere 
to instructions.  Reassuring messages also included stating that casualties’ privacy and 
modesty will be protected.  
“Medical care is on the way” (P1). 
Try and explain to them that the best thing for them is to get that clothing off of 
them, I know it'll take up to 80% of the contaminant off of them but telling them 
that it's the best thing for the (P4). 
Normally if we're telling them that is the safest thing, taking your clothing off 
reduces the decontaminants, or trying to get that message across, they 
normally do it (P5). 
“By removing that clothing, you're going to remove the majority of that 
contaminant” (P7). 
Try and calm them down and just make them aware that, you know, they are 
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going to be put into something to maintain their dignity (P9). 
“If you remove your outer layers of clothing, that's going to give you the most... 
be the most help for you. It's going to remove most contaminant. … Look, we 
know what we're doing and that's the best thing you can do is to release that 
outer layer and wipe away from your face and stuff; and that's scientifically 
what's the best for you”. (P10). 
“Help is on its way, medical attention is on its way, please come towards me 
now” (P12). 
In some cases, participants discussed how they would understate the threat of 
contamination to reassure casualties. 
“You’re gonna be alright” (P1). 
“What we’re doing here is belt, braces and a bit of string”. … It was trying to just 
reassure them that “we are going through this process but I’m 95% certain that 
it’s not necessary” because they weren’t displaying any symptoms by the time I 
got there. (P2). 
We try and tell them that it's going to be okay, and they're going to be fine even 
though at that point we probably haven’t got a clue what it is that they're 
contaminated with or the problem is. But mainly it will be: “don’t worry, calm 
down; you're going to be fine”. (P8). 
Participants recalled explicitly acknowledging that aspects of the decontamination 
process may be difficult for casualties. 
“This may take some time, we need your patience, we will get these things 
sorted out as soon as we can but it may take some time” (P8). 
We always warn them that they are going to get wet; but that the water is 
obviously warm, not freezing cold, and they would be fairly, you know, 
decontaminated in detail, shall we say (P9). 
“It's going to be cold, but, sorry it's a necessary evil” (P12). 
Despite the fact that the interview schedule was tailored towards unidirectional 
communication from responders to casualties, a minority of participants recalled asking 
casualties for information.  
“Is anybody injured? Is anybody in need of first aid?” (P3). 
…asked them if any injuries have occurred, have they got any burn sensations, 
have they got any hearing problems (P5). 
Mainly it's: are you all okay, is everything okay? (P8). 
4.3.2.4 Communicator  
Participants reflected on who should communicate with casualties. Whilst there was 
recognition that the first person on scene would need to be the communicator, 
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participants primarily reported that there was an ideal type of communicator, 
specifically a person with authority, such as an Incident Commander or Watch 
Commander. 
If you just passed it to a generic firefighter and say: that's now your job it will 
start to fall apart quite quickly. You want people that are naturally quite 
disciplined and, you know… I come from a military background so I find it very 
easy to - not being horrible - shout at people and organise them in that form. 
Whereas if you give it to a part-time firefighter or a relatively new recruit, they 
haven't got the confidence to be quite bossy, does that make sense? You know, 
so it needs to be… you need to make sure that the… whether it's the watch 
commander or the crew commander that's in charge of the fire engine or 
whether it's someone on the watch that are quite a strong character to do it, 
because you need to relay that in your voice as well. So, if for example you're 
just shouting it across the car park because you know, they're not… you haven't 
got to that stage where you're in protective suits or anything again, you need 
that voice to carry, you need to be quite direct to what you need to do. (P6). 
I would think they would be told by a senior officer who would be suited, you 
know, he would make himself heard that they were going to be X, Y and Z done 
to them (P9). 
It could be a random rapid response paramedic who's first on scene, or a police 
officer or, you know, just... for its [IOR’s] impact to be there it's got to be easily 
implemented by all levels, I guess (P10). 
There were conflicting perspectives on which of the main emergency services would be 
most suited to communicating with casualties in a decontamination incident. Each of 
the three main emergency services were cited as the most suitable communicating 
organisation. In most cases, a member of an emergency service cited their type of 
service as the most suitable but, in one case, the participant cited their service as less 
suitable than either of the other main services.  
We [fire service] don’t have maybe the same experience and understanding of 
how people behave that maybe the police will have cos everything they do is 
with people. The ambulance, again, all with people. Ours is much more often to 
do with, sort of, how do you put it – buildings, natural sort of phenomena, fire, 
water, whatever it might be. The people are usually either incapacitated and 
needing rescuing or put outside a cordon and dealt with, again, by the police or, 
if they’re injured, ambulance. So suddenly coming across mass decon which 
requires us to engage with people or mass casualty events where we become 
part of the health administering medical care, I think would be quite unusual for 
us and I don’t think we’d have the same awareness and ability as the police and 
the ambulance would naturally have. … If we go to a house on fire, we don’t, in 
the crudest way, we don’t talk to the fire. We just get on with what we need to 
do. We communicate between ourselves as a team. (P1). 
The fire service does achieve being quite direct, literally in the fire service we do 
that quite well. You know, certain police officers do that quite well in terms of 
how they deal with someone you know, kicking off in a pub and things like that. 
The ambulance service tend to struggle with that, because it's not in their, sort 
of... they don't really need to do it on a regular basis (P6). 
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having a police officer telling you that you're not allowed to move and you've got 
to stay there and basically kettling you probably isn't going to come across as 
well as when you've got someone through ambulance service in green who is 
there to help you (P10). 
Participants discussed the role of the sight of the communicator’s full-face personal 
protective equipment (PPE) and the sound of a “forceful” vocal tone in capturing 
casualties’ attention and encouraging adherence to instructions. 
It's not barking orders to them, but I need them to understand. So, I'm not quiet 
but I'm quite... how shall I say? I'm not like a dictator shouting orders to them, 
I'm quite forceful in what I'm saying because I want them to look at me and 
listen to what I'm saying because there's going to be a lot of other stuff going on 
as well. … You've got to have that initial forceful voice and then when 
everybody turns and looks at you then you bring your tone down (P3). 
They'll look at you like you're mad, telling them to get undressed. And then I 
think when they realise and they start seeing people with breathing apparatus 
getting put on and stuff like that I think they realise they may have something 
nasty on them and we're serious, and then they'll slowly but surely comply … I 
think they realise the seriousness of it when we've come crashing through their 
door dressed in full-face respirators. (P4). 
4.3.2.5 Communication barriers 
Participants reported that due to the risk of responders becoming contaminated by 
exposure to contaminated casualties, it is necessary to either maintain a safe distance 
from casualties or approach casualties wearing PPE (Figure 4-5), such as self-
contained breathing apparatus that covers the whole face.  These measures were 
reported to make communication between responders and casualties more difficult. 
I think the greater level of PPE… it becomes harder to communicate because 
you get more and more difficult actually seeing, people seeing your face, 
hearing your voice (P1). 
The problem is that the PPE that these forward personnel are wearing, that 
restricts the communication (P5). 
But you've got to look after yourself as well...it's distance, which can bring in, 
introduce problems in terms of communication (P12).  
The other communication barriers that participants either expected or experienced 
were casualties not understanding English or having difficulty hearing the responders 
and responders having difficulty communicating face-to-face with a large number of 
casualties.  
You've also got foreign casualties as well; that's when the communication 




Depending on the community that you're working in, English might not be their 
first language (P6). 
Now that was easier to a nurse who sort of, understood the concept and there's 
one individual, but if you had that as 10, 15 perhaps 20 people; it would be 
incredibly difficult to try and explain that because you'd probably end up 
explaining it about five-ten times over. … It was just a case of you know, 
because it was a one-to-one I could have that conversation with her. You know, 
she stood at the face shield of my gas tight suit and I could explain to her what I 
wanted her to do. But like I say, if it was a larger group you would really struggle 
to do that. (P6). 
It's a difficult one depending on both how... not just the communicating, the 
reason for doing it, but being able to communicate in the first place; whether 
people can actually communicate in English, if they've got an understanding of 
the language. And that's a whole new ball game. (P7). 
That's where the real challenge is going to come in, where you've got massive 





Figure 4-5 An illustration of the communication challenges posed by full-face Personal 
Protective Equipment worn by first responders (image reproduced with permission from 
Public Health England). 
 
4.3.2.6 Coercion 
Although it was never prompted, the subject of using force to decontaminate casualties 
was raised by a small minority of participants. When the coercive approach was 
discussed, it was typically alluded to then disregarded but in two cases, the perceived 
advantages of coercion were discussed. In one case, the participant even discussed 
the use of coercion in a decontamination exercise. 
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Ultimately what we're going to do, we're going to arrest them, we're going to lay 
them down, we're going to cuff them and then we're going to drag them 
through. Put them on stretchers and actually forcibly decontaminate them. You 
know, that's the ultimate we've got to do; because, you know, we've got to clean 
them, we can't leave them contaminated out in the field for the next day and a 
half until they change their mind. … We've run a couple of exercises, for 
example, where we've got… we've had a female that wouldn't go through 
because she had issues around obviously stripping off, removing her clothing, 
modesty etc. And then we had another individual that wouldn't go through for 
religious reasons; you know, they wouldn't take their headwear off and things 
like that. So again, although they were staged it proposed problems to the 
crews. And again, the ultimate one was, one of them we managed to convince 
to go through, but the guy that we had has played the part that wasn't going to 
remove any headwear. … It was a case of we got the police to basically arrest 
him, take him to the ground and then we basically cuffed him, removed his 
headgear and then took him through the showers (P6). 
So if an individual or a group of individuals don't want to comply, you'd ask them 
politely to please comply; but if not there's not a lot you can do. You can't ask 
the police to go and shoot them. It would be easier, because then there would 
be shoot one, save a thousand. I think people who weren't ready to comply as 
soon as they saw guns they would be, oh, it's best I can comply now, because 
that could hurt (P11). 
4.3.2.7 Expectations regarding casualties’ psychological state and behaviour 
Although the interview schedule was focused on responders’ recollection of their 
approach to communication, almost all participants volunteered unprompted reflections 
on casualty behaviour and the psychological basis of casualty behaviour during the 
course of discussion. Participants reported that casualties would be stressed and 
impatient though this was predominantly raised as an expectation or assumption rather 
than as a recollection from a real incident. Participants reflected on how stress would 
make it difficult for casualties to follow instructions and make it more likely that they 
would self-evacuate to their home or to a hospital. 
I mean, even, going back to the IOR packs, they’re not straightforward to 
use…Now if that person’s panicked or in some way is riled up because of 
what’s just happened, that presumably in a hostile environment is going to 
become even harder (P1). 
For a casualty, you know, it can become very scary, a very… panic situations. 
And there, I think most people would try to get out (P5).  
I think we would have a lot more panicky patients, a lot more you know, 
grumpy, upset, ‘for God's sake do something'; you know, especially if people 
would be suffering ill health and pain from being exposed to anything they 
would be a lot more anxious (P8). 
Conflicting attitudes were raised about the use of commanding or controlling casualty 
management approaches in response to anticipated stress. 
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I’m not… convinced command and control is the best way to, sort of, don’t 
know, if you start trying to push people into lines to go through a shower, people 
are already wound up, are you just going to make it worse? I don’t know (P1). 
You need to get physical with them, you need to literally almost line… treat 
them like recruits, line them up physically and then point to what you want them 
to do because if you try talking to them, if they're in distress they don't really 
listen (P6). 
Participants stated that the provision of information and treatment would facilitate 
casualties’ trust and improve compliance and that providing explanation about the 
benefits of decontamination would improve compliance with instructions, including the 
instruction to disrobe.  
I think you want to be open and honest as much as possible. You want to give 
information. I think, the more information- I don’t think it matters- in some ways I 
think it’s about whether people trust you so I think if you’re giving plenty of 
information, I don’t think people necessarily compute that information or know 
what you do with it cos they’re in a pretty unusual situation so I don’t think it’s 
got anything to do with necessarily, them actually weighing up and computing 
this information in sort of a rational logical manner. But I do think that they have 
information, if you’re willing and forthcoming with it, explaining what’s 
happening, why you’re doing what you’re doing, and almost trying to build a 
rapport with the crowd. You’re trying to build trust with the crowd, with the 
group, whoever it might be so that you are –they view you as there to help them 
and being legitimately there for that reason without any other, sort of, issues 
going on. And you sort of bring them into a part of the solution maybe. I think 
then people will be more likely to be compliant. (P1). 
It's trying to just talk to them to let them know exactly what's happening; 
because a lot of the people, and we've certainly seen it with a lot of people, the 
lack of information sometimes is worse than anything else because they can 
see things happening, but they don't understand why they're happening. … I 
think once people are then informed, they can then make the decisions to 
remove stuff. And I don't think you'll have a problem with anyone following 
instructions if they are informed of the reasons behind why they're doing it, why 
we're doing it, and benefits to them of them complying (P7). 
I think for me if someone just came up to me and told me to take off my clothes 
or even take off all my clothes... I don't think I'll be too happy, but I think if you 
try and contextualise it, and try and give someone a reason for it; yes, I think 
that helps (P10).  
Compliance with instructions was believed to be influenced by factors beyond 
communication. For example, participants believed that casualties would find it difficult 
to disrobe in view of other people and cameras and that casualties would be unlikely to 
disrobe unless they feel the physical symptoms of chemical contamination. 
I know the initial thing wasn't to take everything off but that's not a real life thing, 
it's not going to happen, you're not going to get people to do that unless they're 
absolutely covered and absolutely plastered in the stuff and they're really in 
some sort of stress (P3). 
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Initially they do look at you like you're talking rubbish, and there's no way they're 
going to strip off in front… because there may be a crowd even if the crowd's 
100 metres back it's just a sea of camera phones pointing at them, and you're 
telling them to strip off down to their pants and that (P4). 
If they were suffering in terms of got irritation or a burning sensation or they 
were struggling to breathe, I don't think you would struggle to get people to strip 
off and go into a shower, if I'm perfectly honest (P6). 
Certainly from what I've seen, most people have been quite happy with how the 
process has gone. I think it's just the same problem over and over again, is that 
sudden realization that people are having to take off their clothing in view of a 
lot of people; and I certainly wouldn't be happy doing that (P7). 
Participants stated that there would be differences between different casualty 
populations in terms of their perception of and interaction with authorities, particularly 
police officers. 
I think the police see that most clearly, if you go to certain demographics as a 
police officer, you’re gonna be received, probably again to do with trust, you’re 
gonna be received much more kindly than in other demographic areas and I 
think, same with the fire service is that, depending on who’s been contaminated 
and depending on their relationship with the state, authority, fire service, it’s 
gonna influence how they then react to it (P1). 
People can start to get angsty, there's some people who aren't on terms with 
the police and they then spread unrest through the group and stuff, it then leads 
to a scene, I guess (P10). 
4.3.2.8 Communication training 
Participants reflected on the training they had received in communication during 
decontamination and in some cases the training was regarded by the participant as 
insufficient.  
So I think part of the problem is that that’s not really laid out but it’s a really 
crucial element cos IOR is really quite basic because it’s effectively getting 
people to take off their clothes, dab themselves off, and then move away from a 
hazard. So it’s almost entirely based around actually communicating, getting 
people to co-operate but all of our processes and procedures are based around 
the process part. And so I think you’d see very differently between each crew 
that turned up exactly what they would do, probably based on their own 
perceptions of what they’re likely to encounter. (P1). 
Not a lot of that [training], no. The IOR, when it first came out, we had like, an e-
learning package and a video to watch and that was basically it (P3).  
Yes, I've been involved initially with IOR when that started rolling out, and I had 
one input up at the National Centre on how people react and public reaction 
and communication and who they trust and who they don't trust within a position 
of authority in a CBRN event (P4). 
Okay, so part of that, sort of, initial roll out and ongoing is how we explain to the 
crews and the firefighters how they're going to try and communicate the 
instructions to the members of the public. Whether it be through IOR or through 
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mass decontamination and the best methods for processing those individuals 
through the systems that we need to put in place to get them decontaminated. 
(P6). 
Many participants reported having participated in live decontamination field exercises 
with role-playing casualty actors and participants specifically discussed the limitation of 
exercises as tests of the effect of communication on adherence in a real incident due to 
the artificiality of role-playing casualties’ behaviour. Role-playing casualties reportedly 
either went through the motions of the exercise or portrayed the ‘character’ of ‘non-
compliant casualty’. 
If you tell them to do something they basically do it because that’s what they’re 
there for (P1). 
We have exercises where people are just told to go with what happens and then 
there's exercises where people are told to just hang back and panic a bit and say 
they can't hear and this, that and the other (P3). 
A lot of people’s exercises I was going to it was always going to be 10 or 20 off 
duty squaddies or students that when you say to them strip off, they'll strip off (P6). 
Usually when we do live casualty play, we use actors from various backgrounds 
and they are usually instructed to be as difficult as possible. So if you do not tell 
them exactly what to do, then they'll carry on their own script (P7). 
And it's role playing, so it's hard to gauge how at a real incident people would 
behave and react to good communication (P11). 
4.3.2.9 Feedback from participants following the submission of summary report 
Aside from statements of agreement with the summary of themes reported above, 
feedback included reference to an exercise in which scripted signage, specifically an 
enlarged version of the pictogram included in the disrobe pack (Figure 4-2), was used. 
The participant stated that “discussion moved on to disabilities, learning difficulties, 
foreign language”. One participant reiterated that the tone of the responder was 
important and explained that, when responding to incidents, a “direct assertive voice” 
gets results from the public whereas, in their experience, a softer tone “does not get the 




The aim of this study was to ascertain the current standard practice of communication 
during the Initial Operational Response to mass casualty chemical incidents by 
synthesising recommendations across guidance documents and by identifying trends in 
first responders’ experiences in communication with casualties during decontamination. 
Several key findings were identified with regards to the communication methods and 
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types of messaging both recommended to, and reportedly used by, first responders 
during decontamination.  
4.4.1. Communication channels 
Guidance documents and interviewees cited a wide range of available communication 
channels. The literature reviews reported in Chapters 2 and 3 provided no empirical 
support to justify the use of one channel over another. Using multiple channels to 
communicate consistent information could be effective at promoting trust and 
adherence based on findings from the broader review (Chapter 2). The use of voice 
amplification, for example via a handheld loudhailer or vehicle-mounted PA system was 
the only cited communication channel that allowed for both verbal communication and 
the capability to adapt the message during the course of an incident. Speaking with 
voice amplification, as opposed to pre-recorded messages in the form of signage, 
pictograms and recordings, allows the communicator to adapt messaging as more 
information becomes available about: the contaminant; the actions responders are 
taking; the actions casualties are required to take; and any other events that occur.  
Interview participants made reference to communication barriers including the need to 
communicate with multiple casualties and the need to either maintain distance from 
casualties or only approach casualties whilst wearing PPE, making communication 
more difficult. Voice amplification technology enables a responder to communicate with 
multiple casualties from a safe distance. Consideration would need to be taken to 
ensure that voice amplification systems can be heard above extraneous noise, such as 
the sound of fire engines running water for an interim decontamination shower. 
However, as a pragmatic step to ensure that messages are heard, emergency 
response organisations that respond to chemical incidents should ensure that 
responders have access to voice amplification technology. 
4.4.2. Communicator 
Whilst interview participants expressed views about messenger characteristics, 
including reflections on which emergency services would be best suited to 
communicating, in practice the issue may be a moot point. Findings from the review 
reported in Chapter 2 indicate that, to promote trust and adherence, information needs 
to be communicated as soon as it is known by the authorities. Moreover, as reported in 
Chapter 1, delaying decontamination undermines its effectiveness. Delaying 
communication until someone from the ‘correct’ service or someone with the ‘correct’ 
personality is available is therefore not possible during IOR. Instead, communication 
training for mass casualty decontamination, particularly at the IOR stage, should be 
applied as extensively as possible across the emergency services. Given that several 
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participants discussed perceived advantages and disadvantages of different 
emergency services or post-holders taking charge of communication, it may be that 
training should be adapted to emphasise the importance of the ‘person on the spot’ as 
being the best communicator, and that waiting for someone else to arrive is not an 
option. If the first person on scene is the person who needs to communicate with 
casualties, then any responder who could be deployed to the scene of a chemical 
incident needs to have high perceived self-efficacy in communication. Findings from 
studies on the effectiveness of training courses in patient communication for healthcare 
professionals (Hsu, Huang, & Hsieh, 2014; Nørgaard, Ammentorp, Ohm Kyvik, & 
Kofoed, 2012; S. Wilkinson, Linsell, Perry, & Blanchard, 2008; S. Wilkinson, Perry, 
Blanchard, & Linsell, 2008) indicate that training in communication with casualties 
would be an effective approach to improving responders’ self-efficacy in this 
proficiency. 
4.4.3. Coercion 
Decontamination via physical force, or threat of physical force, was discussed by 
responders in the interview study. Coerced evacuation and confinement may have 
legal precedent. Under the terms of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, a senior Minister 
of the Crown, such as the Prime Minister, “may make emergency regulations” if urgent 
provisions are warranted to prevent, control, or mitigate “an aspect or effect” of an 
emergency that “has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur”. Emergency 
regulations include the authority to “prohibit, or enable the prohibition of, movement to 
or from a specified place” and to “require, or enable the requirement of, movement to or 
from a specified place” (Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, pp. 15-17). In the context of 
IOR, this authority would only apply to evacuation and containment. Clearly however, 
this a legally complicated issue. Proper interpretation of the Civil Contingencies Act 
2004 would require input from a legal expert. 
Discussions of the Civil Contingencies Act may also be moot. Forced decontamination 
of those who have the capacity to consent to undergoing decontamination but choose 
not to, is likely to be unethical and impractical. In terms of ethics, the use of physical 
coercion runs counter to the principle of patient autonomy, discussed by scholars of 
healthcare ethics (Trotter, 2007).  Regarding practicality, in a mass casualty incident 
there are unlikely to be the requisite resources and personnel to forcibly disrobe and 
decontaminate every casualty. The likely media presence and video recording 
capabilities of members of the public with smartphones would publicise cases of 
responders forcibly decontaminating people and this would potentially have an adverse 
effect on the reputation of the responding agency. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
Elaborated Social Identity Model predicts that crowd behaviour would be influenced by 
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the actions of responders. If the behaviour of responders is perceived to be illegitimate, 
this can lead crowd members to unite to challenge emergency responders; conversely, 
where responders’ actions are perceived to be legitimate, this promotes compliance 
and cooperation from crowd members (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury, Stott, & Farsides, 
2003). In the case of IOR, if responders were to attempt to force casualties to 
decontaminate, there is a risk that this behaviour would prompt reactance and hostility 
among the casualty group, which would have detrimental effects on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of decontamination. Rather than attempting to physically force casualties 
to undergo decontamination, it is therefore both morally and logistically more 
appropriate for responders to communicate about the importance of decontamination. 
4.4.4. Message content 
In terms of the actual messages delivered to casualties, instructional messaging about 
actions casualties should take was cited in all guidance documents in which 
recommended messages featured and was reportedly used by all interview 
participants. This is a promising finding given the empirical support from the previous 
two chapters for the positive effect of providing information about protective actions that 
should be taken on adaptive behaviour change during an emergency (Amlôt et al., 
2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; Glik, 2007a; 
Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; D. D. Sellnow et al., 2017; Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018; World 
Health Organization, 2017). Instructional messages cited in this study typically took 
casualties through each step of the process, with varying degrees of detail. Synthesis 
of findings from included studies in the systematic review reported in the previous 
chapter highlighted the effect of justifying the adoption of target behaviours on 
casualties’ adherence to evacuation or decontamination instructions. In Chapter 2, I 
explained that, based on predictions of Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (R. W. 
Rogers, 1975, 1983) and the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte, 1992, 
1994), justification should consist of information about: the severity of the threat; 
casualties’ susceptibility to hazardous chemical exposure; the efficacy of IOR at 
reducing the threat of contamination; and casualties’ self-efficacy.  
In the present study, interview participants recalled explaining why adhering to 
responders’ instructions was necessary by a) referring to the severity and likelihood of 
contamination and b) explaining the efficacy of disrobing and showering at reducing 
contamination. Severity messages reported by interview participants included 
highlighting both the personal consequences of not undergoing IOR decontamination 
and the consequence of self-evacuating and potentially contaminating other people, 
including loved ones. Concern about this risk is well-founded. Following the sarin 
attacks in Matsumoto and Tokyo in 1994 and 1995, rescue and healthcare staff were 
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treated for exposure to off-gassing from casualties who had not been decontaminated 
(Eckstein, 1999; Rebera & Rafalowski, 2014). However, no guidance is given in official 
documents as to the importance of informing casualties about the risk of secondary 
contamination were they to leave the scene.  
Messages aimed at informing casualties that they are contaminated that were found in 
guidance documents introduced a level of ambiguity as to whether the threat is certain 
for all casualties who hear the message, with qualifying words and phrases that 
casualties “might have” contaminant on them or that there is a “suspicion” or “strong 
belief” that they are contaminated. Furthermore, there were two recommended 
reassurance statements in guidance documents that understated the threat of 
contamination, “it is highly unlikely that any harm has come to you” and “you’re going to 
be fine”. Interview participants also made references to understating the threat of 
contamination to reassure casualties. It is possible that this type of messaging, whilst 
aiming to reduce casualties’ anxiety could potentially reduce adherence to instructions. 
As stated in Chapter 2, unsubstantiated reassurance is discouraged in the literature on 
disaster risk and crisis communication (Glik, 2007a; Rubin et al., 2012; Sorensen, 
2000; World Health Organization, 2017). If the casualty is symptomatic then a 
statement from a responder along the lines of “you’re going to be fine” would be 
perceived as objectively false, reducing levels of trust. If the casualty is asymptomatic 
then such a statement might reduce the motivation of the casualty to engage in self-
protective behaviour (Witte, 1992, 1994). Based on PMT and the EPPM, a more 
effective form of reassurance would be highlighting the efficacy of decontamination 
actions at reducing the threat rather than downplaying the threat itself.  
Based on findings from studies included in the systematic review reported in Chapter 3, 
information about actions responders are taking would help to improve perceived 
legitimacy of responders and by extension compliance with decontamination 
instructions (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015). 
Interview participants reported the use of statements about provision of medical 
assistance and protection of privacy and modesty. It is likely that this information would 
also improve casualties’ self-efficacy perceptions, particularly regarding disrobing, 
which is likely to improve adherence to IOR based on predictions of PMT and the 
EPPM, though further investigation is required to test this assertion. 
4.4.5. Limitations 
In this study, assessment of the standard practice for communication was based on: 
recommendations in guidance documents; responders’ reflections on what they would 
say in a real incident; recollections about communication with simulated casualties in 
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exercises; and recollections of information disseminated to casualties in real incidents. 
Each of these approaches has limitations.  
With regards to recollection of communication with real-life casualties in the interview 
study, most reported cases were from incidents involving a small number of casualties, 
in some cases one casualty, so communication approaches that were reported to be 
effective in these cases may not be feasible in a mass casualty incident. Furthermore, 
interview participants explicitly acknowledged the limitation of inaccurate recall of 
words spoken to casualties both in exercises and in real-life incidents.  
Half of the participants in the interview study had only interacted with role-playing 
casualty actors in decontamination exercises. The perceived artificiality of 
decontamination exercises, in which casualty actors are either required to follow 
instructions for the purposes of the exercise or are briefed to be obstructive to ‘test’ 
responders, was raised by participants. However, artificiality aside, the manner in 
which responders communicate with casualties in exercises when they are being 
monitored by official observers may reflect their perceptions of ‘best practice’ 
communication. 
Whilst the sample size for the interview study was small, low variability in coding 
frequency for the themes of communication and message content indicated that the 
sample size was sufficient to answer the research question of how responders typically 
communicate and what they say to casualties during decontamination. In previous 
research on data saturation, a sample size of 12 was found to be sufficient to achieve 
saturation when the structure and content of the interview schedule are consistent 
across participants and when there is homogeneity in the knowledge, experiences or 
perceptions of participants (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006).  The schedule for the 
present study was focused on specific instances of responders’ use of communication. 
It was not an exploratory study on responders’ attitudes toward broad concepts such as 
casualty behaviour in emergencies, which would have warranted a larger sample size. 
Participants in the present study were all emergency response staff who had taken part 
in decontamination exercises and/or responded to hazardous chemical release 
incidents. This use of a focused interview schedule and homogenous sample meant 
that the sample size was probably sufficient. 
There was an anticipated risk of participants reporting on what they perceived to be 
optimum communication and not on how they actually communicate with casualties. A 
concerted effort was made to mitigate against this risk, as indicated in the preamble to 
the interview schedule in which participants were informed that the interview was not a 
test with a “right answer”. However, it is not possible to rule out the possibility that 
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interview participants volunteered what they considered to be “best practice” when 
asked what they would say or what they have said to casualties. However, even if this 
were the case, the responses still reflect current perceptions on what constitutes 
effective communication and therefore provide insight into how responders are 
currently likely to communicate with casualties during IOR decontamination when 
attempting to follow best practice. 
The approaches used to ascertain the standard practice of communication were limited 
to a guidance document review and interview study. Interview participants discussed 
the inaccuracy inherent in recalling previous instances of communication. Guidance 
documents were more focused on the technical parameters of decontamination, such 
as shower configurations. More comprehensive understanding of current standard 
practice of first responder communication in chemical incidents requires more robust 
methods. The first proposed measure would be a cross-sectional survey deployed to 
first responder agencies to assess the prevalence of communication practices 
identified in this study. An alternative approach would be an observational study in 
which casualties, played by research confederates, are instructed by participants 
sampled from first responder populations to undergo the same decontamination 
procedures. The responders would be audio recorded and a standard practice 
intervention would be derived from trends found in the transcripts of the recordings. 
However, the artificiality of such an approach and the potential for demand awareness 
would still limit the study’s validity as a measure of standard communication practices 
during mass casualty decontamination. A more objective measure would be to analyse 
data from body cameras worn by first responders in real chemical incidents to identify 
trends in real-life communication. Such an approach would also allow for assessment 
of the impact of different communication approaches on casualty behaviour. 
4.4.6. Conclusion 
Findings from this study pertaining to message content are promising as they indicate 
that theoretically effective messages are currently in use though it is not possible to 
assess prevalence of usage from the outcomes of this study. But there was also an 
apparent lack of a script or standardised approach to messaging. Interview participants 
also stated that, based on their experiences, it was impractical to script communication. 
This suggests that first response staff need to be trained to communicate using simple, 
easy to recall principles, rather than trained to memorise a script. On completion of this 
PhD, a script will have been developed and tested and, whilst this can be used as an 
exemplary guide, scope should be allowed for tailoring the script to the parameters of 
each incident. The next step in the process of developing these principles is to examine 
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how members of the public are likely to perceive the risk of chemical contamination. 
The execution of this task is reported in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 5 Interview study to understand lay public mental 




The Initial Operational Response (IOR) to a mass casualty chemical incident consists 
of: evacuation from the source of the hazardous chemical; rapid removal of 
contaminated clothing; implementation of self-decontamination with either absorbent 
materials or water, depending on whether or not the contaminant is caustic; and 
remaining in place until specialist decontamination resources arrive (Home Office, 
2015; Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, 2013, 2016; National 
CBRN Centre, 2016). As explained in Chapter 1, the success of IOR decontamination 
as a countermeasure is contingent on all casualties adhering to this protocol. Theories 
and supporting studies discussed in Chapter 2, such as Protection Motivation Theory 
(PMT) (R. W. Rogers, 1975, 1983) and the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) 
(Witte, 1992, 1994), point towards the inclusion of information about the threat of 
contamination and the efficacy of decontamination as information that would be 
conducive to successful promotion of adherence. As observed in Chapter 4, 
responders are currently advised to provide information about response efficacy, 
though this recommendation was not standardised across all reviewed documents. A 
proportion of first responders revealed in interviews that they have previously provided 
casualties with response efficacy information and have also informed casualties about 
the likelihood that they have been contaminated. But this type of messaging was not 
reportedly used by all participants and some reported preferring to offer reassuring 
words downplaying the likelihood of contamination and suggesting that 
decontamination was simply a precaution. 
Whilst providing information about the level of threat or the response efficacy of 
decontamination may be theoretically effective, practical application of these principles 
is still hindered by a lack of clear guidance on what exactly first responders should say 
to convey these concepts quickly and clearly to casualties.  The threat of chemical 
contamination and the effectiveness of the IOR protocol as a countermeasure are not 
necessarily intuitive to people outside the emergency response and decontamination 
research communities. Optimal wording of this information may require us to first 
understand pre-existing non-expert intuitions regarding chemical contamination and 
decontamination. Understanding how laypeople conceptualise chemical contamination 
may also reveal insights into what types of information would be sought by casualties 
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during this particular health threat and what actions they would be inclined to take in 
the absence of information from authorities. 
The ‘mental models’ approach is an established method for understanding how 
laypeople conceptualise risks and how these conceptualisations can inform risk 
communication (Glik, 2007a; Morgan, Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Atman, 2002). Mental 
models are intrinsic representations or simulations of a concept (Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
N. Jones, Ross, Lynam, Perez, & Leitch, 2011; Whitmer, Sims, & Torres, 2017). 
Empirical assessment of lay mental models has been used to understand how people 
conceptualise abstract subjects such as the periodic table (Larson, Long, & Briggs, 
2012) and the shape of the earth (Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), and the concept of 
“emergencies” (Whitmer et al., 2017). The mental models approach has also been 
used to understand non-expert representations of the risks associated with health 
threats, such as HIV (Newman, Seiden, Roberts, Kakinami, & Duan, 2009), 
electromagnetic fields (Claassen, Bostrom, & Timmermans, 2016), flash floods 
(Lazrus, Morss, Demuth, Lazo, & Bostrom, 2016), nuclear waste disposal (Skarlatidou, 
Cheng, & Haklay, 2012), radon exposure (Bostrom, Fischhoff, & Morgan, 1992) and 
climate change (Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & Read, 1994). Findings from a review on 
communication with the public about Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear 
(CBRN) risks highlighted a need for communicators to tailor messages to public mental 
models to correct popular misconceptions about CBRN and ensure that the utility of 
protective measures is understood by a lay audience (Rubin et al., 2012).  
The mental models approach has been used to understand how staff who work with 
hazardous chemicals in a professional capacity conceptualise hazardous chemical 
risks in the workplace, with implications for improving workplace safety information 
(Cox et al., 2003; Niewöhner, Cox, Gerrard, & Pidgeon, 2004; Pettersson-Stromback, 
Liljelind, Nordin, & Jarvholm, 2010; Quadrel et al., 1994) and to understand laypeople’s 
perceptions of the risks associated with long-term exposure to toxic chemicals in the 
environment (Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2013). Less is known about the mental models of 
members of the public who do not have professional experience with hazardous 
chemicals but who are at risk of suffering the effects of acute chemical exposure in a 
deliberate or accidental hazardous chemical release incident. By learning more about 
the mechanisms used to make sense of the external world and the connections people 
make between concepts pertaining to a particular risk, communicators can identify 
knowledge gaps and common misconceptions that may exist in a non-expert 
population and use these insights to tailor risk communication to mitigate against 
popular misconceptions and highlight prevalent knowledge gaps (Breakwell, 2001).  
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Understanding the mental models used by the public to make sense of risks is 
particularly important when communicating during an emergency. The Mental Noise 
Model predicts that information processing is impaired in a highly stressful situation 
(Barry et al., 2013; Covello et al., 2001; Firestone & Everly, 2013). Human volunteer 
trials have indicated deterioration in cognitive performance following nerve agent 
exposure (DiGiovanni, 2003; DiGiovanni Jr, 1999) and following exposure to acute 
stressors modelled on emergency conditions (Porter & Leach, 2010; Robinson et al., 
2013). But the Mental Noise Model also predicts that information is more easily 
understood under stressful conditions if the information corresponds to a pre-existing 
conceptual framework relating to the emerging risk (Barry et al., 2013). 
The mental models method, as applied to risk, typically involves several stages. The 
first consists of developing an expert model of the risk in order to develop an expert 
‘influence diagram’ which makes explicit how the particular risk ‘works.’ An influence 
diagram, consisting of nodes that represent concepts, and arrows that represent 
influences between concepts, is a standard approach to representing the mental model 
of a risk (Bostrom et al., 1992; Morgan et al., 2002). The second stage is to develop a 
similar, lay, influence diagram, which makes explicit how non-experts understand the 
risk. Cross-referencing trends in lay public beliefs with the expert model can then be 
used to highlight areas where misunderstandings may occur and content that would 
need to be included in risk communication (Maharik & Fischhoff, 1992; McComas, 
2006; Skarlatidou et al., 2012).  
In the present study, I developed an expert model influence diagram based on a rapid 
review of the decontamination guidance document and toxicology literature, outcomes 
of which are reported in Chapter 1. I then consulted with subject matter experts who 
either affirmed or proposed modifications to the diagram. Using an interview schedule 
based on the expert model influence diagram, I interviewed non-experts to identify 
knowledge gaps, misconceptions, anticipated behaviours, and factors that would 
influence engagement in or avoidance of IOR actions. My aims in this study were: a) to 
identify knowledge gaps and misconceptions that would need to be addressed in 
communication and; b) to identify concepts relating to chemical contamination that are 
likely to be intuitive to casualties so that communicators can map information on to pre-









5.2.1. Expert model 
I designed a first draft of an influence diagram to visually represent chemical skin 
contamination and the protective actions comprising IOR, based on a rapid review of 
the toxicology literature on skin decontamination and the most recent guidance 
documents on UK IOR protocols. The diagram was submitted, along with a covering 
letter (Appendix H) to nine emergency response policy and chemical toxicology experts 
who comprised a Technical Advisory Group attached to a Department of Health and 
Social Care funded project on the decontamination of skin and hair. I asked experts to 
assess whether the diagram: had any critical omissions; accurately represented the 
status of UK decontamination guidelines for chemical incidents; and was accurate from 
a toxicological standpoint.  
5.2.2. Non-expert model 
5.2.2.1 Design 
The development of a non-expert mental model of chemical contamination and 
decontamination was based on qualitative interviews carried out with a sample of 
people recruited from the lay population, using an interview schedule that was informed 
by the influence diagram of the expert model. 
5.2.2.2 Participants  
Twenty participants aged between 18 and 45 (M = 28.8, SD = 8.58) took part in a one-
on-one interview. The sample size for this study was 20, based on the recommendation 
by Morgan et al. (2002, p. 76) that 20 to 30 interviews are sufficient to gather all the 
main available concepts that people may have when it is expected that similar beliefs 
about the subject matter exist within the sample population. A self-selected 
convenience sampling method was used. The majority of participants were students. 
All participants had completed or were working towards completing an undergraduate 
degree but no participants had qualifications relevant to the subject of skin toxicology, 
CBRN or emergency response. 
5.2.2.3 Materials 
I used a semi-structured interview schedule (Appendix I) during all interviews to ensure 
consistency. Prompts in the schedule were informed by concepts outlined in the expert 
model influence diagram. I carried out practice interviews with two colleagues (one 
psychology research assistant and one research administrator, neither had worked in 
emergency response before) and with a member of a Public Involvement Panel 
attached to the Department of Health and Social Care funded decontamination project. 
The purpose of the practice interviews was to check that the wording of questions in 
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the interview schedule was appropriate for a lay public sample. Each pilot participant 
was provided with the participant information sheet for this study in advance of the 
interview so they would have the same level of knowledge about the study as a 
participant during data collection. At the conclusion of each interview, pilot participants 
provided feedback on my interview technique and on the structure of the interview. The 
key change made to the interview schedule following the practice interviews was the 
presentation of the scenario. In the practice interview, a recording of an emergency 
evacuation at a train station was played to participants to replicate the evacuation 
described in the interview. However, due to issues of sound quality during practice 
interviews, it was suggested that the text of the scenario be read to participants during 
the actual interviews. The panel member advised me to simply read the text of the 
evacuation alarm myself during data collection due to issues of sound quality when 
playing a video over the telephone. Other changes made as a result of the practice 
interviews were: asking demographic questions in a more informal, less rigid style; 
providing feedback on contributions made by the interviewee, such as “that’s a good 
point”, before probing for further information; and warning interviewees early on that 
some of the questions may seem redundant but they are necessary to uncover their 
reasoning for each assertion. 
5.2.2.4 Procedure 
Interviews took place in July and August 2017. Ethical approval for this study was 
granted by the King’s College London Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics 
Panel (reference: LRS-16/17-4476; Appendix J). Potential participants responded to a 
recruitment advertisement (Appendix K) that I posted on a university research 
webpage, distributed via a university circular email, or emailed to a database of 
contacts who had consented to be emailed about participation in studies conducted by 
the research team. The exclusion criterion, “you must . . . have no professional 
experience or expertise in the areas we are looking at (e.g. skin toxicology, Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear incidents, or decontamination)”, was made explicit 
to participants in the information sheet (Appendix L) and all recruitment materials for 
the study. Prior to each interview, I checked with the participant that they did not have 
professional experience or expertise in the subject area. 
I sent an information sheet and consent form to participants who approached me to find 
out more about the study after seeing the recruitment advert and arranged an 
appointment with them on receipt of a completed consent form (Appendix M). Each 
participant took part in a one-on-one semi-structured open-ended interview, carried out 
remotely via telephone or Skype and audio recorded. The mean interview duration was 
41.16 minutes (SD = 9.95). It is recommended that prompts and follow-up questions 
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are non-judgemental in the same vein as questions asked during client-centred therapy 
(Morgan et al., 2002, p. 65). To that end, I informed each participant, in advance of the 
interview, that the objective of the study was not to assess whether the participant’s 
assertions were “correct” and that the purpose of asking follow-up questions was only 
to understand why the participant raised a particular point. 
I asked demographic questions so that the generalisability of the non-expert model to 
other populations could be assessed in future studies. Following the demographic 
questions, the interview began with a broad, simple question, “Tell me what you 
already know about chemical contamination,” modelled on opening questions used in 
previous research on lay mental models of health risks (Bostrom et al., 1994; Cousin & 
Siegrist, 2010; Lazrus et al., 2016; Morgan et al., 2002; Skarlatidou et al., 2012). This 
approach aimed to help the participant externalise their existing knowledge about 
chemical contamination in the absence of cues from me. The schedule included 
instructions for me to ask the participant follow-up questions about each item raised 
during this opening section of the interview. When participants reported not having any 
further knowledge on the subject, I presented neutral prompts, such as “How do you 
know if you have a chemical on you?”.  
Once the participant had responded to the opening question and neutral prompts, I 
asked them if there was anything further that they knew about chemical contamination 
or anything they had previously mentioned which they would like to elaborate. Once it 
was confirmed that all available knowledge had been provided by the participant, I 
presented them with a specific scenario of an emergency evacuation from a train 
station. The aim of providing the scenario was to standardise the context within which 
hazardous chemical contamination was discussed. The text for the scenario, outlined 
below, was read out loud. 
You are standing in the middle of a queue for an automated ticket machine at a 
crowded train station. The weather is mild with no wind or rain. You are 
travelling alone and you have never been to this station before. Suddenly, you 
hear the following announcement on an overhead speaker: “Due to a reported 
emergency, all passengers must leave the station immediately. Go to the 
nearest exit.” You join the crowd of people walking towards the nearest exit. 
You hear the announcement again: “Due to a reported emergency, all 
passengers must leave the station immediately. Go to the nearest exit.” You 
follow the crowd outside the station. You are now standing on a street among 
roughly 100 people. In the distance, you can see a police van with blue lights 
flashing. 
 
After discussing their reflections on the evacuation itself, I asked participants to 
consider whether and, if applicable, how they would know if they had been exposed to 
a hazardous chemical in this scenario. I then asked participants what they would do if 
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they thought that they had been contaminated. If the participant did not raise a 
protective measure included in the expert model (for example, disrobing or dry 
decontamination) after having the opportunity to raise any measure that they could 
articulate, I provided prompts about each protective measure in the expert model. I 
asked questions about whether and why each measure would or would not reduce 
health threats and how they reached their conclusion. Finally, I asked if there was 
anything else on the subject of chemical contamination or decontamination that 
participants had considered but not raised during the interview. Interviews were 
terminated once I confirmed that the participant had exhausted all relevant knowledge 
that they could associate with the subject. 
Interviews took place in the context of wide media coverage of acid attacks but before 
the 2018 Novichok release in Wiltshire. 
Recordings were transcribed by a third party transcription agency with a signed data 
confidentiality agreement in place. The data set consisted of all participant quotations 
in the collated transcripts.  
5.2.2.5 Analysis 
I carried out thematic analysis of interview transcripts using NVivo 11.2.1.616 (QSR 
International). Participant quotations were allocated to semantic categories using the 
data-derived approach to thematic analysis outlined by Braun and Clarke (2013) to 
“reflect the semantic content of the data” (p. 207), the same analysis approach that I 
used in Chapter 4. Instances of participants asking for clarification on a question were 
not coded to a theme. The minimum number of sources required to constitute a sub-
theme was two, in order to avoid basing a sub-theme on one participant’s particular 
attitudes and experiences. Sub-themes based on fewer than two sources were not 
included in the influence diagram. Resulting themes and sub-themes were visually 
represented as nodes in non-expert influence diagrams to represent participants’ 
collated mental models about chemical contamination and emergency 
decontamination. Themes and sub-themes were reported in writing with broad theme 
titles as headings and theme titles italicised in the text.  
I compared non-expert mental models against the expert mental model to identify 
potential knowledge gaps and misconceptions about contamination and 
decontamination that may exist within a non-expert population. Non-expert mental 
models were also used to identify factors that either facilitate or inhibit uptake of 
protective behaviours outlined in the expert model. I identified implications for 





5.3.1. Expert model 
On reviewing my initial influence diagram that was derived from technical publications, 
three of the nine panel members (a CBRN research programme manager, a toxic 
health risks technical advisor, and a CBRN policy advisor) suggested that changes be 
made to the diagram, such as specifying that the latency of 4-12 hours following 
exposure to sulphur mustard applies when it is only skin that has been contaminated. 
The model was adapted based on these suggestions. After three iterations following 
feedback from members of the advisory group, the diagram (Figure 5-1) was finalised 
and used to inform the development of the interview schedule used to ascertain the 
layperson or non-expert mental model. The diagram depicts concepts associated with 
the risk of chemical contamination (left side) and steps that would be effective in 
reducing or alleviating the risks (right side). Concepts displayed in dashed borders are 








5.3.2. Non-expert models 
5.3.2.1 Sample characteristics 
Demographic characteristics of the sample are reported in Table 5-1. 
 













Highest Educational Qualification   
PhD 5 
Postgraduate Degree 5 
Professional Qualification 1 





End user analyst 1 
Events officer 1 
Lobbyist 1 






















Russian and English 1 
  
Ethnic group or background  
Asian/Asian British 8 










No religion 10 
Prefer not to say 1 
 
5.3.2.2 Themes omitted from model 
Due to the broad opening question, designed to facilitate the availability of all thoughts 
on the subject of chemical contamination, several themes were identified that appeared 
to be tangential or irrelevant to acute chemical contamination. Example themes 
included: reflections on acid rain; prolonged exposure to everyday household 
chemicals; general inhalation of vehicle emissions in towns and cities and reported lack 
of available public information about chemical contamination. Participants also 
described the effects of environmental contamination on communities affected by 
contaminated food and water supplies. 
I think the first thing I think of is air pollution, I don't know if that falls within that 
category, but that's, kind of, my association (P2). 
I'm sure I read somewhere about a company dumping loads of toxic waste into 
a river that provided clean water for, like, communities living on the banks of the 
river, obviously water to wash in, but also fish, and things that they feed off 
(P2). 
one of the main ones I can think of is, perhaps, drinking water. So, I’m not sure 
exactly in the UK because I’m not sure how our drinking water is actually 
processed. Well, I have a slight clue, but I’m not sure. Perhaps it could be 
contaminated after the fact it’s been processed. But food. So, the soil that we 
grow… So, chemical contamination, actually, pesticides as well. I guess that 
would come under it. (P3). 
When it comes to hazardous chemicals there's not much public information 
about what your immediate steps should be (P6). 
I think a lot of us don’t understand that we're being exposed to so many 
chemicals every single day and we just don’t even realise that (P11). 
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I feel like you're already in, you live in an urban area, you're already being 
contaminated with so much on a daily basis (P16). 
I mean chemicals is a broad term. There are chemicals in everything from you 
know paint to cleaning products. … We're exposed to chemicals on a daily 
basis. So yes, like because it's such a broad term, and because the amount is 
very significant, I would say like there's regular exposure to a vast range of 
things. (P20). 
5.3.2.3 Non-expert model of acute chemical contamination  
When discussing acute chemical contamination, participants raised concepts pertaining 
to: why and how a hazardous chemical would be released; mechanisms by which they 
could be exposed to or contaminated with a chemical; all possible effects resulting from 
contamination; and all possible indications of chemical contamination. All concepts 
pertaining to skin contamination from the expert model were discussed. The influence 
diagram of the model is displayed in Figure 5-2. 
Most participants discussed hazardous chemical release in the context of a deliberate 
attack, including acid attacks, which were deemed to be currently high profile with 
increased public awareness for example due to increased news coverage, and 
chemical weapons used in either a terrorist or military attack. 
Yes I can say I know quite a few, well even in London too, there's the issue of 
acid attacks which is rising so that is an example of, like, chemical, it is a 
chemical attack (P1). 
I know in the Korean and the Vietnamese war there was a lot of use of them, 
and Napalm and, I know obviously in the Syrian conflict there's been some 
horrendous use of chemical weapons (P2). 
Chemical warfare, which I believe, in the future, is going to be… It is already 
being rather dangerous, and it can only get more dangerous (P3).  
The only thing I guess I can think about, which is all of the stuff that's going on 
at the moment, is around the kind of acid attacks where people are using 
unknown very noxious substances in quite a malicious way against other 
people (P13). 
Although I guess chemical warfare is something that is used by potentially 
countries or governments as a threat or in real life against others, you know to 
threaten life. Something that can actually cause very much damage. I'd guess 
it's kind of the warfare term (P13). 
I do have like, a sort of, like a brief understanding of like, I guess, chemical 
weapons are used obviously, within the army and to… well, they use that, I 
suppose, as a form of a gas maybe, as a weapon (P14). 
I guess, I was thinking again, just the current news events, I was thinking about 
acid attacks (P16).  
Well, I mean, not by name but certainly there's been a pretty horrible rise in the 
number of acid attacks in London and around the country and the world, so yes, 
it seems, like, every day, kind of, bleachers and acidic drain unblockers are able 
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to cause some pretty severe damage to people and life changing injury. So, 
yes, the stuff that you can buy over the counter can certainly have that kind of 
effect on someone's skin. (P17). 
Scenarios involving the accidental release of hazardous chemicals were raised by a 
smaller proportion of participants, with examples including the accidental leak of 
industrial chemicals and the release of liquid chemicals following a transport accident. 
There was reflection on chemical contamination as something that would occur in 
large-scale disasters.  
The things I think about when I think around chemical contamination are things 
like disasters which have happened in various places around the world. For 
example, something like Chernobyl or contamination potentially like oil spills or 
leaks which may obviously contaminate in terms of public health. That's as 
much as I'd say that I know really. (P13). 
Chemical contamination, yes, then I just think of like, big kind of industrial 
incidents or accidents or what's it called when the stuff leaks off (P16). 
It could be anything, I guess, so something like oil on a tanker, and a leak in a, 
kind of, a factory or a nuclear plant perhaps (P17). 
Accidental release of industrial chemicals was linked to insufficient safety protocols and 
corporate negligence/corruption. 
It’s something which I think is actually widely prevalent with all of the new 
practices that we have today, in terms of, say, business practices. So, lots of 
factories will churn out a lot of chemicals, which they want to dispose of in the 
cheapest way they could, be that getting rid of it by avoiding the proper 
methods of getting rid of it; so just dumping it, could be by accident. … And in 
terms of, say, the contamination through negligence, where these companies 
are earning hundreds of millions of profit every year, yet they’re not getting rid 
of… This is part of the reason why they’re earning such high amounts, because 
they’re not spending the money to get rid of their waste. (P3). 
There are certain industries where it's terribly worrying, particularly countries 
where there isn’t necessarily the safety protocol we have here (P20). 
The state of matter of the contaminant and the process by which it would be released 
was discussed. Routes of dispersal included spray, liquid spillage, or a liquid or a gas 
canister being dropped from above. Participants also described the contaminant as a 
noxious gas in the atmosphere, for example due to combustion. 
Many of these materials, you know, when they combust they can release 
certain chemicals that can actually be, like, very, very hazardous (P1).  
I think probably if there are chemicals in the atmosphere (P4). 




Maybe there was some sort of toxic gas or hazardous gas that was leaking 
(P12). 
I guess it's about something potentially being spilled (P13). 
I'm envisaging some sort of misty spray (P15).  
Something liquid that was dripping through that ceiling (P17). 
Unless like someone crazy just dumps dangerous liquids from the air (P18).  
Participants reflected on routes of exposure by which contaminants could enter the 
organism, such as inhalation, skin contact, and ingestion.  
If you inhale, kind of, gas coming off a chemical (P2). 
They could touch terrible chemicals that could burn them (P3). 
When someone says chemical contamination I assume someone's maybe 
swallowed something (P14).  
It might be skin contact (P20). 
On the subject of skin contact, there was discussion about the process of skin 
penetration and absorption and on how exposure could occur by touching a hazardous 
chemical and then transferring the contaminant to the face, specifically to mucus 
membranes, or to consumables that would then be ingested.  
Perhaps, if, yes, they touch it, and then it gets into their food or drink, and then 
it enters their digestive tract, some chemicals may be more harmful through that 
method (P3). 
And if you're not careful to wash your hands, you could potentially, I don’t know, 
say, you play with your dog and then grab some crisps and eat it and then 
obviously it goes literally inside of your body (P11). 
It would damage not only the top layer and the bottom layer. And I guess the 
top layer of skin we often get cuts and grazes, and it can sort of scab, but if it 
burns any more, than it would leave a larger scar and I guess it's even more 
dangerous if those parts are exposed. (P12). 
…some form of acid, I'd imagine that'd literally burn through … into your blood 
stream and what not (P14). 
…or, yes, and after that, you ingest it because you have it on your hands or 
something (P19). 
Acute health effects that were discussed included physical impairment, headache or 
dizziness, blindness, eye irritation, and nausea or stomach upset. 
I can’t remember exactly what... it was such a long time ago, I can’t remember 
exactly what happened, but – I don’t know – maybe there was blindness (P4). 
Cough or some flu-like symptoms, a headache or things like that, feeling just 
generally unwell if it's poisonous (P6).  
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Eye irritation, that sort of a thing, is what I'm thinking about (P13). 
Skin effects included abrasions, rashes, dry skin, blistering, painful skin burns 
(including severe painful burn following an acid attack), skin discolouring, skin irritation, 
and loss of skin.  
You might get a rash or like almost, like a chemical burn or some pain, itching 
or allergic reaction-like symptoms (P2). 
Yes, blistering would be, sort of, you know, one of the worst things that would 
happen (P4). 
I'm not sure how they work but I'm assuming that they would first sort of irritate 
or burn the skin, causing irreversible damage. … I guess the first sort of mode 
of action, either if it's a toxic gas or if it's some sort of spray, would be to irritate 
and burn the skin I think (P12). 
I would imagine that it's, apart from just feeling like a burn you… from the past I 
think things like getting a welt or a blister (P15). 
Very severe immediate skin blistering and burning (P16). 
I mean, it's certainly a huge amount of damage to the skin and severe burns 
(P17). 
Well, something like rashes or allergies, contact allergies (P19). 
Respiratory effects included breathing difficulty; chemically-induced inflammation of the 
throat; haemorrhaging; respiratory irritation; damage to the nasal cavity and lungs; and 
a chemical reaction within the respiratory system.  
If you inhale, kind of, gas coming off a chemical then perhaps a cough or 
maybe shortness of breath (P2).  
I'd say sort of either breathing in, the damage to the nasal cavity or the lungs 
(P13).  
Participants described how skin or respiratory contact with the chemical or ingestion of 
the chemical would affect other organs, including the brain. The level of detail provided 
varied between participants who discussed the path from skin contact to health effects 
and, in some cases, the process was likened to the process by which a virus causes 
adverse health outcomes for the host organism. 
I think, because our skin is slightly porous so the chemicals can go inside, they 
can go, they can pass through your skin and that could, like, that could allow 
the chemical to be transported around one's body (P1). 
I suppose [chemicals] get in your system somehow. I suppose they must come 
in through either inhalation or through the skin and then somehow they are 
transported around the body and then perhaps there are particular areas of the 
body that are more vulnerable to these particular chemicals. I don’t actually 
know. That’s what I’d imagine. (P4). 
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If it has gone into my air pipes and started affecting my cells, or going into my 
bloodstream and it would maybe start a… Some sort of a virus, I daresay it 
would be a virus or some sort of adverse reaction inside there (P6). 
Because I feel like chemical substances, they can go into our blood vessels, 
right, so they would follow the blood, and they would just go to the brain … so 
you feel like keeling over, like you'll go unconscious (P9).  
The risk of death as a result of exposure was discussed.  
I guess it gets released into the atmosphere and then causes, you know, death 
(P14). 
It's certainly a huge amount of damage to the skin and severe burns, with death 
in obviously a huge number of cases (P17). 
Participants discussed the potential for long-term health effects following exposure to a 
hazardous chemical, including genetic effects and irreversible skin damage. In one 
case, long-term health effects were discussed in relation to the nuclear accident at 
Chernobyl. 
Perhaps, just missing limbs, or bigger body parts, or warped body parts, or 
decreased health. So, yes, just somehow adversely, yes, affects their health in 
the next generation (P3). 
I mean if you know you see photos of people who’ve been affected by these 
kinds of weapons, and obviously if you’re burned, you know that leaves a scar 
on your body basically forever and you can't really you know… You can have 
some sort of operation but it still leaves that kind of scar I guess, that's why I 
would call it irreversible. You know, you'll be left with disfigured limbs and face 
as well in some cases. (P12). 
…causing deformities with babies, with pregnant women, I think (P16). 
I'm sure I've read articles about people who lived in the surrounding areas of 
Chernobyl who suffered from cancer later in life, there are still certainly people 
who live there who die well before their age… the average life expectancy, I 
guess, is what I'm trying to say. But, I think, yes, certainly cancers and the 
issues with the lungs and breathing ability (P17). 
I have heard there are some chemicals, but I don’t know what it is, that once it 
got onto your skin for maybe quite some time it would just stay there forever 
(P18).  
Long-term social and psychological consequences were discussed in the context of 
acid attacks.  
They could be potentially depressed, upset, angry, they could be traumatised 
by the event. They could be scared to go out and other times (P8). 
Well particularly in a society where you know we pay quite a lot of attention to 
what we look like, and also you know having, not even just that but meeting 
anyone, you know if you're working sort of customer-facing, getting that kind of 
work is slightly difficult if, let's say, you have a facial disfigurement that you 
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might look a bit different or a bit you know strange or sometimes even scary 
(P12). 
Without using the phrase secondary contamination, participants expressed awareness 
of the potential for contamination of other people as a result of coming into direct or 
indirect contact with a contaminated casualty. 
It would be the risk of contaminating others that I'd be concerned about and, 
you know, there are ultimately much more vulnerable people than me out there 
that don't need added problems with chemical contamination (P2). 
whether that individual is then contaminated in a way where they would 
potentially pass that on to somebody (P13). 
You could infect those around you (P15). 
I could maybe contaminate others or something (P16).  
Secondary chemical contamination was likened in some cases to a biological or 
radiological contagion.  
I mean I guess it's like back to the whole coughing and sneezing common cold 
kind of thing, but that could be completely and utterly incorrect (P13). 
If it's like with… with polonium, I think he was… I feel like I remember reading 
that they had try and trace his steps, so that they could see who else he came 
into contact with (P17).  
If it's like Litvinenko then I'm not like terribly dangerous, but if they don't know, if 
they believe I'm exposed, and if you don't know then you must exercise all 
precautions (P20). 
Reported routes of secondary contamination included exposure to exhaled air of 
contaminated persons and skin exposure to a chemical on the contaminated person or 
surface to which contaminated person has transferred the chemical.  
There must be some chemicals which, perhaps, will linger on your skin. So, 
perhaps, if you touch someone else (P3).  
By touching them, maybe, you know, the surfaces we touched, maybe if 
someone else touched those surfaces as well after us because I think anything 
we were exposed to would need to be wiped clean to make sure nobody else 
was affected (P4). 
I guess if it’s on your clothes and then you go and sit on a train seat, then it’s on 
the train seat and you’ve got the potential to spread something that way (P5).  
I guess it's like a deeper contamination within me that not only I have it on the 
surface of my skin but also have it, like, inside of my body. Whenever I were to 
sweat, like, whenever I have sweaty palms or something like that, again, you 
know, I would use public transportation, I'll touch like a railing, I'll touch the seat 
or whatever, right. And it will be contamination in the sweat of my palms. And 
then of course, when someone else touches the same seat or the same railing, 
you know what I mean, they'll get it. (P11). 
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So, I exhale a certain amount of air droplets, the same air droplets that could be 
inhaled by someone else if we were at a secluded environment, like 
underground (P11). 
maybe if there was like a substance that was leaked and I stepped on it and it's 
on my shoes, I traipse around the carpet of the coffee shop and leave it there. 
And if there's, like, no air conditioning and the doors are closed, then it's kind of 
just sort of staying there in the room and people are breathing it in and there 
could be spread exposure if people step on it or touch, yes, I don’t know. (P16). 
Participants expressed diverging opinions on the subject of awareness of exposure to 
hazardous chemicals. The assertion that symptoms of contamination would be felt 
immediately was raised by a proportion of participants and lack of symptoms was 
associated with low danger. 
Unless I started to experience some, you know, adverse symptoms and sort of 
coughing or something, feeling a bit unwell. I wouldn't know unless I was 
suddenly feeling unwell for no reason (P12). 
My understanding is…contaminants get into your system straight away, and 
they start to cause discomfort (P14).  
I mean if I don’t have any symptoms then nobody there can tell me, that it's 
particularly dangerous for me (P19).  
If it didn't manifest immediate symptoms, then I wouldn't know (P20). 
However, participants also expressed awareness of the potential for delayed onset of 
symptoms.  
I think sometimes the effects of that, of a particular chemical will not show for a 
very long time, so one example was with the aftermath of the tragic 9-11 
attacks.  So not only were people killed through the planes that crashed into the 
Twin Towers but the fire-fighters and the police officers who came in the 
aftermath were also affected, but they weren't affected immediately.  And the 
reason why they were affected was because they inhaled all of this, like, smoke 
which contained so many different chemical, and it only showed up, like, in a 
few, like it, showed up, like, many, many years later. (P1). 
So I suppose sometimes these things can take decade to develop. You don’t 
necessarily know at the time. The contamination doesn’t... You don’t realise 
you’re being contaminated, not instantly, the effect isn’t instant (P4).  
But I guess there could be side-effects that you know you wouldn't feel or know 
about until you know some time after exposure. And I guess that's the thing 
around sort of more long-term health conditions whereby you know somebody 
suddenly got some kind of nasty lung infection or cancer as a result of 
something that happened years before. (P13). 
I would say it’s safer to go to the doctor, to just check if there are any long term 
effects that might happen. Because sometimes you cannot see like just for the 
first few hours. Who knows what’s going to happen? (P18).  
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In some cases, participants drew from their knowledge of asbestos and radiological 
contamination when discussing the delayed onset of symptoms.  
I would say, well asbestos is one example, so many people inhaled it and, I 
mean, they weren't ill immediately but, I guess, later they became ill and they 
died from it (P1). 
It could be a radioactive substance which you might not be able to tell you’ve 
been exposed to until later (P5). 
Participants described symptoms that they believed would be indicative of hazardous 
chemical exposure. Symptoms included: blurred vision; changes to body temperature; 
dizziness; dryness of mouth; eye irritation or stinging; feeling generally unwell; feeling 
aggressive or agitated; headache; nausea or stomach upset; respiratory symptoms; 
and skin burning or skin irritation.   
Maybe double vision or just like not having clear vision or blurred vision, will be 
one example of, like, symptoms that could show a chemical incident (P1).  
If I start maybe feeling nauseous (P7). 
You feel very like aggressive or agitated, yes. Then I would know if something 
is wrong. (P9). 
I imagine it would start to burn the skin, and probably a lot of pain (P14). 
I guess breathing difficulties (P15). 
I think I may have some physical symptoms or indicators such as burning eyes, 
for example (P16).   
In addition to symptoms of chemical contamination, participants discussed possible 
signs that would indicate that contamination may have occurred. Signs included 
Olfactory cues, such as a peculiar smell. 
If I just smell something, that's something has gone wrong, yes that could make 
me think that there's been some, sort of, chemical incident (P1). 
I know chemicals are invisible sometimes, so if there was no sort of visual then 
a sudden smell as well, like a gas, if I could smell something. That would be my 
way to sense it. (P6). 
Information from authorities was cited as a sign that contamination had occurred. 
If there was a report or if someone just… if it was like hearsay, maybe not but if 
it was explained how the incident occurred and I was told that I could have been 
contaminated or was within the vicinity which was contaminated (P16).  
But when an expert tells you something you do have to listen (P17). 
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Visual cues that would be indicative of a chemical incident included the sight of liquid; 
smoke or fumes; and the presence of emergency responders, particularly responders 
wearing personal protective equipment. 
I guess, if I looked around and I saw, like, you know, the emergency services 
they'll come in with these suits, you know, these white, I think Hazmat Suit…so 
basically it covers their entire skin and visor, so if they're coming that will make 
me think that, you know, like, for that, a chemical incident has taken place (P1).  
So, something like a... like mustard gas or something like that. I imagine you 
can see... I think from what you’ve seen on television, I would imagine some 
things you can see as, kind of, clouds, so visible gases (P5). 
I guess it's just a physical sign of a chemical, some sort of chemical being 
exposed, because… Unless of course, like, if it's liquid also, and there's a sign 
that that's a chemical that spilled (P7). 
I mean I'm sort of thinking you know perhaps the days of the magic spells or 
where you know it would be really obviously bright green and flashing or 
something. It would be looking like something was not right. I guess what I'm 
sort of thinking around as well, is the sort of combustibles, for example, and you 
know just would look different to normal air, because normal air doesn't look like 
anything (P13). 
I mean, I think maybe eventually you'd probably work it out, you know, maybe 
we've been exposed to something. And that's why… especially if there's people 
that turn up in hazard suits. (P14). 
Seeing liquid spilled somewhere (P16).  
If it's some kind of smoke from somewhere, coming out from somewhere, 
maybe like that” (P19). 
Witnessing other people displaying symptoms was a visual indicator of possible 
chemical contamination. Symptoms mentioned were: coughing or sneezing; coughing 
up blood; fainting; skin or eye irritation; skin and limb removal; vomiting; people 
seeming generally unwell or in pain or discomfort; and people displaying the similar 
symptoms to those experienced by the participant.  
If I saw I was having these symptoms and that people around me were also 
going through the same symptoms (P10). 
Well, I’d see if other people were having the same. If they weren't, then maybe 
I'd think it was something that I was just feeling a bit funny, but if others were 
having the same symptoms, I'd maybe see if we could call an ambulance or 
something (P12). 
People coughing and spluttering… People actually showing some kind of side-
effects or something, you know (P13). 
For me seeing other people being in discomfort and they may be in pain and 
worried and I think that would just sort of… you know, you, sort of, reflect 
through yourself and you think hang on a minute, if it's happening to them then 




Figure 5-2 Influence diagram to visually represent the non-expert model of acute chemical contamination. 
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5.3.2.4 Non-expert model of decontamination 
All IOR actions outlined in the expert model, except for dry decontamination, were 
raised without prompt. Due to the number of themes to which at least two quotations 
were coded, the non-expert model of decontamination has been separated into five 
diagrams. The diagram displayed in Figure 5-3 pertains to general expected 
behaviours and perceptions following evacuation in the scenario, whilst the diagrams 
displayed in Figures 5-4 through 5-7 pertain to each post-evacuation IOR action from 
the expert model, specifically containment in the warm zone, disrobing, dry 
decontamination, and wet decontamination. 
When asked to reflect on what they would do and how they would feel having 
evacuated from the train station in the scenario, participants expected that they would 
be experiencing anxiety. Concerns were raised about contamination, particularly when 
long-term consequences of contamination were considered. 
Well, the thing I fear most, I think, you know, is cancer, I suppose. That’s the 
thing that, yes, one in three get. So I think it probably... Yes. That’s what I’d be 
worried about, cancer. (P4).  
It's knowing that you've already been contaminated is a bit horrible and not 
knowing what the consequences short and long term are of that, yes, I'll be 
scared (P16). 
Anticipated anxiety was also attributed to separation from family and unfamiliarity with 
the type of incident occurring.  
When can I see my family, you know, how am I going to get home? (P2). 
I've got no, sort of, insight or professional knowledge about chemicals or 
infections so I wouldn’t have a clue what was going on, so I'd just be terrified 
the whole time I guess (P15).  
Expectations about how other casualties would be panicking were discussed and, in 
some cases, participants explained how, due to the anticipated anxiety of themselves 
and of other casualties, they would expect to try to keep themselves and others calm.  
it is kind of obvious to me: not many people would, say, act rationally. I guess 
that’s a very broad statement or whatnot, but not many people would… Say, 
even if you gave them a good reason as to why to stay put, a lot of people, I’m 
sure, would be in the panicked state (P3). 
So, if there is a crowd of around 100 people, it's a lot of people; so, if we see 
that a certain individual, so one or two are extremely panicking, I will probably 
try my best to calm them because I think it would, in a situation like that it would 
only help for everyone just to calm and try to stick together and just be patient 
as opposed to running around and trying to run away from the station or 
actually create more chaos or something like that. I know it's not a direct answer 
but I guess my actions will be dependent on other people's action. … But if 
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there is an official announcement that at a particular venue, so, like a train 
station, you were exposed to chemical, that sets off a lot of panic. (P11). 
I imagine if this was an emergency, that maybe there'd be people screaming 
and shouting, running for their life (P14). 
I'd probably just stand there and try and control my… calm myself down, control 
my anxiety (P16). 
Related to the expectation that hazardous chemical release would lead to panic were 
two conflicting themes. Participants expected that authorities would withhold 
information to prevent panic but conversely, participants also expected that they would 
feel anxious if provided with insufficient information and that information from 
authorities would reduce anxiety. 
When they're vague that leads me to think that something serious, really 
serious was going on and they just don't want to try and scare the public (P1). 
The Police probably wouldn't want to give too much information … Because 
they wouldn't want to panic people, whereas people can say what they want on 
the Internet (P4). 
But if they're not giving us any information, then that may make you feel… Or 
would make me feel more likely to be worried, and uncomfortable, and just 
uncertain of what's going on (P8). 
Ultimately you know I'd want to know, just as a bit of information I think, 
informing the public and keeping the public up to date on what is going on. If 
there is a potential you know situation of any sort, it's always helpful, either to 
calm people down or for at least them to understand (P13). 
 
I do feel that authorities, paramedics and police, they may have access to 
information and updates that they don’t want to share with the public to prevent 
people, you know, to prevent chaos and panic (P16). 
 
The expected behaviour of seeking further information was discussed with reference to 
expected anxiety. Specifically, participants stated that they would want to know: what 
the chemical is; the cause of the chemical incident; the health impact of the chemical; 
what protective actions to take; and what treatment would be provided by authorities. 
I'll be very worried and you know, try to find out well what exactly is this incident 
and what can I do, like, if I've inhaled anything, what can I do specifically so 
that, you know, we can, we can stop… this from happening (P1). 
I’d also like to know, yes, so which chemical it was, and how we got 
contaminated, and if they were able to tell us, like, how much we were 
contaminated, or, you know, how severe the contamination was (P3). 
Have someone, to me authorities or some sort of chemical expert, tell me the 




The first thing I would want to do would be to find out the extent of the 
contamination. So if it’s... Like how serious it is, what, you know, what are the 
effects. (P10). 
Because I'd want to know the potential impacts on myself in the short term, long 
term. And you know if it's something that they know causes certain things (P13). 
I think I'd probably try and push for some kind of answer or response from 
whoever is deemed to be in charge for the situation. So, I'd probably look for a 
police office or a paramedic and ask them what was happening and why we're 
being asked to… I'd probably just want to get more information really just for my 
own peace of mind (P17). 
I would ask the people or police or medical staff, what to do next. If I have to 
report somewhere, if I… if it's linked, to what extent it's dangerous, and if I need 
to get treatment, and if so where I can get treatment (P19). 
Preferred sources of information included phoning 999 or loved ones or using a 
smartphone to access the internet, specifically Google, news websites or emergency 
services webpages or Twitter accounts. Search terms that would be entered included 
location details, emergency service details, and words associated with “chemical 
contamination”, “incidents”, and “accidents”. 
I will go on Google, I will see if it, what exactly, I will try to narrow the scenario 
down (P1). 
Because they would be able to see what’s going on if it’s already hit the news. 
They could... If there were rumours of what the agent possibly was, they could 
probably look some information up on my behalf and send me that information, 
so as to how to best protect myself (P5).  
Sometimes the emergency centres do respond, or do actually post things on 
social media, particularly on Twitter where they you know update, ‘we're 
attending an incident at this place for this reason’. And it may just be that there's 
some information on there. (P13).  
First I would look up to see if there was any current media report about what 
was going on in the station, so probably like BBC news (P16). 
Probably first Google (P19).  
Emergency services or other authorities (e.g. train station staff) at the scene were cited 
as preferred sources of information. Participants anticipated that they would have trust 
and confidence in authorities at the scene and would follow responders’ instructions. It 
was believed that instructions would be given for good reason that first responders 
would have more knowledge than the interviewee were the scenario to occur.  
I guess I would assume that the authorities wouldn’t allow people to leave if 
they had thought that there was a good chance that they’d been exposed. I 
think I would trust in what the emergency services were deciding. (P5).  
I would trust that somebody in authority or in that fashion would know better 
than me what would be best (P6). 
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Whoever's in charge of the train station since they will know most probably 
what's happening (P7). 
I would obviously do what I was told from… well, I'd hope I would do as I was 
told and follow guidance at the time (P15). 
However, one dissenting participant cited the 2017 Grenfell Tower Fire as a reason 
why they would not follow emergency responders’ instructions. 
Actually I will just ignore the advice and I'd go and there's a very good reason 
for that because I'm, well generally I'm just sceptical of people in charge.  But 
also with the recent…Grenfell Tower fire, so the people in the building, tragically 
they listened to the operator saying, just stay inside the building, stay inside the 
building. … And actually, all the people who listened to that advice died and all 
those who ignored it and decided to run out are alive to this day.  So if they told 
me to stay in place actually I will just ignore it, and my side is that they have no 
legal, like, there's no legal recourse that they can take, like, to punish me for 
leaving, I'll just leave and I'll will just, like, try to find it myself.  (P1).  
Confidence varied depending on the type of emergency response organisation (police 
officers, firefighters, ambulance crews) and there was no clear consensus as to which 
service would be trusted the most.  
I would trust…the ambulance crew first and foremost, because I've got certain 
biases, that I'm aware of (P2). 
You know, the Police, they are the law (P4).  
Because they [firefighters] are good at… I hope that they would be good at 
dealing with burns, or have some knowledge about that (P8). 
In particular, participants trusted authorities with assumed medical knowledge, such as 
nurses and doctors or a medical professional or chemical expert. 
Some sort of chemical expert tell me the best course of action so I could be 
informed if that's what I would need to be treated (P6). 
It would have to be someone that I'm satisfied has a reasonable amount of 
knowledge in how to deal with this… Doctors, nurses, healthcare assistants… 
(P8). 
I'd probably trust the information if most of it was from a health professional 
whether they were you know a paramedic or an ambulance member of staff or 
a GP who was working with them or something (P13).  
Let's see, certainly doctors, you know… Everybody else I would probably 
double-check (P20). 
When discussing decontamination in general terms, participants demonstrated 
awareness that decontamination should be carried out as soon as possible. The 
importance of timely decontamination was specifically discussed with regards to 
removal of contaminated clothing and the application of water to skin. 
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The thing is that you don't want the chemical to settle on your skin because as I 
said before, our skin is slightly porous so sometimes, you know, it can actually, 
it can seep through one's skin and once they seep through one's then that 
means they can enter into a person's bloodstream.  So the ability to remove it 
as quickly as possible is very important. (P1). 
You should remove the chemical contamination from your skin as quickly as 
possible (P5). 
You know if you ever pour water on yourself, on your clothes, it goes through, it 
will sort of seep through your clothes towards your skin, so if you remove it fast, 
before it actually gets there, then you might protect yourself (P12). 
I guess, you don’t want, I guess, my understanding of acid is it burns through. 
So you wouldn’t want it to burn through your clothing and actually get on to your 
skin. So, you'd get it all removed as quickly as possible (P14). 
Determinants of whether and how to actively self-decontaminate were what the 
chemical is and the severity of symptoms. 
Well, I suppose it depends how... I suppose it depends what the effect... If we 
could feel the effect, so, if our skin was itchy or our eyes were runny or itchy 
and, so, if we’d been obviously affected then I would expect immediate 
assistance. If it was something that we’d been exposed to that, you know, we 
might not need... feel the effects then I suppose I could wait a bit longer to be 
seen, if they wanted us to remain there. (P4). 
I guess it depends on what their advice is for this particular chemical that I 
would have been exposed to (P6). 
If there's that liquid on my head, for example, and then it's causing like some 
rashes or like redness, then I would try to like get it off . . . But if it's not causing 
any rashes, I would like just wait for like medical treatment to come over and 
help me (P9).  
Only if you realised that something's happened. If it was… if you saw people 
around you reacting or having symptoms, maybe coughing up blood or these 
sorts of things. (P14). 
It probably depends on the chemical (P19). 
It was assumed to be difficult to take protective action without help or if immobilised. In 
some cases, participants believed that it may not be possible to alleviate or prevent 
effects of chemical contamination.  
There’s not really much you can do about it once you’ve been contaminated, or 
if you’re in the middle of being contaminated (P3). 
Well, because once you’ve been exposed I suppose there’s no going back. 
Yes. I don’t think... I can’t think what we could do after the event. (P4). 
The reaction is going on means like it's too late for me to like wipe it off, 
because like the chemicals have already gone through (P9). 




I'm not sure what you could do really because if it happens it happens, there's 
not any way of stopping it … I think you'd feel so much pain that you can't do 
anything (P14). 
Whilst participants reported that they would want medical attention or want to be 
assessed by a medical professional, to the extent that they would want to go to hospital 
(discussed in the following sub-section), participants also discussed protective actions 
that they would take at the scene of the incident, on realisation of being contaminated.  
Actions included IOR actions, specifically disrobing and improvised wet 
decontamination, which are discussed in more detail in subsequent subsections.  
Actions that participants would take to protect themselves that were extraneous or in 
contrast to the expert model included: staying away from the chemical, for example by 
keeping low to the ground; drinking water; and covering nose and mouth for respiratory 
protection. 
I’d probably do something really foolish like put my potentially contaminated 
clothes up against my face if I thought it was airborne, if people were saying it 
was, you know, respiratory route (P5). 
This is assuming that, say for example, it's close to me, I would just move back, 
I would create some distance…[from] the site, or the source of this chemical 
(P8). 
I think I would try to like use a wet cloth, some type of like wet cloth, and then 
cover my mouth, just like to reduce the contamination (P9). 
I suppose the only thing I could possibly do is just like to literally drink a lot of 
water, like, literally two litres of water. And just to kind of, very superficially to try 
kind of flush my system, if that makes sense, just to drink a lot of water. (P11). 
covering the mouth and nose so you're not breathing in, or trying to protect 
yourself from breathing in anything further (P15). 
To protect from skin exposure, participants reported that they would not touch affected 
skin or they would keep skin covered. 
Maybe having clothing on is perhaps the safer option, you know, in terms of 
further contamination (P2). 
Probably maybe just keep [skin] covered so nothing can interact, nothing can 
interfere with it … If, for example, it's a rash, if I'm itching it, and like my nails 
have bacteria in it, it… I can make it infected. I could just make it even more 
sore than it already is…I feel like I would just like kind of try, I would try to leave 
it alone until like there's medical attention that can see me. (P8). 
Whilst protecting other casualties was cited as a preliminary action that participants 
would take, participants also discussed the act of avoiding other casualties to prevent 
succumbing to secondary contamination.  
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Also trying to not yes, be near people who maybe are contaminated or 
whatever, because that's how it would spread (P13). 
If it's passed on by people, trying to have as little contact as possible (P15).  
Try and help everyone else in the same situation and ensure they're as safe as 
possible as well (P17). 
Participants reported that they would phone loved ones, for example to check that they 
are unaffected by the incident or to update them on the situation, particularly if they 
were to suspect that the cause of evacuation was terrorism.  
I'll probably also tell someone close to me that that had happened and just that 
I'd probably be going to seek medical help or whatever if it was appropriate 
(P2). 
I would probably call someone in my family to let them know what was going on 
(P6). 
And in these days of mobile phones I guess it would be pretty easy just to pick 
up the phone and call the family anyway. I would want… I guess I would not 
want to worry them, you know, unduly, and therefore I think, you know, I would 
probably want to know some sort of prognosis first or what was going to happen 
in terms of testing and things and… rather than just phone and panic my wife 











Figure 5-3 Influence diagram to visually represent the non-expert general model of decontamination from the point of evacuation. 
144 
 
5.3.2.5 Non-expert model of containment 
Both self-evacuating and remaining in place were discussed when participants 
considered what they would do following evacuation from the train station. Reasons for 
remaining in place included: high symptom severity; provision of information, including 
the provision of justification for remaining in place and assurance that responders have 
the necessary resources to treat casualties; concern about falling unconscious when 
leaving the scene; concern about effects of prolonged exposure to the contaminant if 
the participant leaves without taking protective action; concern that leaving the scene 
would motivate other casualties to leave the scene as well; and willingness to remain in 
place if instructed by responders at the scene. 
I will stay because then I will say that, you know, they probably know, they have 
the equipment and the necessary things to, you know, to solve whatever issues 
that I have, so I would stay in that event (P1). 
Because in a situation I'm assuming that they knew... They know about this 
exposure, that they know more than I do about what’s the best thing to do in 
this scenario (P10). 
I guess I would stay most probably, but if I was feeling more unwell after the 
attack, then there'd be more chance of me actually staying rather than going 
home. If I was feeling fine, then I might be tempted to go home (P12). 
Unless I knew exactly what was going on, I wouldn't really know that there was 
any point in hanging around (P13). 
Gone untreated you would suffer worse than had you stuck around and been 
helped at the scene (P15). 
I am also, I believe, under no obligation to stay there if they've not informed me 
after one or two hours what we're doing, and if they're not going to stop me, I 
will leave myself and go to the hospital, because if I am not informed, if I don't 
believe I am safe, then off I go. I will leave (P20). 
Self-evacuation was discussed when participants perceived that the cause of 
evacuation was terrorism, particularly when they suspected that there would be a risk 
of subsequent attack.  
So, it could be a terrorist attack, which might not be terror related, but it could 
be someone just going on a rampage almost, per se, destroying everything in 
their path, or everyone, so you’d want to get out of there as quickly as possible 
(P3).  
Leaving the area was perceived to be an action that would help emergency services to 
handle the situation.  
If there was some kind of incident then being in the way probably wouldn’t be of 
any use to anyone unless I was called on to help (P17). 
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It's best to get out of the way and like let the situation be handled…Because the 
more people there, the more problems you make (P20).  
Participants reported that they would leave the area on realisation that they were 
contaminated, that they would continue to evacuate to avoid further contamination, and 
to self-decontaminate.   
The best option is to escape from the current place (P18). 
Yes, actually I would leave, just to avoid further contamination (P9).  
I would go to the bathroom and just go to the sink and just wash (P18).  
Participants stated that they would self-evacuate to a location that is perceived to be 
safe. Indications that the area to which the participant evacuates is safe were lack of 
emergency service presence and people appearing calm or unaware of the 
emergency.  
Because if there is a police emergency in the area, most likely it might not be so 
safe, especially because I'm travelling alone, and in a place that I've never been 
to before. So once the initial curiosity of what's going on subsides, I… Like my 
next priority would just to like get…  Would just… Would be to get somewhere 
safe (P8). 
Probably cues from other people around, I know that’s a bit weak but we always 
look to social cues I guess. Yes, if everyone else seems kind of calm, if no one 
really knew about it or talking about it (P16). 
When there…is no speaker announcements or there’s no police or fire fighters 
around (P18).  
 
Participants stated that they would leave the area to present at a hospital upon 
realisation of contamination. Self-presentation at a hospital was deemed to be more 
likely than returning home. Reasons for presenting at a hospital after self-evacuating 
included receiving medical treatment and acquiring information or assurance. 
Participants reported that their decision to self-present at a hospital would be 
dependent on perceived severity of contamination. 
Yes, yes I do think so, I think, I mean, it depends on how far A&E is, but the 
time that it takes to travel to A&E, by that time the chemical could have, like, 
you know, it could have done everything that it set out to do.  So that's why I 
would be inclined to, like, to try to resolve it as quickly as possible myself before 
walking to A&E. (P1). 
I'd consider visiting an emergency department, but it will be very much 
dependent on the severity of my symptoms and the degree of exposure that I 
could estimate… if it's, like, if you don't get treatment now or if you don't go to 
the hospital now it's going to get much worse very quickly and blah-blah-blah, 
then obviously I'd take myself to an A&E in some kind of way. (P2). 
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I don't think I would go home. I would always try and get to some sort of A&E 
first (P12).  
I'd probably want to try and get to the hospital as quickly as possible. … It's 
probably the best place to be if you're ill or need medical attention (P17). 
The risk of secondary contamination was a cited justification for remaining in place. 
When discussing expectations of self-evacuating, participants expressed an awareness 
of the risks, specifically the burden on hospital resources and the risk of secondary 
contamination. 
I don't know how these things work, but I wonder if you've been exposed to a 
chemical, in particular if it's on your clothes or anything like that, whether that 
would, you know, put others at risk, because obviously that would be a massive 
reason not to go to A&E (P2). 
So, if they’re telling us to stay, I would be guessing that there’s good reason, in 




Figure 5-4 Influence diagram to visually represent the non-expert model of containment at the treatment area.  
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5.3.2.6 Non-expert model of disrobing 
The subject of disrobing (removing clothing that may be contaminated) was raised by 
some participants without prompt from the interviewer. Participants discussed how 
contaminated clothing should be removed as quickly as possible.  
You should remove the chemical contamination from your skin as quickly as 
possible (P5).  
So, perhaps, take my clothes off, you know, yes, take my clothes off, if the 
chemical was like literally on me, like on my clothes (P11). 
Well I guess sometimes you can remove your clothes if you think that this 
substance, particularly if it's some sort of liquid, has come into contact with you, 
then you know you'd remove your clothes maybe (P12). 
I would have thought if it was a, sort of, materials, so it was on the skin it would 
be on the clothes, and therefore you would want to discard those clothes as 
quick as possible (P15). 
Well, I guess, if someone told me it was, like, a contact-based contaminant and 
might like remove some clothes or shoes (P16). 
The first thing coming to my mind is, it's on my skin, change my clothes and 
probably have a shower (P19). 
Reasons for removing clothing included stopping skin contact with the chemical and 
preventing inhalation of the chemical. Clothing removal was cited as a protective action 
if the chemical is flammable or if the chemical is a liquid. 
Because of, with some clothing, like things like… I guess a chemical can stay 
there, and as long as it's like near you, you'll be inhaling that chemical as well, 
so that will be one reason why it's important to remove the clothing as much as 
possible (P1). 
If I thought my clothing was also, if the chemical was on my skin and there was 
clothing nearby that I saw was also contaminated, then yes, because obviously 
it would just continue to contaminate my skin (P2). 
If it had been soaked into my clothes, it’d be in contact with my skin for a lot 
longer, so I’d want to take off my clothes (P3).  
Say something's a flammable chemical then, I'd want to try and remove myself 
from that danger (P6).  
If I'm literally wearing a jacket, it has been contaminated at the station, however 
it was contaminated, so basically if the jacket is not on me, I'm not longer 
breathing the chemicals off of it (P11).  
I mean I guess obviously if your clothing's come into contact with it, then it may 
be that you'd want to remove your clothing, so that it was limiting its exposure 
on your skin (P13). 
Just to get it away from me, and especially if it's emitting fumes, I would still be 




 Any gas obviously would be just airborne anyway, so it probably wouldn’t make 
much difference but if it was something which was liquid of some description 
and could've splashed on to clothing then, yes, I guess outer clothing is the first 
line of defence in that (P17).  
Participants expected that they would disrobe if instructed by authorities or if other 
people are removing clothing. 
I would say it would need to be the Police or a medical professional. I mean, to 
get someone to take their clothes off in public I think it needs to come from the 
Police or a medical professional (P4).  
I think if everyone around me was stripping off, I’d probably do it because 
someone would have been told to get it off or someone else is having a reaction 
(P5). 
The fact that everybody else was doing it, then I should probably also be doing 
it (P6). 
Barriers to removing clothing included: cold weather; concern about further exposure to 
contaminant if clothing is removed; and modesty concerns.   
Would that be indecent exposure? I don’t know. I mean, that’s illegal as well, 
isn’t it? (P4). 
Modesty reasons I guess, I don't want to be standing around not wearing much 
(P6).  
But if I'm still in a situation which I'm still being exposed to it, then I suppose 
taking off my clothes would expose my skin more to [the chemical] (P10). 
You know you’re not anywhere close to home and people aren't really used to 
people walking around naked and I'm certainly not used to walking around 
naked (P13). 
Taking off what you can afford to take off, given the weather and stuff (P16). 
If there is still signs of chemical contamination outside the station, then I would 
keep wearing the jacket (P18).  
It's fundamentally taboo, it's socially taboo, there are religious taboos, there are 
cultural taboos, so you're going to produce a) outrage and b) panic. You've 
made a potential problem about 500 times worse. Chemical spill is bad. 
Chemical spill with rioting, looting and lawsuits is worse. (P20). 
When discussing their modesty concerns, participants stated that they would 
deprioritise modesty for health protection and that they would be more likely to remove 
clothing if there is a change of clothing or a private area for changing provided. 
For me personally it would be a matter of, you know, if I thought something was 
going to burn my skin I'd have no qualms about not being fully dressed in 




I mean, if they thought that keeping our clothes on would be, you know, 
dangerous for our health then, you know, my health would be my priority. I’d be 
very uncomfortable doing it in front a group of strangers, but I would (P4). 
I mean I don't know that I'd really be wanting to walk around without anything 
on, so unless there was some way of actually obtaining something else to cover 
yourself (P13). 
if you're in that scenario and it's obviously serious enough that it's threatening 
either your life or your…quality of life…you would get over your modesty issues 
and just, sort of, instinct for survival would take over (P15).  
Because patient dignity is very important. We don’t live in a country where you 
know you just demand people get naked in public. This needs to happen like in 
a private context. You need to give me some sterile clothing to put on (P20). 
Expected Clothing removal methods included: cutting off the clothing; wearing hand 
protection when removing contaminated clothing; keeping clothing away from the face 
when removing it; and ripping clothing off the skin.  
If someone happened to have a pair of scissors then I'd probably just cut it off, 
because that's much easier and safer (P2). 
Rip it off, to be honest. Give it a good tear (P3).  
Probably without touching the clothing if at all possible. So, I guess using 
something as a… cover my hands, so maybe a pair of gloves or something 
lying around like a newspaper (P17). 
There was also discussion of safe disposal of contaminated clothing after it has been 
removed though this aspect of disrobing was rarely cited. 
Those clothes need to be put away somewhere that will not contaminate 
anything else (P7).  
Removed and disposed of some way and you know put in a corner (P12). 
Choice of clothing to remove varied from all or most clothing to only clothing that feels 
contaminated based on whether it looks or feels stained or damp. Participants also 
discussed how their decision regarding amount of clothing to remove and method of 
removal would be influenced by authorities at the scene.  
And if I felt I still had to, I’ll take everything else off, pull down my trousers and 
whatnot (P3) 
Might double check with whoever's there…I suppose if they said it is harmful to 
take it over your head, it would be, and I'll just rather follow the instructions of 
the person that knows how to do it (P7).  
I probably would keep on my jeans unless I could visually see that my jeans 
had like a stain or have been sprayed with something, then I would want to take 




Figure 5-5 Influence diagram to visually represent the non-expert model of disrobing. 
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5.3.2.7 Non-expert model of dry decontamination 
Dry decontamination was not raised without prompt when participants considered 
actions that they would take to protect themselves on realisation of chemical 
contamination in the scenario. When asked to consider dry decontamination as a 
method of decontamination, participants expressed limited confidence in dry 
decontamination. Low perceptions of dry decontamination efficacy were raised, 
primarily because dry materials are not used for cleaning in everyday life. There was 
also a lack of confidence in dry decontamination relative to wet decontamination. 
I just believe that, you know, water is very powerful and with dry materials you 
can't really wipe everything off completely, there will always still be a miniscule 
amount on the skin.  With water, because everything dissolves in water, if you 
wiped it on the skin it should, I would say it's much more effective than, you 
know, something like tissues (P1). 
A dry wipe is not the same as wiping... you know, using a wet wipe, you know. 
That’s why we have showers and baths rather than just wiping ourselves with a 
towel (P4). 
In everyday life, unless it’s, you know, like a baby wipe, you wouldn’t go for 
absorbent material to clean yourself or decontaminate yourself in any other way 
(P5). 
I suppose because like you always have the impression that if you wash it with 
water, it will just go… It will all flow out. But then if it's like tissue, it might just 
like… If it's dry, especially dry tissue, don't know if it has been like fully removed 
or not (P7). 
Because if you use tissue or cloths it might just... Like you might just tap it on 
your body and it just absorbs. But I think the best to clean the area is to use 
water because after you use tissue there is still... After you wipe all of the 
chemicals out there has to be some that remains on your skin but you cannot 
see it. So just use water, like how we shower (P18). 
Concerns were raised about exacerbating the spread or absorption of the contaminant 
when rubbing the skin and an adverse reaction between chemicals in the absorbent 
materials and chemicals on the skin (though this particular concern was based on the 
perception that the materials would be wet wipes). 
You wouldn’t know whether that was the safe thing to do or whether it would 
exacerbate the situation by maybe spreading a small area of infection wider 
(P15). 
Well, I'm not sure because I don’t want to go, like, rubbing at my skin if there's 
something already sitting on the surface of it. I don’t want to, like, increase 
absorption … especially if I don’t know what's going on and what kind of 
chemical it is (P16). 
I mean, most kind of cloths or any kind of clothing material or wet wipes or 
something like that is going to have some kind of substance, chemicals or, if 
you're otherwise… so you're not going to introduce another substance to my 
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skin when there might already be something else sitting there…Well, it could 
clearly make the situation worse (P17).  
Motivation for applying absorbent materials was based on being able to see something 
to wipe away on the skin and trust in authorities. 
I would do it, but very cynically. I would do it because I don’t know any better 
and I trust the authorities that have told me to do it, so I assume it would serve 
a purpose, but to be honest, I would be doing it thinking, what on earth is this 
for? But I would do it out of self-protection (P5). 
If like, a bystander is just, like, oh here, have some tissues, I would be not likely 
to do it. I would do it if it was a police person or like a paramedic or someone 
who had information on the chemical and what was the appropriate action to 
deal with it (P16). 
Well, if I could see something, so, if it's like stuff I can see with my eyes on my 
skin, I probably would try that. But if I can't see it, I would either see no point or 
be afraid that I'd just rub it in deeper, so, I'd rather not (P19). 
But if it's like one paramedic who hands me a tissue, or if it's like you know 
context-based, if like one street police officer hands me a tissue, no. But if 
there's an announcement, if there's an organised system for everybody to do 
the same thing, then yes, that's fine (P20).  
When discussing dry decontamination, the methods that would be used included 
dampening absorbent materials before applying them to skin and simply wiping the 
chemical off the skin.  
So I wet the tissue paper or whatever I have and then I will put it say in my 
hands and then I will just like gently wipe it off (P9). 









Figure 5-6 Influence diagram to visually represent the non-expert model of dry decontamination.
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5.3.2.8 Non-expert model of wet decontamination 
The application of water was raised as a likely protective action that participants would 
take and, in many cases, the action was raised without prompt. The application of 
water was perceived to be something that should be done as soon as possible.  
That's probably the first thing I'd do (P2). 
so, yes, I’d want it done as soon as possible and wash as much of the chemical 
away as possible (P4). 
I'd like probably shower, just get it off my skin (P6). 
The first thing coming to my mind is, it's on my skin, change my clothes and 
probably have a shower (P19).  
Reasons for applying water were: removing the chemical from skin; neutralising, 
diluting or dissolving the chemical; preventing skin penetration of chemical; alleviating 
pain and burning.  
There's a reason why they call water the universal solvent, because when you, 
you know, almost everything dissolves in it.  So that, for me that will be the 
reason why I would be inclined to get water (P1). 
It would remove the contaminant from the surface, one would hope (P2). 
It would hopefully wash everything away before it permeated the skin... before it 
penetrated the skin (P4). 
If you’re feeling pain and it's a natural instinct to try and lessen the pain by using 
water, if it burns you'd automatically think to get something cold and just pour 
water on yourself (P14). 
In the hope of getting rid of whatever chemical touches my skin (P19). 
Participants also discussed the application of water to skin with reference to the 
recommendation to use water in response to acid attack or observation of people using 
water in response to acid attacks in media reports.  
I was reading about acid attacks in London recently and there was a Guardian 
article about what to do if you witness or are involved in an acid attack, and it's 
basically just chuck loads and loads of water at it (P2).  
Actually read a BBC article on how to deal with an acid attack, when all of this 
madness was going on. Yes, basically, pull off your clothes, spray as much 
water as you can, was basically the advice they gave. (P3). 
I guess, it just stems maybe from the media seeing particularly people who 
have been faced by acid attacks, random acid attacks where they just seem to 
be drowning themselves in water after being attacked. That seems to help them 
in the sense that it seems to appear that it's relieving the pain (P14). 
Participants discussed how they would apply water if instructed to do so by authorities. 
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Yes, if an expert was standing there telling me that was the best course of 
action, then I'd take that they'd be telling me for a good reason (P17).  
If the authorities have indicated that it's fine, I would do so (P20). 
Perceptions were raised about how the effectiveness of showering is dependent on the 
properties of the contaminant.  
It would help, not in the case of a gas, but in the case of if this was some sort of 
acid (P12). 
if it was something that my skin had been exposed to then possibly. If it's 
something that I've breathed in then obviously it's pointless (P15). 
Participants raised concerns: that there would be an adverse chemical reaction 
between water and chemical on skin; that the water itself would be contaminated; and 
that washing would exacerbate the spread of absorption of the chemical. 
I think I’d also be concerned that if there was something in my hair, actually 
pouring water down my hair would... it would go down my back and on my skin 
(P5). 
If it's bottled water sitting outside of the station, I would assume that it had not 
been contaminated but if it's like tap water or a fire hose like you said, that's in, 
like, direct geographical proximity with the station, then I would assume that the 
water has been contaminated just in the same fashion as I was contaminated at 
the station just because the water source and I both were at the station (P11).  
 “if you get blood on some clothes and you put it in a hot wash, or even I think 
red wine's another example, if you put it in a hot wash, that actually ends up 
washing the product into your clothing, rather than actually removing the 
product… So I guess the same kind of thing could happen to some extent with 
skin” (P13). 
Water and most chemicals don’t mix very well, in my experience. It certainly 
could probably just make the situation worse, especially relating to burns, yes, 
and… any kind of chemical burn. (P17). 
Although there was expressed doubt about availability of public showering facilities 
from a minority of participants, potential sources of water were discussed, for example: 
bottled water; tap or drinking fountain; and emergency decontamination shower. 
Participants discussed the following water application methods: pouring the water over 
themselves; applying to the affected area; using a cloth as a washing aid and 
showering as a passive process, for example by being sprayed with a hose.  
I would try to rub it off as much as I can, you know, go and find a physical shop, 
where they sell water and try to rub it off from my skin as much as possible 
(P1). 
I would pour it on to wherever the contamination was, so that it was running 
down, obviously off my skin or off the clothing or whatever onto the ground in a 
specific place, away from people so that no one else is contaminated by the 
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water that has been in contact with the chemical, ideally into some kind of 
receptacle so that water could then be disposed of appropriately, but obviously 
that's quite a big ask and probably not all that feasible (P2). 
Just straight up bottled drinking water (P3). 
Well, I mean, given they probably wouldn’t be able to provide showers in the 
middle of a street (P4). 
Emergency shower station or something I would assume they’d have set up 
(P5). 
Ask somebody to hose me down, if there was someone nearby (P6). 
I would just pour it on the affected area (P8). 
So I would just pour the water over wherever I thought I would have been 
exposed (P10). 
Well more of a vigorous wash than just splashing a bit of water on yourself. So 
yes, washing in a more intense manner, probably using a flannel or a sponge of 
some sort, rather than just using your hands and some water (P13). 
You'd just grab the bottle and you'd just be pouring, I guess, just on to the areas 
that you think you've been affected by (P14). 








IOR decontamination requires rapid uptake of specific behaviours, including disrobing, 
applying absorbent materials to skin and waiting for decontamination facilities to arrive. 
Understanding how laypeople conceive of the risks of chemical contamination and how 
particular actions may mitigate against these risks is an important step in the 
development of a communication intervention aimed at improving adherence to 
decontamination protocols. Guidelines for extrapolating findings from mental models 
research to communication interventions state that it may not be necessary for 
communicators to explain in detail concepts with which the audience are deemed to be 
familiar and to focus more on apparent knowledge gaps and misconceptions (Morgan 
et al., 2002). My semi-structured open-ended one-on-one interviews with 20 non-
experts revealed several concepts that may not be as intuitive to casualties as they are 
to the first responders deployed to the scene.  
Most concepts in the expert model were discussed by at least two non-expert 
participants. Concepts that were covered in both expert and non-expert models 
included: awareness of the effects of skin exposure to a chemical contaminant; 
awareness of the potential delay to the onset of symptoms following hazardous 
chemical exposure; the risk of secondary contamination of other people with whom 
casualties come into contact; the efficacy of disrobing and showering as protective 
measures against the effects of chemical contamination; and the fact that 
decontamination actions, specifically disrobing and applying water, would be most 
effective when performed as soon as possible. Based on the results of the present 
study, the concepts outlined above are likely to be congruent with casualties’ existing 
conceptual framework. This is reassuring and suggests that, while messages about the 
need to engage in these actions may be required, information about why the actions 
are being recommended may not need to be highly detailed in order to be accepted by 
casualties.  
Themes resulting from the present study can inform the development of messages to 
address constructs in Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (R. W. Rogers, 1975, 1983) 
and the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte, 1992, 1994). For example, 
participants conceived of the severity of chemical contamination in terms of acute 
effects (including death) and long-term health effects, such as irreversible skin 
damage. Severity was also discussed in terms of secondary contamination. The 
concept of secondary contamination was in some cases conflated with the risk of 
infection from a biological or radiological contagion. In previous mental models 
research, conflation of two separate risks has been shown to occur when the risks 
share similar elements (Bostrom et al., 2018). In this study, it appeared that the 
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concept of chemical secondary contamination fits within the model of how 
communicable diseases can be transferred. 
Perceptions of susceptibility varied, with some participants citing an awareness of 
delayed onset of effects and other participants discussing how symptoms would be felt 
immediately. Explicitly informing casualties that symptoms do not necessarily occur 
immediately on contact with a chemical may therefore be a necessary step to ensure 
that casualties accept messages which are intended to address threat susceptibility.  
Response efficacy perceptions included references to how removing clothing would 
stop skin contact with the chemical and how applying water would remove the chemical 
from skin. There was a misconception that it may not be possible to alleviate or prevent 
effects of chemical contamination or that decontamination involves the level of medical 
attention that can only be provided in a hospital. Responders may therefore need to 
explain that chemical contamination is not necessarily fatal and that action can be 
taken by the casualty themselves to reduce the extent of contamination. One of the 
reasons cited for self-evacuating was to present at a hospital and receive treatment for 
chemical contamination –a finding supported by questionnaire data from a previous 
study on attitudes of simulated casualties who participated in mass decontamination 
field exercises (Carter et al., 2012b). This should not be dismissed as an irrational 
response to realising that chemical contamination has occurred. In fact, presenting at 
an emergency department on realisation of a medical emergency is perhaps the most 
rational response available in the absence of pre-hospital decontamination. As stated 
in Chapter 1, medical staff have experienced secondary contamination following 
chemical poisoning and chemical suicides with hydrogen sulphide and phosphine 
(Gaskin et al., 2017) and the Matsumoto and Tokyo sarin attacks (Clarke et al., 2008; 
Eckstein, 1999; Nakajima et al., 1997; Nishiwaki et al., 2001; Okumura et al., 2005) 
and following the Tokyo sarin attack, 23% of hospital staff at one of the receiving 
hospitals were subjected to secondary contamination due to a lack of personal 
protective equipment and on-site decontamination facilities (Okumura et al., 2005). 
Participants demonstrated awareness of the risk of secondary contamination of 
hospital staff so this could be made salient when communicating the instruction to 
remain in place. Responders would also need to make clear that decontamination 
without hospitalisation is an effective countermeasure and make salient that going to a 
hospital would delay their decontamination and put staff and patients at risk of 
secondary contamination.   
There was a misconception that dry decontamination would be an ineffective 
countermeasure. Participants believed that wet would be more effective than dry 
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decontamination, particularly because water is used more in everyday hygiene 
behaviours. This perception is supported by findings from previous focus group 
discussions in which participants expressed low confidence in the efficacy of dry 
decontamination, relative to wet decontamination (Carter, Weston, Betts, Wilkinson, & 
Amlôt, 2018). The perception of dry decontamination as an ineffective measure is 
supported by the finding from a simulated decontamination study in which participants 
reported low confidence in cleanliness after undergoing a dry decontamination 
procedure, though there were no comparator groups that underwent a different form of 
decontamination or no decontamination at all (Amlôt et al., 2017). If dry 
decontamination is to be performed by the casualty, responders need to explain how 
applying absorbent materials to skin is an effective form of decontamination and also 
explain how the safe application (dabbing, blotting or brushing) of dry material would 
not result in the risk of exacerbating contamination that was raised in this 
study.Messages to address response cost and self-efficacy constructs could be 
informed by themes pertaining to barriers to taking protective actions from the expert 
model. For example, whilst the efficacy of disrobing as a means of limiting skin contact 
with and inhalation of the chemical was discussed, participants also discussed factors 
that they believed would limit their willingness to disrobe in the context of a chemical 
incident, including ambient cold weather, concern about further exposure to 
contaminant if clothing is removed, and modesty concerns. Participants did point out 
that they would deprioritise their aversion to removing clothing in public if they felt that 
their health was in danger. When instructing casualties to disrobe during IOR, 
responders should point out that the more clothing removed, the more contaminant 
removed but they also need to specify that it is sufficient for outer clothing to be 
removed (until the arrival of disrobe packs, containing ponchos, that arrive concurrently 
with specialist decontamination shower facilities). 
Several themes pertained to participants basing their decision as to what protective 
action to take on the instructions provided by responders at the scene. Participants 
also discussed how they would base their method of disrobing and dry 
decontamination on the guidance provided by responders. When discussing trust and 
confidence in authorities at the scene, participants indicated that they would trust that 
first responders would have more knowledge than them in the context of a chemical 
incident and would follow their guidance. However, confidence varied depending on the 
type of emergency response service, with participants reporting greater confidence in 
responders with assumed medical knowledge, such as paramedics. According to 
current IOR guidance, the first person to communicate with casualties should be the 
first responder on scene (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme, 2013; 
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National CBRN Centre, 2016) so the designation of a medical responder to the 
communication role may not be an option. Responders who are not affiliated with the 
medical profession, such as police officers and firefighters, may need to make salient 
their authority in the area of decontamination or state that they are speaking on behalf 
of a health authority. 
Specific details that participants would want to know and that would reportedly 
influence their compliance with instructions were: what the chemical is; the cause of the 
chemical incident; the health impact of the chemical; whether and what treatment 
would be provided; and what protective actions to take. These perceptions as to what 
information would be required correspond with best practice guidelines for crisis 
communication message content in the literature (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; 
Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; Firestone & Everly, 2013; Glik, 2007b; Liu et al., 
2017; Mallett et al., 1999; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Omori et al., 2017; Sorensen, 2000; 
Sutton et al., 2015; Sutton et al., 2014; Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018; World Health 
Organization, 2017). Whilst emergency services at the scene were cited as an 
information source from which participants would seek information, participants also 
reported that they would seek information from remote sources, including 999, loved 
ones via phone or accessing the internet on their phone. Specifically, participants 
mentioned accessing emergency services’ webpages or Twitter accounts. Information 
transmitted via emergency services’ media accounts and webpages would have to be 
consistent with information delivered by responders at the scene in order to promote 
trust and prevent anxiety (Rubin et al., 2012). The implication of this finding is that 
responders should quickly communicate information about the incident and what 
actions are required of casualties to their commanding officers so that the information 
can be disseminated to communication teams who can broadcast the information to 
affected casualties via social media. 
5.4.1. Limitations 
I used a data-driven approach to thematic analysis to attempt to ensure that coding of 
transcripts to themes was based on the data rather than an a priori framework, in order 
to best capture the mental model of participants. But, as argued by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), “researchers cannot free themselves of their theoretical and epistemological 
commitments, and data are not coded in an epistemological vacuum” (p. 12).  This 
means that I cannot rule out the possibility that my approach to thematic analysis was 




Given that this was a qualitative investigation and not a population-wide quantitative 
assessment, the communication implications outlined above are not to be treated as 
robust evidence to inform emergency response practice; rather they are reasonable 
assumptions to be subjected to further scrutiny ideally through a cross-sectional survey 
or intervention trial. Some assertions raised in the present study are supported to an 
extent by quantitative data in previous research. For example, in a questionnaire study 
on perceptions of hazardous substances, the majority of participants reported that the 
first signs of ill health would appear within two days of exposure to anthrax, carbon 
monoxide, swine flu, and radiological agent, Polonium 210 (Rubin, Amlôt, Page, 
Pearce, & Wessely, 2013). For the purposes of this thesis, the present interview study 
is deemed sufficient to inform the development of the messaging intervention tested in 
subsequent studies.  However, it may be beneficial in future research to use a closed 
question survey to investigate the prevalence of assertions raised in the present study.
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Chapter 6  Development of preliminary messages to promote IOR 
adherence following the release of a chemical skin contaminant 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of my PhD was to develop and test an effective communication strategy for 
the promotion of IOR among casualties to reduce contamination of the skin in a 
chemical incident. My literature reviews in Chapters 2 and 3 indicated no clear 
advantage of using a particular communication channel. Rather the available evidence 
supported the use of multiple channels conveying a consistent message. In Chapter 4, 
I outlined a range of channels that would be available to first responders, including 
pictorial instruction sheets in disrobe kits and voice amplification devices for 
communicating via the auditory route. For the remainder of this thesis, I will focus on 
decisions that need to be made regarding the content of the message that would be 
disseminated to casualties via the available channels.  
The evidence to date provides guidelines for developing an optimal message. There 
are two message components that I would consider essential. Firstly, the message 
needs to include instructions pertaining to specific behaviours. The provision of 
information about actions that casualties should take to protect themselves emerged as 
a minimum requirement for message content in the reviews reported in Chapters 2 and 
3. Secondly, the message needs to contain contextual information about who the 
responders are. Trust in authorities at the scene was raised by participants interviewed 
in the study reported in Chapter 5 as a factor in their adherence to each IOR action. 
Trust in the communicator also emerged as one of the key determinants of adherence 
in an emergency in my crisis communication literature review (Chapter 2). In the 
interview study reported in Chapter 5, participants reported that they would want to 
know what treatment would be provided and what steps are being taken to protect 
casualties. This finding was related to one of the message content recommendations 
informed by the literature review reported in Chapter 3, that perceived legitimacy of 
responders by message recipients, which is in turn associated with increased 
adherence, could be improved by providing information about actions responders are 
taking (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015). 
Aside from these two basic elements, the rationale for including other message 
components is less clear in the absence of further empirical assessment to address 
uncertainties. For example, whilst making salient the severity of and susceptibility of 
message recipients to the threat of chemical contamination is supported by theory 
(Chapter 2), in practice responders reported often understating the threat to reassure 
casualties (Chapter 4). This assumption that reassurance is an effective measure 
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seems to be widespread. Most recently the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) deliberately 
provided reassuring messages which understated the threat of contamination following 
the Salisbury Novichok attack, whilst also advising members of the public to engage in 
protective measures, such as washing clothes worn at the scene of the incident (Public 
Health England, 2018). In the aftermath of the incident, the CMO described the risk of 
contamination as “slight”, framed the need to engage in personal decontamination as 
“precautionary advice… a belt and braces approach” and added that she was 
“confident this has not harmed the health of anyone.” Given that these communicators 
have substantial real-world experience in this proficiency and given that there is no 
study to date in which the effect of threatening information has been assessed in the 
context of IOR, it is unclear whether information that makes salient the threat of 
contamination would be more effective in promoting adherence than information that 
understates the threat or vice versa.  
Similarly, it is unclear, in the absence of further empirical testing, whether information 
about the efficacy of IOR is necessary to promote adherence or whether it is sufficient 
to simply provide the instructions. Outcomes of reviews reported in Chapters 2 through 
4 indicate that response efficacy information may be conducive to adherence and that 
provision of some form of response efficacy information is already likely to be part of 
standard practice. But participants interviewed in the study reported in Chapter 5 
demonstrated clear understanding of the efficacy of IOR actions, particularly disrobing 
and showering, at reducing risks. It may not be necessary to make efficacy explicit. 
Given the limited amount of time responders have to communicate with casualties and 
the potential for limited information processing capabilities due to stress (Barry et al., 
2013; Covello et al., 2001; Firestone & Everly, 2013), it would be useful to check 
whether message components are superfluous. 
The primary aim of this chapter was to develop separate message variants based on 
all constructs outlined above. The relative strength of including efficacy information as 
opposed to no efficacy information and the relative strength of including information to 
make explicit the threat (High Threat information) as opposed to information to 
understate the threat (Low Threat information) would best be resolved by comparing 
the effect of these message components on adherence outcomes in a randomised 
controlled trial (RCT). The secondary aim of this chapter was to refine messages to 
ensure they were consistent in terms of word count and readability in order to allow a 




I developed multiple message components, within four key domains: instruction, 
context, threat and efficacy. Within the threat and efficacy domains, I developed 
components intended to portray high, neutral and low threat, and high and neutral 
efficacy.  
6.2.1. Development of contextual scenario 
To help with the development of the messages, I first developed a short scenario in 
which an IOR message might be used. This depicted a group of casualties (chosen to 
be university students to facilitate future testing of the message) whose skin and 
clothing had been contaminated with liquid sulphur mustard present on furniture in a 
lecture theatre. In many ways, this is a worst-case scenario for IOR. Firstly, the latency 
between contamination and symptom onset for liquid sulphur mustard can range from 
30 minutes to 12 hours (Borak & Sidell, 1992; Clarke et al., 2008; Kales & Christiani, 
2004; Spiandore et al., 2017; Wattana & Bey, 2009) so chemical contamination is not 
obvious to casualties at the point of IOR implementation. First responders at the scene 
may also be unclear as to what the chemical is. Secondly, it is probable that in such a 
scenario the only available decontamination provisions will be rolls of tissue paper 
available at the university or provided by the first emergency service vehicle to arrive 
and, eventually, an interim decontamination shower consisting of hoses mounted to fire 
appliances. There are very unlikely to be disrobe kits containing modesty gowns 
available to the casualties. The scenario used as the context to guide the drafting of the 
message is presented below. 
At 09:15, an administrator in the university department receives an email sent to 
the General Enquiries inbox from an unrecognised account, which reads: “You 
didn’t listen. Now you will pay.”  
The administrator forwards the email to security then phones them to ask what 
should be done. Because the university has previously received other, credible 
threats, the security guard tells the administrator that she will escalate this. 
At 09:30, the head of security phones 999 and informs them that the university 
has received an anonymous threat. Two officers are dispatched to the campus 
as a precaution due to the heightened threat level. 
At 09:45, the police arrive at the campus and meet with the Head of Security. 
At 09:48, the administrator receives a follow-up email from the same email 
address as before. This time it reads: “You might want to check the cleaning 
products used in the lecture theatres this morning. I just hope no one’s 
been in them! Which lecture theatres I hear you ask? You know, I forget. 
Just like you all forgot about us.  We don’t want money. You have nothing 
you can bargain with. WE ONLY WANT JUSTICE!!!!!” 
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The administrator immediately forwards the email to Security then phones 
them. 
At 09:51, a senior officer at police headquarters advises the attending officers to 
treat the incident as a chemical attack, based on previous intelligence. 
Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) paramedics and fire engines are 
dispatched. The officer instructs all buildings on campus to be evacuated. The 
fire alarm is sounded. 
The police officer asks campus security to retrieve as many dry absorbent 
materials as possible. The other police officer sets up a cordon at the entrance 
to the campus then picks up a handheld loudhailer. 
Students and a lecturer evacuate from the nearest lecture theatre. The police 
officer guides them to the area on the ground where the tissue paper is 
positioned. This is the point in the scenario when the officer will need to deliver 
a message to the casualties, in this case, via amplified voice. 
6.2.2. Development of instructional components 
Target behaviours for which instructional messages were drafted were informed by the 
IOR actions outlined in Chapter 1 and confirmed by stakeholders at a mass 
decontamination instructors’ course and by members of the Technical Advisory Group. 
I developed instructional messages by first amalgamating instructional messages 
extracted in the standard practice investigation (Chapter 4) relating to each target 
behaviour. I then composed an instructional message for each behaviour that 
addressed both information included in the quotations and the circumstances of the 
scenario. Instructional messages are displayed in the column furthest to the right in 
Table 6-1. The instructional statement pertaining to dry decontamination was 
predominantly informed by suggested instructions from communication guidance 
provided in the National Ambulance Resilience Unit (2016) guidance document 
included in the review reported in Chapter 4. These suggested instructions were shown 
to improve performance in a field experiment included in the systematic review 
reported in Chapter 2, relative to simply asking participants to use the available dry 
materials to clean themselves (Amlôt et al., 2017). The inclusion of the words “down to 
your underwear” in the disrobe instruction was a departure from standard practice 
instructions reported in Chapter 4, which tended to stress the removal of outer clothing 
and did not mention underwear. I included these four words to make explicit the 
maximum extent of disrobing that would be required in the scenario.  
6.2.3. Development of contextual components 
Three statements, displayed in the right-hand column of Table 6-2, were composed to 
address: the organisation represented by the communicator; the competence of the 
organisation at responding to a chemical incident; and actions taken by the 
communicator to protect casualties. I selected a police officer as the communicator 
because, according to insights provided by stakeholders in the emergency response 
168 
 
profession, including a proportion of emergency responders interviewed in Chapter 4, 
the police are likely to be the first on the scene in a chemical incident. Findings from 
interviews reported in Chapter 5 suggested that responders who are not affiliated with 
the medical profession, including police officers, would need to make salient their 
authority in the area of decontamination or state that they are speaking on behalf of a 
health authority in order to increase trust. I therefore included the statements, “we train 
for this type of incident regularly” in the message source and “we are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the situation” in the actions responders are taking 
message components respectively. 
6.2.4. Development of threat components 
I developed three types of Threat message: High (emphasising the threat), Low 
(understating the threat), and Neutral (neither emphasising nor understating the threat). 
The Threat message construct consisted of information about the severity of chemical 
contamination and the susceptibility or likelihood of contamination. Findings pertaining 
to the lay mental model of acute chemical contamination from the study reported in 
Chapter 5 indicated that whilst the potential for delayed onset of symptoms may be an 
accessible concept to some, there is likely to be a misconception that, unless there are 
available signs and/or symptoms of chemical exposure, it is unlikely that message 
recipients have been affected by the contaminant. I manipulated susceptibility by 
making salient the delayed onset of symptoms in the High Threat message whilst 
stating that the absence of symptoms means that contamination is unlikely to have 
occurred in the Low Threat message.  
I manipulated severity in the High Threat message by highlighting hazardous effects of 
dermal exposure, specifically skin burns, the risk of death, and the risk of secondary 
contamination, all of which were included in the non-expert model of acute chemical 
contamination. In the Low Threat message, the corresponding statement highlighted 
the precautionary nature of the response and included no information about health 
effects for casualties or others with whom casualties may come into contact. The 
wording of the severity subcomponent of the Low Threat message was adapted from 
wording used in Public Health England and Chief Medical Officer risk communications 
following the Salisbury Novichok incident in March 2018, e.g. “the risk to anyone that 
visited The Mill pub or Zizzi restaurant from this incident is low. The advice about 
clothing is precautionary” (Public Health England, 2018). 
In all three types of Threat message component, I included statements pertaining to the 
communicating organisation’s uncertainty about specific details about the incident, 
specifically the type of chemical that was released. This decision was based on the 
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recommendation to communicate uncertainty as justified in the review reported in 
Chapter 2. 
I needed to keep word count consistent between messages to control for the potentially 
confounding effect of amount of information in future studies. This meant that I included 
text in the Neutral message to keep the word count consistent with the High and Low 
messages. The information consisted of: additional information about uncertainties; 
reiteration of actions responders are taking, specifically the action of investigating the 
incident and the intention of updating casualties when more information is known; and 
reiteration of the instruction to remain in place. This information was also present, albeit 
in a marginally lower quantity, in the High and Low Threat messages. 
The wording of message components in each type of Threat message component is 
displayed in Table 6-3. I ensured that sentence structure was as consistent as possible 
between High, Low, and Neutral threat components.  
6.2.5. Development of efficacy components 
The efficacy construct in both Protection Motivation Theory and the Extended Parallel 
Process Model comprises response efficacy and self-efficacy. I originally drafted a 
statement to address self-efficacy, based on expected behavioural barriers to disrobing 
(modesty and cold weather concerns) raised in the mental models study (Chapter 5). 
However, I decided to remove the statement because it was predicated on the 
availability of disrobe packs containing gowns and, based on stakeholder input, this is 
not a guaranteed in all IOR cases, including the worst-case scenario outlined above. I 
therefore focused entirely on response efficacy. Efficacy message items were designed 
for all target behaviours outlined in Table 6-1, except for the instruction pertaining to 
casualties assisting one another as the efficacy of asking for help if unable to perform 
actions appeared axiomatic.  
For each efficacy message component, I drafted a corresponding neutral component to 
ensure that messages without efficacy information would be of similar length/duration 
to messages with efficacy information in subsequent studies. Neutral components 
consisted of the same instructions displayed in efficacy items but including sentences 
designed not to address efficacy or threat. Efficacy and neutral items are displayed in 
Table 6-4 along with the rationale for framing efficacy information based on the mental 
models interview study reported in Chapter 5. 
6.2.6. Combining message components and assessing word count and readability 
When combining message components into one message, I used the following order. 
1. Message source: Statement 1; 
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2. Threat component;  
3. Message source: Statement 2;  
4. Statement about actions responders are taking;  
5. Instruction to remain in place;  
6. Instruction to disrobe (with efficacy or neutral statement); 
7. Instruction to undergo dry decontamination (with efficacy or neutral statement); 
8. Instruction to ask for assistance if required; and  
9. Instruction to continue to remain in place (with efficacy or neutral statement). 
 
The word count for each type of message was checked to ensure minimal variability 
between conditions. Readability of text across conditions was assessed using the 
Automatic Readability Calculator (Automatic Readability Checker) that amalgamates 
readability scores derived from seven tools including the Coleman-Liau Index 
(Coleman & Liau, 1975) and Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level (Kincaid, Fishburne, Rogers, 
& Chissom, 1975; Walters & Hamrell, 2008). 
 
6.3 Results 
The preliminary message components are displayed in the columns furthest to the right 




Table 6-1 Instructional message components. 
Target behaviour for which instructional 
messages were targeted 
Direct quotes (where available) from guidance documents (GD) 
and interview transcripts (IT) analysed in Chapter 4  
Preliminary message after 
amalgamating quotes and 
applying to scenario context 
Remaining in place after evacuating (not self-
evacuating, e.g.  to home or hospital) 
 
Do not make your own way to the hospital – medical assistance is on its 
way (GD) 
 
Wait for the emergency services to arrive and act upon their instruction 
(GD) 
 
Do not approach the fire truck (GD) 
 
Wait for the emergency services to arrive and act upon their instruction 
(GD) 
 
If you come towards us we can't help you, if you rush at us we can't 
help you (IT) 
 
Stay in that area, stay away from us (IT) 
 




Stay where you are. I’m going to 
give you some instructions.  
Disrobing 
Remove outer clothing – do not pull clothing over head unless 
absolutely necessary (GD) 
 
Remove outer layer of clothing (GD) 
 
I need you to take your clothes off where you are. Stay there. Leave 
your clothes where they are (GD) 
 
I need you take your clothes off where you are. Stay there. Drop your 
clothes in a pile and come towards me (GD) 
Carefully remove as much clothing 
as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing 
touch your face. Tear or cut 
clothing away from the body 
instead of lifting it over your head. 
If you have to lift it over your head 
then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the 
clothing away from your face. 
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Target behaviour for which instructional 
messages were targeted 
Direct quotes (where available) from guidance documents (GD) 
and interview transcripts (IT) analysed in Chapter 4  
Preliminary message after 
amalgamating quotes and 
applying to scenario context 
 
You need to drop your clothes and come to us. We can take care of you 
once you’ve left your clothes and come to us. Just leave them in a pile 
and come this way (GD) 
 
I want you to put on the blue garbs and the mask from the disrobe pack 
and I want you to start removing your outer layer of clothing. Don’t move 
it over your head. Cut it off if it needs to be. Take that off. (IT) 
 
What I need you to do is take your clothes off, not over your head if 
that's possible, if you've got a jumper on ideally I'd like you to cut it 
down the front I don't want anything going past your face. Take your 
outer layer of your clothes off, put it in a pile in one corner of the room 
and then move away from that pile of clothing to the opposite side of the 
room.(IT) 
 
Okay, everybody, you all need to take your outer clothes off (IT) 
 
We need you to put your clothes down, just put the clothes down gently 
and walk away from them (IT) 
 
Come towards me, and just take off your top layer of clothing (IT) 
 
Please come towards me, walk towards me now, and as you're doing so 
take off your top layer of clothing (IT) 
 
Dry decontamination 
Please use this material (state or show what you mean; e.g. blue roll), 
to remove the substance from your skin (GD) 
 
Use some of the blue roll to blot and then rub your hands first (GD) 
 
Use a new piece of blue roll to blot and then rub your face and neck 
(GD) 
Use the tissue paper on the 
ground to blot and then rub your 
skin. Start by blotting then rubbing 
your hands and then use a new 
piece of paper to blot and then rub 
your face. Repeat this process 
from your neck down to your toes.  
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Target behaviour for which instructional 
messages were targeted 
Direct quotes (where available) from guidance documents (GD) 
and interview transcripts (IT) analysed in Chapter 4  
Preliminary message after 
amalgamating quotes and 
applying to scenario context 
 
Use a new piece blue roll to blot and rub your left arm and then repeat 
for your right arm (GD) 
 
Use a new piece of blue roll to blot and rub your torso and back (GD) 
 
Use a new piece of blue roll to blot and rub your left leg and foot and 
then repeat for your right leg and foot (GD) 
 
Get some of that paper towel and then start blotting and rubbing and 
wiping anything off of you, especially your face, work your way down 
your body concentrating on your hands and anywhere that anything 




Assisting other casualties  
Assist others who are less able or injured to carry out tasks - if you can 
(GD) 
 
If you cannot walk and can hear my voice, raise a hand (GD) 
 
Have one of these [self-help packs], help someone else (IT) 
If anyone requires assistance, 
please ask someone next to you.  
Remaining in place to await the arrival of a 
decontamination shower 
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are. 
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Table 6-2 Contextual message components. 
Message Component Statements pertaining to message 
construct 
Message Source 1. This is the police. Please listen carefully.  
 
2. We train for this type of incident regularly.  
 
[Statements 1 and 2 are interspersed with the 
threat item displayed in Table 6-3] 
Actions that responders are 
taking 
We are working with the ambulance crews to 
resolve the situation. We’re waiting on 
equipment to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should be 
here in 20 minutes. 
 
 
Table 6-3 Threat message item in each threat level. 
 High Threat Message 
Component 
Low Threat Message 
Component 
Neutral Threat (Control) 
Message Component 
We’ve been informed that 
a harmful chemical was 
released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are 
still investigating what type 
of chemical it is but, based 
on what we know, the risk 
to the public is high.  
 
It can sometimes take a 
while to feel the effects. 
You might feel fine right 
now but still be affected. 
The chemical may cause 
painful skin burns and 
may even be fatal. People 
who come into contact 
with you could be exposed 
to the chemical. 
We’ve been informed that 
a chemical may have 
been released in one of 
the lecture theatres. We 
are still investigating what 
type of chemical it is but, 
based on what we know, 
the risk to the public is 
low.  
 
Had you been exposed to 
the substance, you would 
have felt some symptoms 
by now. You will probably 
be fine but we will still 
need to take some 
precautions. The 
instructions we are about 
to give you are a 
precaution. 
We’ve been informed that 
a chemical may have 
been released in one of 
the lecture theatres. We 
are still investigating what 
type of chemical it is, 
where the chemical would 
have originated, and what 
time it would have been 
released.  
 
Please stay where you are 
and listen for updates. If 
you have just arrived, 
please remain where you 
are. We will update you 
when we know more 
about the situation. Listen 




Table 6-4 Efficacy and neutral (no efficacy) message items. 
Instruction Rationale for framing of message based on 
non-expert mental model (Chapter 5) 
Efficacy statement Matched Neutral statement 
Remaining in place 
after evacuating (not 
self-evacuating, e.g.  
to home or hospital) 
Outcomes from interviews in Chapter 5 indicated 
that responders should make clear to casualties 
that decontamination without hospitalisation is 
an effective countermeasure and that action can 
be taken by the casualty themselves to reduce 
the extent of contamination. 
High Threat: 
There are things 
you can do right 
now that will 
remove the 
chemical from your 
skin. Staying here 
and following our 
instructions is the 
best thing you can 
do right now to 
protect yourselves. 
Low and Neutral 
Threat: 
There are things 
you can do right 
now that would 
remove the 
chemical from your 
skin. Staying here 
and following our 
instructions is the 
best precaution 
you can take right 
now to protect 
yourselves. 
 
We are still currently looking into the 
cause of the incident. We are also looking 
into the source of the chemical and the 






One of the implications of the interviews in 
Chapter 5 is that when instructing casualties to 
disrobe during IOR, responders should tailor 
efficacy information to the concept of removing 
clothing to stop skin contact with the chemical 
and inhalation of the chemical as this is likely to 
be intuitive. 
High Threat 
Most of the 
chemical is on 
your clothing. So 
the more clothing 
you remove, the 
more chemical 
you’ll prevent from 
getting onto your 
skin or into your 
lungs. 
Low and Neutral 
Threat: 
Most of the 
chemical would be 
on your clothing. 
So the more 
clothing you 
remove, the more 
chemical you’d 
prevent from 
getting onto your 
skin or into your 
lungs. 
If you have just arrived, please stay 
where you are and listen out for updates. 
We are currently investigating this 
incident. We will be giving you some 
instructions in a moment. Please listen. 
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Instruction Rationale for framing of message based on 
non-expert mental model (Chapter 5) 
Efficacy statement Matched Neutral statement 
Instruction 4: Dry 
decontamination 
The ineffectiveness of dry decontamination 
emerged as a likely misconception in Chapter 5 
so responders need to explain how applying 
absorbent materials to skin is an effective form 
of decontamination and also state that it is safe 
to blot then wipe (as opposed to rub) the skin to 
address concerns about exacerbating the 
spread and absorption of the chemical. 
Participants expressed lack of confidence in dry 
decontamination relative to wet 
decontamination, for example because dry 
materials are not used as much as water in daily 
hygiene behaviour so responders should 
reiterate that water will be provided as well. 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. Blotting then wiping the skin with 
dry paper is a safe and effective way to 
remove some of the chemical from your 





A decontamination shower is on the way. 
We are investigating what type of 
chemical this is and the cause of the 
incident. Remain where you are and 





Remaining in place to 
await the arrival of a 
decontamination 
shower 
According to the interviews in Chapter 5, the 
efficacy of wet decontamination is likely to be 
intuitive to casualties. 
After using the tissue paper, going 
through a decontamination shower is the 
best way to ensure that you are 
thoroughly cleaned.  
 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out more 




6.3.1. Word count and readability 
The full communication interventions, consisting of message items outlined in 
preceding tables, are displayed in Table 6-5. Word count variability between conditions 
was minimal, the maximum percentage difference between conditions being 1.82%. 
The amalgamated readability score was equal across conditions. Scores indicated that 
the message in all conditions was tailored to the US 6th-grade reading level (age: 10 to 
11, equivalent UK level: Year 7 [key stage 3]) as recommended in the emergency 
communication literature (Omori et al., 2017).  
 







Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
High 
[Word count = 389] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a harmful 
chemical was released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it 
is but, based on what we know, the 
risk to the public is high.  
 
It can sometimes take a while to feel 
the effects. You might feel fine right 
now but still be affected. The chemical 
may cause painful skin burns and may 
even be fatal. People who come into 
contact with you could be exposed to 
the chemical. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now 
that will remove the chemical from 
your skin. Staying here and following 
our instructions is the best thing you 
can do right now to protect yourselves. 
 
Stay where you are. I’m going to give 
you some instructions.  
 
Most of the chemical is on your 
clothing. So the more clothing you 
[Word count = 389] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a harmful 
chemical was released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it 
is but, based on what we know, the 
risk to the public is high.  
 
It can sometimes take a while to feel 
the effects. You might feel fine right 
now but still be affected. The chemical 
may cause painful skin burns and may 
even be fatal. People who come into 
contact with you could be exposed to 
the chemical. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the 
cause of the incident. We are also 
looking into the source of the chemical 
and the precise time when the incident 
was reported.  
 
Stay where you are. I’m going to give 
you some instructions. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay 








Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
remove, the more chemical you’ll 
prevent from getting onto your skin or 
into your lungs. 
 
Carefully remove as much clothing as 
you can, down to your underwear. Do 
not let the clothing touch your face. 
Tear or cut clothing away from the 
body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your 
head then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the clothing 
away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. Blotting then wiping the skin with 
dry paper is a safe and effective way 
to remove some of the chemical from 
your skin before showering. 
 
Use the tissue paper on the ground to 
blot and then rub your skin. Start by 
blotting then rubbing your hands and 
then use a new piece of paper to blot 
and then rub your face. Repeat this 
process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going 
through a decontamination shower is 
the best way to ensure that you are 
thoroughly cleaned.  
 
A shower is on its way here now. 





updates. We are currently 
investigating this incident. We will be 
giving you some instructions in a 
moment. Please listen. 
 
Carefully remove as much clothing as 
you can, down to your underwear. Do 
not let the clothing touch your face. 
Tear or cut clothing away from the 
body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your 
head then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the clothing 
away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. We are investigating what type of 
chemical this is and the cause of the 
incident. Remain where you are and 
listen out for further instructions. 
 
Use the tissue paper on the ground to 
blot and then rub your skin. Start by 
blotting then rubbing your hands and 
then use a new piece of paper to blot 
and then rub your face. Repeat this 
process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out 
more about what has happened here. 
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are. 
Low 
 
[Word count = 386] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it 
is but, based on what we know, the 
risk to the public is low. 
 
Had you been exposed to the 
substance, you would have felt some 
symptoms by now. You will probably 
be fine but we will still need to take 
[Word count = 385] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully. 
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it 
is but, based on what we know, the 
risk to the public is low. 
 
Had you been exposed to the 
substance, you would have felt some 
symptoms by now. You will probably 








Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
some precautions. The instructions we 
are about to give you are a precaution. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now 
that would remove the chemical from 
your skin. Staying here and following 
our instructions is the best precaution 
you can take right now to protect 
yourselves. 
 
Stay where you are. I’m going to give 
you some instructions.  
 
Most of the chemical would be on your 
clothing. So the more clothing you 
remove, the more chemical you’d 
prevent from getting onto your skin or 
into your lungs. 
 
Carefully remove as much clothing as 
you can, down to your underwear. Do 
not let the clothing touch your face. 
Tear or cut clothing away from the 
body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your 
head then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the clothing 
away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. Blotting then wiping the skin with 
dry paper is a safe and effective way 
to remove some of the chemical from 
your skin before showering. 
 
Use the tissue paper on the ground to 
blot and then rub your skin. Start by 
blotting then rubbing your hands and 
then use a new piece of paper to blot 
and then rub your face. Repeat this 
process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going 
through a decontamination shower is 
the best way to ensure that you are 
thoroughly cleaned. 
some precautions. The instructions we 
are about to give you are a precaution.  
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the 
cause of the incident. We are also 
looking into the source of the chemical 
and the precise time when the incident 
was reported.  
 
Stay where you are. I’m going to give 
you some instructions. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay 
where you are and listen out for 
updates. We are currently 
investigating this incident. We will be 
giving you some instructions in a 
moment. Please listen. 
 
Carefully remove as much clothing as 
you can, down to your underwear. Do 
not let the clothing touch your face. 
Tear or cut clothing away from the 
body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your 
head then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the clothing 
away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. We are investigating what type of 
chemical this is and the cause of the 
incident. Remain where you are and 
listen out for further instructions. 
 
Use the tissue paper on the ground to 
blot and then rub your skin. Start by 
blotting then rubbing your hands and 
then use a new piece of paper to blot 
and then rub your face. Repeat this 
process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out 









Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are. 
 
 
A shower is on its way here now. 





[Word count = 383] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it 
is, where the chemical would have 
originated, and what time it would 
have been released.  
 
Please stay where you are and listen 
for updates. If you have just arrived, 
please remain where you are. We will 
update you when we know more about 
the situation. Listen out for updates 
and instructions. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now 
that would remove the chemical from 
your skin. Staying here and following 
our instructions is the best precaution 
you can take right now to protect 
yourselves. 
 
Stay where you are. I’m going to give 
you some instructions.  
 
Most of the chemical would be on your 
clothing. So the more clothing you 
remove, the more chemical you’d 
prevent from getting onto your skin or 
into your lungs. 
 
Carefully remove as much clothing as 
you can, down to your underwear. Do 
not let the clothing touch your face. 
Tear or cut clothing away from the 
body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your 
head then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the clothing 
away from your face. 
 
[Word count = 382] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it 
is, where the chemical would have 
originated, and what time it would 
have been released.  
 
Please stay where you are and listen 
for updates. If you have just arrived, 
please remain where you are. We will 
update you when we know more about 
the situation. Listen out for updates 
and instructions. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the 
cause of the incident. We are also 
looking into the source of the chemical 
and the precise time when the incident 
was reported.  
 
Stay where you are. I’m going to give 
you some instructions. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay 
where you are and listen out for 
updates. We are currently 
investigating this incident. We will be 
giving you some instructions in a 
moment. Please listen. 
 
Carefully remove as much clothing as 
you can, down to your underwear. Do 
not let the clothing touch your face. 
Tear or cut clothing away from the 
body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your 
head then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the clothing 









Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. Blotting then wiping the skin with 
dry paper is a safe and effective way 
to remove some of the chemical from 
your skin before showering. 
 
Use the tissue paper on the ground to 
blot and then rub your skin. Start by 
blotting then rubbing your hands and 
then use a new piece of paper to blot 
and then rub your face. Repeat this 
process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going 
through a decontamination shower is 
the best way to ensure that you are 
thoroughly cleaned.  
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. We are investigating what type of 
chemical this is and the cause of the 
incident. Remain where you are and 
listen out for further instructions. 
 
Use the tissue paper on the ground to 
blot and then rub your skin. Start by 
blotting then rubbing your hands and 
then use a new piece of paper to blot 
and then rub your face. Repeat this 
process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out 
more about what has happened here. 
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
The message development process described in this chapter has enabled me to 
assemble a set of six messages that convey essential baseline information but vary 
across two domains that are of theoretical interest. Which of these messages is most 
effective in encouraging protective behaviours is an empirical question that I will 
answer in an RCT, reported in Chapter 8. Readability was constant in all messages 
and word count variability was minimal, which allows for a more robust test of the effect 
of wording. Whilst differences in wording between messages may appear subtle, slight 
variation in wording has been shown to have significant effects in previous studies. For 
example side-effect symptom reporting was lower when a patient information leaflet 
was subtly manipulated to be positively framed (Webster, Weinman, & Rubin, 2018). 
The steps I took to determine the optimum type of message out of the options 




Chapter 7 Pilot study to validate messaging interventions for use 




Following the development of a preliminary message to promote casualty adherence to 
IOR in a chemical incident (Chapter 6), I identified six messaging options that could be 
effective in promoting IOR adherence. The approaches are as follows:  
1. Making salient the threat of contamination and the efficacy of IOR (High Threat, 
Efficacy); 
2. Making salient the threat of contamination but not the efficacy of IOR (High 
Threat, No Efficacy); 
3. Understating the threat of contamination and making salient the efficacy of IOR 
(Low Threat, Efficacy); 
4. Understating the threat of contamination and not making salient the efficacy of 
IOR (Low Threat, No Efficacy); 
5. Neither making salient nor understating the threat of contamination and making 
salient the efficacy of IOR (Neutral Threat, Efficacy); 
6. Neither making salient nor understating the threat of contamination and not 
making salient the efficacy of IOR (Neutral Threat, No Efficacy). 
 
The ideal approach to testing which of these messages is most effective would be to 
use a randomised controlled trial (RCT) including actual or intended behaviour as an 
outcome. But before an RCT can be conducted, an important preliminary test is to 
check whether messages would be perceived as intended. In other words, do the 
manipulations alter perceptions of threat and efficacy in the intended directions, but 
without altering other perceptions? 
In this chapter, I report the results of a small experiment conducted to act as a 
manipulation check. I used the following null and directional alternative hypotheses to 
check Threat and Efficacy manipulations.  
RQ1. Does the presentation of information about Threat affect threat (severity 
and susceptibility) perceptions?  
H0. The manipulation of Threat information will have no effect on threat 




Ha1. Threat (severity and susceptibility) perceptions will be higher in the 
High Threat condition than in the Low or Neutral Threat conditions. 
Ha2. Threat perceptions (severity and susceptibility) will be higher in the 
Neutral Threat condition than in the Low Threat condition. 
RQ2. Does the presentation of information about Efficacy affect response 
efficacy perceptions? 
H0. The manipulation of Efficacy information will have no effect on threat 
response efficacy perceptions. 
Ha. Response efficacy perceptions will be higher in the Efficacy 
condition than in the No Efficacy condition. 
Perceived legitimacy of emergency responders and expected identification with 
responders were not designed to vary in response to the different messages but these 
variables are likely to impact on compliance expectations (Carter, Drury, et al., 2018; 
Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015). Similarly, self-
efficacy perceptions were not targeted in any of the messages but self-efficacy is a 
predictor of behaviour change in both Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (R. W. 
Rogers, 1975, 1983), and the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte, 1992, 
1994). As an additional manipulation check, I tested whether measures of perceived 
responder legitimacy and identification with responders and measures of self-efficacy 
differed between conditions. I used qualitative data to ascertain whether participants 




I carried out an online RCT with a 3x2 (three levels of Threat and two levels of Efficacy) 
independent measures design to assess the effect of messages read by participants in 
a text vignette of an emergency on outcome measures pertaining to perceptions of 
threat severity, threat susceptibility, response efficacy, self-efficacy, responder 
legitimacy, and identification with responders. 
7.2.2. Participants  
G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Franz Faul, Universität Kiel) was used to compute required sample 
size for ANOVA (fixed effects, special, main effects and interactions) using a priori 
power analysis. An effect size from a previous meta-analysis of studies that included 
attitude perceptions as outcomes of threat and efficacy information, η2= 0.21 (Witte & 




number of groups, number of predictors, number of response variables, alpha, power 
and effect size (f) were set at 6, 2, 5, 0.05, 0.95, and 0.51 respectively. The computed 
required sample size was 52, which was rounded up to 54 to allow for an equal number 
of participants across groups (9 per group). All participants were at least 18 years of 
age and fluent in written English. In line with the scenario which presented the incident 
as taking place within a university, participants were all university undergraduates or 
graduates.   All participants were recruited via a King’s College London research 
participation circular email and webpage (recruitment advertisement displayed in 
Appendix N). Each participant received an online gift voucher to the value of £10 as 
reimbursement for their time. 
7.2.3. Materials 
One of six messages was presented to participants in the context of a text vignette 
depicting the scenario described in the preceding chapter but from the perspective of a 
casualty. The wording of the vignette and the instruction given to participants to 
imagine themselves in the situation were adapted from the approach used in a 
previous mass casualty decontamination visualisation experiment (Carter, Drury, 
Amlôt, et al., 2015). Specifically, participants were asked: “Try to imagine that you were 
involved in the incident and think about how you might feel and act in this type of 
situation”.  
The vignette presented to participants read as follows: “Imagine you are waiting in a 
crowded lecture theatre for a lecture to begin. You hear a fire alarm. You and your 
fellow students walk out of the room and walk outside the building. Roughly 20 
university staff and students are gathered outside. You are now standing among them. 
You see a police van parked nearby and there are rolls of blue tissue paper on the 
ground. You hear the following announcement on a megaphone… [one of six 
messages displayed to participant]”. 
At the point in the scenario when the participant was informed that they hear a voice on 
a megaphone, they read one of the six messages displayed in Table 6-5. 
7.2.4. Measures 
7.2.4.1 Quantitative measures 
I adapted perceived severity (two items), susceptibility (two items), response efficacy (3 
items), and self-efficacy (one item) Likert items from a study on public reactions to a 
hypothetical chemical spill by Pearce et al. (2013). These scales were deemed to be 
appropriate for the present pilot test due to the thematic similarity between the 




from threat and coping appraisal items used by Teasdale, Yardley, Schlotz, and Michie 
(2012) in a study on pandemic flu.  
I adapted four Likert items pertaining to perceptions of responders’ legitimacy and two 
items pertaining to expected identification with responders. The scales had good 
internal reliability (α = .85 and .89 respectively) in an online visualisation experiment 
centred on a hypothetical incident involving mass casualty decontamination (Carter, 
Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015). All items presented below had response options ranging 
from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree).  
Severity 
• If I was exposed to the chemical released in this incident it is likely that I 
would become seriously ill 




• It is likely that I had been exposed to the chemical released in this incident 
• If I didn’t take preventative action, it is likely that I would be exposed to the 
chemical released in this incident 
 
Response efficacy 
• Staying where I am and following instructions would help to protect me if I 
had been exposed to the chemical 
• Removing the clothing that I am wearing would help to protect me if I had 
been exposed to the chemical 
• Blotting then rubbing my skin with tissue paper would help to protect me if I 
had been exposed to the chemical 
 
Self-efficacy 
• I would be able to follow all instructions in this incident 
 
Legitimacy 
• I imagined the police officer to be respectful 
• I imagined the police officer to be fair 
• I imagined the police officer to be open about the actions they were taking 
• I imagined the police officer to be trustworthy 
 
Identification 
• If this situation had been real, I would have felt a sense of unity with the 
police officer responding to the incident 
• If this situation had been real, I would have identified with the police officer 
responding to the incident 
 
7.2.4.2 Qualitative measure 
After completing the quantitative measures, participants were asked: “Was there 




said differently? Also, are there any reasons as to why you answered particular 
questions a certain way?” Participants were provided with a text box in which to record 
their responses. 
7.2.5. Procedure 
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the King’s College London Psychiatry, 
Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Panel (reference: LRS-17/18-7875; Appendix O). 
I emailed the information sheet and instructions on how to access the online survey, 
developed and hosted on Qualtrics (Appendix P), to participants who responded to the 
recruitment materials. Reattempting an online survey or experiment by deleting 
browser cookies or using a different device or browser is a recognised problem in 
online research (J. J. Chandler & Paolacci, 2017). To account for this possibility, a list 
of unique user codes was generated and stored on a database. Each email sent to a 
prospective participant included a unique code which the participant was asked to enter 
when prompted on the first page of the experiment. Codes entered in the survey were 
checked against the list of sent codes prior to analysis to ensure there were no 
duplicates, indicating that no one had completed the study twice. After clicking on the 
link to the survey and completing the consent form, the participant was randomly 
allocated by the survey tool to receive one of the six messages outlined in Table 6-5. 
All other information in the survey was identical across conditions, including the 
scenario used to contextualise the message. After reading the scenario and the 
message that they would hear from a police officer during the scenario, participants 
completed all outcome measures outlined above. Data collection occurred between 
28th and 31st August 2018. 
7.2.6. Analysis  
7.2.6.1 Quantitative analysis 
I carried out quantitative analyses using IBM SPSS Statistics 25. Scale reliability was 
assessed using Cronbach’s alpha for scales consisting of more than two items and 
Pearson correlation coefficient for scales consisting of two items. Two-way ANOVAs 
with Bonferroni post hoc comparisons were applied to test the main effects and 
interaction of Threat and Efficacy manipulations on the sum of items in each scale. 
Bootstrapping was used if assumptions of normality were not met. Normality was first 
assessed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistics. If both values were 
non-significant, the ANOVA was carried out without bootstrapping. If Levene’s statistic 
for homogeneity of variance was significant but Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk 
statistics were not significant, the analysis was repeated with bootstrapping as a 




Given the controversy associated with applying parametric tests to individual Likert 
items (Carifio & Perla, 2008), non-parametric tests were applied to the self-efficacy 
item. Kruskal-Wallis H test with Bonferroni-corrected post hoc comparisons was used 
to test the effect of the Threat manipulation as there were three levels to this variable. 
Mann-Whitney U test was used to test the effect of the Efficacy manipulation as there 
were two levels to this variable.  
7.2.6.2 Qualitative analysis 
I carried out thematic analysis on responses to the qualitative measure using NVIVO 
11.2.1.616 (QSR International). I used the same data-derived approach to thematic 
analysis that I used in the studies reported in Chapters 4 and 5. A minimum of two 
statements was required to constitute a theme. Themes were compared across 
conditions to identify whether the patterns of responses would have been related to the 
message read by the participant. Themes are denoted in italics in the Results section. 
 
7.3 Results 
A total of 56 participants completed the online experiment. Two extra participants 
began the study before I could close the link to the online survey, so I allowed them to 
complete the study before ceasing data collection. 
7.3.1. Quantitative outcomes 
Reliability was relatively low for severity, r = .46, and susceptibility, r = .47, but 
acceptable for response efficacy, α = .79, legitimacy, α = .85, and identification, r = .78, 
scales. As indicated in Table 7-1, reported agreement was generally high for most 
items, particularly response efficacy and self-efficacy items and the item pertaining to 
expected anxiety. 
There was no significant effect of Threat, F(2, 50), = 2.11, p = .13, ηp2 = 0.08, Efficacy, 
F(1,50) = 0.23, p = .63, ηp2 = 0.01, or interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 50) 
= 0.12, p = .89, ηp2 = 0.01, on perceived severity (Figure 7-1).  
There was a significant effect of Threat, F(2, 50), = 7.57, p < .005, ηp2 = 0.23, on 
perceived susceptibility (Figure 7-2). Participants in the High Threat condition had 
higher susceptibility perceptions than participants in the Low Threat condition, Mdiff = 
2.12, 95% CI [0.39, 3.85], p < .05, and participants in the Neutral Threat condition also 
had higher susceptibility perceptions than participants in the Low Threat condition, Mdiff 
= 2.75, 95% CI [1.24, 4.28], p < .005. There was no difference in susceptibility 
perceptions between the High and Neutral conditions, Mdiff = 0.63, 95% CI [-0.63, 1.85], 




There was no effect of Efficacy, F(1,50) = 0.51, p = .48, ηp2 = 0.01, on perceived 
susceptibility. There was a significant interaction effect between Threat and Efficacy, 
F(2, 50) = 4, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.14, on perceived susceptibility (Figure 7-3). When Efficacy 
information was provided, participants in the High Threat condition had higher 
susceptibility perceptions than participants in the Low Threat condition, Mdiff = 3.98, 
95% CI [1.8, 6.3], p < .001, and participants in the Neutral Threat condition also had 
higher susceptibility perceptions than participants in the Low Threat condition, Mdiff = 
3.11, 95% CI [1.09, 5.33], p < .005, with no difference in susceptibility perceptions 
between the High and Neutral conditions, Mdiff = 0.87, 95% CI [-0.59, 2.25], p = .4. But 
when no Efficacy information was provided, susceptibility perceptions were higher in 
the Neutral Threat group than they were in both the High, Mdiff = 2.26, 95% CI [0.5, 
4.02], p < .05, and Low, Mdiff = 2.37, 95% CI [0.15, 4.7], p < .05, Threat conditions, with 
no difference in susceptibility perceptions between the High and Low conditions, Mdiff = 
0.11, 95% CI [-2.29, 2.67], p = .92. 
There was no significant effect of Threat, F(2, 50), = 0.35, p = .71, ηp2 = 0.01, or 
interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 50), = 0.64, p = .53, ηp2 = 0.03, on 
perceived response efficacy (Figure 7-4).  
There was a significant effect of Efficacy on perceived response efficacy, F(1,50) = 
4.81, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.09 (Figure 7-5), with participants in the Efficacy group having 
higher response efficacy perceptions than participants in the No Efficacy group, Mdiff = -
1.93, 95% CI [-3.48, -0.2].  
There were no significant differences in self-efficacy perceptions between Threat, H = 
1.26, p = .53, or Efficacy, U = 280, p = .05, conditions (Figure 7-6). 
There was no significant effect of Threat, F(2, 50), = 2.1, p = .13, ηp2 = 0.08, Efficacy, 
F(1,50) = 3.17, p = .08, ηp2 = 0.06, or interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 50) 
= 0.38, p = .69, ηp2 = 0.02, on perceived legitimacy of the communicator (Figure 7-7). 
There was no significant effect of Threat, F(2, 50), = 1.01, p = .37, ηp2 = 0.04, Efficacy, 
F(1,50) = 0.01, p = .93, ηp2 = 0, or interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 50) = 




Table 7-1 Median and IQR (interquartile range) for each Likert item (response options 
range from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree]) in the total sample (N = 56). 
Scale Behavioural expectation Likert item Median  IQR 
Severity 
If I was exposed to the chemical released in this 
incident it is likely that I would become seriously ill 
5 2 
I would feel anxious about being exposed to the 
chemical released in this incident 
7 1 
Susceptibility 
If I didn’t take preventative action, it is likely that I 
would be exposed to the chemical released in this 
incident 
6 1 
It is likely that I had been exposed to the chemical 




Staying where I am and following instructions would 
help to protect me if I had been exposed to the 
chemical 
7 1 
Removing the clothing that I am wearing would help 
to protect me if I had been exposed to the chemical 
6 1 
Blotting then rubbing my skin with tissue paper would 
help to protect me if I had been exposed to the 
chemical 
6 2 




I imagined the police officer to be respectful 6 1 
I imagined the police officer to be fair 6 1 
I imagined the police officer to be open about the 
actions they were taking 
5 3 
I imagined the police officer to be trustworthy 6 1 
Identification 
If this situation had been real, I would have felt a 
sense of unity with the police officer responding to 
the incident 
5 2 
If this situation had been real, I would have identified 







Figure 7-1 Mean threat severity score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 
represent lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 7-2 Mean threat susceptibility score by Threat condition. Error bars represent 
lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. * = difference from Low Threat condition 




























































Figure 7-3 Mean threat susceptibility score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 
represent lower and upper 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Figure 7-4 Mean response efficacy score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 


































































Figure 7-5 Mean response efficacy score by Efficacy condition. Error bars represent 




Figure 7-6 Median self-efficacy score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 



































































Figure 7-7 Mean legitimacy score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 
represent lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 7-8 Mean identification score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 






























































7.3.2. Qualitative outcomes 
Thirty-three participants responded to the open-ended item pertaining to their 
perception of the message that would be delivered by the police officer. In all groups, 
aside from the Neutral Threat, No Efficacy group, participants expressed a positive 
appraisal of the message and communicator, for example by appreciating the officer’s 
honesty on the subject of the effects of hazardous chemicals. 
Clear guidelines on what to do is important and I believe that was portrayed 
logically (High Threat, Efficacy). 
I would appreciate the honesty of letting us know that it can be fatal and that's 
why we were being instructed to take certain actions (High Threat, No Efficacy). 
I understood everything the police officer said, and I think he said it 
appropriately (Neutral Threat, Efficacy). 
However, insufficient practical instructions were raised in all threat conditions and were 
not confined to one efficacy condition. 
I think the instruction to blot and then rub my skin was slightly unclear - I usually 
think of blotting as involving water but did this mean dab myself with a dry 
tissue, and then use the same tissue to rub my skin? (Low Threat, Efficacy). 
The police officer mentioned cutting away the clothes. Yet I heard no 
information on access to scissors (High Threat, No Efficacy). 
Concerns about disrobing in front of people were expressed in all threat conditions. 
I would be concerned about removing clothing in front of men (Neutral Threat, 
Efficacy). 
We live in the age of the smartphone.  It is quite something to ask people to 
strip in public when there is a risk of people taking photos. (Low Threat, 
Efficacy). 
injunctions to do things that by no means I'll do in public such as removing my 
clothes where somebody can see me, can you imagine? peers and 
colleagues...just awful (High Threat, Efficacy). 
Suggestions for addressing modesty concerns were raised. 
I think the policeman should have announced that the use of smartphones was 
forbidden. I also think there should have been disposable gowns provided for 
anyone who had stripped off (Low Threat, Efficacy). 
I feel like men and women should be separated in such situation - many would 
feel uncomfortable getting undressed to underwear in front of members of 
opposite sex (High Threat, No Efficacy). 




20 minutes is a very long time in a situation like this - that would be very anxiety 
provoking to know/wait that long (High Threat, No Efficacy). 
I did not feel complete trust in the police officer. I felt that I needed to shower 
sooner than 20 minutes (Low Threat, Efficacy). 
In the High threat condition only (both Efficacy and No Efficacy groups), the severity of 
the message was noted. 
I think that the police officer's messages would instill unnecessary and unhelpful 
panic in the crowd. They could have avoid mentioning the possible effects of 
the chemical and state that the measures they were taking were precautionary 
(High Threat, No Efficacy). 
I also think she should not have mentioned that there is a high risk/it is 
potentially fatal - instead she should have said that there's a possibility it could 
have harmful effects so you need to make sure you follow instructions (High 
Threat, No Efficacy). 
Anxiety resulting from ambiguous information about the incident was discussed by 
participants in the Neutral threat condition. Relating to this, participants in the Neutral 
threat condition expressed willingness to follow instructions because potential severity 
was clear. 
The fact that they don't know what the chemical is (or won't tell you) is quite 
anxiety inducing and would probably make me more frightened (Neutral Threat, 
No Efficacy). 
In terms of the incident itself, I got a real sense of the urgency of the situation 
and the importance of taking action as instructed. I didn't get a clear sense of 
whether or not I had actually been exposed to the chemical, but if I had been in 
that situation, I would have gone about the preventative measures as described 
anyway, because the potential severity was clear. (Neutral Threat, Efficacy). 
I would do as I was told as I feel like the seriousness of the situation is clear 
(Neutral Threat, No Efficacy). 
Participants in the Low threat condition perceived reassuring messages to be false and 
intended to reduce panic. 
Obviously a police officer would want to contain any release of the chemical, 
and would want to avoid panic - so regardless of what a police officer says I 
would be distrustful in such an incident (Low Threat, Efficacy). 
I would think he was lying about the extent the chemical would effect me in 
order for us all to remain calm (Low Threat, Efficacy). 
Criticism of the communicator being monotonous and robotic was discussed by 




I understand that there needs to be repetition in case people did not hear the 
initial statements, but the repetition of the same minimal information is 
somewhat unnerving (Neutral Threat, No Efficacy). 
I said that I would not have identified with the police officer, nor felt a sense of 
unity, as I imagined it being very robotic. Perhaps when spoken it would seem 
more empathetic, but the transcript sounds very basic and monotonous on its 
own (Neutral Threat, No Efficacy). 
Participants in the No Efficacy groups in both the high and neutral threat conditions 
expected that they would have difficulty following instructions due to anticipated anxiety 
resulting from the wording of the message. 
The way the police officer provided information and the information itself would 
have put me in a seriously frightened state and that could have reduced my 
ability to follow instructions (Neutral Threat, No Efficacy). 
I disagreed about being able to follow all instructions because the panic and 
fear would make it difficult to listen - especially if a lot of crucial instructions and 
information is being given all at once (High Threat, No Efficacy). 
In the No Efficacy condition only, there was a reported deficit of information about why 
disrobing and dry decontamination are necessary. 
I would also appreciate a quick explanation to why blotting skin with blue paper 
towel would help me (High Threat, No Efficacy). 
It was not explained why we would need to remove our clothes or blot our skin. 
This would have made me feel unsettled about stripping down in front of 
strangers if I weren't certain as to why I should do so. I imagine I would have 
been reluctant to follow this instruction without reassurance from the police 
officer that the action was necessary. (Neutral Threat, No Efficacy). 
 
7.4 Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to assess whether the manipulations of threat and 
efficacy information carried out in Chapter 6 would have the intended effect on 
perceptions relating to severity, susceptibility and response efficacy and whether the 
manipulations would have any unanticipated effect on legitimacy, identification and 
self-efficacy. 
The efficacy manipulation affected response efficacy perceptions in the expected 
direction. Participants who received information as to the efficacy of each IOR action 
reported higher overall agreement that adhering to the instructions would be conducive 
to self-protection.  Outcomes from the qualitative analysis further supported the 
difference in message perceptions between efficacy conditions, with participants in the 
No Efficacy condition questioning the lack of information as to why disrobing and dry 




information on scores for the item pertaining to expected self-efficacy, which was 
hypothesised given that there was no attempt to manipulate self-efficacy perceptions.  
I expected that ratings of severity and susceptibility would be higher in the High than in 
the Neutral and Low Threat conditions and lower in the Low than in the Neutral 
condition. The threat manipulation had no effect on severity perceptions, possibly due 
to limitations outlined in the following paragraph. Participants in the Low Threat threat 
condition indicated lower ratings of threat susceptibility than participants in the other 
Threat conditions. In this respect, the Low threat manipulation was sufficient to lower a 
proportion of threat perceptions, relative to the control condition. However, the High 
threat manipulation did not have the intended effect of increasing susceptibility 
perceptions relative to the Neutral condition. One explanation for this was found in the 
qualitative analysis. Participants in the Neutral threat condition discussed both the 
expectation of anxiety resulting from the communicator’s use of repetition and the 
apparent uncertainty about the impact of the chemical. They discussed anticipated 
willingness to follow instructions due to the potential severity. Participants in all 
conditions were aware, on reading the message that a hazardous chemical had been 
released but only in the Low Threat condition were participants informed that the threat 
was low. Emergencies involving the release of CBRN materials are likely to be fear-
arousing (Krieger et al., 2014; Sheppard et al., 2006; Sullivan & Bongar, 2007) so the 
mere mention of a hazardous chemical release without a qualifying, reassuring 
statement about the low risk of exposure may explain why susceptibility scores were 
high in both the Neutral and High Threat condition, relative to the Low Threat condition. 
The wording of the statement about the incident was sufficiently severe in the High 
threat condition, based on concerns about the severity of the message identified in the 
qualitative data. Implications for the hypotheses in subsequent studies are raised. 
Rather than the High Threat Efficacy message being most effective in improving 
adherence, it is possible that both the High Threat and Neutral Threat conditions would 
be equally conducive to expected behaviour change, relative to messages that 
understate the threat.  
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the threat manipulation from the present study 
due to the poor reliability of severity and susceptibility scales and the low number of 
items per scale. There were also limitations associated with the wording of items that 
were realised after data collection. For example, the item, “I would feel anxious about 
being exposed to the chemical released in this incident”, may be more representative 
of expected anxiety than perceived threat severity. In retrospect, the qualifying clause, 
“If I didn’t take preventative action”, in one of the susceptibility items may have 




and may have accounted for the interaction between threat and efficacy manipulations. 
Further work was required to identify more appropriate items for threat appraisal scales 
to be used in a further manipulation check nested in the study reported in the next 
chapter. 
The null hypothesis that responder legitimacy perceptions and expected identification 
with the responder would not differ between groups was retained. This was expected 
because information about the communicator, their competence and expertise in 
managing the incident, and actions they are currently taking was present in all 
conditions. 
For all items in the present study, responses were skewed toward the positive end of 
the scale. All items had a median and mode ranging from 5 (somewhat agree) to 7 
(strongly agree). Visual analogue scales (VAS) may therefore be more appropriate 
measurement tools in future studies. If VAS data are skewed, there is the option to 
categorise them into ranges akin to ordinal Likert scale points, whereas the reverse 
cannot be achieved. Reliability and validity are broadly consistent between the two 
scale types (Musangu & Kekwaletswe, 2012; Tucker-Seeley, 2008) though significant 
change is more easily detected in VAS (Musangu & Kekwaletswe, 2012) and VAS are 
less conducive to ceiling effects (Voutilainen, Pitkäaho, Kvist, & Vehviläinen‐Julkunen, 
2015). But literature searches for VAS used to measure expected behaviour in a 
hypothetical incident have so far resulted in no findings. I decided that the most 
appropriate approach to outcome measure development was to refine and improve the 
use of Likert measures prior to the RCT reported in the next chapter, rather than 
attempt to introduce a novel outcome measure approach. 
The results of this study indicate that messages designed to improve response efficacy 
perceptions improved response efficacy perceptions, relative to messages designed to 
have no impact. Messages designed to reduce perceptions of threat susceptibility, 
relative to High and Neutral messages, had the intended effect. And, as expected, the 
known extraneous variables of legitimacy, identification and self-efficacy were not 
significantly affected by my experimental manipulations. The outcomes of this study 
provide no conclusive guidance on how to improve the wording of Threat messages so 
that severity perceptions vary as intended and no guidance on how to improve the 
wording of the High and Neutral Threat message components so that susceptibility 
perceptions would be higher following receipt of the High, rather than Neutral message. 
This is because it is difficult to draw valid conclusions about the effect of Threat 




limitations. Improvement of threat perception outcome measures was addressed prior 




Chapter 8 The effect of responder communication on expected 
adherence to initial decontamination protocols by casualties in a 




The aim of this PhD is to test optimum parameters for communication with casualties 
during the early stages of a chemical incident to promote adherence to IOR 
procedures. The objective of this study is to assess the effectiveness of discrete 
message components, specifically the inclusion of information about the threat of 
contamination and the efficacy of decontamination, at promoting adherence.  
Findings from the systematic review reported in Chapter 2, the crisis communication 
review reported in Chapter 3, and the lay public interview study reported in Chapter 5, 
suggest that engagement in protective actions by casualties in an emergency is likely 
to be facilitated by the provision of information about the emergency. There is more 
than one approach to conveying this information. In the investigation into current 
communication practice reported in Chapter 4, example messages emerged from the 
guidance documents and interviews with first responders that described the nature of 
the incident in a manner that understated the threat posed by a hazardous chemical, 
such as “It is highly unlikely that any harm has come to you”. Conversely, there were 
also messages that unequivocally described the threat posed to casualties, such as “as 
far as we're concerned you're all contaminated”. There is a strong theoretical rationale, 
based on Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (R. W. Rogers, 1975, 1983) and the 
Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM) (Witte, 1992, 1994), for framing information 
about the incident in a way that makes salient the severe consequences of chemical 
contamination and the likelihood that casualties have been contaminated in order to 
improve the likelihood of acceptance and adherence to first responders’ instructions. 
Specifically, the EPPM predicts that a level of fear is required as part of the message 
acceptance process.  
Based on PMT and the EPPM, it is likely that the framing of information to increase 
perceptions of threat would only be conducive to message acceptance and casualties 
undertaking protective actions when these messages are accompanied by information 
about the effectiveness of protective actions at reducing or preventing the threat. In the 
absence of this perceived ‘response efficacy’, message recipients engage in a process 
of fear control whereby they attempt to protect themselves from the fear of the threat 




processes in the EPPM is such that the message audience is unlikely to assess the 
efficacy of target behaviours unless they have first assessed the threat as high. 
Findings from the interviews with first responders and the review of guidance 
documents reported in Chapter 4 show that information about the efficacy of protective 
actions is currently used in practice (e.g. “the best thing you can do is to release that 
outer layer and wipe away from your face and stuff; and that's scientifically what's best 
for you”. As stated in Chapter 6, it is still unclear whether information about the efficacy 
of IOR is necessary to promote adherence or whether it is enough to simply provide 
instructions, given that the efficacy of following instructions at reducing exposure is 
likely to be intuitive, based on outcomes from Chapter 5.  
Meta-analyses have indicated that the most effective fear appeals at promoting 
reported or intended behaviour change are high in both threat and efficacy information 
(Peters et al., 2013; Sheeran et al., 2014; Witte & Allen, 2000). However, in the studies 
included in such meta-analyses, the timeframe for behaviour change is extensive. Less 
is known about the effect of the combination of threat and efficacy information in the 
context of a chemical incident when message recipients need to accept and act on 
directives to take protective actions within a narrow, 15-minute timeframe in order to 
minimise detrimental effects of the chemical on their health and on the health of others. 
The aim of this study was to test whether the presentation of information about the 
threat of chemical contamination (low, high, or neutral threat) and efficacy of 
decontamination (efficacy or no efficacy) would affect willingness to adhere to initial 
decontamination protocols. I used the following null and directional alternative 
hypotheses to address this question. 
RQ1. Does the presentation of Threat and Efficacy information affect expected 
adherence to IOR? 
H01. Threat and Efficacy information will have no main or interaction 
effects on expected adherence to IOR. 
Ha1. Messages in which the threat of chemical contamination is 
understated by the communicator (Low Threat) will result in lower 
expected adherence to the initial decontamination protocol than 
messages in which the threat is emphasised (High Threat) or in which 
there is no attempt to emphasise or understate the threat beyond stating 
that there is a suspected chemical release (Neutral Threat). 
Ha2. Messages in which the communicator emphasises the efficacy of 
initial decontamination actions at reducing the threat of chemical 




initial decontamination protocol than messages in which the efficacy of 
initial decontamination is not addressed (No Efficacy). 
Ha3. High Threat and Neutral Threat messages with Efficacy will result 
in higher expected adherence to the initial decontamination protocol 
than High Threat and Neutral Threat messages with No Efficacy. 
Participants interviewed about their perceptions of chemical contamination (Chapter 5) 
volunteered alternative courses of action that they would consider taking during a 
chemical incident in the absence of adequate information from authorities. Actions of 
interest were: leaving the area; self-presenting at a hospital; and seeking further 
information prior to taking action. I selected these behaviours for inclusion as outcome 
measures in this study because engagement in any of these behaviours would 
increase the interval between contamination and decontamination, thereby 
undermining the effectiveness of decontamination (Borak & Sidell, 1992; Chan et al., 
2013; Chilcott, 2014; Hewitt et al., 1995; Hui et al., 2012; Kales & Christiani, 2004; 
Leary et al., 2014; Levitin et al., 2003; Wester et al., 1999). Self-evacuating is also a 
public health concern due to the risk of secondary contamination of other members of 
the public (Chilcott, 2007a; Clarke et al., 2008; Eckstein, 1999; Gaskin et al., 2017; 
Horton et al., 2003; Nakajima et al., 1997; Nishiwaki et al., 2001; Okumura et al., 2005; 
Spiandore et al., 2017; Vale et al., 2016). In this study, I tested whether the 
presentation of threat and efficacy message components would affect expected 
engagement in these alternative courses of action and, if so, what the direction of these 
effects would be. 
RQ2. Does the presentation of Threat and Efficacy information affect expected 
engagement in alternative behaviours to IOR adherence? 
H0. Threat and Efficacy information will have no main or interaction 
effects on expected adherence to alternative behaviours to IOR 
adherence. 
As a secondary objective, I tested whether the presentation of Threat and Efficacy 
information would have the expected effect on perceptions of threat severity, 
susceptibility and response efficacy and whether these perceptions predict adherence 
expectations. Self-efficacy is a sub-component of coping appraisal in PMT and 
perceived efficacy in the EPPM. As explained in Chapter 6, I did not target self-efficacy 
perceptions in the messaging intervention. Similarly, perceptions about the costs of 
behaviour change (response costs) are a sub-component of coping appraisal in PMT 
that were not addressed in the messaging intervention in this study. I included an 




perceptions would be affected by the messaging intervention and whether these 
perceptions predict adherence expectations.    
RQ3. Does the presentation of information about Threat affect threat (severity 
and susceptibility) perceptions?  
H0. The manipulation of Threat information will have no effect on threat 
severity and susceptibility perceptions. 
Ha1. Threat (severity and susceptibility) perceptions will be higher in the 
High Threat condition than in the Low or Neutral Threat conditions. 
Ha2. Threat perceptions (severity and susceptibility) will be higher in the 
Neutral Threat condition than in the Low Threat condition. 
RQ4. Does the presentation of information about Efficacy affect response 
efficacy perceptions? 
H0. The manipulation of Efficacy information will have no effect on threat 
response efficacy perceptions. 
Ha. Response efficacy perceptions will be higher in the Efficacy 
condition than in the No Efficacy condition. 
RQ5. Does the presentation of information about Threat and Efficacy affect self-
efficacy and response cost perceptions? 
H0. The manipulation of Threat and Efficacy information will have no 
effect on self-efficacy and response cost perceptions. 
The crisis communication review (Chapter 3) highlighted the role of trust in the 
communicator as a facilitator of compliance with emergency directives (Bass et al., 
2015; Glik, 2007a; Liu et al., 2017; Maxwell, 2003; McComas, 2006; Pearce et al., 
2013; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005; Rubin et al., 2009; Sherman-Morris & Lea, 2016) and 
how this can be improved by highlighting the competence and expertise of the 
communicator. This recommendation was supported by the finding from the lay public 
interviews reported in Chapter 5 that trust in first responders who communicate 
instructions would be improved by making salient the responders’ authority about 
decontamination, for example by stating that they are trained to respond to chemical 
incidents. As outlined in Chapter 6, this contextual information would be recommended 
in any message used to promote IOR. Unsubstantiated reassurance during crisis 
communication may be a barrier to trust in the messenger (Glik, 2007a; Maxwell, 2003; 




2017), which raises questions as to whether a Low Threat message would result in 
lower trust perceptions, relative to a High or Neutral Threat message with the same 
contextual information about the communicator. In previous studies on communication 
during mass casualty decontamination, messages that included health-focused 
information as to why decontamination was necessary improved perceptions of the 
legitimacy of responders (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 
2015) which suggests that messages with Efficacy information would improve trust 
perceptions. In this study I tested whether trust would be affected by Threat and 
Efficacy information and whether trust perceptions predict adherence expectations.  
RQ6. Does the presentation of information about Threat and Efficacy affect trust 
perceptions?  
H0. The manipulation of Threat and Efficacy information will have no 
effect on trust perceptions. 
Ha1. Low Threat messages will result in lower perceptions of trust in the 
communicator than High or Neutral Threat messages. 
Ha2. Efficacy messages will result in higher perceptions of trust in the 
communicator than No Efficacy messages. 
The justification raised by interviewees in Chapter 4 for understating the threat was to 
reassure casualties. I therefore included research question to test whether anxiety 
would be reduced by understating the threat posed to casualties and whether anxiety 
perceptions predict adherence expectations. 
 RQ7. Does the presentation of information about Threat and Efficacy affect 
state anxiety? 
H0. The manipulation of Threat and Efficacy information will have no 
effect on state anxiety. 
Ha1. Low Threat messages will result in lower expectations of state 
anxiety than High or Neutral Threat messages. 
A common limitation in mass casualty incident communication intervention studies 
included in the systematic review (Chapter 2) was that communication interventions 
were tested with one group of participants per condition (Amlôt et al., 2017; Boyce et 
al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Proulx & Sime, 1991; Purser, 2010). 
Testing each condition in one session makes it difficult to rule out the confounding 
effect of baseline group characteristics or extraneous factors, such as weather, in 




using an immersive virtual environment to simulate the experience of being part of a 
group of casualties, whilst ensuring complete consistency in the behaviour of all 
“casualties” across multiple study sessions. Immersive virtual environment technology 
(IVET) has been applied extensively in the emergency domain, for example in studies 
on: wayfinding behaviour in emergency egress (Duarte et al., 2014; Feng, González, 
Amor, Lovreglio, & Cabrera-Guerrero, 2018; Kinateder, Comunale, & Warren, 2018; 
Tucker et al., 2018; Vilar et al., 2014); mass evacuation (Drury, Cocking, Reicher, et 
al., 2009); and bystander behaviour in an emergency (Bakker et al., 2018; Stubbe et 
al., 2017). In this study, I used IVET to test the effect of threat and efficacy information 
on expected IOR adherence in a simulated mass casualty chemical incident. 
 
8.2 Method 
8.2.1. Design  
I used a double-blind randomised controlled trial with a 3x2 independent measures 
factorial design (Table 8-1) and an allocation ratio of 1:1 to assess the effects of threat 
and efficacy message constructs on participants’ self-reported hypothetical 
expectations of adherence to preliminary self-protective behaviours during a simulated 
chemical incident. Participants were presented with a simulated chemical incident 
scenario via a virtual reality headset, and during this incident the communication 




Table 8-1 Segmentation of treatment groups according to the combination of Threat 




























Message items designed to increase 
perceptions of severity and 
susceptibility 
 
Condition 1: High 
Threat - Efficacy 
Condition 2: High 
Threat – No 
Efficacy 
Low  
Message items designed to decrease 
perceptions of severity and 
susceptibility 
 
Condition 3: Low 
Threat - Efficacy 
Condition 4 –Low 
Threat – No 
Efficacy 
Neutral (Control) 
Message items designed to inform 
casualties about the threat without 
increasing or decreasing perceptions 
of severity and susceptibility 
Condition 5: 
Neutral Threat - 
Efficacy 
Condition 6 – 
Neutral Threat – 
No Efficacy 
 
8.2.2. Randomisation and blinding 
My first supervisor computed a block randomisation sequence of condition allocations 
using the randomisation programme, sealedenvelope.com. The order of videos was 
randomised in blocks of six (one per threat x efficacy group) so that if the trial needed 
to be terminated early, the variability in number of participants between conditions 
would be reduced.  
My second supervisor copied and pasted 22 versions of each video in the order 
specified in the random allocation sequence. The filename for each video was re-
labelled with a number from 1 to 132 determined by the order of the video in the 
sequence. My third supervisor and a colleague of the supervisory team carried out 
checks of the blinded video files to ensure that they corresponded to the correct 
condition in the random allocation sequence. I allocated each participant on a 
consecutive basis to the next video in the sequence during each study session, whilst 




The list of randomly ordered, coded video files was stored in a shared folder that was 
configured to not display file size, to reduce the risk of me accidentally unblinding 
myself by identifying a pattern in file sizes. All videos were exactly six minutes in length 
to further reduce the risk of accidental unblinding. Equal duration was achieved by 
extending the duration of the title card that informs participants that the video has 
completed. I remained blind to condition throughout data collection. Participants were 
aware of the information they received during the intervention but unaware of the 
condition to which the information corresponded. 
I asked my second supervisor to relabel the random allocation sequence with randomly 
generated codes pertaining to each level of each independent variable to keep me 
blind to condition during data analysis. Random codes were obtained from the website, 
randomcodegenerator.com. The randomisation code was broken on completion of all 






Figure 8-1 Allocation concealment flow diagram. 
 
8.2.3. Participants  
132 participants aged 18 to 81 (M = 26.13, SD = 10.83) completed the study from 29th 
October to 5th December 2018 at the Public Health England South West regional office 
in Temple Quay, Bristol. Participants were reimbursed with £30 for their time. 
I used a convenience sampling method. Recruitment channels consisted of: 
advertisements placed in the University of Bristol study participation webpage and 
First supervisor generates block random allocation sequence using SealedEnvelope™ 
Second supervisor creates list of video files in a shared folder, ordered according to random 
allocation sequence 
Second supervisor blinds researcher to intervention by relabelling files with numbers 1 to 
132 
Third supervisor and colleague of supervisory team check that blinded videos are in the 
correct order 
Researcher is blind to condition when transferring each video from shared folder to virtual 
reality headset because all videos are the same length and folder is configured not to 
display file size 
Second supervisor blinds researcher to levels of each independent variable by substituting 
the name of each level with codewords derived from randomcodegenerator.com 
Researcher carries out analyses pertaining to H1-H14 and reports the results 
Randomisation code is broken 




circular email; circular emails distributed to University of Bath and City College Bristol 
students; and word-of-mouth promotion of the study by participants to friends and 
colleagues. To mitigate against the risk of demand awareness resulting from word-of-
mouth promotion, I asked each participant not to disclose information about the study, 
apart from information they received in advance of their participation. I also asked each 
participant to state whether they had received any information about the study aside 
from information provided by me prior to their participation. All participants confirmed 
that the only information they knew prior to their arrival at the assessment centre was 
the information contained in the information sheet and recruitment materials.  
Participants were eligible for participation if they were 18 years of age or older and 
fluent in written and spoken English. For methodological reasons, I excluded people 
from participating if they had: hearing impairments including active ear infections; visual 
impairments that cannot be corrected with glasses or contact lenses; professional 
experience or expertise in emergency response or toxicology. In accordance with the 
risk assessment that was based on health and safety guidelines published by the 
manufacturer of the virtual reality headset used in the study, I advised all participants to 
consult their GP before participating if they: were pregnant; had a pre-existing binocular 
vision disorder or heart condition; or previously had a seizure, loss of awareness, or 
other symptom linked to an epileptic condition. Participants were also informed that 
they would need to reschedule their participation if, on the day of their scheduled study 
session: they felt over-tired or unwell (including cold, flu, headaches, migraines, and 
earaches) or if they were under the influence of drugs (including alcohol but not 
including nicotine, caffeine, and prescribed medication) or experiencing emotional 
stress and anxiety. 
8.2.3.1 Sample size calculation 
I used G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Franz Faul, Universität Kiel) to compute the required sample 
size for ANOVA fixed effects, special, main effects, and interactions using a priori 
power analysis. The number of groups, numerator df, alpha, power and effect size (f) 
were set at 6, 2, 0.05, 0.95, and 0.35 respectively. The computed required sample size 
was 130, which was rounded up to 132 to allow for an equal number of participants 
across groups (22 per group). The effect size used in the power analysis was informed 
by a meta-analysis effect size of studies that tested the effect of combined high threat 
and high efficacy information on true behavioural outcomes , d = 0.71 (Peters et al., 
2013), which equates to f = 0.3550. Other meta-analyses of studies that included 
attitude and/or behavioural intention as outcome measures, which are more proximal to 
the measures used in the present study, found meta effect sizes, η2= 0.21 (Witte & 




analysis, would have yielded a required sample size of 63 or 68 respectively. I decided 
to use the lower effect size based on true behavioural outcomes, f= 0.35 (Peters et al., 
2013), as a conservative estimate. This higher sample size was also justifiable given 
that the experiment itself posed very few risks or burdens to participants. 
8.2.4. Materials 
8.2.4.1 Immersive video 
An immersive video was recorded, using a 360 camera, from the vantage point of a 
student attending a lecture at a university-style campus (in reality, a lecture theatre at a 
Public Health England facility). The camera was mounted to a tripod held in a backpack 
worn by the camera operator.  
I based the video plot on the vignette used in an online visualisation experiment 
(Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015) and the scenario used in a field experiment (Carter, 
Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014) on mass casualty decontamination. The video depicts events 
described in the scenario presented in Section 6.2.1, from the perspective of the 
casualties. The full outline for the video is presented in Appendix Q.  In summary, the 
video depicted students (n = 15) in a lecture theatre watching a lecturer present 
introductory slides for a course. A fire alarm sounds and the students and lecturer start 
to evacuate the lecture theatre (Figure 8-2). The students and lecturer evacuate the 
building via the nearest exit (Figure 8-3) then walk away from the building (Figure 8-4). 
Outside, the casualties (n = 17: lecturer, university warden and 15 students) are guided 
by a police officer to assemble at an area marked by rolls of tissue paper on the 
ground. The police officer stands in front of a police van and communicates to 
casualties using a handheld loudhailer (Figure 8-5). The actual communication 
interventions were not recorded during filming and were instead added during post-
production. I briefed actors portraying the casualties to look concerned as they 
“listened” to the police officer (Figure 8-6) and to examine their skin at the point in the 
intervention when the threat manipulation would be delivered. I recruited all actors, with 
the exception of the police officer, warden and two of the students, via the casting 
website, starnow.co.uk. 
A local police officer (who portrayed the officer in the video) and a police officer from 
the National CBRN Centre served as consultants during production to ensure that the 
scenario being filmed was representative of an emergency in which IOR protocols 
would be implemented. Changes made as a result of stakeholder input included the 
police officer instructing casualties to walk towards the sound of their voice during the 




One video was produced and used in all conditions, the only variation being the audio 
communication intervention superimposed during post-production. The text of the 
communication intervention in each condition, as displayed in Appendix R, was 
recorded using an ambisonic audio recorder to ensure that the audio was 360° 
directional. In other words, as the participant turned their head while wearing the VR 
headset, the direction of sound changed accordingly. Sound effects were added to 
simulate the use of voice amplification technology.  The same professional voice artist 
recorded all six messages to ensure consistency in accent and fundamental frequency. 
The voice artist was briefed to keep his tone consistent across conditions though it was 
not possible to measure this. 
The communication intervention was implemented at the same timepoint in all 
conditions (two minutes and 22 seconds from the beginning of the video). Symptoms of 
chemical exposure were not depicted in the video in order to account for the delayed 
onset of symptoms following exposure to certain chemical agents, such as sulphur 
mustard in liquid form (Borak & Sidell, 1992; Clarke et al., 2008; Kales & Christiani, 
2004; Spiandore et al., 2017; Wattana & Bey, 2009). The visual content of the video 
during the communication intervention was identical across conditions so that the 
behaviour of casualties, including their reactions to the communication intervention, 
remained the same in all conditions.  
 
Figure 8-2 Scene in the immersive video depicting students first hearing the fire alarm 










Figure 8-4 Scene in the immersive video depicting lecturer, university warden, and a 






Figure 8-5 Scene in the immersive video depicting the police officer delivering the 
communication intervention to casualties. 
 
 
Figure 8-6 Scene in the immersive video depicting casualties looking concerned whilst 




8.2.4.2 Communication interventions 
The process used to draft the messaging framework is outlined in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Following the method testing reported in the previous chapter, further amendments 
were made to messages during immersive video production. The first amendment 
addressed concerns raised during filming about presenting instructions as imperatives 
for actions that need to be taken right now. The actors portraying the casualties would 
either need to follow the actions (compliance) or not follow the actions (non-
compliance). In either case, there would be a confounding effect of casualty behaviour 
on participants’ perceptions of what they would do. There was the option of having a 
proportion of the actors as compliant and the rest noncompliant but in an immersive 
video, it is not possible to control for the attention afforded to compliant or non-
compliant “casualties”. The least problematic solution was for the wording of 
instructions in all conditions to be adjusted in such a way that the actions would be 
taken immediately following rather than concurrently with the presentation of 
instructions (e.g. “We will ask you to carefully remove as much clothing as you can” 
rather than “Carefully remove as much clothing as you can”). The point in time when 
actions would need to be taken in the scenario coincided with the exact point in time in 
the study when the video would stop and measures of behavioural expectation would 
be recorded. The second amendment was to change the instruction pertaining to dry 
decontamination from “blot then wipe” to “brush”. This adjustment was proposed by the 
police officers present who served as consultants during video production and the 
suggestion was based on up-to-date wording of dry decontamination instruction in 
updated public-facing IOR guidance.  
Amendments were only made to the wording of instructions, rather than threat and 
efficacy message components, and the same amendments were applied to all 
conditions. This means that the outcomes from the pilot test reported in the previous 
chapter were still considered valid but, as a precaution, manipulation checks were 
included in the present study. Following the adjustments, readability scores for each 
condition remained unchanged. As explained in Chapter 6, the text in all messages had 
the same readability score (appropriate for aged 10+), as calculated using an 
amalgamation of seven readability tools (Automatic Readability Checker). Word count 
variability between conditions remained minimal, the maximum percentage difference 
between conditions being 2.02%.  
The message in all conditions contained a statement as to who the communicator was 
(i.e. the police) and their competence in responding to a chemical incident. All 
messages contained the same instructions for actions that message recipients would 




statements pertaining to the efficacy of IOR actions, information was identical across 
conditions. Statements that were present in more than one condition were recorded 
once then duplicated across the six conditions to minimise variability in vocal 
performance between conditions. As displayed in Appendix R, Table R-1, the duration 
of messages ranged from 165 seconds (High Threat & Efficacy) to 177 seconds 
(Neutral Threat & Efficacy) (M = 172.17, SD = 3.89). The maximum percentage 
difference in duration between any two conditions was 7.02%.  
8.2.5. Measures 
All measures, aside from demographic questions, were Likert items. All measures were 
recorded using the online survey tool, Qualtrics. I informed participants that the 
measures apply to how they would feel at the point in the scenario when the 
communication intervention concludes. All outcome measures are presented in 
Appendix S. 
8.2.5.1 Behavioural expectation (primary outcome measure) 
Consistent with self-report scale measures used in previous studies on expected 
behaviour in a disaster situation (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; 
Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2016; Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018), 
participants indicated their hypothetical likelihood of engaging in selected behaviours. 
Given that participants were asked to rate the likelihood of behaviour during a 
hypothetical scenario, behavioural expectation or willingness are more appropriate 
measures than intention. Intention implies a plan to engage in a particular course of 
action, whereas expectation denotes the perceived likelihood that a course of action 
will be taken (Gibbons, 2005). Behavioural expectation was measured with three items 
for each behaviour that corresponded to wanting to, trying to, and expecting to engage 
in the behaviour. I based the wording of each item on the wording used in previous a 
study carried out by Teasdale et al. (2012) on intended behaviours during a 
hypothetical pandemic flu outbreak. In the present study, participants rated the extent 
to which they would be likely to want, try, or do each behaviour. The purpose of 
including the “want to” and “try to” items is to account for the role of perceived 
behavioural control (Ajzen, 1991) in the participant’s decision-making process when 
considering each action. The wording of each type of item is presented below. 
• I would remain where I am until the shower arrives; 
• I would try to remain where I am until the shower arrives; 
• I would want to remain where I am until the shower arrives. 
I used both adherent and alternative, non-adherent behavioural expectation measures. 




shower; disrobing; and undergoing dry decontamination. Non-adherence behaviours 
were: going straight to a hospital without following any of the police officer’s 
instructions; leaving the area without following any of the police officer’s instructions; 
and seeking further information before taking any action.  
8.2.5.2 PMT variables 
Participants completed measures pertaining to threat severity, threat susceptibility and 
response efficacy so that I could carry out a manipulation check of the messages akin 
to the one carried out in Chapter 7. To check that messages did not affect non-targeted 
PMT perceptions, participants completed measures pertaining to self-efficacy, and 
response costs. Three items pertaining to perceived threat severity were adapted from 
items used in a pandemic flu study (Teasdale et al., 2012). Three perceived threat 
susceptibility items were adapted from susceptibility measures used in the Risk 
Behavior Diagnosis Scale (Witte, McKeon, Cameron, & Berkowitz, 1995). Three 
response efficacy items were adapted from response efficacy items used in a study on 
public reactions to a hypothetical chemical spill by Pearce et al. (2013).  
 
Three self-efficacy items were adapted from items used in a pandemic flu study 
(Teasdale et al., 2012) and the Risk Behavior Diagnosis Scale (Witte et al., 1995). Two 
response cost items were based on perceived response costs discussed by 
participants in Chapter 5. 
8.2.5.3 Anxiety 
Anxiety was measured using a modified version of the 6-item state version of the 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-6) (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). The 
scale was modified so that states were presented in the conditional rather than 
indicative tense, for example “I would feel calm” instead of “I feel calm”. This 
adjustment was made because participants were asked to reflect on how they would 
feel if they were in the situation presented in the video, rather than how they actually 
feel at the point in time when the question is presented. Scores for the items, “calm”, 
“relaxed”, and “content” were reverse-coded.  
8.2.5.4 Trust 
A 7-item trust scale was adapted from items used in the Trust in Government scale 
developed by Quinn, Kumar, Freimuth, Kidwell, and Musa (2009) to cover the key 
determinants of trust, as outlined in the literature. In the adapted version of the scale 
used in the present study, the terms “government” and “swine flu” were substituted with 
“police officer” and either “chemical” or “emergency” respectively. On some items the 




8.2.5.5 Stimulus check 
Two items used by Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al. (2015) were used to check if there were 
differences between groups in terms of perceived realism of and emotional 
engagement with the scenario. The items were not designed to form a scale. 
8.2.5.6 Demographic measures 
Participants stated their age, gender, occupation, highest educational qualification to 
date, and national identity for descriptive purposes only. 
8.2.6. Procedure 
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the King’s College London Psychiatry, 
Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Panel (reference: LRS-15/16-3406; Appendix T). 
I submitted the protocol for this study to the ISRCTN, in advance of data collection, on 
24th October 2018 (Reference Number: 35889). The trial was registered on 7th 
November 2018 (https://doi.org/10.1186/ISRCTN17886859). 
I asked potential participants who saw the study advertisement (Appendix U) to contact 
me for more information and were provided with an information sheet (Appendix V). I 
asked participants who wished to take part in the study to make an appointment for a 
single study session. Each study session began with me escorting the participant from 
the Reception at the assessment centre to the experiment room. At the experiment 
room, the participant re-read the information sheet and provided informed consent via 
an electronic form (Appendix W).  
 
I informed each participant via written instruction (Appendix S) that they would be 
watching an immersive video through a virtual reality headset. I asked them not to 
reveal to me any aspect of what they heard in the video in order to keep me blind to 
condition. I instructed them to listen carefully to what is said during the video because 
they would answer a series of questions on completion of the video. 
The participant wore an Oculus Go virtual reality headset (Oculus VR, LLC) (Figure 8-7 
and Figure 8-8) and watched one of six immersive videos, determined by the condition 
to which they had been randomly allocated. The participant wore a disposable 
protective mask around the perimeter of their eyes prior to donning the headset for 
hygiene reasons as the same headset was used in all sessions. During the 
presentation of the video, the participant sat in a swivel chair to allow them to watch the 
video from all possible angles. The participant listened to the audio content of the video 
at the same volume, which was the maximum available volume on the headset. The 




headphones so that I could monitor the safety of the participant but not hear the 
intervention, thus ensuring that I was blind to condition during intervention. 
At the point in the immersive video when casualties would be required to undergo the 
disrobing component of IOR, text was displayed informing the participant that the video 
had ended, at which point I re-entered the room, removed the headset from the 
participant, and instructed them to proceed to the computer to record all outcome 
measures in an online Qualtrics survey.  
Measures were recorded immediately after the conclusion of the immersive video and 
the removal of the headset, and always in the following order: behavioural expectation; 
anxiety; threat susceptibility; threat severity; response efficacy; self-efficacy; response 
costs; trust; emotional engagement with and perceived realism of scenario; and 
demographic questions. 
 
The participant read the debrief document (Appendix X) then completed their expenses 
claim form for reimbursement of their participation. I asked the participant not to share 
their recollection of the content of the immersive videos with anyone else, to reduce the 
risk of demand characteristics among friends or colleagues of theirs who may 
participate in subsequent study sessions. 
 
I documented potential protocol deviations during each study session and, if applicable, 
recorded them at the end of the study session.  
 





Figure 8-7 Virtual reality headset (Oculus Go) through which immersive video and 
communication intervention were presented to participants.  
 
 





Figure 8-9 Participation procedure flow diagram.





Random allocation to communication intervention condition administered via immersive video 
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Threat & No 
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Immediately record the following measures on conclusion of intervention: 
1. Behavioural expectation measures  
2. Anxiety measures  
3. Manipulation check measures: severity, susceptibility, response efficacy, self-efficacy, response 
costs 
4. Trust measures 
5. Stimulus check measures (emotional engagement and perceived realism) 
Full debrief at end of data collection and reimbursement for participation 
  






I carried out all analyses in IBM SPSS 25.  
8.2.7.1 Screening of protocol deviations 
Prior to data analysis, potential methodological issues observed and documented by 
me during study sessions were screened by the supervisory team who were blinded to 
study condition. Each documented issue was discussed and a decision was made 
based on consensus among supervisors as to whether issues constituted a serious 
deviation and, if so, whether cases should be excluded from analysis as part of a 
sensitivity test. A decision was made based on consensus between all supervisors. 
8.2.7.2 Primary outcome scale reduction 
Likert items used to measure behaviour expectation were novel. I therefore subjected 
behavioural expectation items (n = 18) to exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with 
unweighted least squares extraction and promax rotation with kappa kept at the SPSS 
default value of 4. I chose unweighted least squares (ULS) as the extraction method 
because Monte Carlo simulations have indicated that, independently of the ratio of 
sample size to number of items included in factor analysis, ULS results in less bias and 
error in factor loading matrices and stronger correlations between factor scores and 
population factor scores than both Maximum Likelihood and Principal Axis extraction 
methods (Coughlin, 2013, 2015). I used an oblique rotation because correlation 
between factors could not be ruled out in advance given that items were designed to 
measure adherence or non-adherence. If the factor correlation matrix indicated that all 
correlations were equal to or less than the threshold of ±0.32 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007), then the EFA was repeated with an orthogonal (varimax) rotation.  
The loading of each item was incorporated into the factor score. When interpreting the 
type of behaviour represented by each factor, I based the decision on the wording of 
items that loaded at .512 or higher, in accordance with recommended guidelines for 
sample sizes of 100 (Field, 2009; Stevens, 2002). Factor scores computed with the 
regression method were used as dependent variables in subsequent primary outcome 
analyses that are outlined below. Factor scores were used in place of scores based on 
the mean or sum of items to account for variability in loading between items on each 
factor and to provide a more accurate representation of expected engagement in each 
behaviour. 
8.2.7.3 Primary outcome analysis 
Two-way ANOVAs were applied to each factor score computed in the preceding factor 
analysis with Threat and Efficacy as independent variables. Bonferonni post hoc tests 




more than one scale as a dependent variable, MANOVA was ruled out as an analysis 
because there was limited confidence that all scales would increase or decrease as a 
vector. I applied bootstrapping if assumptions of normality were violated. Normality was 
first assessed using Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk statistics. If both values 
were non-significant, the ANOVA was carried out without bootstrapping. If Levene’s 
statistic for homogeneity of variance was significant but Kolmogorov-Smirnov and 
Shapiro-Wilk statistics were not significant, the analysis was repeated with 
bootstrapping as a precaution. The number of samples for bootstrapping was 1000. For 
all analyses, alpha was set at .05. If the effect of Efficacy was significant for any 
outcome, I subsequently ran an independent samples t-test on the dependent variable 
solely to calculate confidence intervals for the difference between Efficacy and No 
Efficacy group means. If bootstrapping was used, confidence interval values were 
derived from the bootstrap for multiple comparisons for post hoc tests for the Threat 
condition and from bootstrapped t-tests for the Efficacy condition.    
8.2.7.4 Secondary outcome analysis 
Kruskall-Wallis H test and Mann-Whitney U test were used to check whether there was 
a significant effect of Threat and Efficacy respectively on each of the two stimulus 
check Likert items. The reason for using non-parametric tests was because these items 
did not have –and were not expected to have – sufficient reliability to constitute a scale 
and individual Likert items are not suitable for parametric analysis. 
Each remaining secondary outcome scale was subjected to reliability analysis using 
Cronbach’s alpha for scales consisting of more than two items and Pearson correlation 
coefficient for scales consisting of two items. On determining that reliability was 
sufficient for each scale (≥.7), the sum of items in each secondary outcome scale was 
entered as the dependent variable in a two-way ANOVA with Threat and Efficacy 
condition as the independent variables and Bonferonni-corrected post hoc tests used to 
assess differences between threat condition levels.  
Stepwise multiple linear regression was carried out with each behavioural expectation 
as dependent variable and trust, anxiety, threat severity, threat susceptibility, response 
efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs perceptions as predictors to determine which 
perception predictors accounted for variance in behavioural expectation scores. 
Analysis was repeated for each type of expected behaviour resulting from EFA. The 
assumption of no perfect multicollinearity was checked by ensuring that: no two 
predictors had correlations exceeding ±.7; tolerance statistics were greater than .1; and 
VIF statistics were less than 10 (Pallant, 2007). The assumption of independent errors 




than 3 (Field, 2009). Unless otherwise stated in the multiple regressions report, these 
two assumptions were met. The standardized, rather than unstandardized, coefficients 
were reported for all regression models. 
8.2.7.5 False discovery rate to account for multiplicity of analysis 
A total of 43 tests were carried out, increasing the risk of Type 1 errors due to the 
interpretation of multiple p values. As a precaution, I applied the Benjamini–Hochberg 
procedure (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995) on completion of all analyses to correct for 
multiple p values. The calculation was carried out using SPSS syntax obtained on 
researchgate.net (Weaver & Mulyono, 2015). The highest p value that was equal to or 
less than its Benjamini-Hochberg critical value [p value rank (i) divided by number of 
tests (m) multiplied by false discovery rate (q)] was defined as the maximum threshold 
for interpretation of significance. The false discovery rate (q) was set at 0.15. 
 
8.3 Results 
All recorded demographic characteristics of the study sample are presented in Table 
8-2. As indicated in Figure 8-10, the withdrawal rate for participants who were 
randomised to a condition was 1.49%. Participant recruitment continued until the 
predetermined sample quota of 132 was reached. All 132 participants who completed 
the intervention subsequently completed all outcome measures and were included in 
all planned analyses.  
One participant was deemed eligible to participate but could not be randomised to a 
condition due to a loss of connectivity to the internet at the assessment centre. Two 
participants were deemed eligible to participate and were randomised to a condition but 
had to be withdrawn from the study. In one case, the participant was withdrawn 
because the video file (labelled “Video 2”) was corrupted and could not be played all 
the way through. The next participant to arrive at the assessment centre was assigned 
to the next playable video in the sequence (“Video 3”), as identified by my second 
supervisor. The technical issue was resolved by my second supervisor. The sixth 
participant was therefore allocated to the second video (“Video 2”) in the sequence and 
the allocation order for the first block of six conditions was changed to reflect this. In 
the other case, the participant was withdrawn because they experienced a headache 
and nausea that were attributed to watching the immersive video. The study session 
was immediately terminated and the participant confirmed that they had fully recovered 
at post-24hr follow-up. The next participant to arrive at the assessment centre who met 




It was decided that the two withdrawn participants would not have their missing values 
included in an intention-to-treat analysis because their exclusion was unrelated to the 
intervention itself, i.e. the information provided by the police officer in the video. In other 
words, the lack of outcomes in these two cases did not provide us with any information 
about the communication interventions. 
Following screening of potential protocol violations documented during completed 
study sessions, the supervisory team highlighted two cases. In one case, the 
participant reported that the video became gradually blurrier because of condensation 
within the headset. In the other case, the headset malfunctioned partway through the 
communication intervention so the video had to be repeated from the point that the 
intervention begins, which means that the participant heard part of the intervention 
twice and there was a disruption to the flow of the intervention. The supervisory team 
concluded that these two cases should be included in all analyses but sensitivity 
analyses would be carried out with the two cases removed. The analyses reported 




















Education (attained or working towards)  
Undergraduate degree 64 
A-Level, AS-Level, or equivalent 30 
Postgraduate degree or higher 28 
GCSE or equivalent 2 
Professional qualification 1 
Trade apprenticeship 1 
Other qualification 6 
  
Employment status  
Full-time education at college or university 79 
Full-time employed 24 
Part-time employed 14 
Unemployed 4 
Retired from paid work 4 
Self-employed (full or part-time) 3 
Full-time student whilst working 3 
On career break 1 
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(n = 22) 
Allocated to 
Neutral 
Threat & No 
Efficacy 
Intervention 
(n = 22) 
Invited to participate (n = 183) 
  
Expression of interest in participating (n = 260) 
  
Did not report to assessment centre (n = 48) 
Excluded due to loss of connection to internet (n = 1) 
 
Assessed for eligibility (n = 134) 
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• Video not playable (n = 1) 
• Adverse reaction to headset (n = 1) 
  





8.3.1. Manipulation check 
There was a significant effect of Threat on threat severity perceptions, F(2, 126) = 6.32, 
p < .005, ηp2 = 0.09, with participants in the High threat group having higher severity 
scores than participants in the Low threat group, Mdiff = 3.10, 95% CI [1.47, 4.77], p < 
.005 (Figure 8-11). There was no difference in mean scores for threat severity between 
the High and Neutral groups, Mdiff = 2.00, 95% CI [0.26, 3.78], p = .07, or between the 
Low and Neutral groups, Mdiff = 1.05, 95% CI [-0.78, 2.86], p = .71. There was no effect 
of Efficacy, F(1, 126) = 2.45, p = .12, ηp2 = 0.02, and no interaction between Threat and 
Efficacy, F(2, 126) = 1.34, p = .27, ηp2 = 0.02, on threat severity perceptions (Figure 
8-12). 
There was a significant effect of Threat on threat susceptibility perceptions, F(2, 126) = 
5.90, p < .005, ηp2 = 0.09, with participants in the High threat group having higher 
susceptibility scores than participants in the Low threat group, Mdiff = 2.18, 95% CI 
[0.96, 3.43],  p < .005 (Figure 8-13). There was no difference in mean scores for threat 
susceptibility between the High and Neutral groups, Mdiff = 1.20, 95% CI [-0.03, 2.50], p 
= .18, or between the Low and Neutral groups, Mdiff = 0.98, 95% CI [-0.32, 2.22], p = 
.38. There was no effect of Efficacy, F(1, 126) = 2.30, p = .13, ηp2 = 0.02, and no 
interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 126) = 1.78, p = .17, ηp2 = 0.03, on threat 
susceptibility perceptions (Figure 8-14). 
There was a significant effect of Efficacy information on response efficacy perceptions, 
F(1, 126) = 13.96, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.1, with participants in the Efficacy group having a 
higher mean rating than participants in the No Efficacy group Mdiff = 2.05, 95% CI [0.97, 
3.15] (Figure 8-15). There was no effect of Threat, F(2, 126) = 2.45, p = .09, ηp2 = 0.04, 
and no interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 126) = 0.24, p = .79, ηp2 = 0.004, 






Figure 8-11 Mean threat severity score by Threat condition. Error bars represent lower 
and upper 95% confidence intervals. ** = difference from Low Threat condition 
significant, p < .005. 
 
 
Figure 8-12 Mean threat severity score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 


















































Figure 8-13 Mean threat susceptibility score by Threat condition. Error bars represent 
lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. ** = difference from Low Threat condition 
significant, p < .005. 
 
 
Figure 8-14 Mean threat susceptibility score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error 



























































Figure 8-15 Mean response efficacy score by Efficacy condition. Error bars represent 
lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. *** = difference between means significant, 




Figure 8-16 Mean response efficacy score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 
































































8.3.2. Primary outcomes 
8.3.2.1 Exploratory factor analysis 
The first iteration of EFA indicated cross-loading of variables between two of the five 
factors in the structure matrix. For example, the item, “I would want to leave the area 
without following any of the police officer’s instructions” loaded .661 on to Factor 1 and 
-.661 on to factor 5. Given the thematic similarity between these two factors (factor 1 
appearing to represent going to hospital and factor 5 indicating leaving the area), I 
repeated the EFA but limited extraction to four factors rather than base the number of 
factors on Kaiser’s criterion. The resulting EFA indicated that variables that had 
previously loaded on either “leaving the area” and “going to hospital” factors now 
loaded on one factor. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure verified sampling adequacy, KMO = .79, and 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2 (153) = 1647.65, p < .001, indicated significantly large 
correlations between items. The factor correlation matrix indicated strong correlations 
between factors, e.g. .49, ruling out the use of orthogonal rotation. The four factors 
accounted for 67.01% of variance.  
Based on the items that loaded at or above .512 on each factor, Factor 1 appeared to 
represent leaving the treatment area (including going straight to the nearest hospital) 
without following instructions at the scene, Factor 2 seeking further information before 
taking any action, Factor 3 adhering to the dry decontamination protocol, and Factor 4 
adhering to the disrobing protocol. All factors and constituent variables are displayed in 




Table 8-3 Factor loadings and communalities based on unweighted least squares 
extraction with promax rotation for 18 items used to measure behavioural expectation 
















Pattern Structure Pattern Structure Pattern Structure Pattern Structure Initial Extraction 
I would try to go 
straight to the nearest 
hospital without 
following any of the 
police officer’s 
instructions 







I would go straight to 
the nearest hospital 
without following any 















I would try to leave 
the area without 
following any of the 
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I would leave the area 
without following any 















I would want to leave 
the area without 
















I would want to go 
straight to the nearest 
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remain where I am 










.019 .341 .123 .322 .485 .308 
I would remain where 
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I would try to seek 
further information 
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Pattern Structure Pattern Structure Pattern Structure Pattern Structure Initial Extraction 
I would try to brush 
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I would want to brush 
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I would remove my 
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I would try to remove 










.117 .502 .779 .845 .806 .726 
I would want to 
remove my clothing, 










.012 .305 .471 .581 .509 .392 
I would try to remain 









.065 .174 .185 .221 .138 .063 
 
 
8.3.2.2 Primary outcome analysis 
As indicated in Table 8-4, Likert item scores for the total sample were generally high for 
adherence to remaining in place, disrobing, and dry decontamination protocols and 
were generally high for seeking further information. Scores were generally low for 
leaving the area and going straight to the nearest hospital.  
ANOVA revealed no significant effect of Threat, F(2, 126) = 0.76, p = .47, ηp2 = 0.01, 
Efficacy, F(1, 126) = 0.02, p = .90, ηp2 = 0, or interaction between Threat and Efficacy, 
F(2, 126) = 0.75, p = .48, ηp2 = 0.01, on factor scores for leaving the treatment area 
without following instructions at the scene (Figure 8-17). 
There was no significant effect of Threat, F(2, 126) = 1.81, p = .17, ηp2 = 0.03, Efficacy, 
F(1, 126) = 2.16, p = .14, ηp2 = .02, or interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 
126) = 0.04, p = .96, ηp2 = 0, on factor scores for seeking further information before 
taking any action (Figure 8-18). 
There was a significant effect of Efficacy, F(1, 126) = 6.17, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.05, on dry 
decontamination factor scores, with participants in the Efficacy group indicating greater 
likelihood of engaging in dry decontamination than participants in the No Efficacy 
group, Mdiff = 0.42, 95% CI [0.09, 0.74] (Figure 8-19). Threat had no effect, F(2, 126) = 
0.43, p = .65, ηp2 = 0.01, and there was no interaction between Threat and Efficacy, 
F(2, 126) = 0.17, p = .84, ηp2 = 0, on dry decontamination scores (Figure 8-20). 
There was a significant effect of Threat, F(2, 126) = 3.90, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.06, on 




likelihood of removing clothing down to their underwear than participants in the Neutral 
threat group, Mdiff = 0.54, 95% CI [0.15, 0.93], p < .05 (Figure 8-21). There was no 
difference in mean scores between the High and Low groups, Mdiff = 0.48, 95% CI 
[0.08, 0.88], p = .08, or between the Low and Neutral groups, Mdiff = 0.06, 95% CI [-
0.41, 0.51], p = 1. Efficacy had no effect, F(1, 126) = 1.60, p = .21, ηp2 = 0.01, and 
there was no interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 126) = 0.42, p = .66, ηp2 = 






Table 8-4 Median and IQR (interquartile range) for each behavioural expectation Likert 
item (response options range from 1 [strongly disagree] to 7 [strongly agree]) in the 
total sample (N = 132). 
Behavioural expectation Likert item Median  IQR 
I would remain where I am until the shower arrives 7 1 
I would try to remain where I am until the shower arrives 7 1 
I would want to remain where I am until the shower arrive 7 2 
I would remove my clothing, down to my underwear 6 2 
I would try to remove my clothing, down to my underwear 6 2 
I would want to remove my clothing, down to my 
underwear 
4 4 
I would brush my skin with the tissue paper 7 1 
I would try to brush my skin with the tissue paper 7 1 
I would want to brush my skin with the tissue paper 7 2 
I would go straight to the nearest hospital without following 
any of the police officer’s instructions 
1 1 
I would try to go straight to the nearest hospital without 
following any of the police officer’s instructions 
1 1 
I would want to go straight to the nearest hospital without 
following any of the police officer’s instructions 
3 4 
I would leave the area without following any of the police 
officer’s instructions 
1 1 
I would try to leave the area without following any of the 
police officer’s instructions 
1 1 
I would want to leave the area without following any of the 
police officer’s instructions 
2 3 
I would seek further information before taking any action 5 3 
I would try to seek further information before taking any 
action 
6 3 







Figure 8-17 Mean factor score for leaving the treatment area without following the 
police officer’s instructions by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars represent lower 
and upper 95% confidence intervals. Higher scores indicate higher perceived likelihood 
of engaging in the behaviour.  
 
Figure 8-18 Mean factor score for seeking further information by Threat and Efficacy 
condition. Error bars represent lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. Higher 
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Figure 8-19 Mean factor score for dry decontamination by Efficacy condition. Error bars 
represent lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. * = difference between means 
significant, p < .05. Higher scores indicate higher perceived likelihood of engaging in 
the behaviour.  
 
Figure 8-20 Mean factor score for dry decontamination by Threat and Efficacy 
condition. Error bars represent lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. Higher 
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Figure 8-21 Mean factor score for disrobing by Threat condition. Error bars represent 
lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. * = difference from Neutral Threat condition 
significant, p < .05. Higher scores indicate higher perceived likelihood of engaging in 
the behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 8-22 Mean factor score for expecting to disrobe by Threat and Efficacy 
condition. Error bars represent lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. Higher 
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8.3.3. Secondary outcome analysis 
As displayed in Table 8-5, all secondary outcome scales showed good internal 
reliability.  
There was no effect of Threat, F(2, 126) = 3.07, p = .05, ηp2 = 0.05, Efficacy, F(1, 126) 
= 0.79, p = .38, ηp2= 0.01, or interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 126) = 0.87, 
p = .42, ηp2 = 0.01, on anxiety (Figure 8-23).  
There was no effect of Threat, F(2, 126) = 0.33, p = .72, ηp2 = 0.01, Efficacy, F(1, 126) 
= 3.26, p = .07, ηp2 = 0.03, and no interaction between Threat and Efficacy, F(2, 126) = 
0.64, p = .53, ηp2 = 0.041 on trust perceptions (Figure 8-24).  
There was no effect of Threat on perceived response costs, F(2, 126) = 1.19, p = .31, η
p
2 = 0.02 or self-efficacy,  F(2, 126) = 1.16, p = .32, ηp2 = 0.02. Efficacy had no effect on 
either response costs, F(1, 126) = 0.11, p = .74, ηp2 = 0.001, or self-efficacy, F(1, 126) 
= 0.46, p = .50, ηp2 = 0.004, and there was no interaction between Threat and Efficacy 
for either response costs, F(2, 126) = 0.54, p = .58, ηp2 = 0.01 (Figure 8-25), or self-
efficacy, F(2, 126) = 0.54, p = .59, ηp2 = 0.01 (Figure 8-26). 
Stepwise multiple linear regressions were calculated to predict participants’ 
expectations of engaging in each behavioural outcome derived from exploratory factor 
analysis based on their trust, anxiety, threat severity, threat susceptibility, response 
efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs perceptions.  
For the behaviour of leaving the treatment area, a significant regression equation was 
found, F(3,128) = 9.95, p < .001, with an adjusted R2 of  .17. Perceived response 
efficacy, β = -.30, 95% CI [-0.14, -0.03], p < .005, and perceived trust, β = -.19, 95% CI 
[-0.10, -0.001], p < .05, were negative predictors whilst perceived threat severity was a 
positive predictor, β = .22, 95% CI [0.01, 0.09], p < .01, of leaving the area.  
For the behaviour of seeking further information before taking any action, a significant 
regression equation was found, F(2,129) = 15.99, p < .001, with an adjusted R2 of  .19. 
Perceived response efficacy was a negative predictor, β = -.40, 95% CI [-0.16, -0.07], p 
< .001, whilst perceived response costs associated with disrobing was a positive 
predictor, β = .17, 95% CI [0.003, 0.08], p < .05, of seeking further information before 
taking any action. 
For the behaviour of undergoing dry decontamination, a significant regression equation 
was found, F(1,130) = 24.46, p < .001, with an adjusted R2 of  .15. Response efficacy 
was a positive predictor, β = .40, 95% CI [0.07, 0.17], p < .001, of undergoing dry 
decontamination.  
For the behaviour of disrobing, a significant regression equation was found, F(4,127) = 




disrobing was a negative predictor, β = -.46, 95% CI [-0.14, 0.08], p < .001, whilst 
perceived self-efficacy, β = .38, 95% CI [0.07, 0.14], p < .001, trust in the officer, β = 
.23, 95% CI [0.03, 0.09], p < .001, and anxiety, β = .22, 95% CI [0.03, 0.11], p < .001, 
were all positive predictors of removing clothing down to the underwear.  
Kruskal-Wallis H test indicated no significant difference between threat conditions on 
emotional engagement with the video, H = 0.46, p = .8, or perceived realism of the 
depicted chemical incident, H = 1.18, p = .55. Mann-Whitney U test indicated no 
significant effect of efficacy information on emotional engagement, U = 2116.5, p = .77, 
or perceived realism, U = 2103, p = .73. There was also no effect of threat and efficacy 
combination on emotional engagement, H = 0.64, p = .99, or perceived realism, H = 
2.86, p = .72. Both the median and mode response for the total sample was 6 (agree) 
and 5 (somewhat agree) for emotional engagement and perceived realism respectively. 
 
 
Table 8-5 Number of items, Cronbach’s alpha, and sample mean, standard deviation 

















































Figure 8-23 Mean anxiety score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars represent 
lower and upper 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Figure 8-24 Mean trust score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars represent 


















































Figure 8-25 Mean score for response costs associated with disrobing by Threat and 
Efficacy condition. Error bars represent lower and upper 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 8-26 Mean self-efficacy score by Threat and Efficacy condition. Error bars 





























































8.3.4. False discovery rate to account for multiplicity of analysis 
The Benjamini–Hochberg procedure indicated that the largest p value that was equal to 
or less than its Benjamini-Hochberg critical value was .023 which means that all p 
values ≤ .023 are considered significant. All previously reported tests with significance 
values, p < .05, were also ≤ .023 so the rejection of the null hypotheses for these tests 
is not considered a Type 1 error given a false discovery rate of 0.15 for multiple 
comparisons. 
8.3.5. Sensitivity analysis 
When the cases highlighted by the supervisory team during the protocol deviation 
review were removed from the dataset, significance values and directions of effects 
were the same as reported above, with one exception. Threat had a significant effect 
on anxiety, F(2, 124) = 3.52, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.05, when the two cases were excluded. 
Post hoc tests indicated that participants in the High threat group had higher anxiety 
scores than participants in the Low threat group, Mdiff = 1.70, 95% CI [0.29, 3.24], p < 
.05, when the two cases were removed. There were no differences in anxiety scores 
between the High and Neutral, Mdiff = 0.32, 95% CI [-0.84, 1.46], p = 1, and Low and 
Neutral groups, Mdiff = 1.38, 95% CI [-0.01, 2.76], p = .13. 
 
8.4 Discussion 
The primary objective of the present study was to assess the effect of information 
about the threat of contamination and the efficacy of IOR on expected adherence to 
IOR. A total of 132 participants were immersed in a simulated chemical incident, with 
no salient signs and symptoms of chemical contamination, and answered questions 
about their expected adherence and non-adherence behaviours. The communication 
intervention was delivered by the police officer at the scene of the incident depicted in 
the video. In line with PMT and the EPPM, I hypothesised that a message in which the 
severity of chemical contamination and the likelihood of casualties’ exposure to the 
chemical was either addressed or not understated would result in greater adherence 
expectations, relative to a message in which the threat was understated. I also 
hypothesised that messages in which the threat was addressed or not understated 
would have a greater effect when IOR instructions were accompanied by statements 
about the efficacy of each instruction at reducing the extent of contamination. The 
results indicated that the effectiveness of threat and efficacy manipulations varied 
according to type of behaviour under consideration.  
Whilst the inclusion of efficacy information had no effect on disrobing expectations, 
messages in which the severity of contamination and susceptibility of casualties to the 




to neutral messages in which the severity and likelihood of exposure to the 
contaminant were not explicitly addressed. Disrobing expectations were not 
significantly reduced when the threat of contamination was explicitly underestimated by 
the communicator, compared to when the threat was explicitly addressed. But 
messages in which the threat was underestimated did not significantly increase 
willingness to disrobe, relative to neutral messages, indicating that appraisal of the 
danger posed by a harmful chemical is likely to be necessary when disrobing is 
required. It is also possible that this conceptualisation of disrobing as removal of the 
chemical from skin was made more accessible to participants in the high threat 
condition as these participants were explicitly informed that the chemical could cause 
skin burns. 
The implication of this finding is that, if signs and symptoms of contamination are non-
salient but IOR is still deemed necessary by responders, then responders should be 
open about the risks posed to casualties and be explicit about why decontamination is 
required. In contrast, recommendations in guidance documents and example 
messages used by responders, reported in Chapter 4, demonstrate a perceived need 
among responders to reassure casualties. The results suggest that this desire to 
reassure casualties is misplaced on several levels. First, it is ineffective. In the 
intention-to-treat analysis, anxiety did not decrease when the threat was understated, 
compared to when the threat was made salient. Second, it may be counterproductive. 
Although willingness to disrobe did not increase in the low threat condition compared to 
the neutral condition, anxiety itself was associated with increased willingness to disrobe 
– attempting to reduce it would therefore be misguided. Third, it may detract from more 
effective strategies, such as emphasising the nature of the threat that casualties are 
facing.  
This does not necessarily mean that all forms of reassurance should be abandoned. 
Instead, it may be that reassurance focused exclusively on the actions responders are 
taking to protect casualties would be more productive. For example, reassurance can 
be given that treatment will be provided in the form of a decontamination shower, and 
that IOR actions are effective in reducing the threat. Such forms of reassurance would 
assist in promoting the efficacy of the suggested IOR behaviours which would in turn 
improve adherence to the dry decontamination protocol, based on the results of the 
present study. 
Neither response efficacy perceptions nor messages pertaining to response efficacy 
had any effect on disrobing expectations, but participants in all conditions indicated 




perceptions about their self-efficacy at adhering to IOR instructions were associated 
with increased willingness to disrobe while perceptions about the costs of disrobing, 
including the embarrassment of removing clothing in public, were associated with 
decreased willingness to disrobe and increased expectations of seeking further 
information before taking any action. Self-efficacy and response costs were not 
addressed in the messaging interventions and, as expected, threat and response 
efficacy manipulations had no effect on self-efficacy or response cost perceptions.  An 
earlier draft of the messages included the statement, “you will be provided with a gown 
to wear before you undress to protect your modesty and keep you warm” in the efficacy 
conditions. This component was designed to address the response costs raised in the 
interview study reported in Chapter 5, in which interview participants raised cold 
weather and modesty concerns as potential barriers to clothing removal. In the present 
study, it was decided that the communicator would not address these concerns 
because a worst-case scenario was used as the premise for the simulated incident. In 
this worst-case scenario, disrobe packs containing gowns would not be available. In 
future studies on the effect of communication on IOR adherence, it would be useful to 
test the adherence-promoting effectiveness of the statement on gown provision and the 
effectiveness of statements that address disrobing response costs in a worst-case 
scenario in which disrobe gowns are unavailable. Statements would need to be pre-
tested in advance following the protocol outlined in Chapter 7. 
Whilst information about the threat of contamination had no effect on dry 
decontamination expectations, the inclusion of statements about the efficacy of IOR 
increased expectations of applying dry material to skin. It is unclear whether it was the 
specific efficacy statement, “brushing the skin with dry paper is a safe and effective 
way to remove some of the chemical from your skin before showering” that increased 
dry decontamination expectations or whether this increase was a result of the 
combination of response efficacy statements in the efficacy condition that also included 
information about the efficacy of remaining in place and following instructions. 
Response efficacy perceptions, which were higher in the efficacy condition, were also 
associated with increased willingness to perform dry decontamination. Underestimation 
of the efficacy of applying dry material to skin at reducing the extent of chemical 
contamination emerged as a lay public misconception in a previous focus group study 
(Carter, Weston, et al., 2018) and in the interview study reported in Chapter 5. Whilst 
there was general agreement from participants in all conditions in this study that 
application of dry material would help protect participants from the chemical, the results 
indicate that explicitly addressing this misconception about the efficacy of dry 




The results of the interview study reported in Chapter 5 provide a tentative qualitative 
explanation for the contrast between self-efficacy perceptions affecting engagement in 
disrobing and response efficacy perceptions affecting engagement in dry 
decontamination. Interview participants’ perceived barriers to undergoing dry 
decontamination were focused on doubts about the efficacy of the action itself, 
whereas perceived barriers to disrobing were focused on perceived costs of publicly 
removing clothing. In the absence of a cross-sectional survey to assess the prevalence 
of these beliefs it is not possible to state whether this contrast in activation of different 
coping appraisal components for different behaviours in the same health context truly 
exists when there is no communication from authorities.  
Neither the threat nor the efficacy manipulation had any effect on expectations 
regarding leaving the treatment area without adhering to IOR or seeking further 
information before taking any action. Increases in perceptions about the efficacy of IOR 
were associated with decreases in expectations of engaging in both behaviours. Whilst 
increased response efficacy perceptions were associated with decreased expectations 
of leaving the area, increased threat severity perceptions were associated with 
increased expectations. Whilst there was no interaction observed between threat and 
efficacy information for self-evacuation, the contrasting effects of severity and response 
efficacy perceptions highlights the importance of explaining the efficacy of IOR to 
casualties, particularly when the danger posed to casualties is salient, either due to 
signs and symptoms or due to the messaging administered by responders. If casualties 
do not think that IOR is effective at reducing the threat, perceived threat severity is 
likely to motivate people to actions that are considered adaptive based on their mental 
model of medical emergencies. Seeking treatment in a hospital or evacuating further 
from the source of a harmful chemical are intuitively adaptive actions, as indicated by 
the results of the interview study reported in Chapter 5. Based on the results of the 
present study, casualties need to know that they are in danger to improve the likelihood 
of adherence to the disrobing procedure but casualties also need to know that IOR 
itself is an effective countermeasure to reduce the likelihood of self-evacuation. 
There was no effect of the experimental manipulation on perceived trust in the 
communicator. It was hypothesised that understating the threat of contamination whilst 
instructing casualties to perform IOR would be interpreted as unsubstantiated 
reassurance which would undermine trust in the responder (Glik, 2007a; Maxwell, 
2003; Pearce et al., 2013; Rubin et al., 2012; Sorensen, 2000; World Health 
Organization, 2017). It was also hypothesised that the components of trust pertaining 
to the perceived legitimacy of responders would be increased by statements about the 




2015). Trust itself was one of the perception variables that were associated with 
increased disrobing expectations and decreased expectations of leaving the treatment 
area. The lack of difference in trust perceptions between conditions is attributed to 
statements designed to promote trust, i.e. actions responders are taking and the 
expertise and competence of responders at managing this type of emergency due to 
regular training, that were consistent across conditions. In the absence of any 
comparison group that did not receive such information, it is not possible to state 
whether excluding these items from a communication intervention would lower trust 
perceptions. But, based on previous studies on crisis and emergency communication 
(Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; Latré et al., 2017), 
it is likely that inclusion of this information would promote trust. 
8.4.1. Limitations and implications for future research 
The primary limitation in the study was the hypothetical nature of the threat of 
contamination and the relatively comfortable setting in which the experiment took 
place. Whilst participants’ ratings of emotional engagement with and perceived realism 
of the scenario depicted in the video were generally high, messages were still 
processed in the context of a comfortable environment with no real threat of 
contamination and no requirement for participants to actually engage in IOR. This may 
explain the ceiling effect for IOR adherence expectations and floor effect for self-
evacuation expectations. Whilst the use of a virtual environment is an immersive and 
cost-effective way of exploring these research questions, a further study is warranted to 
test the effectiveness of threat and efficacy messaging in the context of a field 
experiment in which participants are actually required to undergo IOR rather than 
simply indicate willingness to undergo IOR in a series of Likert items. 
One of the recruitment channels inadvertently employed in the convenience sampling 
process was word-of-mouth promotion of the study by participants. I asked each 
participant not to share details about the study until the cautiously estimated date of 
data collection completion in order to reduce the risk of participant crosstalk, whereby 
participants share details about the study with future participants (Nichols & Edlund, 
2015). I also used a self-report measure to find out if crosstalk had occurred and the 
results for this measure indicated zero cross-talk. But in the absence of an observed 
measure of crosstalk, such as having a confederate ask the participant for specific 
details about the study (Walsh & Stillman, 1974), it is not possible to rule out the 
possibility that a proportion of participants were aware of the instructions that would be 
issued during the scenario and based their behavioural expectations on pre-experiment 




The framing of information in control conditions was problematic. In an earlier draft of 
the design, the control condition consisted of no information or of information unrelated 
to the incident. But there was a concern that behavioural expectation outcome 
measures would be inappropriate in the absence of any relevant information. In this 
type of control condition, participants would essentially be answering questions about 
the likelihood of removing clothing down to their underwear following evacuation from a 
lecture theatre in the absence of any instruction. I was also mindful of the need to keep 
the amount of information consistent across conditions in case effects attributed to 
threat or efficacy were in fact a result of the act of providing more information rather 
than of the content of that information. This is why control condition messages included 
additional information designed not to affect threat or efficacy perceptions and piloted 
to ensure they did not. The control condition in this study consisted of a baseline 
messaging intervention, comprising instructions for casualties and statements about 
who the responders are and what actions they are taking plus the additional 
information. The baseline approach was based on outcomes of the literature reviews 
reported in Chapters 2 and 3 and on the apparent standard practice of communicating 
instructions to casualties reported in Chapter 4. The methodological approach used in 
this experiment could be applied to a parallel design to compare a message consisting 
of instructions plus trust statements against a message consisting of just instructions to 
check whether the trust statements themselves have any additional effect on IOR 
adherence. 
Participants were informed in advance of the study, via the information sheet, that they 
would be participating in a study on the effect of communication on behaviour during an 
emergency. The fact that participants were anticipating that the study would be about 
an emergency situation may have primed them to expect severe information, which 
may have impacted on perceived severity. In a subsequent study, it may be necessary 
to employ deception and not allude to the actual content of the video. In a previous 
study in which an immersive virtual environment was used to test compliance with 
emergency exit signage, participants were not informed about the true nature of the 
research and were instead told that the study was an evaluation of immersive virtual 
environment technology (Duarte et al., 2014, p. 1371). A similar approach could be 
used in a modification of the present experiment.  
The minimum message duration in this study was two minutes and 45 seconds. The 
reason for the long duration was due to the constraints of the study. In a real incident, 
the information would be staggered over the course of the full IOR procedure. This 
means that information about disrobing would be provided whilst casualties are 




following the disrobing procedure. In the present study it was not possible to stagger 
information in this way. The IVET did not allow for measures to be recorded during the 
scenario so all of the information had to be presented in one block. In future studies, 
outcome measures could be recorded during the presentation of the scenario using a 
handheld device and measures programmed into the video. An alternative approach to 
measure self-report during a sequence of staggered instructions could be for 
participants to record their behavioural expectations via a verbal protocol. As used in 
previous studies of emergency behaviour in hypothetical scenarios (Lawson, 2011; 
Rickard, Schuldt, Eosco, Scherer, & Daziano, 2017), participants would be prompted to 
say what they would do at different stages of the intervention. Responses would then 
be coded as completely compliant, partially compliant or not at all compliant. The 
coding scheme would need to be pilot tested using the IVET used in the present study. 
There would be a requirement for two other researchers to code a subsample of talk-
aloud scripts. Analysis would consist of a two-way chi-square test of coded compliance 
outcome. 
In the present study, all instructions had to be presented in the future tense rather than 
as a sequence of imperatives, e.g. “We will ask you to carefully remove as much 
clothing as you can …” rather than “carefully remove as much clothing as you can…”. 
The reason for this was that if instructions were presented as a sequence of immediate 
imperatives, the depiction of the behaviour of casualties in the video would have a 
confounding effect on behavioural expectation. If casualties are depicted following 
instructions, this would likely constitute supportive feedback, whereas if they were 
depicted not following instructions, this would likely constitute opposing feedback. 
Given the role of social cues (observations of other people’s behaviour) in decision-
making during environmental hazards and disasters, as predicted by the Protective 
Action Decision Model (Lindell & Perry, 2012), supporting and opposing feedback are 
likely to be conducive to ceiling and floor effects respectively. In a previous study on 
expected behaviour in a crisis involving the release of a hazardous chemical (Verroen 
et al., 2013), there was a significant interaction between efficacy and peer feedback. In 
the low efficacy condition, the difference between opposing and supporting peer 
feedback was significant. In the high efficacy condition, participants did not respond to 
differences in peer feedback on the intention to engage in self-protective behaviour. 
Peer feedback was manipulated through the wording of social media messages. If the 
messages in the present study were to be reframed as a sequence of imperatives 
rather than a single notification about upcoming instructions then the role of peer 
feedback would need to be addressed. There are two approaches to this. The first is to 




participants follow instructions due to other participants following instructions then the 
normative influence of other participants would be measured as a moderating outcome. 
The second approach is to use a two-way design, akin to the approach used by 
Verroen et al. (2013), with message as one variable and peer feedback as the other 
variable. Half of the sample would watch a video in which other “casualties” are 
depicted following each instruction whilst the other half of the sample would see other 
“casualties” refusing to follow instructions or even engaging in alternative courses of 
action, such as leaving the scene. 
Further investigation is required to reduce the duration of the message delivered to 
casualties whilst retaining the effects observed in the present study to increase 
communication efficiency. For example, it was not possible to isolate the specific 
effects of severity and susceptibility components as both of these were concurrently 
manipulated. It was also not possible to separate specific components of threat 
severity. In the high threat condition, participants were informed about the severity of 
contamination for themselves (skin burns) and for others (exposing other people to the 
chemical). In total, threat consisted of three separate items of information. Separating 
all these components would have increased the number of comparisons, increasing the 
risk of Type 1 errors. But it is unclear whether all of this information was necessary to 
improve disrobing willingness. It would be useful to repeat the experiment and only 
manipulate the threat components of the message, with efficacy information in all 
conditions and a control group receiving the neutral threat message. If it transpires that 
only one of these items of threat information has the effect then it allows for more 
specific guidance for responders on what to say to sufficiently increase threat 
perceptions. A similar modification to the experiment could be conducted with the 
efficacy information.  
An additional approach to reducing the duration of the message that would need to be 
tested is to manipulate tone of voice to be either alarming or neutral. In the present 
study, tone of voice was consistent across conditions. Only the information was 
manipulated to be threatening or non-threatening. But vocal communication has more 
parameters than the content of messages. In previous studies, an urgent or emotional 
vocal tone affected response time latency (Ljungberg & Parmentier, 2012), attention 
capture (Ljungberg et al., 2012) and intended carefulness (Barzegar & Wogalter, 
1998). The present study could be repeated with a two-way design with two levels of 
threat information (high and neutral) and two levels of threat tone (alarming and 
neutral) to address this question. Alarming and neutral tones would need to be pre-




Trust was not affected by the communication manipulation in the present study. The 
communicator in all conditions was a uniformed police officer. An outstanding question 
is whether the effects of messages would be the same if the communicator were a 
member of a different emergency response organisation or if the communicator were a 
member of the public. The latter eventuality is not unlikely given that the audience for 
IOR training is set to increase following the roll-out of preparedness information 
campaigns, such as the “Remove, Remove, Remove” campaign discussed in Chapter 
9 (Carter, Weston, Symons, & Amlôt, 2019). And first responders interviewed in the 
study in Chapter 4 discussed previous instances of asking a casualty to relay 
information to other casualties. It is unknown whether the High Threat High Efficacy 
message used in the present study would be effective when communicated by 
someone without the authority afforded to the emergency services. This question could 
be answered by repeating this study but with type of communicator as an independent 
variable.  
Further recommendations for subsequent applications of the immersive virtual model to 
emergency communication research in general, and chemical incident communication 
research in particular, are discussed in Chapter 9. 
8.4.2. Implications for communication practice 
The caveats outlined in the preceding subsection highlight the need for further 
empirical assessment and communication practice will need to update accordingly as 
this field develops. However, the results of the present study provide sufficient 
evidence on which to base the scripting of communication with multiple casualties in a 
chemical incident by first responders in UK emergency services, including non-medical 
response organisations. The High Threat High Efficacy message used in the present 
study can serve as the basis for a script but, as pointed out by responders interviewed 
in the study reported in Chapter 4, it is not always feasible to follow a predefined script 
because information will vary according to the circumstances of the chemical incident. 
Therefore, recommendations for practical application are based on messaging 
principles, with example messages offered as guidance. Recommendations are 
presented below.  
1. Do not reassure casualties by understating the risk that they are contaminated. 
Currently, there is a tendency for emergency planners to withhold information in 
order to “prevent panic” (Drury et al., 2013). But the findings of the present 
study indicate that being informed about the severity and likelihood of 
contamination improved willingness to follow disrobing instructions. Attempted 




2. Provide casualties with information about the efficacy of IOR, in particular the 
efficacy of dry decontamination. 
Participants in the present study indicated greater likelihood of adhering to the 
dry decontamination protocol when information about the efficacy of dry 
decontamination was included. 
3. Inform casualties about any means of providing warmth and protecting privacy 
during the disrobing process, for example if disrobe packs containing modesty 
gowns are available  
In the present study information was not provided to address perceived costs 
associated with disrobing but findings indicated that these perceptions were 
negatively associated with willingness to disrobe. 
  
The process by which outcomes from this study and preceding research are translated 




Chapter 9 Discussion 
 
9.1 Summary of recommendations 
The aim of this PhD was to develop communication strategies that can be incorporated 
into the Initial Operational Response (IOR) protocols used by non-specialist first 
responders in the early minutes of an incident. The specific context of interest was the 
release of a chemical with a long interval between exposure and symptom onset, for 
example liquid sulphur mustard, which has an estimated latency of four to 12 hours 
(Borak & Sidell, 1992; Clarke et al., 2008; Kales & Christiani, 2004), though cell and 
tissue damage can occur within minutes of exposure (Borak & Sidell, 1992; Davis & 
Aspera, 2001; Garcia et al., 2011; Kales & Christiani, 2004). This scenario is a 
particular challenge for first responders because the need to take protective action may 
not be immediately obvious to affected casualties. Messaging principles were informed 
by Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM), 
outcomes of two literature reviews, and an interview study to ascertain lay mental 
models about chemical contamination and decontamination. Messaging principles were 
subjected to empirical assessment in the form of a double-blind RCT.  
In terms of contribution to health and social psychology, this thesis indicates that 
messaging interventions informed by established theories and models on the 
processing of fear-arousing information do not have the hypothesised effect when 
applied to decontamination. The effectiveness of threat-based and efficacy-based 
information varied according to the type of decontamination people were asked to do. 
This thesis also contains the novel application of immersive virtual environment 
technology to the study of communication by first responders in an emergency. As 
outlined in Chapter 8, the use of IVET allows for a high standard of methodological 
rigour and experimental control and enables researchers to employ a double-blind 
approach to assessing communication whilst retaining more realism than can be 
achieved by conveying hypothetical scenarios through other channels, such as text 
vignettes. The methodology can be adapted to measure other characteristics of on-
scene emergency communication. 
In terms of practical impact, this thesis has resulted in evidence-based scripts 
(Appendix Y) which will be finalised and disseminated to frontline responders and 
control room operators by the UK Home Office National Resilience Policy Team 
(Appendix Z) thereby leading to standardisation of evidence-based communication 
practice. Over time the scripts will develop into aides-memoires and/or mobile 




promote casualty adherence to IOR. It is hoped that by furthering the specific 
recommendations on communication, translation from science to practice will be 
ensured. The anticipated consequence will be a reduction in injury in the event of a 
chemical incident.  
9.1.1. Message content 
9.1.1.1 Provide clear guidance on what protective actions should be taken 
There was strong support for this recommendation from the literature reviews 
(Chapters 2 and 3). The provision of instructions was associated with significant 
increases in adaptive behaviour change at the scene of real or simulated mass 
casualty emergencies (Chapter 3). Lay participants in Chapter 5 also discussed how 
they would want to know what action to take and how they would take their cue from 
authorities, including emergency services, at the scene.  
The results of the qualitative investigation into standard practice reported in Chapter 4 
indicated that the provision of instructions is already part of standard practice. First 
responders indicated that the provision of instructions could be facilitated through the 
use of pictograms contained in disrobe kits and physical gestures performed by 
responders to illustrate how casualties should disrobe and apply dry material. 
9.1.1.2 Provide information about responders 
Findings from Chapters 2, 3 and 5 suggested that responders should make salient the 
fact that the communicator is a representative of an emergency response organisation, 
that responders have the necessary competence to respond to a chemical incident, 
and that responders are providing casualties with the treatment they require. 
Participants in Chapter 5 specifically cited emergency responders with medical 
expertise, such as paramedics, as people whose advice they would trust most in a 
chemical incident. Responders who are not affiliated with the medical profession, such 
as police officers and firefighters, may need to make salient their training and expertise 
in decontamination or state that they are speaking on behalf of a health authority. 
Findings from Chapter 5 also suggested that informing casualties that further 
decontamination facilities will be provided, and providing an estimate for when they will 
arrive, would reduce the risk of self-evacuation and self-presentation at a hospital. This 
supports findings from Chapter 2 that information about actions responders are taking 
is conducive to improved legitimacy perceptions which are in turn associated with 
expected adherence (Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 
2015). 
I included components to address the above information in all messages tested in the 




of this information. However, the evidence to support the inclusion of this information is 
supported by outcomes of the two literature reviews (Chapters 2 and 3) and further 
qualitative evidence from the mental models study (Chapter 5). 
9.1.1.3 Inform casualties about the threat facing them 
Whilst the provision of instructions was consistently reported by responders and cited 
in guidance documents in the study reported in Chapter 4, there was variability in how 
the threat of contamination is currently conveyed to casualties. A proportion of currently 
used statements informed casualties that they were in danger whilst other statements 
informed casualties that decontamination was “precautionary”. The justification for 
understating the threat was to reassure casualties. However, participants in Chapter 5 
stated that they would want to know the health impact of the chemical and findings 
from Chapter 8 indicated that being informed about the severity and likelihood of 
contamination improved willingness to follow disrobing instructions. Understating the 
threat of contamination had no effect on anxiety perceptions in the intention-to-treat 
data analysis. However, anxiety perceptions were themselves positively associated 
with willingness to disrobe – successful reassurance might therefore decrease this 
willingness. The implication is that while understating the threat of contamination may 
seem like a humane approach during a decontamination incident, it may put people at 
greater risk if it prevents them from adhering to decontamination. Misconceptions about 
the need for threat-focused reassurance to prevent “panic” during decontamination 
should be challenged during decontamination training. 
Participants in Chapter 5 demonstrated an awareness of the potential for a delayed 
onset of adverse health effects following chemical contamination. In some cases, the 
delayed onset was conceived in relation to other health risks, such as asbestos. This 
suggests that communicating the likelihood of exposure in the absence of symptoms 
would not necessarily run counter to lay mental models of chemical contamination. 
Participants in Chapter 5 also stated that they would want to know what the chemical is 
so if this information is known by responders, it should be provided to casualties both to 
fulfil a reported information requirement and to address the severity of the incident. 
9.1.1.4 Provide casualties with information about the efficacy of IOR 
Theories and models of behaviour change in response to fear appeals (PMT and the 
EPPM) discussed in Chapter 2 suggest that information about the threat of 
contamination would only be effective when participants have high perceptions of self-
efficacy and response efficacy. In this context, response efficacy refers to the efficacy 
of IOR as a means of reducing chemical contamination and reducing the risk of health 




were associated with increased expectations of leaving the area but response efficacy 
perceptions were associated with decreased expectations of leaving the area, 
indicating the importance of explaining the efficacy of IOR to casualties to prevent self-
evacuation when severity perceptions are high. 
Whilst the efficacy of disrobing and showering conformed to the lay mental model in 
Chapter 5, there was also a perception that decontamination should consist of medical 
treatment. Responders should make clear to casualties that decontamination without 
hospitalisation is still an effective countermeasure.  
Participants in Chapter 5 expressed doubts about the efficacy of dry decontamination, 
relative to applying water. Participants in the RCT (Chapter 8) indicated greater 
likelihood of adhering to the dry decontamination protocol when information about the 
efficacy of IOR was included. Response efficacy perceptions were improved by the 
information about IOR efficacy, and response efficacy perceptions were associated 
with increased willingness to undergo dry decontamination and decreased willingness 
to leave the treatment area or seek further information before taking any action. 
9.1.1.5 Inform casualties about privacy provisions 
Perceptions regarding response costs are a subcomponent of coping appraisal in PMT 
(Chapter 2). Participants in Chapter 5 discussed several perceived barriers to 
disrobing, but particularly concerns about modesty. In Chapter 8, information was not 
provided to address perceived costs associated with disrobing, such as 
embarrassment, but findings indicated that these perceptions were negatively 
associated with willingness to disrobe and positively associated with seeking further 
information before taking any action. It is therefore recommended that responders 
inform casualties about any means of protecting privacy during the disrobing process, 
for example if disrobe packs containing modesty gowns are available. 
9.1.2. Message delivery  
9.1.2.1 Deliver information to casualties as soon as it is available 
Based on findings from the literature review (Chapter 2), responders need to deliver 
information to casualties as soon as it is available to improve or maintain trust and 
legitimacy perceptions and to ensure that casualties decontaminate themselves as 
soon as possible. This means that the best communication channel is one that allows 
for fast communication. Outcomes from the review of mass casualty decontamination 
guidance documents and interviews with first responders trained to respond to 
hazardous chemical incidents (Chapter 4) indicated a range of available 
communication channels, the most frequently cited being voice amplification 




based on the evidence in this PhD, voice amplification technology should be regarded 
by first responder agencies as essential decontamination equipment as it allows for fast 
dissemination of messages that would be conducive to promoting protective actions. 
9.1.2.2 Use multiple channels of communication to disseminate consistent information 
There is more empirical support for using multiple channels to disseminate one 
consistent message than there is for using any one particular modality (Chapter 2). 
Participants in Chapter 5 stated that they would be likely to check for further 
information via their smartphone. If feasible, it is recommended that responders 
communicate information about the incident and what actions are required of casualties 
to their commanding officers so that the information can be disseminated to 
communication teams who can broadcast the information to affected casualties via 
social media.  
9.1.2.3 Use non-technical language 
Findings from the crisis communication literature review (Chapter 2) suggest that 
responders should use simple, non-technical language to ensure that information is 
understood by as many casualties as possible, particularly if information processing 
capabilities are impaired due to stress, as findings from the literature review in Chapter 
2 would predict. The messages tested in Chapter 8 were aimed at a low level of literacy 
in accordance with crisis communication recommendations for extending the reach of 
communication (Glik, 2007a). An amalgamation of readability assessment tools was 
used to ensure that all messages would be understood by audiences at the minimum 
UK Key Stage 3 reading level (Automatic Readability Checker). 
 
9.2 Links for theory 
In previous research in this field, the Elaborated Social Identity Model and Social 
Identity Model of Collective Resilience have informed the development of messages 
designed to promote compliance during mass casualty decontamination by improving 
perceived legitimacy of and identification with the communicator (Amlôt et al., 2017; 
Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2015; Carter et al., 2013; 
Carter, Drury, Rubin, Williams, & Amlôt, 2014; Carter, Drury, Rubin, et al., 2015). 
Findings from this PhD demonstrated the applicability of behaviour change theories 
from the health psychology literature to the development of specific message 
components during the acute response phase of a mass casualty emergency. 
PMT and the EPPM predict that an appeal to perceived severity and susceptibility are 
more likely to be conducive to message acceptance when perceptions of response 




pertaining to response costs and benefits of maladaptive behaviour are low. As stated 
in Chapter 2, the EPPM is supported by findings from previous meta-analyses which 
indicate that the most effective interventions at promoting behaviour change, based on 
measures of attitudes, intentions or real behaviour, are high in both threat and efficacy 
information (Peters et al., 2013; Sheeran et al., 2014; Witte & Allen, 2000). Findings 
from this PhD indicate that the effects of threat and efficacy information on behaviour 
are more complicated when it comes to decontamination. IOR is a sequence of 
behaviours rather than one discrete behaviour. And, based on findings from Chapters 5 
and 8, the effectiveness of threat and efficacy message components varied according 
to type of behaviour in this sequence. Only threat information affected disrobing 
expectations, only efficacy information affected dry decontamination expectations, and 
there was no interaction between the two message components. 
Whilst response costs and self-efficacy were not factored into messages tested in 
Chapter 8, findings indicated that both constructs were associated with expectations of 
disrobing in a chemical incident. It is hypothesised, based on these findings that the 
interaction between information about the threat of contamination and information to 
counter perceived costs of disrobing raised by participants in Chapter 5 would result in 
similar effects to those observed in previous research on the EPPM. 
Components of fear control, such as perceived manipulation or message deprecation, 
were not measured in Chapter 8. Fear control occurs when message recipients take 
steps to reduce their emotional response to the danger posed to them rather than 
reducing the danger itself, and is predicted to occur when perceived threat is higher 
than perceived efficacy in the EPPM (Beatson & McLennan, 2010, pp. 15-16). It would 
be useful to repeat the study from Chapter 8 with measures of fear control to determine 
the optimum balance of threat and efficacy information to avoid message recipients 
reaching the critical juncture where threat appraisal surpasses efficacy appraisal and 
the message is rejected even though the threat of contamination is made salient. 
 
9.3 Practical application of thesis findings 
During this PhD, I consulted with emergency response professionals, Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) policy advisors, and toxicology experts to 
ensure that outcomes of the project would be in line with current decontamination 
protocols and prevailing medical expertise and that outcomes would lead to 
recommendations that would be of use to frontline staff. I regularly communicated my 
progress to emergency response professionals so that people who work in mass 
casualty decontamination were aware that research on the practice of communication 




involvement included discussions following presentations at workshops, meetings and 
seminars, as well as email exchanges and one-on-one meetings with emergency 
response professionals. Stakeholders with whom I engaged included mass 
decontamination instructors and staff at the Public Health England Emergency 
Response Department (ERD), an organisation that supports and advises healthcare 
professionals who respond to emergencies, including emergencies involving the 
release of CBRN materials. The department includes Training and Exercises teams 
that serve as a bridge between emergency response research and practice. The full list 
of stakeholder engagements is presented in Table 9-1. 
 
Table 9-1 Stakeholder engagements. 
Date Venue Stakeholder group 










Training and exercise co-
ordinators  
 





19th June 2018 PHE 
 
Home Office policy 
advisor 
 
26th July 2017 
9th March 2018 
24th April 2019 
Various 
 





At the time of writing (May 2019), outcomes from this PhD are beginning to have an 
impact on the communication component of UK IOR protocols. Following a meeting 
with policy advisors from the UK Home Office National Resilience Policy Team, I was 
asked to write scripts for responders to use during IOR. Emergency response 
practitioners have long expressed the need for more detailed guidance on the precise 
wording of communication. Considering references made by interview participants 
(Chapter 4) about the impracticality of scripting communication, the aim in writing the 
scripts was to provide exemplary messages that responders can use, whilst 
maintaining scope to tailor the script to the circumstances of the incident. Scripts were 




incident when there are no signs or symptoms of chemical contamination; 
communicating at the scene when there are signs and/or symptoms; communicating at 
the scene when the contaminant is a caustic (burning) substance; and communicating 
from a control room. I based the script for the first of these scenarios on the High 
Threat, High Efficacy message that I tested in the RCT (Chapter 8). For the remaining 
scenarios, I edited the message to account for circumstantial differences. For example, 
the pain associated with a caustic chemical burn would render it unnecessary for 
responders or control room operators to make salient the likelihood and severity of 
exposure. The IOR scripts (Appendix Y) will be disseminated to frontline responders 
and control room operators (Appendix Z). 
The scripts are currently being subjected to end user assessment in decontamination 
exercises to identify any limitations in the usability of scripts by responders in a real-
world context with a casualty audience. I anticipate that the most useful next step 
would be to carry out a series of controlled field experiments, using the outcome 
measures for field experiments suggested in Section 9.4.4, to test the effectiveness of 
the script at promoting observable IOR adherence among a heterogenous sample of 
role-playing casualties recruited from lay populations.  
Over-reliance on scripts is discouraged, however, because it limits the flexibility of first 
responders to adapt to the specific parameters of the incident. A proportion of 
responders interviewed in Chapter 4 recognised the problem with scripts when 
communicating with casualties and the need to be able to adapt communication to 
different situations and different casualty populations. Scripting frontline responders 
would further fuel the tendency in the emergency response community to try to impose 
a superficial order to an emergency and to try to force every aspect of a disaster into a 
predefined, rigid structure (Easthope, 2018). Reliance on scripts may also leads to a 
continuation of paternalistic strategies “to give an appearance that a highly structured 
‘order’ is now in place” (Easthope, 2018, p. 34). Whilst stakeholders, including frontline 
responders have asked for clearer guidance on the wording of communication and 
scripts will satisfy that demand, scripts should be regarded as a means to 
operationalising the principles emerging from this thesis and the work on which this 
thesis builds.  
The critical component that determines the success of practical applications of 
evidence from this PhD is training. Drawing from theory used to inform the 
development of public-facing communication in this PhD, it is anticipated that both 
highlighting the efficacy of messaging guidelines at promoting IOR adherence and 




professional experience in engaging with the public would improve the rate at which 
responders adhere to the latest communication guidance. Ongoing work to improve 
effectiveness of health emergency exercises at preparing responders for practice 
(Skryabina, Reedy, Amlôt, Jaye, & Riley, 2017) should incorporate perceptions by 
emergency response trainees of the quality and usability of communication training. 
Multi-agency training is a recommended step to improving interoperability between first 
responder agencies (House, Power, & Alison, 2014). It is particularly important that 
training on communication with casualties is incorporated into multi-agency training 
because, as explained in Chapter 2, consistent messaging between different sources 
facilitates trust in the message.  
As stated in Chapter 1, first responders constitute the primary end user group for the 
recommendations arising from the outcomes of this PhD. Other end user groups 
include organisations for which there is a legally binding responsibility in place to 
protect the lives of patrons, occupants or clients in the event of an emergency. This 
group includes: Category 1 response organisations, such as hospitals and healthcare 
facilities; critical national infrastructure organisations; and crowd safety professionals 
operating in large venues or shopping centres. The communicator at the scene of a 
chemical incident could also be a member of the public. First responders interviewed in 
the study reported in Chapter 4 discussed how they had asked casualties to relay 
messages on to other casualties. Findings from studies on the bystander effect 
(Fischer et al., 2011), studies on behaviour in decontamination exercises (Carter, 
Drury, Amlôt, et al., 2014), and from studies on real incidents (Cocking, Drury, & 
Reicher, 2009; J. Cole, Walters, & Lynch, 2011; DiGiovanni, 2003; Drury, Cocking, & 
Reicher, 2009; Glik, 2007a; Lemyre, Johnson, & Corneil, 2010; Sheppard et al., 2006), 
including chemical incidents (Sheppard et al., 2006), suggest that people in 
emergencies adopt prosocial behaviours, with casualties themselves assisting in the 
emergency response effort as “civilian responders” (J. Cole et al., 2011; Drury et al., 
2013; Monteith & Pearce, 2015; Perry & Lindell, 2003). Recommendations from this 
PhD could be used to develop guidance for members of the public to communicate 
instructions to casualties in a chemical incident. Stakeholders specifically 
recommended incorporating recommendations from this PhD in CitizenAID™, a UK web 
application that provides public guidance on emergency response aimed at members 
of the public.  
 
9.4 Limitations and implications for future research 




The evidence base for mass casualty decontamination is continuously under review as 
operational guidance is reviewed and updated. Target behaviours used as outcome 
measures in the present investigation reflect the latest guidance informed by recent 
toxicology findings (Amlôt et al., 2017; Kassouf et al., 2017; Matar, Price, & Chilcott, 
2010a; Matar et al., 2010b). But irrespective of any potential adjustments to UK 
standard decontamination protocols, the principles of effective communication will 
remain the same. Responders still need to instruct casualties to undergo specific 
actions within a short interval of time. It is anticipated that the principles of 
communication informed by this thesis can therefore be applied to any decontamination 
procedure used by emergency services. The validity of this assertion could be tested 
using a modified version of the RCT reported in the previous chapter with expectation 
of following different decontamination protocols as the revised outcome measure. 
IOR was the decontamination protocol of interest in this PhD, but decontamination is 
unlikely to end with IOR. IOR is usually followed by showering. Behaviours tested in the 
RCT (Chapter 8) included remaining in place for the arrival of showers, but there was 
no measure of willingness to enter a decontamination shower and remain in place 
following the shower to undergo triage. In the interview study reported in Chapter 5, the 
benefit of showering to remove a harmful chemical appeared to be more intuitive to the 
lay public mental model of decontamination, relative to IOR procedures such as dry 
decontamination. A modified version of the RCT with willingness to enter a 
decontamination shower could address whether this behaviour is subject to the same 
variability in response to threat and/or efficacy information. 
IOR is not the only emergency medical countermeasure for which the messaging 
guidelines developed during this PhD could be applied. Applying the methodology used 
in the RCT in Chapter 8 to testing communication in other types of emergency would 
be a useful, low-cost approach to testing and improving the messaging framework.  
9.4.2. Audience considerations 
One key source of bias in all studies in this PhD was the use of convenience sampling. 
Samples in all studies were drawn from a WEIRD (White, Educated, Industrialized, 
Rich, and Democratic) population, which is not representative of global populations in 
other psychological domains, for example moral reasoning (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). Samples were mostly homogenous, consisting primarily of 
students enrolled in higher education courses in Southern England. This fulfils the 
homogenous sampling criterion that differentiates a controlled efficacy study from a 
less controlled but more ecologically valid effectiveness study (Singal, Higgins, & 




from studies reported in Section 2.5, suggest that trust in the communicator may be 
affected by socio-cultural characteristics of the sample (Chryssochoidis et al., 2009) 
and previous experience of injustice (Cordasco et al., 2007) from representatives of the 
communicating organisation depicted in the scenario.  
Modesty concerns associated with disrobing in a chemical incident featured in 
Chapters 5 and 8. The act of disrobing was not assessed in terms of diverse cultural 
and religious norms relating to modesty. Modesty perspectives among women from 
various religious and cultural backgrounds, such as Chinese-American (e.g. Mo, 1992), 
Jewish-American (e.g. Andrews, 2011) and Muslim-American (e.g. Guimond & Salman, 
2013) backgrounds, have been explored in other healthcare contexts, including cervical 
screening and breast examination. A prevalent practical recommendation in this 
literature is to respect female patients’ preferences to be seen by a female healthcare 
provider (e.g. Guimond & Salman, 2013; Tackett et al., 2018). Cultural norms relating 
to public disrobing are discussed in the decontamination guidance document literature 
and the key recommendation based on the available evidence is to address privacy 
and modesty concerns, for example by providing cover from bystanders or protective 
clothing (Carter & Amlôt, 2016). According to some scholars of religion in medicine, the 
principle, “al-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥẓūrā (necessity makes for allowing the prohibited)” 
provides precedent in Islamic law for the suspension of routine moral regulation in the 
event of an emergency (Padela, 2006, p. 114; Padela & del Pozo, 2011, p. 43). This 
further supports the finding from this thesis that responders need to address explicitly 
the threat of chemical contamination and to be upfront about the risks facing casualties 
in a chemical incident. The need to address diverse cultural perspectives of modesty 
supports the recommendation from Chapters 5 and 8 of this thesis to address available 
privacy provisions but also highlights the need for further research on perceptions of 
first responder communication by participants sampled according to cultural 
background. 
Participants in all studies were anglophone and the messaging interventions tested in 
the RCT were written in English. It is not possible to confirm that the translation of the 
text of a messaging intervention to another language would entail the equivalent 
communication of meaning. Scholars of applied linguistics (e.g. Bühler, 1986; 
Hartmann, 1990) have argued that translation means more than transcoding linguistic 
units of the source language to a target language; translation means finding equivalent 
meanings, not equivalent words. The implication of the English language limitation in 
this thesis is that it would not be sufficient to translate the words of an English-
language messaging intervention or “script”. This constitutes an additional concern with 




evaluation of a decontamination communication intervention for non-anglophone 
audiences would be a useful applied linguistics research programme. 
The perspective of children was not factored into communication assessment in this 
thesis. Participants in all studies were over the age of 18 and no studies included in the 
systematic review (Chapter 3) focused on the effect of communication on the behaviour 
of children. Only a small subset of studies in the broader literature review included 
assessment of children’s perspectives. Whilst the behaviour of children and families 
with young children has been assessed in previous decontamination exercises (e.g. 
Fertel, Kohlhoff, Roblin, & Arquilla, 2009), further research is necessary to test the 
effectiveness of a communication strategy aimed at children and guardians in a 
chemical incident. 
The methodology used in the RCT (Chapter 8) could be repeated to test the efficacy of 
messaging at promoting behaviour change among heterogenous audiences. As a 
precursory step, a cross-sectional survey could be carried out on a stratified UK 
sample, informed by latest Office for National Statistics socio-demographic data, to 
assess the prevalence of beliefs and misconceptions identified in the public interview 
study in Chapter 5 within a wider, more demographically representative UK sample. 
Such a survey would also allow for comparison of perceptions between demographic 
groups.  
9.4.3. Assessing the effectiveness of different communication channels 
Amplified voice was the communication channel used to deliver the message in all 
conditions in the RCT (Chapter 8). This was a pragmatic decision since voice 
amplification was consistently recommended as a communication channel in all 
guidance documents on mass casualty decontamination in the study reported in 
Chapter 4. But the effectiveness of different communication channels in the context of 
a mass casualty chemical incident remains an unanswered question (Carter & Amlôt, 
2016), that can be addressed by repeating the RCT (Chapter 8) with one consistent 
message and communication channel as the independent variable. Based on previous 
research (Glik, 2007a, 2007b; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Omori et al., 2017; Rubin et al., 
2012; Sorensen, 2000; World Health Organization, 2017), it is hypothesised that it 
would be the number rather than the type of channel that predicts behaviour change 
with multiple channels disseminating consistent information having a greater effect on 
trust and behaviour change than one channel in isolation. 
Specifically, further work is required to inform the practice of social media 
communication in a chemical incident. Social media was not raised as an available 




4) and was explicitly ruled out as an on-scene communication channel by a Home 
Office policy stakeholder consulted. But, as indicated in the literature review on crisis 
communication, the role of social media in crisis communication has been addressed in 
other emergency contexts (Austin et al., 2012; Y. Cheng, 2018; Finch et al., 2016; 
Freberg, 2012; Knuth et al., 2016; Liu, Austin, & Jin, 2011; Liu, Fraustino, & Jin, 2015; 
Liu et al., 2016; Liu, Jin, & Austin, 2013; Ma & Yates, 2014; Rasmussen & Ihlen, 2017; 
Silver & Matthews, 2017; Snoeijers et al., 2014; Sutton et al., 2015; Sutton et al., 2014; 
Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018; Wang & Zhuang, 2018). And findings from the study in 
Chapter 5 indicate that casualties may check their phones for further information. A 
modification of the RCT (Chapter 8) could be used to compare social media messaging 
targeted at people in the vicinity of a chemical contaminant against voice-amplified 
spoken communication by responders. 
9.4.4. Improving outcome measures to test IOR adherence in response to 
presentation of message components 
The behavioural outcome measures used in the RCT (Chapter 8) were all self-report 
Likert items. Such measures are commonly used in crisis communication research with 
items, such as “I would evacuate from the area affected by the disaster if instructed to 
evacuate by government officials” (Liu et al., 2016) and “How likely would you be to 
take action to protect yourself before confirming the information somewhere else?” 
(Sutton, Vos, et al., 2018) used to measure intended behaviour in response to different 
communication strategies. But a more objective, observed measure of behaviour is 
warranted to determine the true effectiveness of messages tested in Chapter 8 at 
promoting expected adherence to emergency directives.  
The first suggested approach is to test the messages through field exercises and use 
the observation coding schemes used in previous field experiments on behaviour 
during mass casualty decontamination (Amlôt et al., 2017; Carter, Drury, Amlôt, et al., 
2014). The coding schemes include behaviours such as noncompliance (Carter, Drury, 
Amlôt, et al., 2014) and avoiding cross-contamination when applying dry material to 
skin (Amlôt et al., 2017). An additional measure that would be possible to implement in 
a field exercise is the use of an ultraviolet tracer applied to skin and clothing to simulate 
contamination. In previous decontamination efficacy research, the area or intensity of 
the simulant ultraviolet-fluorescent “contaminant” was used to measure how effective 
the decontamination procedure would be at removing a chemical from skin (Amlôt et 
al., 2010; Amlôt et al., 2015; Symons et al., 2015a, 2015b; Wakefield & Chilcott, 2008). 
In a test of communication, ultraviolet tracers could be used to measure how 
thoroughly participants remove a “contaminant” from their skin surface in response to 




confer a measure of cross-contamination which would indicate how closely participants 
adhere to instructions designed to promote safe adherence to decontamination 
protocols, for example not letting contaminated clothing come into contact with the 
face. 
The second approach is to use a form of immersive virtual environment technology 
(IVET) that allows for behavioural observation. In previous studies in which IVET was 
used, participants operated virtual bodies from a first-person perspective within a 
rendered animated environment (Duarte, Rebelo, & Wogalter, 2010; Kinateder et al., 
2018; Tucker et al., 2018). In the RCT (Chapter 8), participants passively observed the 
scenario which made the use of IVET more akin to an elaborate version of text 
vignettes used in previous research on behaviour in chemical incidents (Carter, Drury, 
Amlôt, et al., 2015; Pearce et al., 2013). In future studies, a simulation can be 
programmed that allows participants to demonstrate observable behaviours within a 
rendered environment modelled on the scene of a chemical incident. Both of the above 
approaches have an element of self-report in that it is not possible to determine 
whether participant behaviour in response to the manipulation is an objective measure 
of how they would behave in a real incident or a practical demonstration of how they 
expect that they would behave. 
The third suggested approach is to use a modified version of the autobiographical 
Implicit Association Test (aIAT) as an outcome measure of behavioural intention 
following presentation of communication strategies. The aIAT is a reliable method that 
has been validated in forensic studies of deception. The test allows the researcher to 
determine which of two alternative autobiographical events is true by pairing them with 
objectively true and false sentences on a logical dimension, e.g. “I am sitting down right 
now” (true) or “I am underwater right now” (false) with contrasting autobiographical 
statements, e.g. “I stole that harmonica 20 years ago”. The outcome measure is 
reaction time when responding as to whether the logical statement is true when it is 
paired with either a “true” or “false” memory or intention. It is also possible to measure 
the neural correlates of reaction times via electroencephalogram (Agosta, Castiello, 
Rigoni, Lionetti, & Sartori, 2011). When modifying and applying this measure to 
emergency behaviour research, the equivalent to autobiographical statements would 
be re-worded versions of the behavioural expectation items used in the RCT (Chapter 
8), for example “I would remain where I am until the showers arrive”. The aIAT has 
previously been adapted to test behavioural intentions (Agosta et al., 2011) but 
extensive further validation work would be required before applying it as a measure for 




An alternative approach to assessing the applicability of health behaviour theories to 
messaging in IOR is to carry out observational analysis of real chemical incidents, for 
example using video data acquired through closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV) or 
body cameras worn by responders, to assess the impact of communication on 
observed behaviour in real-world incidents. Observational analysis of CCTV data has 
been used in previous research on bystander behaviour (Liebst, Philpot, Heinskou, & 
Lindegaard, 2018). In the proposed study, researchers could use an adapted version of 
the method used by Vos et al. (Vos et al., 2018) to code the content of Tweets 
published in the USA during the 2016 Zika outbreak and compare the effects of 
different coded categories of messages on retransmission rates. In the proposed study, 
statements spoken by recorded first responders would be coded, for example with an 
EPPM-based coding scheme. Categories of messages could be assessed via the 
interval of time between communication and IOR completion by all message recipients 
or via frequency of behaviours in an IOR adherence coding scheme. 
In terms of outcome measures pertaining to stress and anxiety responses to 
communication in emergencies, objective measures of stress and anxiety, such as 
heart rate and skin conductance, have been used in previous IVET studies on 
emergency evacuation (Feng et al., 2018; Tucker et al., 2018) and could be used as 
secondary outcome measures in an improved version of the RCT (Chapter 8). 
9.4.5. Adapting messages to contexts in which signs and symptoms of chemical 
exposure are salient 
In the scenario presented to participants in the RCT (Chapter 8), symptoms were not 
depicted as salient. The participants themselves did not experience any pain or feel 
any symptoms indicative of hazardous chemical exposure, nor did they witness anyone 
displaying symptoms or see signs indicative of a chemical release. Questions remain 
as to whether it would be necessary to emphasise the threat when signs and 
symptoms of exposure are salient. It is likely that, when experiencing or witnessing 
symptoms of chemical contamination, threat perceptions would be sufficiently high so 
the focus should be on highlighting the efficacy of protective actions when instructing 
casualties on what to do. One of the determinants of taking protective action raised in 
the mental models study (Chapter 5) was the severity of symptoms. Emphasising or 
making salient the threat of chemical contamination would be unproductive when 
symptoms themselves are salient. This hypothesis could be easily tested by repeating 
the study but introducing the depiction of signs and symptoms as a new variable. In 
Chapter 3, I discussed the issue of immersion in emergency exercises and the balance 




committing psychological harm by convincing participants that the emergency is real. In 
the subsection, I discuss approaches to potentially achieving this compromise. 
In previous IVET studies, smoke exposure was used concurrently with immersion in the 
simulated environment to induce olfactory stimulation (Feng et al., 2018) so it would be 
possible to repeat the RCT (Chapter 8) with the addition of this procedure to replicate 
one of the environmental cues associated with a hazardous chemical release in the lay 
mental model ascertained in Chapter 5. When testing the effectiveness of the 
messages in a field experiment, it is possible to simulate salient chemical exposure by 
using artificial smoke and acetic acid to induce mild irritation of skin, eyes, and mucous 
membranes, as used with the appropriate health and safety restrictions in a previous 
study on evacuation (Fridolf et al., 2013).  
In addition to signs and symptoms of chemical exposure, as stated in Chapter 2, 
casualties are likely to experience physiological stress and anxiety in an emergency 
(Leach, 2004, 2005; Porter & Leach, 2010; Robinson et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 
2008). The unfamiliarity of CBRN hazards is also likely to be conducive to anxiety and 
stress (Krieger et al., 2014; Sheppard et al., 2006; Sullivan & Bongar, 2007). Stressors 
were not induced in any study in this PhD. Whilst participants predominantly reported 
themselves to be emotionally engaged with the scenario depicted in the video used in 
the RCT (Chapter 8), messages were still processed in the context of a comfortable 
environment with no real threat of contamination. Ethical responsibilities prohibit 
deceiving participants into believing that they have actually been exposed to a 
hazardous chemical but there are other approaches to inducing stress whilst using the 
IVET procedure, such as applying the physiological stressor of CO2-enriched air 
inhalation to increase stress levels (Ehlers et al., 1986; Ree et al., 2008; Van Den 
Bergh et al., 1995).  
9.4.6. Long-term pre-incident communication 
Scholars of risk and crisis communication have argued that “communication should not 
begin at the point of crisis” (M. B. Rogers & Pearce, 2016) and I would not recommend 
limiting communication about chemical incidents to situations in which hazardous 
chemicals have been released. Communication about chemical incident preparedness 
over a longer timeframe is an important exercise to promote resilience among potential 
future chemical casualties (Noy, 2004; Ruggiero & Vos, 2015). The “Remove, Remove, 
Remove” campaign is a public-facing communication initiative, akin to “Run, Hide, Tell” 
and “See it, Say it, Sorted”, launched by the UK National CBRN Centre and Home 
Office and designed to inform the public about IOR (Figure 9-1). Concurrently with this 




materials through focus group discussions and questionnaire measures (Carter et al., 
2019). Findings indicated generally positive perceptions among a lay sample regarding 
both the materials themselves and the act of providing such information as part of long-
term public education. Findings from this thesis indicate that public-facing 
preparedness materials could be improved by emphasizing the efficacy of IOR, relative 
to waiting for medical assistance, at reducing chemical exposure. 
The RCT (Chapter 8) could be repeated with the “Remove, Remove, Remove” 
materials as the key stimulus to determine whether this pre-incident information 
improves engagement in IOR in a simulated chemical incident. The additional variable 
of interval between receiving pre-incident information and immersion in the simulated 
chemical incident would address whether the effectiveness of the pre-incident 
messaging is contingent on the length of time between receiving pre-incident 
information and acting on the information. It is anticipated that wider dissemination of 
public-facing educational materials about IOR would reduce the demand on first 
responders to need to explain in detail how and why casualties need to self-
decontaminate. 
9.4.7. Immersive virtual environment technology (IVET) 
IVET, used in the assessment of discrete messaging components in Chapter 8, is a 
cost-effective way of testing outstanding questions relating to communication in 
emergency settings. IVET enables researchers to address these questions in double-
blind controlled trials with multiple participants per communication condition whilst 







Figure 9-1 “Remove Remove Remove” poster designed by UK National CBRN Centre 
and UK Home Office to promote public preparedness for undergoing IOR in a chemical 





The 2018 nerve agent release in Wiltshire was a reminder that hazardous chemical 
exposure on a mass scale remains a threat to public health in the UK. Should a future 
incident result in multiple casualties, the challenge facing responders is not only 
toxicological but also behavioural. The simple action of removing clothing and using 
absorbent materials can reduce injury and may save lives. Whether the public will 
readily engage in these actions continues to cause much concern among policy 
makers.  
Findings from the literature reviews indicated that the use of non-technical language 
and fast dissemination of information, ideally through multiple channels, would promote 
adherence to decontamination protocols. In terms of message content, findings from 
the literature reviews and mental models study suggested that the provision of clear 
instructions on actions that need to be taken and the provision of information about the 
competence of responders and the actions they are taking to protect casualties would 
improve the likelihood of casualty adherence. The results of the RCT indicated that in 
addition to providing this information, responders need to be open about the danger 
facing casualties and need to explain that on-scene decontamination is an effective 
form of treatment. This is particularly the case if dry decontamination is required. 
Outcomes from the mental models study and the RCT also suggest that taking action 
to address privacy concerns would further improve the likelihood of adherence. Based 
on the assessment of standard communication practice in Chapter 4, it is likely that 
these principles of communication are already used by some responders but that the 
principles are not standardised across emergency response organisations. I hope that 
this thesis and the scripts developed as a result will contribute to standardisation of 
evidence-based communication practice. 
The results of my research are reassuring. Firstly, members of the public do seem to 
intuitively understand why such actions are important, suggesting that first responders 
should have confidence in their ability to convince the public to engage in them. 
Secondly, simple communication strategies can increase the likelihood of people 
undertaking these behaviours. I anticipate that the research agenda outlined above will 
further strengthen the evidence base that guides recommendations for communication 
during mass casualty decontamination and could have wider implication for a range of 
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Appendix A: Electronic database search terms in systematic review (Chapter 3) 
 
The following search terms were applied to MEDLINE® (Table A-1), PsycINFO (Table A-2) and Web of Science™ (Table A-3) databases. The search 
results were obtained on 14th March 2018.  
 
Table A-1 Search terms used to search Ovid MEDLINE® on 14th March 2018. 
Concept Combinations Notes 






Population / context 







1 exp Accidents, Aviation/ 2589 
2 exp Biohazard Release/ 117 
3 exp Biological Warfare/  5986 
4 exp Bioterrorism/ 4506 
5 exp Chemical Hazard Release/ 469 
6 exp Chemical Terrorism/ 147 
7 exp Chemical Warfare/ 1243 
8 exp Civil Defense/ 2487 
9 exp Decontamination/ 4246 
10 exp Disasters/  67726 
11 exp Disaster Planning/ 12780 
12 exp Disaster Victims/ 121 
13 exp Emergencies/ 37993 




15 exp Explosions/  3719 
16 exp Fires/ 8699 
17 exp Floods/ 1918 
18 exp Mass Casualty Incidents/ 1659 
19 exp Nuclear Warfare/ 4567 
20 exp Quarantine/  1995 
21 exp Radiation Injuries/ 64707 
22 exp Radioactive Hazard Release/ 6311 
23 exp Relief Work/ 4273 
24 exp Rescue Work/ 1946 
25 exp September 11 Terrorist Attacks/  1032 
26 exp Terrorism/ 11658 
Free Text (Title 
and Abstract) 
27 anthrax.ab,ti. 5787 
28 avalanche.ab,ti. 2048 
29 "bio* warfare".ab,ti. 883 
30 "bio* weapon*".ab,ti. 971 
31 "bioterror*".ab,ti. 3621 
32 blizzard.tw. 172 
33 bomb.ab,ti. 4045 
34 "casualt*".ab,ti. 9210 
35 "cbrn*".ab,ti. 168 
36 chemical spill.ab,ti. 68 
37 chemical warfare.ab,ti. 1751 
38 "chemical weapon*".ab,ti. 631 
39 Chernobyl.ab,ti. 4395 
40 cyclone.ab,ti. 852 
41 "decontaminat*".ab,ti. 9921 
42 "disaster*".ab,ti. 20317 




44 egress.ab,ti. 3768 
45 "emergency respon*".ab,ti. 2434 
46 "evacuat*".ab,ti. 18594 
47 "explosion*".ab,ti. 10369 
48 fire.ab,ti. 20068 
49 "first responder*".ab,ti. 1564 
50 "flood*".ab,ti. 12810 
51 Fukushima.ab,ti. 2170 
52 hurricane.ab,ti. 2332 
53 industrial accident.ab,ti. 319 
54 landslide.ab,ti. 268 
55 "mass casualt*".ab,ti. 1886 
56 "mass gathering*".ab,ti. 490 
57 mass killing.ab,ti. 38 
58 "mass shooting*".ab,ti. 111 
59 massacre.ab,ti. 145 
60 "multi* casualt*".ab,ti. 176 
61 nuclear radiation.ab,ti. 124 
62 "radi* warfare".ab,ti. 12 
63 "radi* weapon*".ab,ti. 32 
64 September 11th.ab,ti. 191 
65 "terroris*".ab,ti. 5454 
66 Three Mile Island.ab,ti. 182 
67 tidal wave.ab,ti. 102 
68 tornado.ab,ti. 417 
69 tsunami.ab,ti. 1935 
70 typhoon.ab,ti. 379 
71 volcanic eruption.ab,ti. 182 












74 exp Health Communication/ 1439 
Free Text (tw= 
Title and 
Abstract) 
75 "communicat*".ab,ti. 235642 
76 "instruct*".ab,ti. 78862 
77 "messag*".ab,ti. 49121 








79 exp Mass Behavior/ 591 
Free Text (tw= 
Title and 
Abstract) 
80 "adher*".ab,ti. 156401 
81 "behav*".ab,ti. 1048077 
82 compliance.ab,ti. 98639 
83 comply.ab,ti. 9194 
84 "co?operat*".ab,ti. 119356 










1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 
17 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 
31 or 32 or 33 or 34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 
45 or 46 or 47 or 48 or 49 or 50 or 51 or 52 or 53 or 54 or 55 or 56 or 57 or 58 or 




  Combined 
Intervention 




Terms 88 79 or 80 or 81 or 82 or 83 or 84 or 85 1394485 
 
  ALL 




Table A-2 Search terms used to search Ovid PsycINFO on 14th March 2018. 






Population / context 







1 exp Air Traffic Accidents/  453 
2 exp BIOTERRORISM/ 111 
3 exp DISASTERS/  8188 
4 exp Emergency Management/ 624 
5 exp Emergency Preparedness/ 1013 
6 exp Emergency Services/  7390 
7 exp Fires/ 478 
8 exp Industrial Accidents/ 1209 
9 exp Natural Disasters/  4473 
10 exp Risk Management/ 4712 
11 exp TERRORISM/  7137 
Free Text (ab,ti 
= Title and 
Abstract) 
12 anthrax.ab,ti.  154 
13 avalanche.ab,ti.  162 
14 "bio* warfare".ab,ti.  52 
15 "bio* weapon*".ab,ti.  51 
16 "bioterror*".ab,ti.  234 
17 blizzard.ab,ti  39 
18 bomb.ab,ti. 561 
19 "casualt*".ab,ti.  1769 
20 "cbrn*".ab,ti.  28 
21 chemical spill.ab,ti.  8 




23 "chemical weapon*".ab,ti.  47 
24 Chernobyl.ab,ti.  221 
25 cyclone.ab,ti.  57 
26 "decontaminat*".ab,ti.  109 
27 "disaster*".ab,ti.  10413 
28 earthquake.ab,ti.  2109 
29 egress.ab,ti. 152 
30 "emergency respon*".ab,ti. 691 
31 "evacuat*".ab,ti.  1523 
32 "explosion*".ab,ti.  2440 
33 fire.ab,ti. 5863 
34 "first responder*".ab,ti. 575 
35 flood.ab,ti. 2413 
36 Fukushima.ab,ti.  231 
37 hurricane.ab,ti. 1744 
38 industrial accident.ab,ti. 73 
39 landslide.ab,ti. 49 
40 "mass casualt*".ab,ti.  140 
41 "mass gathering*".ab,ti.  22 
42 mass killing.ab,ti. 95 
43 "mass shooting*".ab,ti.  161 
44 massacre.ab,ti.  323 
45 "multi* casualt*".ab,ti.  13 
46 nuclear radiation.ab,ti. 17 
47 "radi* warfare".ab,ti.  3 
48 "radi* weapon*".ab,ti.  7 
49 September 11th.ab,ti.  430 




51 Three Mile Island.ab,ti.  127 
52 tidal wave.ab,ti. 63 
53 tornado.ab,ti.  189 
54 tsunami.ab,ti.  767 
55 typhoon.ab,ti. 72 
56 volcanic eruption.ab,ti.  43 
57 white powder.ab,ti. 13 









59 exp Communication Theory/  980 
60 exp Public Service Announcements/  325 
Free Text (ab,ti 
= Title and 
Abstract) 
61 "communicat*".ab,ti. 181006 
62 "instruct*".ab,ti.  126035 
63 "messag*".ab,ti.  36638 








65 exp Collective Behavior/ 5704 
66 exp Compliance/  17818 
67 exp Psychological Reactance/ 939 




Free Text (ab,ti 
= Title and 
Abstract) 
69 "behav*".ab,ti.  857232 
70 compliance.ab,ti.  21425 
71 comply.ab,ti. 3350 
72 "co?operat*".ab,ti.  39987 







1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 or 14 or 15 or 16 or 
17 or 18 or 19 or 20 or 21 or 22 or 23 or 24 or 25 or 26 or 27 or 28 or 29 or 30 or 
31 or 32 or 33 or 34 or 35 or 36 or 37 or 38 or 39 or 40 or 41 or 42 or 43 or 44 or 









Terms 76 65 or 66 or 67 or 68 or 69 or 70 or 71 or 72 or 73 932249 
  
ALL 




Table A-3 Search terms used to search Web of Science™ on 14th March 2018. 
Concept Combinations 
Database: Web of Science™ v5.27.2 (Search in TOPIC: Title; Abstract; Author Keywords; Keywords 
Plus® in Web of Science™ Core Collection, BIOSIS Citation IndexSM, KCI-Korean Journal Database, 









1 anthrax 12,445 
2 avalanche 30,983 
3 "bio* warfare" 4,056 
4 "bio* weapon*" 2,319 
5 bioterror* 8,914 
6 blizzard 879 
7 bomb 23,904 
8 casualt* 20,238 
9 cbrn* 509 
10 "chemical spill" 343 
11 "chemical warfare" 7,867 
12 "chemical weapon*" 2,251 
13 Chernobyl 14,135 
14 cyclone 24,575 
15 decontaminat* 40,290 
16 disaster* 136,186 
17 earthquake 124,638 
18 egress 7,984 
19 "emergency respon*" 9,239 




21 explosion* 112,849 
22 fire 267,091 
23 "first responder*" 3,101 
24 flood* 152,248 
25 Fukushima 7,235 
26 hurricane 22,297 
27 "industrial accident" 1,279 
28 landslide 22,523 
29 "mass casualt*" 3,610 
30 "mass gathering*" 729 
31 "mass killing" 203 
32 "mass shooting*" 246 
33 massacre 3,788 
34 "multi* casualt*" 259 
35 "nuclear radiation" 1,967 
36 "radi* warfare" 29 
37 "radi* weapon*" 88 
38 "September 11th" 714 
39 terroris* 36,516 
40 "Three Mile Island" 1,367 
41 "tidal wave" 1,025 
42 tornado 5,567 
43 tsunami 14,746 
44 typhoon 8,404 
45 "volcanic eruption" 3,520 
46 "white powder" 719 





Intervention (communication)  Combine with 
OR 
48 communicat* 1,682,715 
49 instruct* 325,483 
50 messag* 199,906 
51 signage 1,637 
AND 
Outcome (casualty behaviour)  Combine with 
OR 
52 adher* 326,233 
53 behav* 5,938,645 
54 compliance 239,635 
55 comply 46,984 













#47 OR #46 OR #45 OR #44 OR #43 OR #42 OR #41 OR #40 OR #39 OR #38 
OR #37 OR #36 OR #35 OR #34 OR #33 OR #32 OR #31 OR #30 OR #29 OR 
#28 OR #27 OR #26 OR #25 OR #24 OR #23 OR #22 OR #21 OR #20 OR #19 
OR #18 OR #17 OR #16 OR #15 OR #14 OR #13 OR #12 OR #11 OR #10 OR 









Terms 60 #57 OR #56 OR #55 OR #54 OR #53 OR #52 6,827,915 
 
ALL 
COMBINED 61 #60 AND #59 AND #58 6,706 
  
62 
#60 AND #59 AND #58 





Appendix B: Excluded full texts in systematic review (Chapter 3) 
 
The full texts of the electronic database search results, which were deemed potentially 
relevant following title and abstract screening, were reviewed by the first author. Where 
there was ambiguity regarding whether criteria were met, one or more members of the 
supervisory team were consulted. The citations of rejected papers and justifications for 
exclusion are displayed in Table B-1. 
 
Table B-1 Search results excluded from review on full text screening and reasons for 
exclusion. 
Citation Exclusion Justification 
Ahsan, M. N., Takeuchi, K., Vink, K., & 
Warner, J. (2016). Factors affecting the 
evacuation decisions of coastal households 
during Cyclone Aila in Bangladesh. 
Environmental Hazards-Human and Policy 
Dimensions, 15(1), 16-42. 
doi:10.1080/17477891.2015.1114912 
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review. 
Arrabito, G. R. (2009). Effects of talker sex 
and voice style of verbal cockpit warnings on 
performance. Human Factors, 51(1), 3-20. 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review. 
Bass, S. B., Gordon, T. F., Gordon, R., & 
Parvanta, C. (2016). Using eye tracking and 
gaze pattern analysis to test a "dirty bomb" 
decision aid in a pilot RCT in urban adults 
with limited literacy. BMC Medical 
Informatics & Decision Making, 16, 67.  
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review: 
The stimuli consisted of preparedness 
materials rather than information delivered 
during a simulated or real emergency.  
Bass, S. B., Gordon, T. F., Maurer, L., Greener, 
J., Mora, G., Ruggieri, D., . . . Parvanta, C. 
(2016). How Do Low-Literacy Populations 
Perceive "Dirty Bombs"? Implications for 
Preparedness Messages. Health Security, 
14(5), 331-344. 
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: Communication 
interventions were not tested in this study 
Bass, S. B., Greener, J. R., Ruggieri, D., 
Parvanta, C., Mora, G., Wolak, C., . . . Gordon, 
T. F. (2015). Attitudes and perceptions of 
urban African Americans of a "dirty bomb" 
radiological terror event: results of a 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review: 
This is a study on communication with the 




Citation Exclusion Justification 
qualitative study and implications for 
effective risk communication. Disaster 
Medicine & Public Health Preparedness, 9(1), 
9-18.  
than communication with affected 
casualties at treatment area. 
Bergeron, C. D., & Friedman, D. B. (2015). 
Developing an evaluation tool for disaster risk 
messages. Disaster Prevention and 
Management, 24(5), 570-582. 
doi:10.1108/dpm-11-2014-0224 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review: 
Participants were experts at a Public Health 
Agency in Canada rather than members of 
the lay public. 
Bradley, D. T., McFarland, M., & Clarke, M. 
(2014). The effectiveness of disaster risk 
communication: a systematic review of 
intervention studies. PLoS currents, 6. 
The study is a review and therefore does 
not meet the study type criteria for this 
review. Citations were searched. 
Brandeau, M. L., Zaric, G. S., Freiesleben, J., 
Edwards, F. L., & Bravata, D. M. (2008). An 
ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure: 
improving communication to reduce 
mortality during bioterrorism responses. 
American Journal of Disaster Medicine, 3(2), 
65-78.  
The study does not meet the study type 
criteria for this review: There are no original 
data and the authors use a simulation 
model based on assumptions about 
behaviour. Citations were searched. 
Cairns, G., de Andrade, M., & MacDonald, L. 
(2013). Reputation, relationships, risk 
communication, and the role of trust in the 
prevention and control of communicable 
disease: A review. Journal of Health 
Communication, 18(12), 1550-1565.  
The study is a review and therefore does 
not meet the study type criteria for this 
review. Citations were searched. 
Carattin, E., Meneghetti, C., Tatano, V., & 
Pazzaglia, F. (2016). Human navigation inside 
complex buildings: using instructions and 
maps to reach an area of refuge. 
International Journal of Design Creativity and 
Innovation, 4(2), 105-118. 
doi:10.1080/21650349.2015.1135760 
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: The communication 
intervention was administered in 
preparation for a simulated emergency 
rather than during the emergency. 
Carter, H., Drury, J., Amlôt, R., Rubin, G., & 
Williams, R. (2013). Perceived responder 
legitimacy and group identification predict 
cooperation and compliance in a mass 
decontamination field exercise. Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, 35(6), 575-585.  
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: There is no 




Citation Exclusion Justification 
Carter, H., Drury, J., Rubin, G. J., Williams, R., 
& Amlôt, R. (2012). Public experiences of 
mass casualty decontamination. Biosecurity 
& Bioterrorism, 10(3), 280-289.  
The study does not meet the outcome 
criteria for this review: There is no 
behavioural outcome  
Carter, H., Drury, J., Rubin, G. J., Williams, R., 
& Amlôt, R. (2013). The effect of 
communication during mass 
decontamination. Disaster Prevention and 
Management, 22(2), 132-147. 
doi:10.1108/09653561311325280 
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: There is no 
assessment of the effect of communication 
variables on behavioural intentions in this 
study. 
Carter, H., Drury, J., Rubin, G. J., Williams, R., 
& Amlôt, R. (2015). Applying crowd 
psychology to develop recommendations for 
the management of mass decontamination. 
Health Security, 13(1), 45-53.  
The paper does not meet study type criteria 
for this review: There are no original data. 
Casteel, M. A. (2016). Communicating 
Increased Risk: An Empirical Investigation of 
the National Weather Service's Impact-Based 
Warnings. Weather Climate and Society, 8(3), 
219-232. doi:10.1175/wcas-d-15-0044.1 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review: 
The participants in this study were required 
to adopt the role of a plant manager who 
receives warnings. 
Cava, M. A., Fay, K. E., Beanlands, H. J., 
McCay, E. A., & Wignall, R. (2005). Risk 
perception and compliance with quarantine 
during the SARS outbreak. Journal of Nursing 
Scholarship, 37(4), 343-347.  
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review. 
Contzen, N., & Mosler, H.-J. (2013). Impact of 
different promotional channels on 
handwashing behaviour in an emergency 
context: Haiti post-earthquake public health 
promotions and cholera response. Journal of 
Public Health, 21(6), 559-573.  
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review: 
The focus of the study is on long-term 
communication with the public in the 
recovery phase of an emergency. 
Conzola, V. C., & Wogalter, M. S. (2001). A 
communication-human information 
processing (C-HIP) approach to warning 
effectiveness in the workplace. Journal of Risk 
Research, 4(4), 309-322.  
The paper does not meet study type criteria 
for this review: There are no original data. 
de Hoog, N., Stroebe, W., & de Wit, J. B. F. 
(2007). The impact of vulnerability to and 
severity of a health risk on processing and 
acceptance of fear-arousing communications: 
A meta-analysis. Review of General 
The study is a review and therefore does 
not meet the study type criteria for this 




Citation Exclusion Justification 
Psychology, 11(3), 258-285. 
doi:10.1037/1089-2680.11.3.258 
de Jong, M., & Helsloot, I. (2010). The effects 
of information and evacuation plans on 
civilian response during the National Dutch 
flooding exercise 'Waterproef'. In S. P. 
Hoogendoorn, A. J. Pel, M. A. P. Taylor, & H. 
Mahmassani (Eds.), 1st Conference on 
Evacuation Modeling and Management (Vol. 
3, pp. 153-162). 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review. 
DiGiovanni, C., Conley, J., Chiu, D., & 
Zaborski, J. (2004). Factors influencing 
compliance with quarantine in Toronto 
during the 2003 SARS outbreak. Biosecurity & 
Bioterrorism, 2(4), 265-272. 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review. 
Duarte, E., Rebelo, F., Teles, J., & Wogalter, 
M. S. (2014). Behavioral compliance for 
dynamic versus static signs in an immersive 
virtual environment. Applied Ergonomics, 
45(5), 1367-1375. 
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: The study tested  
installations inherent in the structural 
design of the environment in which 
participants underwent emergency 
wayfinding, rather than signage established 
or activated by emergency responders in 
response to an MCE. 
Emolo, A., Picozzi, M., Festa, G., Martino, C., 
Colombelli, S., Caruso, A., . . . Miranda, N. 
(2016). Earthquake early warning feasibility in 
the Campania region (southern Italy) and 
demonstration system for public school 
buildings. Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering, 
14(9), 2513-2529. doi:10.1007/s10518-016-
9865-z 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review. 
Finch, K. C., Snook, K. R., Duke, C. H., Fu, K.-
W., Tse, Z. T. H., Adhikari, A., & Fung, I. C.-H. 
(2016). Public health implications of social 
media use during natural disasters, 
environmental disasters, and other 
environmental concerns. Natural Hazards, 
83(1), 729-760. doi:10.1007/s11069-016-
2327-8 
The study is a review and therefore does 
not meet the study type criteria for this 




Citation Exclusion Justification 
Firestone, R. M., & Everly, G. S., Jr. (2013). A 
pilot investigation in constructing crisis 
communications: What leads to best 
practice? International Journal of Emergency 
Mental Health and Human Resilience, 15(2-
3), 159-164.  
The study does not meet the outcome 
criteria for this review: There is no 
behavioural outcome  
Fischhoff, B., & Eggers, S. (2006). Mental 
Models of Warning Decisions: Identifying and 
Addressing Information Needs. Wogalter, 
Michael S [Ed] (2006) Handbook of warnings 
(pp 279-287) xxi, 841 pp Mahwah, NJ, US: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers; US, 
279-287.  
The study is a review and therefore does 
not meet the study type criteria for this 
review. Citations were searched. 
Fridolf, K., Ronchi, E., Nilsson, D., & Frantzich, 
H. (2013). Movement speed and exit choice in 
smoke-filled rail tunnels. Fire Safety Journal, 
59, 8-21. doi:10.1016/j.firesaf.2013.03.007 
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: The study tested 
installations inherent in the structural 
design of the environment in which 
participants underwent emergency 
wayfinding, rather than signage established 
or activated by emergency responders in 
response to an MCE. 
Galarce, E. M., & Viswanath, K. (2012). Crisis 
communication: an inequalities perspective 
on the 2010 Boston water crisis. Disaster 
Medicine & Public Health Preparedness, 6(4), 
349-356. 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review. 
Respondents were not casualties in an MCE 
but residents of an area in which crisis 
communication was implemented. 
Galea, E. R., Xie, H., Deere, S., Cooney, D., & 
Filippidis, L. (2017). An international survey 
and full-scale evacuation trial demonstrating 
the effectiveness of the active dynamic 
signage system concept. Fire and Materials, 
41(5), 493-513. doi:10.1002/fam.2414 
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: The study tested 
installations inherent in the structural 
design of the environment in which 
participants underwent emergency 
wayfinding, rather than signage established 
or activated by emergency responders in 
response to an MCE. 
Galea, E. R., Xie, H., Deere, S., Cooney, D., & 
Filippidis, L. (2017). Evaluating the 
effectiveness. of an improved active dynamic 
signage system using full scale evacuation 
trials. Fire Safety Journal, 91, 908-917. 
doi:10.1016/j.firesaf.2017.03.022 
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: The study tested 
installations inherent in the structural 
design of the environment in which 
participants underwent emergency 




Citation Exclusion Justification 
or activated by emergency responders in 
response to an MCE. 
Girandola, F. (2000). Fear and persuasion: 
Review and re-analysis of the literature 
(1953-1998). Annee Psychologique, 100(2), 
333-376.  
The study is a review and therefore does 
not meet the study type criteria for this 
review. Citations were searched. 
Groeger, J. L., Stellman, S. D., Kravitt, A., & 
Brackbill, R. M. (2013). Evacuating damaged 
and destroyed buildings on 9/11: Behavioral 
and structural barriers. Prehospital & Disaster 
Medicine, 28(6), 556-566.  
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: No assessment of 
communication on behaviour, rather 
communication in general is mentioned as 
one of the behavioural barriers attributed 
to evacuation decisions. 
Gutteling, J. M., & de Vries, P. W. (2017). 
Determinants of seeking and avoiding risk-
related information in times of crisis. Risk 
Analysis, 37(1), 27-39. 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review. 
Han, W., Ada, S., Sharman, R., & Rao, H. R. 
(2015). CAMPUS EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION 
SYSTEMS: AN EXAMINATION OF FACTORS 
AFFECTING COMPLIANCE WITH ALERTS. Mis 
Quarterly, 39(4), 909-+.  
The study does not meet the intervention 
criteria for this review: The message used in 
the alerts was framed in the same way and 
the manner in which alerts were broadcast 
was the same in all incidents. The 
independent variables were characteristics 
of the message audience. 
Horlick-Jones, T., & Prades, A. (2009). On 
interpretative risk perception research: Some 
reflections on its origins; its nature; and its 
possible applications in risk communication 
practice. Health, Risk & Society, 11(5), 409-
430.  
The study is a review and therefore does 
not meet the study type criteria for this 
review. Citations were searched. 
Huang, S.-K., Lindell, M. K., & Prater, C. S. 
(2016). Who leaves and who stays? A review 
and statistical meta-analysis of hurricane 
evacuation studies. Environment and 
Behavior, 48(8), 991-1029. 
The study is a review and therefore does 
not meet the study type criteria for this 
review. Citations were searched. 
Ibrahim, N. H., & Allen, D. (2012). Information 
sharing and trust during major incidents: 
Findings from the oil industry. Journal of the 
American Society for Information Science and 
The study does not meet the 
population/context criteria for this review: 
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Appendix C: Text from recruitment email that participants 
received prior to first responder interview study (Chapter 4) 
 
We are a group of researchers from Public Health England and King’s College London who are 
conducting a series of interviews with responders on communication during emergency mass 
casualty decontamination. This study is being conducted as part of the principal investigator’s 
PhD project. The study is part of a project funded by the Department of Health. The study has 
been approved by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee at 
King’s College London (reference number: LRS-15/16-3406).  
 
We are writing to you because you have been trained in decontamination procedures, e.g. IOR, 
for CBRN or HazMat incidents. 
 
The study consists of an interview (maximum duration of one hour) in which we will discuss 
any training and real-life experience that you may have regarding casualty management, 
specifically communication, during decontamination operations. We anticipate that 
information about your experiences will help us understand and improve communication 
strategies for agencies involved in mass casualty decontamination. 
 
Participation is voluntary.  All information will be kept completely confidential. Whilst your 
employer is aware that staff in your organisation are taking part in this study, no participants 
will be personally identified. 
 
Please read the attached information sheet for more information about this research. If you 
would like to take part in this study, please complete the attached consent form and return it 
to charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk. 
 




Appendix D: Discussion guide for first responder interview study 
(Chapter 4) 
 
One interviewer conducted all of the interviews and used this schedule for all interviews 
so that the data collection method was consistent. Comments in italics are instructions 
for the interviewer which were not read aloud. 
The following was a guide for discussion. Not all questions were presented to all 
interviewees, only the relevant questions were asked –based on interviewees’ 
responses. Answers to questions in this schedule may be volunteered without prompting, 
in which case it would not be necessary for the question to be asked. For example, if an 
interviewee responds to one of the initial questions with a question about what they would 
say when asking casualties to disrobe, it would not be necessary to ask the questions 
on this guide about disrobing. When asking what responders say to casualties, the 
interviewer prompted for specific examples of what they would say or what they have 
said to casualties. 
 
Introduction to interview 
The recording device is currently switched off. Before I outline the purpose of this 
interview, please could you confirm that you are not in a public place and that there is no 
one in earshot? If you are in a public place, please confirm that you are happy to continue 
with the interview. Wait for clarification 
My name is Charles Symons and I am the principal investigator for this project. I am a 
PhD student based at King’s College London and Public Health England and this project 
is funded by the Department of Health Policy Research Programme.  
Please confirm that you have read the information sheet and signed the consent form 
Wait for clarification 
Please confirm that you are free for the next hour to take part in this interview? Wait for 
clarification 
During the interview I’m going to be asking you questions about what you would say to 
casualties who need to be decontaminated in an incident involving contamination, such 
as a chemical incident. We’ll be focusing on the Initial Operational Response procedures 
and things you would say to casualties during this type of response. We won’t focus on 
decontamination in purpose-built units such as MD1 units. We are interested in how you 
would engage with casualties in an operational capacity based on your training and your 
experiences. The interview shouldn’t take more than an hour. Just to reassure you, this 
isn’t a test and we are not after any “right” answer. We just want to find out what really 
happens on the ground. Do you have any questions before we get started? Proceed if 
there are no questions 
I am about to switch on the recording device. 





We are recording. 
• State the following information at the start of the recording: 
• Study title 
• Date and time 
• Researcher name 
• Participant’s unique ID number  
 
Experience 
• Before we go into specifics, I want to know more about your experiences in CBRN 
and HazMat and which type of emergency service organisation you work for. 
[Expand acronyms if prompted].  
• Have you been part of a response team for an incident where one or more 
casualties had to be decontaminated in some way, e.g. evacuation, clothing 
removal, dry decontamination, improvised wet decontamination or MD1 
showering? 
• How long ago was the last incident to which you responded? 
• What type of incident was it? What was the contaminant? 
• What decontamination protocol or protocols did you follow? What steps 
did you take? 
• To how many incidents involving some kind of decontamination, 
approximately, have you responded in your career to date? 
• Have you received training in CBRN or HazMat decontamination? 
• Have you specifically received training in IOR? 
• Did this training involve guidance on how to communicate with casualties? 
• Does your service have a guide/script for what to say to casualties and are you 
trained to follow the guide to the letter? 
 
Arrival at scene 
• When you arrive on scene, having established that IOR needs to be followed, 
could you describe how you would go about communicating with casualties?  
• How do you talk to casualties who need to be decontaminated? Do you 
approach them and start speaking or is there someone in the team who 
communicates from a distance? 
• How do you decide who speaks to casualties? 
• Does your organisation provide you with equipment/materials/technology for 
communicating with casualties? 
• Can you think of anything –any kind of equipment, technology etc. -that would 
make it easier to communicate with casualties? 
• What is the first thing you say to casualties? And what effect does it usually have? 
• Thinking back to the incident you previously described, what did you say 
to casualties when you arrived on the scene in the last incident? And what 
effect did it have? 
 
Disrobing 
• Have you ever had to instruct a casualty to remove contaminated clothing? 
• Did they have to remove the clothing themselves or was the clothing 
removed by responders? 
• If they had to remove the clothing themselves, what did you say to them? 
And what happened when you said it?  
• Is that typical of what you would say in an incident where 




• Did they have any questions and, if so, how did you respond to 
these questions? 
• Have casualties ever refused to disrobe and, if so, what did you 
say to them? 
• Do you have anything that you carry on the vehicle that could be used to 
make it easier for casualties to disrobe? 
• Do these provisions include instructions for casualties? 
 
Dry decontamination 
• Are you trained to carry out dry decontamination with absorbent materials and 
have you ever had to carry out dry decontamination in a real incident? 
• Are casualties required to perform dry decontamination themselves? Do 
they use the absorbent materials or do you apply the absorbent materials 
to them? 
• Can you talk me through what you said to casualties in the last incident 
where casualties had to carry out dry decontamination on themselves?  
• How typical is that of what you would normally say in an incident 
involving dry decontamination? 
• What effect did it have when you said that? Did they co-operate? 
Did they have further questions and, if so, how did you answer 
their questions? 
 
Improvised wet decontamination 
• Are you trained to carry out improvised wet decontamination? And can you talk 
me through any incidents you can recall where you used improvised wet 
decontamination? How did you do wet decontamination? 
• Can you talk me through what you said to casualties in the last incident 
where casualties had to undergo improvised wet decontamination? And 
how typical is that of what you would normally say in an incident 
involving wet decontamination? 
• What effect did it have when you said that? Did they co-operate? 
Did they have further questions and, if so, how did you answer 
their questions? 
 
Asking casualties to remain in place 
• Have you ever been in a situation where casualties had to wait a long time for 
specialist resources, like MD1 units, to arrive?  
• What do you normally say to casualties when you need them to remain 
where they are for an unknown amount of time? 
• Have casualties ever refused to co-operate or threatened to leave the scene and, 
if so, what did you say to them? 
• What effect did it have when you said that? 
• [If they have not had to communicate with a noncompliant casualty] What do you 
expect you would say to a casualty who is not co-operating? 
 
Summary 
• Based on what we’ve discussed today, this is how I would imagine you would 




the order written on template appended to this document]. Please let me know if 
this is an accurate reflection of how you communicate with casualties and if I’ve 
missed anything or if there’s anything you would add. 
• In my PhD, I am going to developing and testing a new strategy for talking to 
casualties about decon. Is there anything you think would be particularly useful 
or interesting to include in that?  
 








Charles Symons   
3 August 2016 
Dear Charles 
LRS-15/16-3406  - Interview study of responders’ use of communication during mass 
casualty decontamination 
I am pleased to inform you that full approval for your project has been granted by the 
PNM Research Ethics Panel 
Ethical approval is granted for a period of three years from 3 August 2016 . You 
will not receive a reminder that your approval is about to lapse. It is your 
responsibility to apply for an extension prior to the project lapsing. 
You should report any untoward events or unforeseen ethical problems to the 
panel Chair, via the Research Ethics Office, within a week of occurrence. 
Information about the panel may be accessed at: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/committees/sshl/reps/index.
aspx 
If you wish to change your project or request an extension of approval, please 
complete and submit a Modification Request to crec-lowrisk@kcl.ac.uk. Please 
quote your ethics reference number, found at the top of this letter, in all 
correspondence with the Research Ethics Office. Details of how to complete a 
modification request can be found at: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.as
px 
All research should be conducted in accordance with the King's College London 
Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research available at: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/assets/files/research/good%20practice%20S
ept%2009%20FINAL.pdf 
Please note that we may, for auditing purposes, contact you to ascertain the status of 
your research. 
We wish you every success with your research. 
Best wishes, 




Appendix F: Participant information sheet for first responder 
interview study (Chapter 4) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number: LRS-15/16-3406 
 
 




We are a group of researchers from Public Health England (PHE) and King’s 
College London (KCL) who are conducting a series of interviews with responders 
on communication during emergency mass casualty decontamination for 
incidents involving the release of hazardous Chemical, Biological, Radiological or 
Nuclear (CBRN) material. This study is being conducted as part of the principal 
investigator’s PhD project. We would like to invite you to take part in an interview 
in which we will discuss any training and experience you may have in 
communicating with casualties during emergency decontamination.  
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This research is being conducted to better understand the processes by which 
emergency responders currently communicate information to casualties during 
emergency decontamination. Information about your experiences will help us to 




Why have I been invited to take part? 
 
You have been invited to take part because you may have received training in 
the management of casualties during emergency decontamination. 
 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you decide you would like to take part, you will be asked to complete, sign, and 
return the consent form which accompanies this information sheet. Once we 
receive the completed consent form, we will contact you to arrange the interview 
for a date and time which is convenient for you.  
 
The interview will last no longer than one hour. The interview will either take place 
in person at PHE, Porton Down (near Salisbury) or over the telephone (the 
contact number will be provided). The interview will be recorded on an audio 
device and you will be notified when the recording device is switched on. On 
completion of the interview, the audio recording will be transferred to a restricted 




removed from the recording device itself. Only the immediate research team will 
have access to the folder in which the recording is stored. The recording will be 
transcribed by the principal investigator, a member of the research team, or an 
external agency (a confidentiality agreement will be in place between the third 
party transcribing agency and the research team to ensure confidentiality of any 
potentially identifiable data). Interview transcripts will be stored on a restricted 
access folder on encrypted PHE servers. 
 
The transcript of your interview may be available to other researchers who are 
affiliated with the research team. No personally identifiable information will be 
available to these researchers.  
 
 
What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part? 
 
There are no anticipated risks associated with taking part in this study. We do not 
expect that you will experience any direct benefits from taking part in this study. 
However, we hope you will find the experience of participating in the study 




Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
 
Audio recordings and transcripts of interviews will be kept in a restricted access 
folder on encrypted PHE servers. No identifying details, e.g. consent forms with 
your name on it, will be kept alongside either audio recordings or transcripts so 
you will not be recognised from them. At no point in the interview will you be 
identified by name. You will be given a pseudonym within the transcript and will 
not be named at any point during the write-up. Any potential identifying details 
(e.g. age) will not be used in the write-up. We will be publishing direct quotes from 
participants, but none that could identify who said them. Your data will be 
archived for up to 7 years and may be used in subsequent research.  Whilst your 
employer is aware that staff in your organisation are taking part in this study, no 
participants will be personally identified. 
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. Participation is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether or not you 
would like to take part. We recommend you take a minimum of 24 hours to 
consider the information in this document before completing the consent form. 
Taking part will have no bearing on your employment. If you decide to take part 
you will still be free to withdraw your data without providing a reason. On 
completion of the interview, you are free to withdraw your responses without 
providing a reason by contacting the research team using the contact details at 
the end of this document. However, data withdrawal requests can only be fulfilled 
if the request is made before the data have been analysed. If the study causes 
any distress, you can contact the research team using the contact details at the 






How is the project being funded? 
 
This project is part of a PhD studentship funded by the Department of Health 
Policy Research Programme.  
 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results of the study will be published in the principal investigator’s PhD thesis. 
Results will also be published an internal report submitted to the Department of 
Health, which funds this study. Outcomes from this study may also be used in 
academic journals and in oral and poster presentations at academic and industry 
conferences and internal workshops. Quotations from your interview may be 
used illustratively but it will not be possible to identify interviewees from quotes. 
You will be provided with a summary of the results on completion of the study. 
 
 
Who should I contact for further information? 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please 
contact me using the following contact details:  
 
Charles Symons 
Department of Psychological Medicine,  
Weston Education Centre,  
Cutcombe Road,  
London SE5 9RJ 
charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk 
 
What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong? 
   
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about 
the conduct of the study you can contact King's College London using the details 
below for further advice and information:  
 
Dr James Rubin 
Department of Psychological Medicine,  
Weston Education Centre,  
Cutcombe Road,  
London SE5 9RJ 
gideon.rubin@kcl.ac.uk 





Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part 




Appendix G: Participant consent form for first responder 
interview study (Chapter 4) 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Interview study of responders’ use of communication during 
mass casualty decontamination 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: LRS-15/16-3406 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising 
the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If 
you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation 
already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to 
join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any 
time. 
 
If you agree with each of the statements below, please check the adjacent grey 
box by left-clicking the box then changing the default value from ‘not checked’ to 
‘checked’. 
 
I confirm that I understand that by checking each box I am 
consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it 
will be assumed that unchecked boxes mean that I DO NOT 
consent to that part of the study. I understand that by not 
giving consent for any one element I may be deemed 




1. I confirm that I have read and understood the 
information sheet dated 19/07/2016 (version 1.1) for 
the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information and to ask questions. If I 





2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and 
that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving 
any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be 
able to withdraw my data up to the point at which the 




3. I consent to the processing of my personal 
information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled in 








4. I understand that my information may be subject to 
review by responsible individuals from the College for 




5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be 









7. I understand that my responses will be used in an 
internal report to the Department of Health and in the 
principal investigator’s PhD thesis and may be 
included in publications in academic journals and in 
oral and written presentations at academic and 




8. I understand that the recording of my interview may 
be transcribed by a third party agency but that a 
confidentiality agreement will be in place between the 
transcribing company and the research team to 





9. I understand that the transcript of my interview may 
be analysed in subsequent, related studies but no 
personally identifiable information will be available to 
the researchers running these studies 
 
 
Please enter your full name and today’s date (dd/mm/yyyy) below then 
return this form electronically to charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk   
 





Appendix H: Covering letter sent to Technical Advisory Group 
consisting of emergency response policy and toxicology experts 




I’m a PhD student attached to Work Package 7 of the PHOENIX project. The aim of 
WP7 is to determine an optimum communication messaging intervention to be used by 
the first responder on scene during IOR and then test it in intervention trials.  
 
As part of the intervention development stage, I am interviewing participants recruited 
from lay populations (specifically, people with no pre-existing expertise in skin 
toxicology, CBRN, or decontamination) and discussing their knowledge of chemical 
contamination. The purpose of these interviews is to identify trends in participants’ 
thought processes and to identify a non-expert mental model of the subject that will 
inform the communication intervention. In order to plot a non-expert mental model, I 
need to begin with an initial visual representation of decontamination which I will later 
annotate with the results of the interview study. To that end, I have drafted the attached 
influenced diagram.  
 
I would really appreciate it if you could review the attached diagram, focusing only on 
the text (I anticipate the design will change when I change the wording following this 
review process). After looking at the wording in the diagram, please could you let me 
know: 
 
1. Is it an accurate representation of the current status of UK decontamination 
guidelines for chemical incidents? 
2. Is the information accurate from a toxicological standpoint? 
3. Are there any glaring omissions from a practitioner/policy or toxicological 
standpoint (for example, I do not devote much space to respiratory exposure in 
this draft)? 
4. Any other feedback 
 





Appendix I: Discussion guide for non-expert mental models 
interview study (Chapter 5) 
 
The following is a guide for discussion. Not all questions will be presented to all 
interviewees, only the relevant questions will be asked –based on interviewees’ 
responses. Answers to questions in this schedule may be volunteered without 
prompting, in which case it would not be necessary for the question to be asked. After 
every assertion, ask how (if relevant) and why. Comments in italics are instructions for 
the interviewer and are not to be read aloud. 
 
Introduction to interview 
The recording device is currently switched off. If you are in a public place or there is 
anyone in earshot, please let me know if you are happy to continue with the interview. 
Wait for clarification 
My name is Charles Symons and I am the principal investigator for this project. I am a 
PhD student based at King’s College London and Public Health England and this project 
is funded by the Department of Health Policy Research Programme.  
I have received your consent form. Just to reiterate, you are under no obligation to 
participate and you are free to withdraw from the interview at any time without having to 
provide any reason. During the interview I’m going to be asking you questions about your 
understanding of chemical contamination. Please answer questions honestly. This is not 
a test and I am not interested in right or wrong answers. I want to know what and how 
you currently think about this subject. This will help me to understand people’s actual 
thought processes about the subject, as opposed to how we would expect people to think 
about the subject. 
Some of the questions I ask may sound like unnecessary questions but it is important 
that I ask these questions because it will help me to understand how you think about the 
subject rather than what you think. To that end, I will often ask you follow-up questions 
when you answer a question. This is to make sure I don’t miss anything about your 
thought process. 
During the course of the interview, please do not refer to any personally identifiable 
information, for example your name or address.  
 
Do you have any questions before we get started? Proceed if there are no questions 
I am about to switch on the recording device. 
• Start recording 
 
We are recording. 




• Study title 
• Date and time 
• Researcher name 
• Participant’s unique ID number  
 
Demographic Questions 
• Before we begin, I have some demographic questions. If there are any 
demographic questions you do not want to answer, please respond with “prefer 
not to say” 
 
• Can I ask for your age? 
 
• What is your gender identity? 
 
• What is your highest education qualification achieved to date? If you are 
currently enrolled on a course, what qualification is it?  
Probe for subject if the qualification is undergraduate degree or 
higher 
 
• What is your current occupation? 
 
• What is your nationality and first language? 
 
• How would you describe your ethnic group or background? 
Options 
White 
1. English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British 
2. Irish 
3. Gypsy or Irish Traveller 
4. Any other White background, please describe 
Mixed / Multiple ethnic groups 
5. White and Black Caribbean 
6. White and Black African 
7. White and Asian 
8. Any other Mixed / Multiple ethnic background, please describe 








13. Any other Asian background, please describe 
Black / African / Caribbean / Black British 
14. African 
15. Caribbean 
16. Any other Black / African / Caribbean background, please 
describe 
Other ethnic group 
17. Arab 
18. Any other ethnic group, please describe 
 
• Do you have a religion? 
Options 
1. No religion 
2. Christian (including Church of England, Catholic, Protestant 






8. Any other religion, please describe 
 
• Tell me what you already know about chemical contamination 
▪ Can you think of any examples of chemical substances that may 
be hazardous to your health? 
▪ How do you know if you have a chemical on you? 
▪ Why do you think that? 
▪ How would [perceived effect] happen? 
▪ Are you familiar with chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial 
chemicals and what do you know about them? 
▪ What happens when you are exposed to a hazardous chemical? 
▪ What happens in the long-term? 
▪ If you don’t get an immediate effect, do you have anything to 
worry about? 
▪ Is there anything else you know about chemical contamination 
that you have not already mentioned? 
 
I am now going to read you a scenario and I would like you to imagine that you 
are in this situation: You are standing in the middle of a queue for an automated 
ticket machine at a crowded train station. The weather is mild with no wind or 
rain. You are travelling alone and you have never been to this station before. 




to a reported emergency, all passengers must leave the station immediately. 
Go to the nearest exit.” You join the crowd of people walking towards the 
nearest exit. You hear the announcement again: “Due to a reported emergency, 
all passengers must leave the station immediately. Go to the nearest exit.” You 
follow the crowd outside the station.You are now standing on a street among 
roughly 100 people. In the distance, you can see a police van with blue lights 
flashing. 
 
• What would you be thinking at this point? 
▪ Why would you be thinking that? 
▪ Anything else? 
 
• What is the first thing you would do at this point? 
▪ Why would you do that?/Why is that? 
▪ What would happen if you did that? 
▪ What if the authorities (for example police, firefighters, 
ambulance crew) did not allow you to do that? 
▪ Anything else? 
 
• If no one told you and all the people around you that you had all been exposed 
to a hazardous chemical, do you think you would know whether you have been 
exposed to a hazardous chemical in this scenario? 
▪ How would you know? 
▪ In what way would you be contaminated?  
▪ What do you think would happen to you if you were 
contaminated? 
▪ Why do you think that? 
▪ What would you do if you thought that? 
▪ What effect would that have? 
▪ Anything else? 
 
• Assuming you knew for certain that you and the people around you had been 
exposed to a hazardous chemical because of [perceived indication] or you 
could hear and see other people [perceived indication] or you were informed by 
the authorities that you are contaminated, what is the first thing you would do? 
▪ Why would you do that? 
▪ How would you do that? 
▪ What effect would that have? 
▪ Would it matter who told you that you were contaminated or the 
manner in which they tell you? 
▪ What if the authorities (for example police, firefighters, 
ambulance crew) did not allow you to do that? 
▪ Is there anything that would make it harder for you to do that? 
▪ What else would you do? 
▪ What if it was on your skin? 
▪ What else would you do if you knew your skin had been 
exposed? 
 
Only ask the following questions if the participant has not already addressed them 






• If you were told by the authorities to remain in place until further notice, what 
would you do? 
▪ Why would you do that? 
▪ What would happen if you did that? 
▪ Is there anything that would make it harder for you to do that? 
 
• Would you remove any clothing if you knew that you had been exposed to a 
hazardous chemical? 
▪ Why would you do that? 
▪ How much clothing would you remove, assuming you were 
wearing two layers of upper body clothing? 
▪ Talk me through how you would remove your clothing to protect 
yourself from contamination 
▪ Why would you do it that way?  
▪ If it were dangerous to remove the clothing by lifting it over your 
head, talk me through how you would remove it 
▪ Is there anything you can think of that would make it harder for 
you to remove clothing? 
▪ What if you were told by the authorities to remove clothing? 
▪ Does it matter who tells you? 
 
• If there were absorbent materials available, for example tissue paper or cloths, 
would you use those to protect yourself? 
▪ What kind of absorbent materials would you use? 
▪ Why would you use them? 
▪ Talk me through how you would use [stated materials] in this 
situation 
▪ Why would you do it that way? 
▪ How would that protect you? 
▪ Is there anything you can think of that would make it harder for 
you to use absorbent materials? 
▪ What if you were told by the authorities to use absorbent 
materials on exposed skin? 
▪ Does it matter who tells you? 
 
• If there was water available, for example bottles of water or fire hoses that were 
spraying water, would you wash yourself? 
▪ Why would you wash yourself? 
▪ Why would you use water instead of using dry materials? 
▪ Talk me through how you would wash yourself? 
▪ Why would you do it that way? 
▪ How would that protection you? 
▪ Is there anything you can think of that would make it harder for 
you to wash yourself? 
▪ What if you were told by the authorities to wash yourself? 
▪ Does it matter who tells you? 
 
• Assuming everything that we have discussed has taken place, what would you 
do next? 
▪ Why would you do that? 
▪ Is there anything that would make it harder for you to do that? 





• If, after everything we have discussed has taken place, you were told by the 
authorities to remain in place until further notice, what would you do? 
▪ Why would you do that? 
▪ Is there anything that would make it harder for you to do that? 
▪ What if you were told you were waiting for decontamination 
facilities to arrive? 
 
• Thinking back to the scenario, if, after leaving the train station, you were to 
leave and go home, what would the consequences be if you had been exposed 
to a hazardous chemical? 
▪ What would the consequences be for you? 
▪ What would the consequences be for others? 
 
• Thinking back to the scenario, if, after leaving the train station, you were to 
leave and go to an emergency department, what would the consequences be if 
you had been exposed to a hazardous chemical? 
▪ What would the consequences be for you? 
▪ What would the consequences be for others? 
 
• Before we end the interview, is there anything on the subject of chemical 
contamination, hazardous chemicals, or decontamination that you are aware of 
or that has occurred to you during the course of this discussion that we have 







Appendix J: Ethical approval for non-expert mental models 




    
19 April 2017 
Dear Charles 
LRS-16/17-4476 - Interview study to understand public perceptions of chemical contamination 
Thank you for submitting your application for the above project. I am pleased to inform you that 
your application has now be approved with the proviso specified below: 
1. Please submit a modification request, through REMAS, for the modifications proposed on the 
second page of your covering letter.  
All changes must be made before data collection commences. The Committee does not need to 
see evidence of these changes, however supervisors are responsible for ensuring that students 
implement any requested changes before data collection commences. 
Ethical approval has been granted for a period of three years from 19 April 2017 . You will not be 
sent a reminder when your approval has lapsed and if you require an extension you should 
complete a modification request, details of which can be found here: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx 
Please ensure that you follow the guidelines for good research 
practice as laid out in UKRIO’s Code of Practice for research: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/conduct/cop/ind
ex.aspx 
Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be reported to 
the panel Chair, via the Research Ethics Office.  
Please note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you to ascertain the status of your 
research. 
We wish you every success with your research. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mr James Patterson  
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
For and on behalf of: 
PNM Research Ethics Panel REP Reviewer 







Reference Number: RESCMR-16/17-4476 
 
Study Title: Interview study to understand public perceptions of chemical contamination 
 
Modification Review Outcome: Full Approval 
 
Thank you for submitting a modification request for the above study. This is a letter to confirm that your request has now been granted 
Full Approval. 
 
If you have any questions regarding your application please contact the Research Ethics Office at rec@kcl.ac.uk. 
Kind regards, 
 
Mr James Patterson 
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
on behalf of 




Appendix K: Recruitment advertisement for non-expert mental 
models interview study (Chapter 5) 
 
 
Advertisement for use for recruitment of volunteers for study ref:  LRS-16/17-4476 
approved by Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee. This 
project contributes to the College's role in conducting research, and teaching research 
methods. You are under no obligation to reply to this email, however if you choose to, 
participation in this research is voluntary and you may withdraw at any time 
Overview: We are seeking volunteers to participate in an interview about chemical 
contamination. We are only interviewing people who do not have expertise or 
professional experience in decontamination or hazardous chemicals. Interviews will 
take no longer than one hour. Participants will be compensated for their time with a £10 
online gift voucher. 
To improve how emergency responders communicate with casualties during hazardous 
chemical incidents, we are conducting one-on-one interviews with members of the 
public to learn about current perceptions about the risks of exposure to hazardous 
chemicals, such as chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals.  The 
insights gained from this interview study will contribute to communication strategies 
that will be tested as part of a Department of Health funded project on mass casualty 
decontamination. 
This study is being conducted as part of a Department of Health funded PhD project at 
King’s College London and Public Health England. 
To take part in the study, you must be at least 18 years old and speak fluent English 
and have no professional experience or expertise in the areas we are looking at (e.g. 
skin toxicology, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear incidents, or 
decontamination). 
The study consists of an interview (maximum duration of one hour), which can be 
carried out in person or remotely via phone or Skype. The interview will be audio 
recorded. Audio recordings and transcripts of interviews will be kept in a restricted 
access folder on encrypted PHE servers. At no point in the interview will you be 
identified by name. You will be given a pseudonym within the transcript and will not be 
named at any point during the write-up. Any potential identifying details will not be used 
in the write-up.  
Participation is voluntary.  All information will be kept completely confidential. You will 
be reimbursed for your time with a £10 online gift voucher. If you decide to take part 
you will still be free to withdraw your data without providing a reason. 
The results of the study will be published in a PhD thesis. Results will also be published 
in an internal report submitted to the Department of Health. Outcomes from this study 
may also be used in academic journals and in oral and poster presentations at 
academic and industry conferences and internal workshops. Quotations from your 










Appendix L: Participant information sheet for non-expert mental 
models interview study (Chapter 5) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
REC Reference Number: LRS-16/17-4476 
 
Interview study to understand public perceptions of chemical contamination 
We would like to invite you to participate in this research project. Before you decide 
whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what your participation will involve.  Please take time to read the 
following information carefully. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
To improve how emergency responders communicate with casualties during hazardous 
chemical incidents, we are conducting one-on-one interviews with members of the 
public to learn about current perceptions about the risks of exposure to hazardous 
chemicals, such as chemical warfare agents and toxic industrial chemicals.  The 
insights gained from this interview study will contribute to communication strategies 
that will be tested as part of a Department of Health funded project on mass casualty 
decontamination. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
To take part in the study, you must be at least 18 years old and speak fluent English 
and have no professional experience or expertise in the areas were are looking at (e.g. 
skin toxicology, Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear incidents, or 
decontamination). 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Participation is entirely voluntary. It is up to you to decide whether or not you would 
like to take part. We recommend you take a minimum of 24 hours to consider the 
information in this document before completing the consent form. If you decide to take 
part you will still be free to withdraw your data without providing a reason. On 
completion of the interview, you are free to withdraw your responses without providing 
a reason by contacting the research team using the contact details at the end of this 
document. However, data withdrawal requests can only be fulfilled if the request is 




us before 1st September 2017. If the study causes any distress, you can contact the 
research team using the contact details at the end of this document for further advice 
and information.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you decide you would like to take part, you will be asked to complete, sign, and return 
the consent form which accompanies this information sheet. Once we receive the 
completed consent form, we will contact you to arrange the interview for a date and 
time which is convenient for you.  
The interview will last no longer than one hour and you will be asked what you currently 
understand about the risks of chemical contamination and what steps can be taken to 
reduce these risks. The interview will either be conducted in person at Public Health 
England (PHE), Porton Down (near Salisbury) or King’s College London or it will be 
conducted over telephone/online. The interview will be recorded and you will be notified 
when the recording begins. On completion of the interview, the audio recording will be 
transferred to a restricted access folder on encrypted PHE servers. The recording will 
be completely removed from the recording device itself. Only the immediate research 
team will have access to the folder in which the recording is stored. The recording will 
be transcribed by the principal investigator, a member of the research team, or an 
external agency (a confidentiality agreement will be in place between the third party 
transcribing agency and the research team to ensure confidentiality of any potentially 
identifiable data). Interview transcripts will be stored on a restricted access folder on 
encrypted PHE servers. 
The transcript of your interview may be available to other researchers who are affiliated 
with the research team. No personally identifiable information will be available to these 
researchers.  
You will be reimbursed £10 online gift vouchers for your time.  
 
What are the possible benefits and risks of taking part? 
There are no anticipated risks associated with taking part in this study. We do not 
expect that you will experience any direct benefits from taking part in this study. 
However, we hope you will find the experience of participating in the study interesting 
and the outcomes of this study will be used to inform interventions designed to protect 
public health in the aftermath of a hazardous chemical release. All participants will 
have access to a copy of our final report.  
 
Will my taking part be kept confidential? 
Audio recordings and transcripts of interviews will be kept in a restricted access folder 
on encrypted PHE servers. No identifying details, e.g. consent forms with your name 
on it, will be kept alongside either audio recordings or transcripts so you will not be 




will be given a pseudonym within the transcript and will not be named at any point 
during the write-up. Any potential identifying details will not be used in the write-up. We 
will be publishing direct quotes from participants, but none that could identify who said 
them. Your data will be archived for up to 10 years and may be used in subsequent 
research.  
 
How is the project being funded? 
This project is part of a PhD studentship funded by the Department of Health Policy 
Research Programme.  
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results of the study will be published in the principal investigator’s PhD thesis. 
Results will also be published an internal report submitted to the Department of Health, 
which funds this study. Outcomes from this study may also be used in academic 
journals and in oral and poster presentations at academic and industry conferences 
and internal workshops. Quotations from your interview may be used illustratively but it 
will not be possible to identify interviewees from quotes. You will be provided with a 
summary of the results on completion of the study. 
 
Who should I contact for further information? 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact 
me using the following contact details:  
Charles Symons 
Department of Psychological Medicine,  
Weston Education Centre,  
Cutcombe Road,  
London SE5 9RJ 
charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk 
 
What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong? 
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the 
conduct of the study you can contact King's College London using the details below for 
further advice and information:  
Dr James Rubin 




Weston Education Centre,  
Cutcombe Road,  
London SE5 9RJ 
gideon.rubin@kcl.ac.uk 
020 7848 5684 
 





Appendix M: Participant consent form for non-expert mental 
models interview study (Chapter 5) 
 
 
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet 
and/or listened to an explanation about the research. 
 
Title of Study: Interview study to understand public perceptions of chemical 
contamination 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: LRS-16/17-4476 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising 
the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If 
you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation 
already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to 
join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any 
time. 
 
If you agree with each of the statements below, please check the adjacent grey 
box by left-clicking the box then changing the default value from ‘not checked’ to 
‘checked’. 
 
I confirm that I understand that by checking each box I 
am consenting to this element of the study. I 
understand that it will be assumed that unchecked 
boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to that part of the 
study. I understand that by not giving consent for any 




10. I confirm that I have read and understood the 
information sheet dated 13/07/2017 (version 1.2) 
for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information and to ask questions. I 
have had the opportunity to consider the 
information and asked questions which have 




11. I understand that I will be able to withdraw my 




12. I consent to the processing of my personal 
information for the purposes explained to me.  I 
understand that such information will be handled 
in accordance with the terms of the UK Data 







13. I understand that my information may be subject 
to review by responsible individuals from the 




14. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity 
will be maintained and it will not be possible to 








16. I understand that my responses will be used in an 
internal report to the Department of Health and in 
the principal investigator’s PhD thesis and may 
be included in publications in academic journals 
and in oral and written presentations at academic 





17. I understand that the recording of my interview 
may be transcribed by a third party agency but 
that a confidentiality agreement will be in place 
between the transcribing company and the 
research team to ensure confidentiality of any 




18. I understand that the transcript of my interview 
may be analysed in subsequent, related studies 
but no personally identifiable information will be 






Please enter your full name and today’s date (dd/mm/yyyy) below then 
return this form electronically to charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk   
 
Name:   
 




Appendix N: Recruitment advertisement for pilot study (Chapter 
7) 
 
Advertisement for use for recruitment of volunteers for study ref: LRS-17/18-7875 
approved by Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Subcommittee. This 
project contributes to the College's role in conducting research, and teaching research 
methods. You are under no obligation to reply to this email, however if you choose to, 
participation in this research is voluntary and you may withdraw at any time 
Overview: We are seeking volunteers aged 18 years or over who are fluent in written 
English to participate in a pilot test of interventions and measures designed for use in a 
planned randomised controlled trial. The survey will take no longer than 30 minutes to 
complete. Participants will be reimbursed for their time with a £10 online gift voucher. 
 
To develop materials for a planned randomised controlled trial on the effect of 
communication by emergency responders on expected behaviour in a chemical 
incident, I am inviting volunteers to take part in a pilot study. The study consists of a 
survey in which you will be asked questions about your perceptions of a message that 
could be broadcast by a member of the emergency services during a chemical incident.  
This study is being conducted as part of a Department of Health & Social Care funded 
PhD project at King’s College London and Public Health England. 
To take part in the study, you must be at least 18 years old, fluent in written English, 
and you must be either a university student or a university graduate. 
Participation is voluntary.  All information will be kept completely confidential. You will 
be reimbursed for your time with a £10 online gift voucher. If you decide to take part 
you will still be free to withdraw your data without providing a reason. 
The results of the study will be published in a PhD thesis. Results will also be published 
in an internal report submitted to the Department of Health & Social Care. Outcomes 
from this study may also be used in academic journals and in oral and poster 
presentations at academic and industry conferences and internal workshops.  
If you are interested in participating or you require further information, please email 








    
18 July 2018 
Dear Charles,   
LRS-17/18-7875 - Online survey to assess interventions and measures to be used in a 
study on the effect of communication on behaviour during chemical incidents  
Thank you for submitting your application for the above project. I am pleased to inform 
you that your application has now be approved with the proviso specified below: 
1. Information Sheet: Provide more information about the purpose of the study in lay language.  
All changes must be made before data collection commences. The Committee does 
not need to see evidence of these changes, however supervisors are responsible for 
ensuring that students implement any requested changes before data collection 
commences. 
Ethical approval has been granted for a period of three years from18 July 2018 You 
will not be sent a reminder when your approval has lapsed and if you require an 
extension you should complete a modification request, details of which can be found 
here: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx 
Please ensure that you follow the guidelines for good research 
practice as laid out in UKRIO’s Code of Practice for research: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/conduct/cop/ind
ex.aspx 
Any unforeseen ethical problems arising during the course of the project should be 
reported to the panel Chair, via the Research Ethics Office.  
Please note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you to ascertain the status 
of your research. 
We wish you every success with your research. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mr James Patterson  
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
For and on behalf of: 








Reference Number: RESCM-17/18-7875 
 
Study Title: Online survey to assess interventions and measures to be used in a study on the effect of communication 
on behaviour during chemical incidents 
 
Modification Review Outcome: Full Approval 
 
Thank you for submitting a modification request for the above study. This is a letter to confirm that your request has now 
been granted Full Approval. 
 
If you have any questions regarding your application please contact the Research Ethics Office at rec@kcl.ac.uk. 
 
Kind regards 
Mr James Patterson 
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
on behalf of 




Appendix P: Online survey containing information sheet, consent 
form, instructions, scenario, outcome measures, and debrief in 
pilot study (Chapter 7) 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Online survey to assess interventions and measures to be used in a study on the 
effect of communication on behaviour during chemical incidents  
   
I would like to invite you to participate in this research project which forms part of my 
PhD research. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you 
to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information.  
    
What is the purpose of the study?  
The purpose of the study is to test perceptions of materials to be used in a subsequent 
study on the effect of different communication methods on behaviour in a chemical 
incident. In this study, I am testing how people would feel after hearing a message 
delivered by a police officer during a hypothetical incident. Perceptions about 
messages in this test will be used to either confirm or re-write messages to be used in 
the study.  
    
Why have I been invited to take part?  
You are being invited to participate in this study because you are likely to meet the 
criteria for taking part in this study. To participate, you must be at least 18 years old, 
fluent in written English, and you must be either a university student or a university 
graduate.  
    
What will happen if I take part?  
If you decide you would like to take part, email charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk with the 
subject heading “Pilot Test” and I will email you the link to the online survey. The email 
will contain a unique code for you to enter when attempting the survey. Please note 
that you will not be reimbursed for your time if you enter a number other than the one in 





The survey will last no longer than 30 minutes. You will be asked questions about: your 
perceptions of a message that could be broadcast by a member of the emergency 
services during a chemical incident. The reliability of all responses to each set of 
questions will also be tested to see if the measures used in this test could be applied to 
the subsequent study.  On completion of the survey by all participants, your responses 
will be downloaded from the survey tool to an encrypted Public Health England server. 
Your responses will be stored in a folder on this server that is only accessible by me.  
    
Do I have to take part?  
Participation is completely voluntary. You should only take part if you want to and 
choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in anyway. Once you have read the 
information sheet, please contact us if you have any questions that will help you make 
a decision about taking part. If you decide to take part we will ask you to indicate your 
consent on the first page of the online survey.  
 
Incentives  
You will be reimbursed £10 in online gift vouchers for your time. Please note that this is 
subject to you fully completing the survey. Reimbursement is also contingent on you 
entering, when prompted, the code will have been sent to you from the email account, 
charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk.  
    
What are the possible risks of taking part?  
There are no anticipated risks associated with taking part in this study.  
    
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
We hope you will find the experience of participating in the study interesting and the 
outcomes of this study will be used to inform interventions designed to protect public 
health in the aftermath of a major incident.  
    
Data handling and confidentiality  
Your data will be processed in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation 
2016 (GDPR). No identifying details, i.e. email address will be kept alongside your 
responses to questions. Your data will be archived in a restricted access folder on 
encrypted Public Health England servers for up to 10 years. At the end of the survey 
you will be asked to enter an email address purely so that I can email you the gift code 
as reimbursement for your time. The email address will be stored in a separate folder 
from the file that contains your responses to survey questions. A copy of the email I 




and stored in a separate folder from your responses to survey questions. This means 
that it will not be possible to identify you from your responses to the survey.  
 
Data Protection Statement  
The data controller for this project will be King’s College London (KCL). The University 
will process your personal data for the purpose of the research outlined above. The 
legal basis for processing your personal data for research purposes under GDPR is a 
‘task in the public interest’ You can provide your consent for the use of your personal 
data in this study by checking the statements at the bottom of the first page of the 
survey.  
You have the right to access information held about you. Your right of access can be 
exercised in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation. You also have 
other rights including rights of correction, erasure, objection, and data portability. When 
you begin the survey, you will be provided with a unique identifying number that you 
will need to quote so that I can identify which responses are yours. Questions, 
comments and requests about your personal data can also be sent to the King’s 
College London Data Protection Officer Mr Albert Chan infocompliance@kcl.ac.uk. If 
you wish to lodge a complaint with the Information Commissioner’s Office, please visit 
www.ico.org.uk.   
    
What if I change my mind about taking part?  
You are free to withdraw at any point of the study just by closing your browser. 
Withdrawing from the study will not affect you in any way. After submitting your 
responses, you are able to withdraw your data until 1st October by emailing 
charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk or by calling 01980 616960 and quoting the unique code 
that will have been emailed to you. After 1st October 2018, withdrawal of your data will 
no longer be possible because analysis of the data will have already been used to 
inform the methods used in the subsequent study. Please note that all data will be 
anonymous by this point in time as your email address will have been removed from 
the data set and stored in a separate restricted access encrypted server folder.  
If you choose to withdraw from the study before 1st October 2018, we will not retain the 
information you have given thus far aside from the copy of the email sent to you with 
the online gift code which, as stated before, will be retained for financial auditing 
purposes.  
    
How is the project being funded?  
This study is part of a PhD project funded by the Department of Health & Social Care 
Policy Research Programme.  
    




The results of the study will be published in the principal investigator’s PhD thesis. 
Results will also be published in an internal report submitted to the Department of 
Health & Social Care, which funds this study. Outcomes from this study may also be 
used in academic journals and in oral and poster presentations at academic and 
industry conferences and internal workshops. Please note that it will not be possible to 
identify your individual responses to the survey.  
    
Who should I contact for further information?  
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact 
me using the following contact details:  
    
 Charles Symons  
 Department of Psychological Medicine,  
 Weston Education Centre,  
 Cutcombe Road,  London SE5 9RJ  charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk  
    
What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong?  
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the 
conduct of the study you can contact King's College London using the details below for 
further advice and information:  
 Dr James Rubin  
 Department of Psychological Medicine,  
 Weston Education Centre,  
 Cutcombe Road,  London SE5 9RJ  gideon.rubin@kcl.ac.uk  
 020 7848 5684  
    
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in 
this research.  








PARTICIPANT ONLINE CONSENT FORM 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the 
research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any 
questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, 










I confirm that I understand that by clicking each box I am consenting to this 
element of the study. I understand that it will be assumed that unclicked boxes 
mean that I DO NOT  
consent to that part of the study. I understand  
that by not giving consent for any one element I may be deemed ineligible for the 
study.   
o 
I confirm that I have read and understood the above information. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information and asked questions which have been 
answered to my satisfaction.   
o 
I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study and understand that I can 
refuse to answer questions and I can withdraw from the study at any time, without 
having to give a reason, up until 1st October 2018.   
o 
I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes explained 
to me in the Information Sheet.  I understand that such information will be handled 
in accordance with the terms of the General Data Protection Regulation.   
o 
I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible 
individuals from the College for monitoring and audit purposes.   o 
I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be 
possible to identify me in any research outputs.   o 
I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and 
understand that any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed and 
approved by a research ethics committee. (In such cases, as with this project, my 
data would/would not be identifiable in any report).   
o 
I understand that I must not take part if I fall under the exclusion criteria as 




I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will not be 
possible to identify me in any publications.   o 
I understand that my responses will be used in an internal report to the 
Department of Health & Social Care and in the principal investigator’s PhD thesis 
and may be included in publications in academic journals and in oral and written 
presentations at academic and industry workshops and conferences but it will not 
be possible to identify my individual responses to questions.   
o 
I understand that my email address will only be used for the purposes of sending 
a reimbursement gift code and will be stored separately from my responses to all 
other questions at the conclusion of the study.   
o 
I understand that reimbursement for taking part in this study is contingent on 
reaching the end of the survey and submitting my responses by clicking “Done” on 
the last page of the survey and on entering a unique code on the next page that 
was emailed directly to me from the email account, charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk or 




INSTRUCTIONS FOR ENTERING UNIQUE CODE AND REQUESTING DATA 
DELETION 
 
Please enter the unique code from the email that contained the link to this survey  
________________________________________________________________  
   
If you wish for your data to be deleted before 1st October 2018, please contact the 
researcher using the information below. You will need to keep a record of your unique 
code as you would need to quote this code in order for your responses to be deleted.      
Email: charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk       
The survey can only be completed in one session so please ensure that there are no 
distractions and that you do not close the survey unless you wish to withdraw. Please 
note that you do not have to complete the survey but you will only be reimbursed for 
your time if you reach the end of the survey and submit your responses.  
  
  




SCENARIO AND MESSAGING INTERVENTION 
Please read the following scenario. Try to imagine that you were involved in the 
incident and think about how you might feel and act in this type of situation.    
   
Imagine you are waiting in a crowded lecture theatre for a lecture to begin. You hear a 
fire alarm. You and your fellow students walk out of the room and walk outside the 
building. Roughly 20 university staff and students are gathered outside. You are now 
standing among them. You see a police van parked nearby and there are rolls of blue 
tissue paper on the ground.     
You hear the following announcement on a megaphone:      
[Participant randomly allocated to receive one of the six messages displayed in 
Table 6-5 (condition label stored in dataset but not displayed to participant)] 
 
OUTCOME MEASURES 
Think about how you would feel after hearing that message.     
Based only on the information in the message delivered by the police officer, to what 
















y agree  
If I was exposed to 
the  
chemical released in  
this incident it is likely  
that I would become  
seriously ill   
o o o o o o o 
I would feel anxious  
about being exposed 
to the chemical 
released in this 
incident 
o o o o o o o 
If I didn’t take 
preventative action, it 
is likely that I would 
be  
exposed to the  




chemical released in 
this incident   
It is likely that I had 
been exposed to the  
chemical released in 
this incident   
o o o o o o o 
Staying where I am 
and  
following instructions 
would help to protect  
me if I had been 
exposed to the 
chemical   
o o o o o o o 
Removing  
the clothing that I am 
wearing would help to 
protect me if I had 
been  
exposed to the 
chemical   
o o o o o o o 
Blotting then rubbing 
my skin with tissue 
paper would help to 
protect me if I had 
been exposed to the 
chemical   
o o o o o o o 
I would be able to 
follow all instructions  
in this incident   




Now think about the police officer who was talking on the megaphone. Please answer 
the following questions about how you felt about the police officer in this scenario.  
 Strongly 
disagree  









y agree  
I imagined the police  
officer to be 
respectful   
o o o o o o o 
I imagined the police 
officer to be fair  o o o o o o o 
I imagined the police 
officer to be open 
about the actions 
they were taking   
o o o o o o o 
I imagined the police  
officer to be 
trustworthy   
o o o o o o o 
If this situation had 
been real, I would 
have felt a sense of  
unity with the police 
officer responding to 
the incident   
o o o o o o o 
If this situation had 
been real, I would 
have identified with 
the police officer 
responding to the  
incident   
o o o o o o o 
 
  
Was there anything that the police officer said that you didn’t understand or that they 
should have said differently? Also, are there any reasons as to why you answered 














The outcomes of this survey will be used to inform the development of a 
communication intervention that I will test in an experiment. The intervention is 
designed for use by first responders (e.g. police) in the early phase of a chemical 
incident. In the experiment I will assess the intervention using a video based on the 
scenario that you read in this test.  
The objective of this test was to check that messages that were written to address 
certain information would have their intended effect. For example the message, “The 
chemical is on your clothing. So the more clothing you remove, the more chemical 
you’ll remove.” was designed to heighten people’s perceptions of the effectiveness of 
clothing removal at reducing the risk of chemical contamination of the skin. Previous 
studies on decontamination have indicated that clothing removal followed by 
application of absorbent material to skin is an effective method of reducing the extent of 
chemical contamination until decontamination showers are available.  
If participants who take part in the experiment are aware of the true nature of the study 
then their responses are likely to be biased. Therefore your discretion about the aims of 
this study would be really helpful.  
As reimbursement for your time, you will be emailed an online gift code to the value of 
£10 as well as instructions on how to access the shopping portal. Please enter your 
email address below for this purpose. On completion of the study, your email address 
will be removed from the data set and stored in a separate folder on the encrypted 






Appendix Q:  Immersive video production outline (Chapter 8) 
 
The sequences outlined below, which were set within the context of the scenario outlined in Section 6.2.1 of this thesis, were recorded by 
Dependable Productions (dependableproductions.com) on 27th September 2018 with a cast of 18. 
Bold text indicates that the visual or audio is to be added in post-production. 
Sequence Visuals Audio/Script Time 
1: Lecture 
Theatre 
Students are seated in the lecture theatre.  
 
The lecturer is standing on the stage and delivering a non subject-
specific Microsoft PowerPoint presentation (Figure Q-1). 
 
Following the alarm cue, the students stand up and file out of the 
lecture theatre in an orderly manner, following the lecturer. 
[The lecturer presents three powerpoint 
slides (script for each slide in Figure Q-1). 
Partway through the presentation of the 
third slide, a fire alarm sounds] 
 
Lecturer: “Um, we’re not expecting a drill so I 
think we should evacuate. Let’s all move to 
the, um, fire escape, the nearest one, at the 
front of the building. Just leave your stuff 









Students and lecturer walk from lecture theatre to the building reception 
to outside the front of the building. A university warden donned in a blue 










Sequence Visuals Audio/Script Time 
3: Outdoor 
Muster point 
Casualties walk towards rolls of white tissue paper that are being 
thrown onto the ground by a police officer. 
 
There is a police van in the distance. 
 
The police officer goes to the police van to retrieve a handheld 
loudhailer then begins speaking into the loudhailer. 
 
While the police officer is speaking, the casualties look concerned. 
They examine their skin. They exchange concerned glances with one 
another. 
 
At the conclusion of the communication intervention, the visuals 
fade to black. Graphics instruct the viewer to inform researcher 
that the video has concluded. 
[Alarm continues in background] 
 
 
Police officer: Keep walking, over towards 
my voice… Come toward me…  
 
Lecturer: Everyone, this way 
 
Police officer: Come towards the paper I 
am throwing… Please come towards the 
paper I am throwing…  
 
[At 02:22, the police officer delivers the 

















Figure Q-1 Microsoft PowerPoint slides and accompanying speech for lecture delivered 




Appendix R:  Communication interventions tested in RCT 
(Chapter 8) arranged by condition 
 
Table R-1 All six messages tested in the RCT, arranged according to threat and 
efficacy condition, and duration of each message (maximum percentage duration 






Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
High 
 
[Duration = 165 seconds; Word count = 
399] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a harmful 
chemical was released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it is 
but, based on what we know, the risk to 
the public is high.  
 
It can sometimes take a while to feel 
the effects. You might feel fine right 
now but still be affected. The chemical 
may cause painful skin burns and may 
even be fatal. People who come into 
contact with you could be exposed to 
the chemical. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now 
that will remove the chemical from your 
skin. Staying here and following our 
instructions is the best thing you can do 
right now to protect yourselves. 
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you 
to do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
Most of the chemical is on your 
clothing. So the more clothing you 
remove, the more chemical you’ll 
prevent from getting onto your skin or 
into your lungs. 
 
[Duration = 171 seconds; Word count = 
401] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a harmful 
chemical was released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it is 
but, based on what we know, the risk to 
the public is high.  
 
It can sometimes take a while to feel 
the effects. You might feel fine right 
now but still be affected. The chemical 
may cause painful skin burns and may 
even be fatal. People who come into 
contact with you could be exposed to 
the chemical. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the 
cause of the incident. We are also 
looking into the source of the chemical 
and the precise time when the incident 
was reported.  
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you 
to do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay 
where you are and listen out for 
updates. We are currently investigating 
this incident. We will be giving you 











Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing 
touch your face. Tear or cut clothing 
away from the body instead of lifting it 
over your head. If you have to lift it over 
your head then hold your breath, close 
your eyes and mouth, and hold the 
clothing away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. Brushing the skin with dry paper is 
a safe and effective way to remove 
some of the chemical from your skin 
before showering. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper 
on the ground to brush your skin. Start 
by brushing your hands and then use a 
new piece of paper to brush your face. 
Repeat this process from your neck 
down to your toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going 
through a decontamination shower is 
the best way to ensure that you are 
thoroughly cleaned.  
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are and start 
removing your clothing… 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing 
touch your face. Tear or cut clothing 
away from the body instead of lifting it 
over your head. If you have to lift it over 
your head then hold your breath, close 
your eyes and mouth, and hold the 
clothing away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. We are investigating what type of 
chemical this is and the cause of the 
incident. Remain where you are and 
listen out for further instructions. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper 
on the ground to brush your skin. Start 
by brushing your hands and then use a 
new piece of paper to brush your face. 
Repeat this process from your neck 
down to your toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out 
more about what has happened here. 
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are and start 
removing your clothing… 
Low 
 
[Duration = 172 seconds; Word count = 
396] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it is 
but, based on what we know, the risk to 
the public is low. 
 
Had you been exposed to the 
substance, you would have felt some 
symptoms by now. You will probably be 
fine but we will still need to take some 
precautions. The instructions we are 
about to give you are a precaution. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
[Duration = 172 seconds; Word count = 
397] 
 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully. 
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it is 
but, based on what we know, the risk to 
the public is low. 
 
Had you been exposed to the 
substance, you would have felt some 
symptoms by now. You will probably be 
fine but we will still need to take some 
precautions. The instructions we are 
about to give you are a precaution.  
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 









Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now 
that would remove the chemical from 
your skin. Staying here and following 
our instructions is the best precaution 
you can take right now to protect 
yourselves. 
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you 
to do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
Most of the chemical would be on your 
clothing. So the more clothing you 
remove, the more chemical you’d 
prevent from getting onto your skin or 
into your lungs. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing 
touch your face. Tear or cut clothing 
away from the body instead of lifting it 
over your head. If you have to lift it over 
your head then hold your breath, close 
your eyes and mouth, and hold the 
clothing away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. Brushing the skin with dry paper is 
a safe and effective way to remove 
some of the chemical from your skin 
before showering. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper 
on the ground to brush your skin. Start 
by brushing your hands and then use a 
new piece of paper to brush your face. 
Repeat this process from your neck 
down to your toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going 
through a decontamination shower is 
the best way to ensure that you are 
thoroughly cleaned.  
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are and start 
removing your clothing… 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the 
cause of the incident. We are also 
looking into the source of the chemical 
and the precise time when the incident 
was reported.  
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you 
to do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay 
where you are and listen out for 
updates. We are currently investigating 
this incident. We will be giving you 
some instructions in a moment. Please 
listen. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing 
touch your face. Tear or cut clothing 
away from the body instead of lifting it 
over your head. If you have to lift it over 
your head then hold your breath, close 
your eyes and mouth, and hold the 
clothing away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. We are investigating what type of 
chemical this is and the cause of the 
incident. Remain where you are and 
listen out for further instructions. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper 
on the ground to brush your skin. Start 
by brushing your hands and then use a 
new piece of paper to brush your face. 
Repeat this process from your neck 
down to your toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out 
more about what has happened here. 
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are and start 
removing your clothing… 
Neutral 
(Control) 
[Duration = 176 seconds; Word count = 
393] 
 











Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
 This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it is, 
where the chemical would have 
originated, and what time it would have 
been released. 
 
Please stay where you are and listen 
for updates. If you have just arrived, 
please remain where you are. We will 
update you when we know more about 
the situation. Listen out for updates and 
instructions. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now 
that would remove the chemical from 
your skin. Staying here and following 
our instructions is the best precaution 
you can take right now to protect 
yourselves. 
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you 
to do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
Most of the chemical would be on your 
clothing. So the more clothing you 
remove, the more chemical you’d 
prevent from getting onto your skin or 
into your lungs. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing 
touch your face. Tear or cut clothing 
away from the body instead of lifting it 
over your head. If you have to lift it over 
your head then hold your breath, close 
your eyes and mouth, and hold the 
clothing away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. Brushing the skin with dry paper is 
a safe and effective way to remove 
some of the chemical from your skin 
before showering. 
This is the police. Please listen 
carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it is, 
where the chemical would have 
originated, and what time it would have 
been released. 
 
Please stay where you are and listen 
for updates. If you have just arrived, 
please remain where you are. We will 
update you when we know more about 
the situation. Listen out for updates and 
instructions. 
 
We train for this type of incident 
regularly. We are working with the 
ambulance crews to resolve the 
situation. We’re waiting on equipment 
to arrive so that we can set up a 
shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the 
cause of the incident. We are also 
looking into the source of the chemical 
and the precise time when the incident 
was reported.  
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you 
to do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay 
where you are and listen out for 
updates. We are currently investigating 
this incident. We will be giving you 
some instructions in a moment. Please 
listen. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing 
touch your face. Tear or cut clothing 
away from the body instead of lifting it 
over your head. If you have to lift it over 
your head then hold your breath, close 
your eyes and mouth, and hold the 
clothing away from your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the 
way. We are investigating what type of 
chemical this is and the cause of the 
incident. Remain where you are and 









Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper 
on the ground to brush your skin. Start 
by brushing your hands and then use a 
new piece of paper to brush your face. 
Repeat this process from your neck 
down to your toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going 
through a decontamination shower is 
the best way to ensure that you are 
thoroughly cleaned.  
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are and start 
removing your clothing… 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper 
on the ground to brush your skin. Start 
by brushing your hands and then use a 
new piece of paper to brush your face. 
Repeat this process from your neck 
down to your toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please 
ask someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out 
more about what has happened here. 
 
A shower is on its way here now. 
Please remain where you are and start 
removing your clothing… 
 
 
Table R-2 All six messages tested in the RCT, arranged according to threat and 
efficacy condition, with differences between conditions indicated by formatting. 
 
Bold font denotes statements that differ according to Threat condition 







Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
High  
 
This is the police. Please listen carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a harmful 
chemical was released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still investigating 
what type of chemical it is but, based on 
what we know, the risk to the public is 
high.  
 
It can sometimes take a while to feel the 
effects. You might feel fine right now but 
still be affected. The chemical may cause 
painful skin burns and may even be fatal. 
People who come into contact with you 
could be exposed to the chemical. 
 
This is the police. Please listen carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a harmful 
chemical was released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still investigating 
what type of chemical it is but, based on 
what we know, the risk to the public is 
high.  
 
It can sometimes take a while to feel the 
effects. You might feel fine right now but 
still be affected. The chemical may cause 
painful skin burns and may even be fatal. 
People who come into contact with you 










Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
We train for this type of incident regularly. 
We are working with the ambulance crews 
to resolve the situation. We’re waiting on 
equipment to arrive so that we can set up 
a shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now that 
will remove the chemical from your skin. 
Staying here and following our instructions 
is the best thing you can do right now to 
protect yourselves. 
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you to 
do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
Most of the chemical is on your clothing. 
So the more clothing you remove, the more 
chemical you’ll prevent from getting onto 
your skin or into your lungs. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing touch 
your face. Tear or cut clothing away from 
the body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your head 
then hold your breath, close your eyes and 
mouth, and hold the clothing away from 
your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the way. 
Brushing the skin with dry paper is a safe 
and effective way to remove some of the 
chemical from your skin before showering. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper on 
the ground to brush your skin. Start by 
brushing your hands and then use a new 
piece of paper to brush your face. Repeat 
this process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please ask 
someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going through 
a decontamination shower is the best way 
to ensure that you are thoroughly cleaned.  
 
A shower is on its way here now. Please 
remain where you are and start removing 
your clothing… 
We train for this type of incident regularly. 
We are working with the ambulance crews 
to resolve the situation. We’re waiting on 
equipment to arrive so that we can set up 
a shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the cause 
of the incident. We are also looking into 
the source of the chemical and the precise 
time when the incident was reported.  
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you to 
do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay where 
you are and listen out for updates. We are 
currently investigating this incident. We 
will be giving you some instructions in a 
moment. Please listen. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing touch 
your face. Tear or cut clothing away from 
the body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your head 
then hold your breath, close your eyes and 
mouth, and hold the clothing away from 
your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the way. 
We are investigating what type of chemical 
this is and the cause of the incident. 
Remain where you are and listen out for 
further instructions. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper on 
the ground to brush your skin. Start by 
brushing your hands and then use a new 
piece of paper to brush your face. Repeat 
this process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please ask 
someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out more 










Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
A shower is on its way here now. Please 






This is the police. Please listen carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still investigating 
what type of chemical it is but, based on 
what we know, the risk to the public is 
low. 
 
Had you been exposed to the substance, 
you would have felt some symptoms by 
now. You will probably be fine but we will 
still need to take some precautions. The 
instructions we are about to give you are 
a precaution. 
 
We train for this type of incident regularly. 
We are working with the ambulance crews 
to resolve the situation. We’re waiting on 
equipment to arrive so that we can set up 
a shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now that 
would remove the chemical from your skin. 
Staying here and following our instructions 
is the best precaution you can take right 
now to protect yourselves. 
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you to 
do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
Most of the chemical would be on your 
clothing. So the more clothing you remove, 
the more chemical you’d prevent from 
getting onto your skin or into your lungs. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing touch 
your face. Tear or cut clothing away from 
the body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your head 
then hold your breath, close your eyes and 
mouth, and hold the clothing away from 
your face. 
 
This is the police. Please listen carefully. 
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres. We are still investigating 
what type of chemical it is but, based on 
what we know, the risk to the public is 
low. 
 
Had you been exposed to the substance, 
you would have felt some symptoms by 
now. You will probably be fine but we will 
still need to take some precautions. The 
instructions we are about to give you are 
a precaution.  
 
We train for this type of incident regularly. 
We are working with the ambulance crews 
to resolve the situation. We’re waiting on 
equipment to arrive so that we can set up 
a shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the cause 
of the incident. We are also looking into 
the source of the chemical and the precise 
time when the incident was reported.  
 
In a moment, we are going to ask you to 
do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay where 
you are and listen out for updates. We are 
currently investigating this incident. We 
will be giving you some instructions in a 
moment. Please listen. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing touch 
your face. Tear or cut clothing away from 
the body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your head 
then hold your breath, close your eyes and 











Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
A decontamination shower is on the way. 
Brushing the skin with dry paper is a safe 
and effective way to remove some of the 
chemical from your skin before showering. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper on 
the ground to brush your skin. Start by 
brushing your hands and then use a new 
piece of paper to brush your face. Repeat 
this process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please ask 
someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going through 
a decontamination shower is the best way 
to ensure that you are thoroughly cleaned.  
 
A shower is on its way here now. Please 
remain where you are and start removing 
your clothing… 
A decontamination shower is on the way. 
We are investigating what type of chemical 
this is and the cause of the incident. 
Remain where you are and listen out for 
further instructions. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper on 
the ground to brush your skin. Start by 
brushing your hands and then use a new 
piece of paper to brush your face. Repeat 
this process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please ask 
someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out more 
about what has happened here. 
 
A shower is on its way here now. Please 






This is the police. Please listen carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres.  We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it is, 
where the chemical would have 
originated, and what time it would have 
been released. 
 
Please stay where you are and listen for 
updates. If you have just arrived, please 
remain where you are. We will update 
you when we know more about the 
situation. Listen out for updates and 
instructions. 
 
We train for this type of incident regularly. 
We are working with the ambulance crews 
to resolve the situation. We’re waiting on 
equipment to arrive so that we can set up 
a shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
There are things you can do right now that 
would remove the chemical from your skin. 
Staying here and following our instructions 
is the best precaution you can take right 
now to protect yourselves. 
 
This is the police. Please listen carefully.  
 
We’ve been informed that a chemical 
may have been released in one of the 
lecture theatres.  We are still 
investigating what type of chemical it is, 
where the chemical would have 
originated, and what time it would have 
been released. 
 
Please stay where you are and listen for 
updates. If you have just arrived, please 
remain where you are. We will update 
you when we know more about the 
situation. Listen out for updates and 
instructions. 
 
We train for this type of incident regularly. 
We are working with the ambulance crews 
to resolve the situation. We’re waiting on 
equipment to arrive so that we can set up 
a shower for you. The equipment should 
be here in 20 minutes. 
 
We are still currently looking into the cause 
of the incident. We are also looking into 
the source of the chemical and the precise 










Efficacy No Efficacy (Control) 
In a moment, we are going to ask you to 
do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
Most of the chemical would be on your 
clothing. So the more clothing you remove, 
the more chemical you’d prevent from 
getting onto your skin or into your lungs. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing touch 
your face. Tear or cut clothing away from 
the body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your head 
then hold your breath, close your eyes and 
mouth, and hold the clothing away from 
your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the way. 
Brushing the skin with dry paper is a safe 
and effective way to remove some of the 
chemical from your skin before showering. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper on 
the ground to brush your skin. Start by 
brushing your hands and then use a new 
piece of paper to brush your face. Repeat 
this process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please ask 
someone next to you. 
 
After using the tissue paper, going through 
a decontamination shower is the best way 
to ensure that you are thoroughly cleaned.  
 
A shower is on its way here now. Please 
remain where you are and start removing 
your clothing… 
In a moment, we are going to ask you to 
do the following things.  Please listen 
carefully. 
 
If you have just arrived, please stay where 
you are and listen out for updates. We are 
currently investigating this incident. We 
will be giving you some instructions in a 
moment. Please listen. 
 
We will ask you to carefully remove as 
much clothing as you can, down to your 
underwear. Do not let the clothing touch 
your face. Tear or cut clothing away from 
the body instead of lifting it over your 
head. If you have to lift it over your head 
then hold your breath, close your eyes and 
mouth, and hold the clothing away from 
your face. 
 
A decontamination shower is on the way. 
We are investigating what type of chemical 
this is and the cause of the incident. 
Remain where you are and listen out for 
further instructions. 
 
We will ask you to use the tissue paper on 
the ground to brush your skin. Start by 
brushing your hands and then use a new 
piece of paper to brush your face. Repeat 
this process from your neck down to your 
toes.  
 
If anyone requires assistance, please ask 
someone next to you. 
 
Listen out for further updates. We are 
looking into the situation to find out more 
about what has happened here. 
 
A shower is on its way here now. Please 










You are about to watch an immersive video of an emergency scenario.    
  
Please remain seated until the headset is removed.   
  
On completion of the video, it is important that you do not tell the researcher what you 
heard during the video.   
    
The researcher will be outside the room during the presentation of the video. When it is 
time to inform that the researcher that the video has ended, please raise your hand.   
    
Please listen carefully during the video as you will be asked questions about what you 
hear.    
    
When you are ready to begin the video, please let the researcher know.   
 
[After reading instructions, participant watches immersive video then returns to 
the web-based survey] 
 
Behavioural expectation measures 
Think about what you would do if the scenario carried on from the point that the video 
stopped. Imagine you are still standing outside.  
    
For each of the following statements, please select an option that best represents how 
you would feel in that moment.  
 





I would remain where I am until the shower arrives 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would try to remain where I am until the shower arrives 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would want to remain where I am until the shower arrives 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would remove my clothing, down to my underwear 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would try to remove my clothing, down to my underwear 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  





I would want to remove my clothing, down to my underwear 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would brush my skin with the tissue paper 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would try to brush my skin with the tissue paper 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would want to brush my skin with the tissue paper 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would go straight to the nearest hospital without following any of the police officer’s 
instructions 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  




• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would try to go straight to the nearest hospital without following any of the police 
officer’s instructions 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would want to go straight to the nearest hospital without following any of the police 
officer’s instructions 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would leave the area without following any of the police officer’s instructions 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would try to leave the area without following any of the police officer’s instructions 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
I would want to leave the area without following any of the police officer’s instructions 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  




• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
I would seek further information before taking any action 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
I would try to seek further information before taking any action 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
I would want to seek further information before taking any action 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  








Anxiety measures (STAI-6) 
 
For each of the statements below, please select an option that best describes how you 
would feel by the end of the scenario shown in the video 
 
 Not at all (1) Somewhat (2) Moderately (3) Very much (4) 
I would feel calm  •  •  •  •  
I would be tense  •  •  •  •  
I would feel upset  •  •  •  •  
I would be relaxed  •  •  •  •  
I would feel 
content  •  •  •  •  
I would be worried  •  •  •  •  
 
 
Threat susceptibility measures 
Based on what you heard in the video, how likely or unlikely is it that you had been 
exposed to the chemical? 
• Extremely unlikely  (1)  
• Moderately unlikely  (2)  
• Slightly unlikely  (3)  
• Neither likely nor unlikely  (4)  
• Slightly likely  (5)  
• Moderately likely  (6)  
• Extremely likely  (7)  
 
Based on what you heard in the video, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements?    
 
I was at risk for being exposed to the chemical  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  





It is possible that I had been exposed to the chemical  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
Threat severity measures 
If I don’t take protective action, I am likely to become seriously ill 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
If I don’t take protective action, there will be severe consequences for my health  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
If I don’t take protective action, the chemical will cause me serious problems  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
Response efficacy measures 
Staying where I am and following instructions would help to protect me if I had been 
exposed to the chemical  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
Removing the clothing that I am wearing would help to protect me if I had been 




• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
Brushing my skin with tissue paper would help to protect me if I had been exposed to 
the chemical  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  




To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about how you 
would feel at this point in the scenario? 
 
It would be possible for me to follow all of the instructions that I heard  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
If I wanted to, I am confident that I would be able to follow all of the instructions that I 
heard  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
 
I can easily follow all of the instructions that I heard  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
Response cost measures 




• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
I would be concerned about removing my clothing in front of the other people in this 
situation  
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
Trust measures 
The next questions are about the police officer who was talking to you in the video 
 
How open do you think the police officer was with information regarding the chemical? 
• Not at all open  (1)  
• Somewhat open  (2)  
• Open  (3)  
• Very open  (4)  
 
How honest do you think the police officer was with information regarding the 
chemical? 
• Not at all honest  (1)  
• Somewhat honest  (2)  
• Honest  (3)  
• Very honest  (4)  
 
How competent do you believe the police officer was in handling the emergency? 
• Not at all competent  (1)  
• Somewhat competent  (2)  
• Competent  (3)  
• Very competent  (4)  
 
How committed do you believe the police officer was to protecting you from the 
chemical? 
• Not at all committed  (1)  
• Somewhat committed  (2)  
• Committed  (3)  





How much caring and concern do you think the police officer has shown about people 
who might be affected by the chemical? 
• Not at all caring  (1)  
• Somewhat caring  (2)  
• Caring  (3)  
• Very caring  (4)  
 
How much do you believe that the police officer’s actions in response to the emergency 
are in your personal best interest? 
• Not at all  (1)  
• To some extent  (2)  
• In my best interest  (3)  
• Absolutely in my best interest  (4)  
 
How much do you believe the police officer will protect you from the chemical?   
• Not at all  (1)  
• Somewhat  (2)  
• Yes, will protect me  (3)  
• Absolutely will protect me  (4)  
 
 
Stimulus check measures 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the 
immersive video that you watched during this study? 
I felt emotionally engaged with the video 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  
• Strongly agree  (7)  
 
  
The video accurately resembled how I would imagine a real chemical incident to be 
• Strongly disagree  (1)  
• Disagree  (2)  
• Somewhat disagree  (3)  
• Neither agree nor disagree  (4)  
• Somewhat agree  (5)  
• Agree  (6)  















At birth were you described as... 
• Female  (1)  
• Male  (2)  
• Intersex  (3)  
• I prefer not to say  (4)  
 
 
Which of the following describes how you think of yourself? 
• Female  (1)  
• Male  (2)  
• In another way (please specify)  (3) 
________________________________________________ 
 
Which of these options best describes your current status? 
• Full-time employed  (1)  
• Part-time emplyoed  (2)  
• Self-employed (full or part-time)  (3)  
• Full-time education at college or university  (4)  
• Unemployed  (5)  
• Retired from paid work  (6)  
• On a government supported training programme  (7)  
• Employed (full or part-time) and on long-term leave  (8)  






What is your highest educational qualification achieved to date? 
If you are currently working towards a qualification, please select this option from the 
list below 
• GCSE or equivalent  (1)  
• A-Level, AS-Level, or equivalent  (2)  
• Professional qualification  (3)  
• Trade apprenticeship  (4)  
• Undergraduate degree  (5)  
• Postgraduate degree or higher  (6)  
• Other UK qualification (please specify)  (7) 
________________________________________________ 




How would you describe your national identity? 
• English  (1)  
• Welsh  (2)  
• Scottish  (3)  
• Northern Irish  (4)  
• British  (5)  
• Other (please specify)  (6) 
________________________________________________ 
 
Before participating in this study, had you heard any information about the study, 
besides the information in the information sheet or information provided by the 
researcher? 
• No  (1)  






Appendix T: Ethical approval for RCT (Chapter 8) 
 
 
Mr Charles Symons  
20 September 2018  
Dear Charles,    
Reference Number: HR-17/18-8399  
Study Title: Effect of communication on willingness to adhere to initial 
decontamination protocols in a virtual chemical incident: RCT  
Review Outcome: Approval with Provisos 
Thank you for submitting your application for the above project. I am pleased to inform 
you that your application has now be approved with the proviso specified below: 
1. Participant debrief document: Please consider whether the reference to 'medium risk' is appropriate.   
All changes must be made before data collection commences. The Committee does 
not need to see evidence of these changes, however supervisors are responsible for 
ensuring that students implement any requested changes before data collection 
commences. 
Please ensure that you follow all relevant guidance as laid out in the King's College 
London Guidelines on Good Practice in Academic Research 
(http://www.kcl.ac.uk/college/policyzone/index.php?id=247). 
For your information, ethical approval has been granted for 3 years from 20 September 
2018. If you need approval beyond this point, you will need to apply for an extension at 
least two weeks before this. You will be required to explain the reasons for the 
extension.  However, you will not need to submit a full reapplication unless the protocol 
has changed.  If you have been granted approval for only 12 months, you will not be 
sent a reminder when it is due to lapse. 
Ethical approval is required to cover the data-collection phase of the study. This will be 
until the date specified in this letter.  However, you do not need ethical approval to 
cover subsequent data analysis or publication of the results.  
For secondary data-analysis, ethical approval is applicable to the data that is sensitive 
or identifies participants.  Approval is applicable to period in which such data is 




Please note you are required to adhere to all research data/records management and 
storage procedures agreed to as part of your application.  This will be expected even 
after the completion of the study.   
If you do not start the project within three months of this letter please contact the 
Research Ethics Office.  
Please note that you will be required to obtain approval to modify the study.  This 
also encompasses extensions to periods of approval. Please refer to the URL below 
for further guidance about the process:  
https://internal.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx  
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from 
time to time to ascertain the status of your research.  
If you have any query about any aspect of this ethical approval, please contact your 
panel/committee administrator in the first instance 
(https://internal.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/ethics/contact.aspx) 
We wish you every success with this work. 
Yours sincerely, 
Mr James Patterson 
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
 
For and on behalf of 
 
Mr Chris Webb, Joint Interim Chair 
 






Reference Number: RESCM-18/19-8399 
 
Study Title: Effect of communication on willingness to adhere to initial decontamination protocols in a virtual chemical 
incident: RCT 
 
Modification Review Outcome: Full Approval 
 
Thank you for submitting a modification request for the above study. This is a letter to confirm that your request has now 
been granted Full Approval. 
 
If you have any questions regarding your application please contact the Research Ethics Office at rec@kcl.ac.uk. 
 
Kind regards 
Mr James Patterson 
Senior Research Ethics Officer 
on behalf of 




Appendix U: Recruitment advertisement for RCT (Chapter 8) 
 
RE: Participants wanted for experiment to test the effect of communication on 
behaviour in a simulated emergency 
 
I am running an experiment to test different types of communication in terms of their 
effect on how people would behave in an emergency.  
 
The experiment should take no longer than 1 hour to complete. During the experiment, 
you will watch a video of an emergency situation through a virtual reality headset then 
answer questions about what you would have done during the situation. 
 
The study takes place at Public Health England South West, 2 Rivergate, Temple Quay, 
Bristol. 
 
Participation is voluntary.  All information will be kept completely confidential. You will be 
reimbursed for your time with £30. 
 
To take part in the study, you must be at least 18 years old and fluent in written and 
spoken English. Unfortunately, you will be unable to participate in this study if you have 
any hearing impairments, active ear infections, or visual impairments that cannot be 
corrected with glasses or contact lenses. You will also be unable to participate if you 
have any professional experience or expertise in the area of emergency response 
and/or toxicology.   
 
This study is being conducted as part of a Department of Health & Social Care funded 
PhD project. The study has been approved by the Psychiatry, Nursing and Midwifery 
Research Ethics Subcommittee at King’s College London (reference number: HR-
17/18-8399).  
 
Please read the attached information sheet for more information about this research. If 
you would like to take part in this study or if you have any questions, please email 
charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk with the subject heading, “Emergency Study”. 
 
If you don’t want to take part in this research, please feel free to just delete this email - I 




Appendix V: Participant information sheet for RCT (Chapter 8) 
 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
Ethical Clearance Reference Number: HR-17/18-8399 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 







I would like to invite you to participate in this research project which forms part 
of my PhD research. This study was approved by the King’s College London 
Psychiatry, Nursing & Midwifery Research Ethics Committee (Ref: HR-17/18-
8399). 
 
Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what your participation will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss 
it with others if you wish. Ask me if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information. 
 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The purpose of the study is to test different types of communication in terms of 
their effect on how people would behave in an emergency.  
 
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
 
You are being invited to participate in this study because you are likely to meet 
the criteria for taking part in this study. To participate, you must be at least 18 
years old and fluent in written and spoken English. 
 
You will be unable to participate in this study if any of the following apply to you:  
• Hearing impairments;  
• Active ear infections; 
• Visual impairments that cannot be corrected with glasses or contact 
lenses; 
• Professional experience or expertise in emergency response and/or 
toxicology. 
 
Before deciding to participate, please consult your GP and present them with 
this information sheet if any of the following apply to you: 




• You have a pre-existing binocular vision disorder;  
• You have a heart condition; 
• You previously have had a seizure, loss of awareness, or other symptom 
linked to an epileptic condition. 
 
 
What will happen if I take part? 
 
If you decide you would like to take part, email charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk with 
the subject heading “Emergency Study” and I will email you to arrange a date 
and time to participate. The study takes place at PHE South West, 2 Rivergate, 
Temple Quays, Bristol, BS1 6EH. I will provide directions and arrange for site 
access prior to your arrival.  
 
The study will take no longer than 1 hour. During the study, you will wear a 
virtual reality headset through which you will watch a brief video of an 
emergency. After watching the video, you will be asked questions about what 
you think you would have done and how you think you would have felt during 
the emergency. You will also be asked some demographic questions. On 
completion of the study, your responses to questions will be stored on 
encrypted Public Health England servers in a folder that is only accessible by 
my research team and me.  
 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
Participation is completely voluntary. You should only take part if you want to 
and choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in anyway. Once you 
have read the information sheet, please contact us if you have any questions 
that will help you make a decision about taking part. If you decide to take part 
we will ask you to indicate your consent on the first page of the online survey. 
 
For Health & Safety reasons, we will be required to reschedule your 
participation if, on the day, you feel over-tired or unwell (including cold, flu, 
headaches, migraines, and earaches) or if you are under the influence of drugs 
(including alcohol but not including nicotine, caffeine, and prescribed 





You will be reimbursed £30 for your time. Reimbursement will be paid via an 
expenses claim form. Please note that there will be a delay of at least one 
month between completing the study and receiving reimbursement to allow 
time for the processing of the expenses clam form. 
 
 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
 
Given that the video depicts an emergency situation, there may be references 






What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
We hope you will find the experience of participating in the study interesting and 
the outcomes of this study will be used to inform interventions designed to 
protect public health in the aftermath of a major incident. 
 
 
Data handling and confidentiality 
 
Your data will be processed in accordance with the General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016 (GDPR). No identifying details, i.e. email address will be stored 
alongside your responses to questions. Your data will be archived in a restricted 
access folder on encrypted Public Health England servers for up to 10 years.  
 
 
Data Protection Statement 
 
The data controller for this project will be King’s College London (KCL). The 
University will process your personal data for the purpose of the research 
outlined above. The legal basis for processing your personal data for research 
purposes under GDPR is a ‘task in the public interest’ You can provide your 
consent for the use of your personal data in this study by checking the 
statements at the bottom of the first page of the survey.  
 
You have the right to access information held about you. Your right of access 
can be exercised in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation. 
You also have other rights including rights of correction, erasure, objection, and 
data portability. When you begin the survey, you will be provided with a unique 
identifying number that you will need to quote so that I can identify which 
responses are yours. Questions, comments and requests about your personal 
data can also be sent to the King’s College London Data Protection Officer Mr 
Albert Chan info-compliance@kcl.ac.uk. If you wish to lodge a complaint with 
the Information Commissioner’s Office, please visit www.ico.org.uk.   
 
 
What if I change my mind about taking part? 
 
You are free to withdraw at any point of the study. After completing the study, you 
are able to withdraw your data until 1st February 2019 by emailing 
charles.symons@kcl.ac.uk or by calling 01980 616960 and quoting the unique 
code that will have been assigned to you when you participated. After 1st February 
2019, withdrawal of your data will no longer be possible because analysis of the 
data will have already been completed and the final report written. Please note 
that all data will be anonymous by this point in time  
 
If you choose to withdraw from the study before 1st February 2019, we will not 
retain the information you have given thus far aside from your consent form and 
the form to confirm that you received the vouchers. 
 
 





This study is part of a PhD project funded by the Department of Health & Social 
Care Policy Research Programme. 
 
 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The results of the study will be published in the principal investigator’s PhD 
thesis. Results will also be published in an internal report submitted to the 
Department of Health & Social Care, which funds this study. Outcomes from 
this study may also be used in academic journals and in oral and poster 
presentations at academic and industry conferences and internal workshops. 
Please note that it will not be possible to identify your individual responses to 
questions. You will remain anonymous. 
 
 
Who should I contact for further information? 
 
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please 
contact me using the following contact details:  
 
Charles Symons 
Department of Psychological Medicine,  
Weston Education Centre,  
Cutcombe Road,  




What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong? 
   
If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint 
about the conduct of the study you can contact King's College London using the 
details below for further advice and information:  
Dr James Rubin 
Department of Psychological Medicine,  
Weston Education Centre,  
Cutcombe Road,  
London SE5 9RJ 
gideon.rubin@kcl.ac.uk 
020 7848 5684 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part 




Appendix W: Participant consent form for RCT (Chapter 8) 
 
[An electronic version of this consent form was used in the study to avoid the 
risks associated with transporting and storing personal information in hard 
copy] 
 
Title of Study: Experiment to test the effect of communication on 
behaviour in a simulated emergency 
 
King’s College Research Ethics Committee Ref: HR-17/18-8399 
 
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising 
the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If 
you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation 
already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to 
join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep and refer to at any 
time. 
 
I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am 
consenting to this element of the study. I understand that it will be 
assumed that unticked/initialled boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to 
that part of the study. I understand that by not giving consent for any one 
element I may be deemed ineligible for the study. 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
23/10/2018 v1.1 for the above study. I have had the opportunity to 
consider the information and asked questions which have been 
answered to my satisfaction. 
 
2. I consent voluntarily to be a participant in this study and understand that I 
can refuse to answer questions and I can withdraw from the study at any 
time, without having to give a reason, up until 1st February 2019. 
 
3. I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes 
explained to me in the Information Sheet.  I understand that such 
information will be handled in accordance with the terms of the General 
Data Protection Regulation. 
 
4. I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible 
individuals from the College for monitoring and audit purposes. 
 
5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it 
will not be possible to identify me in any research outputs. 
 
 
6. I understand that I must not take part if I fall under the exclusion criteria 






7. I understand that there will be a minimum of one month between 
completing this study and receiving reimbursement.  
 
 
__________________               __________________               
Name of Participant                 Date     
 
 
__________________               __________________               




Appendix X: Participant debrief for RCT (Chapter 8) 
 
DEBRIEF FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 








Thank you for taking the time to participate in this study and contribute to this 
research. 
The aim of this study was to test the effect of different types of messages on the 
behaviour of casualties at the scene of a chemical incident.  
When you watched the video, you will have heard one of six messages 
delivered by a voice actor who was portraying a police officer. The messages 
varied in content. Some of the messages emphasised the danger, some either 
didn’t emphasise the danger or downplayed it. Some of the messages included 
information about how effective the instructions would be in protecting you from 
the chemical whilst others just consisted of instructions and updates on actions 
responders were taking. My prediction, based on previous research, is that a 
message in which the danger of chemical contamination and the effectiveness 
self-protective actions are both emphasised would make people more likely to 
imagine themselves following instructions, rather than taking alternative courses 
of action, such as leaving the scene and going home.  
Large-scale attacks involving hazardous materials, including harmful chemicals, 
are a low probability, high impact risk to the UK public. Harmful chemicals do 
not always result in immediate symptoms. In the unlikely event that you are 
affected, there are steps you can take to protect yourself and others around 
you. Try to remember the steps outlined in the guidance on the next page.  
If you have experienced any distress as a result of taking part in this study or if 
you wish to make a complaint about the conduct of the study you can contact 
King's College London using the details below for further advice and 
information:  
 
Dr James Rubin 
Department of Psychological Medicine,  
Weston Education Centre,  
Cutcombe Road,  
London SE5 9RJ 
gideon.rubin@kcl.ac.uk 





Appendix Y: Draft IOR scripts 
 
Presented below are the latest drafts (version 0.4) of IOR scripts to be disseminated by 
the UK Home Office National Resilience Policy Team to frontline responders and 
control room operators, following further testing in exercises (as outlined in Appendix 
Z). The scripts are arranged according to the type of chemical release scenario in 
which they would be used. All text, aside from italicised text and capitalised text in 
parenthesis, is to be spoken by the communicator. 
 
 
Communicating at the scene when there are no signs or symptoms of chemical 
exposure but a chemical release is suspected or confirmed 
 
[MOVE CASUALTIES TO PLACE OF SAFETY AWAY FROM HOT ZONE] 
• [If hot zone is within a building, activate fire alarm and continuously repeat this 
message while casualties are evacuating the building] This is the… [State 
emergency service] Keep following the sound of my voice. Walk towards the 
tissue paper on the ground. 
• [If hot zone is in an outdoor location] This is the… [State emergency service] 
There is a suspected toxic chemical leak in this area. Please follow me to a 
place of safety, away from the chemical.  
[CONTAINMENT] 
• This is the… [State emergency service]. Please listen to me [repeat if 
necessary].  
• Raise your hand if you can understand me. 
• Those with your hands up make sure those around you that can’t hear or 
understand follow my instructions. We are investigating a possible chemical 
leak. 
• [If you are a non-medical officer] We are working with [State co-





• For your safety you need to stay with us. 
• It is important you don’t leave until we say it is safe to do so. If you leave now, 
you could put yourself and anyone who comes into contact with you at risk. 
• We are working to make sure you receive the care that you need. A 
decontamination shower is on the way here. 
• Staying here and following our instructions is the best thing you can do right 
now to protect yourself and others. 
 [IF CASUALTIES APPEAR TO BE WALKING AWAY OR CHECKING THEIR 
PHONES] 
• We’ve been informed that a harmful chemical has been released in this area. 
• We are still investigating what type of chemical it is, but based on what we 
know, the risk to the public is high.  
• It can sometimes take a while to feel the effects. You might feel fine right now 
but still be affected.  
• People who come into contact with you could be exposed to the chemical.  
• It is really important that you stay here and follow my instructions, as this will 
protect you and others. 
• Do not touch your face. Do not eat, drink, smoke, or use your phone. Keep your 
hands away from your face. 
 [IOR DISROBE AND DECONTAMINATION INSTRUCTIONS] 
• To stop the chemical going through your skin [pat arms] or into your lungs [pat 
chest area] you need to be decontaminated. Showering facilities are on the way 
and will be here in [estimated number of minutes until interim shower arrives]. 
• In the meantime, most of the chemical will be on your clothing. Follow my 
instructions carefully to remove the contaminated clothing from your skin. 
• Do not let the clothing touch your face. Tear or cut clothing away from the body 
instead of lifting it over your head [use actions]. 
• If you have to lift any clothing  over your head then hold your breath, close your 





• Remove as much clothing as you can, down to your underwear. In [estimated 
number of minutes until disrobe packs arrive], we will provide you with clean 
gowns to wear to keep you warm and covered up.Leave you clothes and 
possessions on the ground. They will also be decontaminated. It’s more 
important to get you cleaned up. 
• Help anyone who requires assistance. 
• After removing the clothing, brushing your skin with clean, dry material is a safe 
and effective way to remove more of the chemical from your skin. The shower is 
on its way.  
• In the meantime, use the [available dry material] on the ground to brush your 
skin and absorb any chemical. Listen carefully to our instructions on how to 
brush from the top down. 
• Use a new piece of [available dry material] to brush each area of your body. Do 
not reuse any of the [available dry material]. Once you’ve used a piece, place it 
in one of the the yellow sacks on the ground. 
1. Brush your hands first. 
2. Use a new piece to brush your hair [use actions]. 
3. Blow your nose. 
4. Use a new piece to brush your face and neck [use actions]. Brush any 
chemical away from your eyes and mouth.  
5. Use a new piece to brush your left shoulder and arm and then repeat 
for your right shoulder and arm [use actions].  
6. Use a new piece to brush your chest, stomach and back [use 
actions].  
7. Use a new piece to brush your left leg and foot and then repeat for 
your right leg and foot [use actions].  
8. Help anyone who requires assistance by brushing their skin from the 
top down. 




• You will need to go through a shower to completely remove the chemical. We 
are setting up the shower now. Please stay where you are.  
 
 
Communicating at the scene when there are signs or symptoms of caustic 
chemical exposure 
 
[APPLY NEAREST CLEAN WATER TO CASUALTIES’ FACES] 
[IOR DISROBE AND DECONTAMINATION INSTRUCTIONS] 
• We are investigating what kind of chemical this is but the priority is to 
completely remove it from you.  
• We have applied as much water as we can to your exposed skin. 
• To stop the chemical going through your skin [pat arms] you need to be 
completely showered. Water is available here so please don’t leave, 
• In the meantime, most of the chemical left on you will be on your clothing. 
Follow my instructions carefully to remove the clothing from your skin. Do not lift 
any clothing over your head. 
• Do not let the clothing touch your face. Tear or cut clothing away from the body 
instead of lifting it over your head [use actions]. If clothing is stuck to skin, do 
not attempt to remove it yet. 
• Remove as much clothing as you can, down to your underwear. In [estimated 
number of minutes until disrobe packs arrive], we will provide you with clean 
gowns to wear to keep you warm and covered up.Leave you clothes and 
possessions on the ground. They will also be decontaminated. It’s more 
important to get you cleaned up. 
• Help anyone who requires assistance. 
• Now pour water over your skin to flush away the chemical. [State where the 




• Pour as much water as you can over yourself, starting with your face. Tilt your 
head back and pour as much water as you can over your face. Make sure you 
completely flush your eyes. 
• You will need to go through a shower to totally remove the chemical. A shower 
is on its way here now. 
• Help anyone who needs help. 
• Stay where you are. Keep applying water. 
[PRIOR TO INTERIM DECONTAMINATION SHOWER] 
• You will need to go through a shower to completely remove the chemical. We 
are setting up the shower now. Please stay where you are. 
 
 
Communicating at the scene when there are signs or symptoms of non-caustic 
chemical exposure  
 
[MOVE CASUALTIES TO PLACE OF SAFETY AWAY FROM HOT ZONE] 
• [If hot zone is within a building, activate fire alarm and continuously repeat this 
message while casualties are evacuating the building] This is the… [State 
emergency service] Keep following the sound of my voice. Walk towards the 
tissue paper on the ground. 
 
• [If hot zone is in an outdoor location] This is the… [State emergency service] 
There is a toxic chemical leak in this area. Please follow me to a place of safety, 
away from the chemical.  
[CONTAINMENT] 
• This is the… [State emergency service]. Please listen to me [repeat if 
necessary].  




• Those with your hands up make sure those around you that can’t hear or 
understand follow my instructions. We are investigating a chemical leak. 
• For your safety you need to stay with us. 
• It is important you don’t leave until we say it is safe to do so. If you leave now, 
you could put yourself and anyone who comes into contact with you at risk. 
• We are working to make sure you receive the care that you need. A 
decontamination shower is on the way here. 
• Staying here and following our instructions is the best thing you can do right 
now to protect yourself and others. 
• Do not touch your face. Do not eat, drink, smoke, or use your phone. Keep your 
hands away from your face.  
 [IOR DISROBE AND DECONTAMINATION INSTRUCTIONS] 
• To stop the chemical going through your skin [pat arms] or into your lungs [pat 
chest area] you need to be decontaminated. Showering facilities are on the way 
and will be here in [estimated number of minutes until interim shower arrives]. 
• In the meantime, most of the chemical will be on your clothing. Follow my 
instructions carefully to remove the contaminated clothing from your skin. 
• Do not let the clothing touch your face. Tear or cut clothing away from the body 
instead of lifting it over your head [use actions]. 
• If you have to lift any clothing  over your head then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the clothing away from your face as you lift it [use 
actions] 
• Remove as much clothing as you can, down to your underwear. In [estimated 
number of minutes until disrobe packs arrive], we will provide you with clean 
gowns to wear to keep you warm and covered up. Leave your clothes and 
possessions on the ground. They will also be decontaminated. It’s more 
important to get you cleaned up. 
• Help anyone who requires assistance. 
• After removing the clothing, brushing your skin with clean, dry material is a safe 
and effective way to remove more of the chemical from your skin. The shower is 




• In the meantime, use the [available dry material] on the ground to brush your 
skin and absorb any chemical. Listen carefully to our instructions on how to 
brush from the top down. 
• Use a new piece of [available dry material] to brush each area of your body. Do 
not reuse any of the [available dry material]. Once you’ve used a piece, place it 
in one of the the yellow sacks on the ground. 
1. Brush your hands first. 
2. Use a new piece to brush your hair [use actions]. 
3. Blow your nose.  
4. Use a new piece to brush your face and neck [use actions]. Brush any 
chemical away from your eyes and mouth.  
5. Use a new piece to brush your left shoulder and arm and then repeat 
for your right shoulder and arm [use actions].  
6. Use a new piece to brush your chest, stomach and back [use 
actions].  
7. Use a new piece to brush your left leg and foot and then repeat for 
your right leg and foot [use actions].  
8. Help anyone who requires assistance by brushing their skin from the 
top down. 
[PRIOR TO INTERIM DECONTAMINATION SHOWER] 
• You will need to go through a shower to completely remove the chemical. We 
are setting up the shower now. Please stay where you are.  
 
 
Communicating from the control room 
 
1. Do you feel any pain right now, like a burning pain on your skin? [If Yes, skip to 




2. Does anyone around you look like they’re in pain? Are they coughing or being sick 
or are their eyes stinging? [If Yes, skip to Point 3; If No, skip to Point 4] 
3. It’s likely that you have been exposed to a harmful chemical.  
4. Help is on the way. 
• Listen to me. I’m going to give you some instructions. Please pass these on to 
people around you. 
• Move away from the area that you are now. Remain with anyone else who has 
been exposed and move at least 30 metres away. Move uphill if possible and 
move in the direction from which the wind is blowing. You should feel the wind 
in your face as you’re walking. 
• Then remain where you are and wait for emergency services to arrive. They will 
be bringing showering facilities so you can wash the chemical off your skin. 
• You must wait to be treated. If you leave, you could put yourself and others, 
including your friends and family, at risk. 
• You may feel fine now, but may still be affected.  
• In the meantime, if the chemical is on you, most of it will be on your clothing. 
Follow my instructions carefully to remove the contaminated clothing from your 
skin to stop the chemical going through your skin or into your lungs   
• Make sure the people around you copy what you do. Put me on speakerphone 
so you and I can both guide them through this.  
• Do not let the clothing touch your face. Tear or cut clothing away from the body 
instead of lifting it over your head. 
• If you have to lift any clothing  over your head then hold your breath, close your 
eyes and mouth, and hold the clothing away from your face as you lift it. 
• Remove as much clothing as you can, down to your underwear. When the 
showering facilities arrive, you will be provided with clean gowns to wear to 
keep you warm and covered up. Leave your clothes and possessions on the 
ground. They will also be decontaminated. It’s more important to get you 
cleaned up. 




• Actions for (a) no signs and symptoms [“No” to 1 and 2] and,  
• (b) where there are signs and symptoms [“Yes” to either 1 or 2] 
 
 [(a) IF CHEMICAL IS NON-CAUSTIC] 
• A shower is on its way to you. You have removed contaminated clothing from 
your skin. Right now, the best way to keep removing the chemical is to brush 
skin and hair with clean dry material. Can you see any dry material around you, 
like tissue paper? Does anyone around you have dry material?  
• [If they confirm that they have dry material, find out what they are using then 
refer to it for the following statements] 
• Follow my instructions carefully. Keep me on speakerphone and make sure 
everyone around you copies what you are doing. When you follow my 
instructions, use a new piece on each area of your body. Do not reuse any of 
the[material]. Once you’ve used a piece, leave it on the ground.  
• 1. Brush your hands first.  
• 2. Use a new piece to brush your hair. 
• 3. Blow your nose. 
• 4. Use a new piece to brush your face and neck. Brush any chemical away from 
your eyes and mouth.  
• 5. Use a new piece to brush your left shoulder and arm and then repeat for your 
right shoulder and arm.  
• 6. Use a new piece to brush your chest, stomach and back.  
• 7. Use a new piece to brush your left leg and foot and then repeat for your right 
leg and foot.  
• 8. Help anyone who requires assistance by brushing their skin from the top 
down. 
 




• You will need to go through a shower to completely remove the chemical. The 
shower is on its way. Please remain where you are. 
 
[(b) IF CHEMICAL IS CAUSTIC] 
• Is there any water around? Bottles of water or a tap? Find water. 
• Now pour water over your skin to flush away the chemical. 
• Pour as much water as you can over yourself, starting with your face. Tilt your 
head back if possible and pour as much water as you can over your face. Make 
sure you completely flush your eyes.  
• You will need to go through a shower to totally remove the chemical. A shower 
is on its way to you. 
• Help anyone who needs help. 
• Stay where you are until the shower gets there. Keep applying water. Apply as 















Appendix Z: Letter from stakeholder 
 
 
